INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATIONDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 6, 20212019005656 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/742,406 01/16/2013 Jing Xue Shen TW920120020US1 1084 103765 7590 01/06/2021 IBM Corp-Rochester Drafting Center 1701 North Street Building 256-3 Department SHCB Endicott, NY 13760 EXAMINER KLICOS, NICHOLAS GEORGE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2142 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/06/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): rocdrctr@us.ibm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte JING XUE SHEN ____________________ Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges. DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 seeks review of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original Specification, filed January 16, 2013; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action, mailed October 29, 2018; “Appeal Br.” for Appellant’s Appeal Brief, filed April 2, 2019; “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed May 14, 2019; and “Reply Br.” for Appellant’s Reply Brief, filed July 11, 2019. 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is International Business Machines Corp. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 2 BACKGROUND Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to “techniques for bringing attention to critical popup messages in a multi- window environment.” Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification explains that “[w]indows are typically displayed with equal priority and urgency,” and “a critical window may be obscured, or hidden, by one or more other windows.” Id. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, comprising: detecting a first popup message associated with a default desktop displayed on a computing system: determining that the first popup message conforms with user specified criteria, comprising: generating a first signature based upon the first popup message, wherein the first signature uniquely identifies the first popup message and any popup messages identical to the first popup message; and matching the first signature to a second signature, based upon a second popup message, that uniquely identifies the second popup message and any popup messages identical to the second popup message stored on a computer readable storage medium; and in response to the determining: generating a first emergency desktop; populating the first emergency desktop with the first popup message; and enabling a display of the first emergency desktop on the computing system in place of the default desktop. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (emphases added). Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 3 REJECTIONS R1. Claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, and 23 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Baer (US 2012/0258691 A1; published October 11, 2012), Kumar (US 9,235,641 B1; issued January 12, 2016), Buchanan (US 2008/0189721 A1; published August 7, 2008). Final Act. 5–9. R2. Claims 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Baer, Kumar, Buchanan, and Prykäri (US 2012/0112908 A1; published May 10, 2012). Final Act. 9–14. ANALYSIS We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, and 23 Claim 1 recites: “generating a first emergency desktop” and “enabling a display of the first emergency desktop on the computing system in place of the default desktop.” Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (referred to herein as the “disputed limitations”). Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 4 The Examiner found Buchanan discloses the disputed limitations. Final Act. 7 (citing Buchanan, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 46–48, 52); see id. at 2–4; see also Ans. 3–6. In Buchanan, a client device receives an emergency notification, which “causes an interruption” at the device. Buchanan ¶¶ 47–48. This interruption “causes the viewable desktop of the client device [] to be overshadowed” and “only the emergency notification [to be] presented on the viewable desktop.” Id. ¶¶ 48, 50; see id. ¶ 42 (explaining that the “overshadow” covers “the whole viewable desktop area of the client device”). Buchanan explains that programs on the device “continue to run unaffected in the background” (such that “no unsaved data is lost”), but the desktop is “render[ed] inoperable.” Id. ¶¶ 48, 52. Appellant argues that Buchanan does not teach or suggest the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 8–10. According to Appellant, “Buchanan is directed to the transmission and display of ‘emergency notifications,’” and “an emergency notification is merely a message rather than a ‘desktop.’” Id. at 8. Appellant contends that “overshadowing” and “rendering a desktop inoperable” fails to meet the claim’s requirement of “displaying a second, or emergency, desktop in place of the default desktop” because these concepts are “not synonymous” and “the default desktop continues to exist and is therefore not ‘replaced.’” Id. at 9. Moreover, Appellant contends that the term “desktop” has a particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art and “cannot be simply dismissed as a ‘display area.’” Id. at 10 (quoting definitions provided in two online dictionaries); see id. at 8 (arguing that a “‘desktop’ . . . is not ‘transmitted’ between devices”), 10 (arguing that a desktop is “something on which windows may be displayed rather than a window itself”). Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 5 In the Answer, the Examiner responds to each of Appellant’s arguments. Ans. 3–6. In particular, the Examiner notes that Appellant’s proposed meaning of the claim term “desktop” is belied by the Specification, which describes a “desktop” more generally as a “display area of a computer screen.” Ans. 6 (citing Spec. ¶ 20); see id. at 4 (citing Spec. ¶ 40). The Examiner also finds that, even under the narrower meaning of the term “desktop” that is advocated by Appellant, Buchanan teaches the disputed limitations. Ans. 5–6 (citing Buchanan ¶¶ 47, 50). Specifically, the Examiner finds that “Buchannan discloses replacing its default desktop with an inoperable image of a desktop together with a pop-up window providing an emergency notification.” Id. at 6. The Examiner explains: Buchanan discloses that when an emergency message is received by a device . . . , the current (default) desktop display is interrupted, a new desktop is created and populated for the emergency message, [and] the new desktop is displayed in place of the default desktop . . . . In other words, the emergency notification is not merely added to the default desktop, but rather, the default desktop is suspended (inoperable), a new and different structure is created with the emergency notification populated, and is displayed on the screen area where the current (default) desktop is displayed. Id. at 5 (citing Buchanan ¶¶ 47, 50). In addition, the Examiner states that, although the new desktop contains an image of the default desktop, it is not the default desktop itself: The [default] desktop is not still displayed. Rather, what is displayed is an inoperable image of the [default] desktop, together with an emergency notification. An inoperable image of a desktop is not a desktop per se. We can confirm this by looking at Appellants’ own definitions of “desktop” enumerated on page 10 of the Appeal Brief. All of Appellant’s definitions of “desktop” involve something that is interactive, e.g., in which various icons “can be moved, accessed, added to, put Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 6 away,” and “from which windows may be opened and programs run.” Id. at 5–6 (quoting Appeal Br. 10; citing Buchanan ¶ 50). In its Reply Brief, Appellant quotes an additional dictionary to support its understanding of the term “desktop” and argues that the term “typically covers an entire computer display.” Reply Br. 2. Appellant also asserts that “the cited elements of Buchanan are described as ‘presented on the viewable desktop’ rather than the desktop itself.” Id. at 3. But Appellant does not otherwise respond to the findings and explanation provided in the Answer. Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error. In the Answer, the Examiner directly and persuasively responds to Appellant’s arguments, and the Examiner clearly articulates and explains the relevant findings and conclusions. As a result, we adopt as our own the findings and conclusions provided by the Examiner. Ans. 3–6; see also Final Act. 2–4, 7. In particular, as the Examiner explained, the Specification indicates that the broadest reasonable construction3 of the term “desktop” in the context of claim 1 is a “display area.” Final Act. 2–3 (citing Spec. ¶ 20); see also Spec. ¶¶ 2 (referencing “a user’s display, or ‘desktop’”), 20 (“Provided is a ‘highlighting’ display area, or desktop, that is displayed only in 3 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 7 conjunction with urgent messages.”); 28 (“A ‘default’ desktop is a typical desktop used to display processes, applications and non-critical popups,” where “highlighting desktops” are “employed to display critical popups.”), 40 (explaining that the emergency desktop is created when an emergency pop-up is detected). Appellant neither disputes the Examiner’s citations to the Specification nor identifies an alternative passage suggesting a narrower meaning for this term. See Appeal Br. 8, 10; Reply Br. 2–3. Instead Appellant relies exclusively on dictionary definitions, which cannot contradict the meaning revealed by the Specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a dictionary cannot be used to “contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.”). Consequently, we conclude that Appellant’s arguments seeking to distinguish Buchanan are premised on an overly narrow construction of the term “desktop.” Moreover, even if we had been persuaded that the term “desktop” requires more than simply “a display area,” we would still not have been persuaded of error. As the Examiner clearly and persuasively explained, Buchanan teaches the disputed limitation even under Appellant’s interpretation of the term “desktop.”4 See Ans. 5–6. In particular, the 4 Although Appellant does not identify a specific construction of the term, Appellant argues that a desktop is the “primary display screen” that “typically covers an entire computer display” and “is not ‘transmitted’ between devices.” Appeal Br. 8, 10; Reply Br. 2. Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 8 Examiner finds that Buchanan creates an “new desktop . . . for the emergency message,” which includes an image of the default desktop, and displays this new desktop in place of the default desktop. Id. Appellant does not address these findings or the Examiner’s supporting rationale (see generally Reply Br.) and, consequently, fails to show error in them. As a result, we would have affirmed the Examiner’s rejection even if we had agreed with Appellant’s narrower interpretation of the claim term “desktop.” Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. Because Appellant argues independent claims 1, 8, 14, and 20 as a group (see Appeal Br. 8–10), claims 8, 14, and 20 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 17, 22, and 23 depend, directly or indirectly, from independent claim 1, 8, 14, or 20, and Appellant relies on the arguments made with respect to independent claim 1 for these claims. See Appeal Br. 11. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection independent claims 8, 14, and 20 and dependent claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 17, 22, and 23. Obviousness Rejection of Claims 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25 The Examiner rejects dependent claims 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25 over a combination of Baer, Kumar, Buchanan, and Prykäri. Final Act. 9–14. Each of these claims depends, directly or indirectly, from independent claim 1, 8, 14, or 20. Appeal 2019-005656 Application 13/742,406 9 For these claims, Appellant relies on the arguments made with respect to independent claim 1. Appeal Br. 12. These arguments, however, are not persuasive for the reasons discussed above. Consequently, Appellant’s arguments do not show error in the Examiner’s factual findings and the conclusion of obviousness of these dependent claims. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23 103 Baer, Kumar, Buchanan 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25 103 Baer, Kumar, Buchanan, Prykäri 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25 Overall Outcome 1–25 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation