International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 13, 2021

2019005027 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 13, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/892,934 05/13/2013 Al Chakra RSW920130053US1 9104
75949 7590 04/13/2021
IBM CORPORATION
C/O: Fabian Vancott
215 South State Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
EXAMINER
BLACKWELL, JAMES H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2177
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/13/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents@fabianvancott.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte AL CHAKRA, JOHN A. FELLER,
TRUDY L. HEWITT, and FRANCESCO C. SCHEMBARI

Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934
Technology Center 2100

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
SCOTT BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed May
13, 2013 (“Spec.”), the Final Rejection mailed October 5, 2018 (“Final
Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed February 20, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer mailed May 1, 2019 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed
June 13, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”). Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

2
INVENTION
This invention generally relates to a link label provided in an
electronic message. Spec. ¶ 3, Abstract. The link label represents multiple
hyperlinks. Spec. ¶ 3, Abstract. One of the multiple hyperlinks is
designated as an active hyperlink based on criteria associated with a
recipient of the electronic message. Spec. ¶ 3, Abstract. The recipient is
directed to an online location of the active hyperlink in response to selecting
the link label. Spec. ¶ 3, Abstract. Criteria may be adjusted based on
solicited feedback from the recipient. Spec. ¶¶ 43, 62. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below.
1. A system for presenting a link label for multiple hyperlinks,
comprising:
a presenting engine to present a layered data element in
an electronic message, the layered data element comprising a
link label that represents multiple hyperlinks;
a designating engine to designate an active hyperlink
from said multiple hyperlinks based on a social networking
profile of a recipient of said electronic message;
a directing engine to direct said recipient of said
electronic message to an online location of said active
hyperlink in response to user input selecting said link label;
and
a learning mechanism to:
solicit feedback from the recipient regarding the active
hyperlink; and
adjust criteria associated with a recipient of the electronic
message and used by the designating engine to designate the
active hyperlink, the learning mechanism utilizing information
about the recipient's feedback regarding previously-selected
active hyperlinks and a situation in which the recipient is in.
Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

3

REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following references.
Name Reference Date
Feig US 6,182,140 B1 Jan. 30, 2001
Bates US 2003/0188263 A1 Oct. 2, 2003
Reisman US 7,062,561 B1 June 13, 2006
Maeng US 2008/0229218 A1 Sept. 18, 2008
Oldham US 8,150,979 B1 Apr. 3, 2012
Bharat US 2012/0095837 A1 Apr. 19, 2012

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–12, 15, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Feig, Bates, and Reisman. Final Act. 2–22.
Claims 17–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Feig, Maeng, Bates, and Reisman. Final Act. 23–29.
Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Feig, Bates, Reisman, Oldham. Final Act. 30.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Feig, Bates, Reisman, Bharat. Final Act. 31.

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Independent claim 1 recites “designate an active hyperlink from said
multiple hyperlinks based on a social networking profile . . . .” Appeal Br.
21 (Claims App.). The Examiner interprets the phrase “based on a social
networking profile” to mean based on information found in a social
networking profile. See Final Act. 3–5; see also Ans. 4–5. The Examiner
thus finds Bates’ use of local browser settings, such as a default language,
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

4
user skill level, or other interest, as criteria for selecting a target link from
multiple links, teaches designating “an active hyperlink from said multiple
hyperlinks based on a social networking profile.” Final Act. 5 (citing Bates
¶¶ 110–112); Ans. 4–5. The Examiner finds that the skilled artisan would
appreciate that at least some of Bates’ local browser settings would be found
in a social networking profile. Final Act. 5; Ans. 4–5.
Appellant argues that “a ‘social networking profile’ is a profile
obtained from the ‘social networking website’ described in Applicant’s
Specification at, for example, paragraph [0039].” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant
argues that because Bates is silent regarding a social network or any profile
of a social network, Bates does not teach obtaining a social networking
profile from a social networking website. Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 5.
We decline Appellant’s offer to import limitations from paragraph 39
of the Specification, because
it is the language itself of the claims which must particularly point out
and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention, without limitations imported from the specification. . . .
Limitations in the specification not included in the claim may not be
relied upon to impart patentability to an otherwise unpatentable claim.

In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 548 (CCPA 1957).
Claim 1 neither recites nor requires accessing a social networking website to
obtain a social networking profile. See Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.). In
addition, paragraph 39 of the Specification does not require a social
networking profile to be obtained from a social networking website. See
Spec. ¶ 39. Rather, paragraph 39 describes a scenario in which information
can be gleaned from a social networking profile when the claimed system is
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

5
part of a social networking website, and one member of the website is
sending a message to another member of the website.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s
argument that the claimed social networking profile must be a profile
obtained from a social networking website. Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant additionally argues that the Examiner erred in finding
Bates’ local browser settings could be found in a recipient’s social network
profile. Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 5; Final Act. 5. Appellant contends
that “no one would interpret a browser setting to be a profile element used
by a user on a social networking website.” Reply Br. 5.
Appellant does not proffer sufficient support for this contention. See
generally Reply Br. And we find no support for this contention in the claims
or in the Specification. Thus, we view Appellant’s contention as attorney
argument without supporting evidence. It is well settled that mere attorney
arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual
evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA
1974) (attorney argument is not evidence). Thus, Appellant’s contention
cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. See In re
Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139–40 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Moreover, in contrast to Appellant’s contention that “no one would
interpret a browser setting to be a profile element used by a user on a social
networking website,” Oldham’s teachings corroborate the Examiner’s
finding that the skilled artisan would appreciate that at least some of Bates’
local browser settings would be found in a social networking profile. Reply
Br. 5; Final Act. 5; Ans. 4–5; Oldham 13:26–43. The Examiner finds
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

6
“Oldham describes selection of a ‘location identifier’ (link) from amongst a
number of possible links based on a ‘determined value’; the ‘determined
value(s)’ are various ‘attributes’ associated with a user.” Final Act. 30
(emphasis omitted) (citing Oldham 1:61–67, 2:36–43; 3:20–24). Notably,
Oldham teaches that these attributes may be obtained from the user’s social
network profile. Oldham 13:26–37. More specifically, Oldham discloses
that one of the browser settings disclosed in Bates, i.e., user interests, is
included in a user’s social network profile. Oldham 13:36–37. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s contention that “no
one would interpret a browser setting to be a profile element used by a user
on a social networking website.” Reply Br. 5.
Claim 1 additionally recites “solicit feedback from the recipient
regarding the active hyperlink; and . . . utilizing information about the
recipient’s feedback regarding previously-selected active hyperlinks . . . .”
Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds Reisman’s use of feedback about the
appropriateness of a selected URL (e.g., link, hyperlink) to improve future
selection of URLs, teaches this limitation. Final Act. 7 (citing Reisman Fig.
5, 18:12–19:6); Ans. 5–6 (citing Reisman 6:18–34). Appellant responds by
characterizing Reisman’s teachings. Appellant states that Reisman “merely
describes redirection of a user to a feedback page when a link is selected.”
Appeal Br. 12. Appellant further states “Reisman merely describes a user’s
selection of a ‘link on a list of possibles’ much like a list of hyperlinks to
different websites are presented to a user in an internet search result list.”
Id. at 13. Finally, Appellant states that “the feedback is merely feedback
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

7
regarding if what the user selected among the ‘list of possibles’ was what the
user expected.” Id.
Appellant’s statements about the teachings of Reisman do not reveal
error in the Examiner’s specific findings, and thus do not persuade us of
error. In fact, rather than revealing error in the Examiner’s findings,
Appellant’s statements regarding the nature of Reisman’s feedback actually
support the Examiner’s findings that Reisman teaches soliciting feedback
from a recipient, as required by claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13; Final Act. 7;
Ans. 5–6.
Claim 1 further recites a “learning mechanism to . . . adjust criteria
associated with a recipient of the electronic message . . ., the learning
mechanism utilizing information about the recipient’s feedback regarding
previously-selected active hyperlinks and a situation in which the recipient is
in.” Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).
Appellant argues that “nowhere [in Reisman] is there any suggestion
of ‘criteria associated with a recipient.’” Reply Br. 6. Appellant further
argues “Reisman makes no mention of recipient-specific criteria.” Id.
Appellant’s arguments do not address the Examiner’s specific
findings. The Examiner finds Reisman teaches soliciting feedback about a
URL selected by a user, “where the selected URL is provided as the result of
a search query, where the user desired to find information on a particular
topic, for example, but did not know any exact sites for the information.”
Ans. 6. The Examiner finds that “the ‘situation in which the recipient is in’
may be interpreted as the desire for the user to locate information which is
driven by their selection and entry of search terms.” Ans. 6. The Examiner
finds that Reisman’s system provides one or more results that are selected, at
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

8
least in part, on previous feedback provided by the user, as well as other
users, and the user’s selection of which terms to provide (e.g., the accuracy).
Id. Appellant’s argument, that “Reisman makes no mention of recipient-
specific criteria,” does not reveal error in the Examiner’s finding that the
situation in which the recipient is in may be interpreted as the desire for the
user to locate information, which is driven by the recipient’s selection and
entry of search terms. Reply Br. 6; Ans. 6.
With respect to claims 2–20, Appellant’s arguments present us with
the same dispositive issues as independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 16–19.
Therefore, the rejections of these claims turns on our decision as to the
rejection of claim 1.
For all the reasons stated supra, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 1–20.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
is affirmed.
Appeal 2019-005027
Application 13/892,934

9
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–12, 15,
16
103 Feig, Bates,
Reisman
1–12, 15, 16
13 103 Feig, Bates,
Reisman,
Oldham
13
14 103 Feig, Bates,
Reisman,
Bharat
14
17–20 Feig, Maeng,
Bates,
Reisman
17–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED