INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 2, 2021

2020005755 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/656,286 03/12/2015 Chung-Sheng Li YOR920150054US1
(163-870)
2051
49267 7590 06/02/2021
Tutunjian & Bitetto, P.C.
401 Broadhollow Road
Suite 402
Melville, NY 11747
EXAMINER
DICKERSON, TIPHANY B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@tb-iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHUNG-SHENG LI and COLIN J. PARRIS
Appeal 2020-005755
Application 14/656,2861
Technology Center 3600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and 20. See Final Act. 1. Claims
16–19 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 27. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 The pending application is related to US Application No. 14/744,212, also
currently on appeal (see Appeal No. 2020-005744). See Appeal Br. 4.
2 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION. Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 14/656,286
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to creating sustainable innovation platforms.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for establishing a sustainable innovation platform in
a cloud computing environment including a network of
interconnected nodes communicating with a plurality of physical
devices equipped with map and navigation service capabilities,
the system comprising:
a memory;
at least one processor in communication with the memory;
an innovation services platform, in communication with
the network of interconnected nodes, including a set of
independent, map services, the innovation services platform
configured to employ the plurality of physical devices to:
identify, via the at least one processor, lifecycle stages of
innovation development for map services by using a lifecycle of
a map services domain employing geographical information
systems (GIS) data, the lifecycle stages of innovation
development for map services including inception, development,
deployment, continuous operation, enhancement, and renewal
stages;
select, via the at least one processor, initial map services
data to support eigenvector services providing coverage of a map
services innovation space; and
construct, via the at least one processor, test scenarios
from the initial map services data to generate new map services
to be transmitted back to the plurality of physical devices
equipped with map and navigation service capabilities;
an innovation community platform, in communication
with the network of interconnected nodes, including a set of
frameworks forming an innovation community and supporting
interaction between community data and community services;
a monitoring, data assimilation, and simulation platform,
in communication with the network of interconnected nodes,
performing service-related monitoring, monitoring-data model
assimilation and performing model-based, machine-executed,
what-if scenario simulation by collecting behavioral data;
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a service enhancement and service optimization platform,
in communication with the network of interconnected nodes,
identifying actual usage of the map services and determining
enhancements and optimizations to the map services exceeding
a predetermined threshold for actual usage, during each stage of
incremental deployment of the map services, based on the model-
based, machine-executed, what-if scenario simulation and
performing incremental innovation adjustments to the map
services based on evolving market demand by conducting in vivo
experimentation to establish causality among parameters
pertinent to innovation of the map services and to generate the
new map services based on the innovation adjustments to the
map services; and
a computing device for outputting the new map services
with the incremental innovation adjustments on a user interface
of one or more of the plurality of physical devices equipped with
map and navigation service capabilities.
Appeal Br. 23–24 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Barros US 8,965,957 B2 Feb. 24, 2015
Shroff et al. (“Shroff”) US 2013/0198050 A1 Aug. 1, 2013
Kibae Kim & Jörn Altmann, Evolution of the software-as-a-service
innovation system through collective intelligence, INT. J. COOP. INF.
SYST., 22 (2013) (“Kim”)
REJECTIONS3
Claims 1–15 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing
to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 4.

3 In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1–15 and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Ans. Final Act. 6.
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Claims 1–15 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Final Act. 7.
Claims 1–15 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination of Shroff, Barros, and Kim. Final Act. 9.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) – Written Description
The Examiner rejects claims 1–15 and 20 because there is insufficient
written description support for the claim limitation
identify, via the at least one processor, lifecycle stages of
innovation development for map services by using a lifecycle of
a map services domain employing geographical information
systems (GIS) data, the lifecycle stages of innovation
development for map services including inception,
development, deployment, continuous operation, enhancement,
and renewal stages,
as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds
there is no support for selecting initial map services data to
support eigenvector services providing coverage of a map
services innovation space, or construct test scenarios from the
initial map service data to generate new map services to be
transmitted back to the plurality of devices equipped with map
and navigation service capabilities.
Id. at 5. The Examiner further finds insufficient written description support
for the limitation
a service enhancement and service optimization platform,
in communication with the network of interconnected nodes,
identifying actual usage of the map services and determining
enhancements and optimizations to the map services exceeding
a predetermined threshold for actual usage, during each stage of
incremental deployment of the map services, based on the
model-based, machine-executed, what-if scenario simulation
and performing incremental innovation adjustments to the map
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services based on evolving market demand by conducting in
vivo experimentation to establish causality among parameters
pertinent to innovation of the map services and to generate the
new map services based on the innovation adjustments to the
map services,
as recited in claim 1. Id. at 5–6.
The Examiner finds the Specification does not describe the recited
functions with sufficient detail to demonstrate that the inventor had
possession of the invention at the time of filing and to enable those skilled in
the art to make and use the invention. The Examiner points out that “there is
no discussion of what specific elements perform these functions,” or of what
metrics related to actual usage are monitored and by what components. Id. at
6.
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s findings and asserts paragraphs
18–20 and 85–99 of the Specification describe how the innovation platforms
operate. Appeal Br. 14. In particular, Appellant argues paragraph 87
describes that a new set of services is identified through constructing test
scenarios from the seed services, that new seed services could be
decomposed and/or refactored from existing services, and that the set of
services become the Eigen-services when the set of services stabilized when
constructing new services. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant argues that test
scenarios are constructed by decomposing new seed services, which are
Eigen-services, described in paragraph 22 of the Specification. Id. at 13–14.
Appellant further argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would “fully
understand” that “map services” is a specific application that can be applied
to the 3-step process for the innovation services platform described in
paragraphs 86–88 of the Specification. Id. at 14.
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To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure must
reasonably convey to skilled artisans that Appellant possessed the claimed
invention as of the filing date. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Specifically, the description
must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the
inventor] invented what is claimed,” and
the test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the
specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill
in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe
an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that
the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
Based on our review of the Specification, we agree with the Examiner
that the Specification does not provide the requisite disclosure to convey to
the ordinarily skilled artisan that Appellant was in possession of the claimed
invention. The Specification does not describe an actual reduction to practice
of the invention claimed in claim 1, and the disclosure cited by Appellant is
not sufficiently detailed to provide evidence that the applicant was in
possession of the claimed invention. For example, Appellant relies on
paragraphs 86–88, which describe that the methodology to identify the base
innovation platform services for each new domain can include:
1. Use lifecycle (inception, development, deployment,
continuous operation, enhancement and renewal) of the
innovation domain to identify stages of the innovation
development.
2. Identify the representative services for each stage of the
lifecycle. These "representative" services are the "seed"
services (whether this is for map services, genomic sequencing,
translational medicine, syndromic surveillance, Internet of
Things, and so forth).
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3. New set of services are identified through constructing "test
scenarios" from these "seed" services. These new seed services
could be decomposed and/or refactored from existing services.
The set of services become the Eigen-services when the set of
services stabilized when constructing new services.
Spec. ¶¶ 86–88. The language in these paragraphs closely tracks the
functional language in the claim, without providing further details.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the claims define the invention
in functional language specifying a desired result, and the Specification does
not sufficiently describe how the function is performed or the result is
achieved. The Specification does not describe any algorithm or
steps/procedure taken to perform the functions with sufficient detail so that
one of ordinary skill in the art would understand how the inventor intended
the function to be performed. See MPEP §§ 2163.02 and 2181(IV). For
example, Appellant has not identified where the Specification describes how
lifecycle stages of innovation development for map services are identified;
how initial map services data to support eigenvector services providing
coverage of a map services innovation space are selected; and how service
enhancements and service optimizations are determined.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15 and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
Rejection of Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error. To the extent
Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular
claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
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§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues claims 1–15 and 20 as a group. Appeal
Br. 7. Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the
§ 101 rejection of claims 1–15 and 20 based on representative claim 1.
Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
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(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101.4, 5
Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites:

4 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). In response to received public
comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019,
clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO
personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to
follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at
1.
5 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates
this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev.
10.2019, rev. June 2020). All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth
Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise
indicated.
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).6
MPEP § 2106.04(a)) and § 2106.04(d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application,7 do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.8
MPEP § 2106.05(d).

6 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s); and (2) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether” the claim as
a whole “integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP
§ 2106.04(d)II.
7 This corresponds to Alice part one where it is determined whether the claim
is “directed to” an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. If a claim is “not
directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice framework, we do not
need to proceed to step two.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
8 This corresponds to Alice part two where it is determined whether the
claim contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
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Step 1
Claim 1, as a system claim, falls within the machine category of
§ 101. See MPEP §§ 2106.03, 2106.06.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determines that claim 1 recites mental processes. Final
Act. 7–8. The Examiner determines that the “identify,” “select,” and
“construct” limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretations, each
covers performance of the limitation in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer environment. Id.at 8.
Appellant argues claim 1 does not recite a mental process because
“the claims describe employing maps on map navigation devices (hardware)
and generating updated maps to be displayed (on display screens) on the
map navigation devices.” Appeal Br. 18.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. The 2019 Revised Guidance
explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in
their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic
computer component performs the acts. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(C);
see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented
steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from
being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in
MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea. We proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea
is integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole
would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea.
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Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
We next determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether
there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. In
claim 1, the additional elements include the limitations “a cloud computing
environment,” “a network of interconnected nodes,” “a plurality of physical
devices,” “a computing device,” “an innovation services platform,” “a set of
frameworks,” “an innovation community platform,” “a monitoring, data
assimilation, and simulation platform,” and “a service enhancement and
service optimization platform,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 8.
To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional
claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or
any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the
judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)).
The Examiner determined that none of the additional limitations is
sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The
Examiner determined the cloud computing environment and the plurality of
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physical devices with map capabilities to which the system is connected “are
recited at a high level of generality such that they amount to no more than
mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer
component.” Final Act. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 121–23). The Examiner further
determined that “[t]he monitoring, data assimilation, and simulation
platform recite functions of collecting and simulating, or iteratively
calculating data, which are not meaningful limitations. “ Id.
Appellant argues that “a practical application is a practical utility for
the invention” that “solves a problem and offers a benefit to a user.” Appeal
Br. 17. Appellant argues
the practical application or practical utility involves providing
new map services to a user. New map services refers to updated
map services. This solves the problem of having outdated
mapping information and benefits the user because the user has
the latest, new or updated mapping services available.
Id. Appellant notes, “[i]t appears that the meaning of the term ‘practical
application’ has been lost in the context of patent law.” Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because they do not address
the additional elements and overlook the guidance for integration into a
practical application set forth in the MPEP. See MPEP § 2106.05(a), (b), (c),
and (e).
Claim 1 as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the abstract
idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a tool to
perform the abstract idea. Here, the additional limitation(s) do not integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the
claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or
other technology or technical field; (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or
use the judicial exception; (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a
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different thing or state; or (iv) any other meaningful limitation. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a), (b), (c), (e). Rather, claim 1 recites an abstract idea as
identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). We look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the
claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims
eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573
U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements in claim 1
“amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a
generic computer component,” which “cannot provide an inventive
concept.” Final Act. 8–9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 121–23).
Appellant did not present arguments directed to Step 2B of the
eligibility analysis. See Appeal Br. 16–18. Thus, Appellant does not direct
our attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the computer
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components perform anything other than well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions.
Because the Specification describes the additional elements in general
terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations
may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer
components and techniques. See MPEP § 2106.07(a)(III)(D) (explaining that
a specification that describes additional elements in a manner that indicates
that the additional elements are so well-known that they do not need to be
described in detail to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) can show that the elements
are well understood, routine, and conventional); Spec. ¶¶ 121–23.
We conclude claim 1 does not have an inventive concept because the
claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along
with no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea
using the computer-based elements.
Because the claims are directed to a judicial exception, without
significantly more, we sustain the Examiner's § 101 rejection of independent
claim 1 and grouped claims 2–15 and 20, not argued separately with
particularity.
Rejection of Claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s finding that the combination of
Shroff, Barros, and Kim teaches or suggests the limitation
a service enhancement and service optimization platform,
in communication with the network of interconnected nodes,
identifying actual usage of the map services and determining
enhancements and optimizations to the map services
exceeding a predetermined threshold for actual usage,
during each stage of incremental deployment of the map
services,
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as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 19. In particular, Appellant argues Barros
does not teach “new map services,” and argues in a conclusory manner that
Barros does not teach the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 20 (citing Barros,
col. 19:19–29). Appellant further argues that Shroff paragraph 41 does not
“recite” “determining enhancements and optimizations to the map services
exceeding a predetermined threshold for actual usage” because the “usage”
of Shroff “is not equivalent to” “a predetermined threshold for actual usage.”
Id. Appellant also argues that “Kim does not cure the deficiencies of Shroff
and Barros,” and “Kim was merely relied on to disclose an innovation
platform where Google Maps is the use case.” Id.
The Examiner finds, in relevant part, that Barros teaches observing
customer usage of the system and to repurpose or create new services in
general. Ans. 6 (citing Barros, cols. 10:27–66; 17:2–9, 65; 18:40). The
Examiner finds Kim teaches an innovation platform that uses map services
(Google Maps). Ans. 7; Final Act. 4, 13; Kim, Introduction, Figs. 1 and 2,
Section 2.1. With regard to optimization when certain map services exceeds
a threshold for actual usage, the Examiner finds Shroff teaches service usage
context data is extracted (Shroff ¶ 41), and the metered consumption is
validated against one or more predefined quota allocations (Shroff ¶ 48), by
a specified departmental or project budget (Shroff ¶ 46). Ans. 7.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error because the
Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Shroff, Barros, and Kim to
teach the disputed limitation. See Ans. 6–7; Final Act. 9–13. Appellant,
however, attacks Shroff, Barros, and Kim individually. The test for
obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in
any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject matter
would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the
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combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981).
Here, Appellant did not persuasively address what the combined
teachings of Shroff, Barros, and Kim would have suggested to an artisan of
ordinary skill. Nor did Appellant address the teachings of Kim in sufficient
detail to rebut the Examiner’s finding that Kim teaches an innovation
platform that uses map services. See Ans. 7; Final Act. 4, 13.
For these reasons, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In addition, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 2–15 and 20, which were not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 18;
see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and 20 is affirmed.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15, 20 112(a) Written
Description
1–15, 20
1–15, 20 101 Eligibility 1–15, 20
1–15, 20 103 Shroff, Barros,
Kim
1–15, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–15, 20

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED