International Business Machines CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 15, 20202020000128 (P.T.A.B. May. 15, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/799,082 07/14/2015 Akram Bou-Ghannam AUS920150141US1 2093 58919 7590 05/15/2020 TERRILE, CANNATTI & CHAMBERS, LLP - IBM SV PO BOX 203518 AUSTIN, TX 78720 EXAMINER CHEN, WENREN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/15/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@dockettrak.com tmunoz@tcciplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte AKRAM BOU-GHANNAM, KALMAN GYIMESI, and JENNY S. LI Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 Technology Center 3600 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, LARRY J. HUME, and CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7–18, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 1–6. Appeal Br. 9. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the assignee, International Business Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to a system and method for dynamic discovery and enhancements of diagnostic rules. See Spec. ¶ 1. Exemplary Claim Claim 7, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal (italics added to contested prior-art limitations; underlining added to contested limitations pertaining to written description Rejection R1 and indefiniteness Rejection R2): 7. A system comprising: a processor; a data bus coupled to the processor; and a non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium embodying computer program code for performing a complex asset analysis operation within a complex asset analysis environment, the complex asset analysis environment comprising a plurality of crowd sourced complex assets and a complex asset analysis system, the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets and the complex asset analysis system communicating via a network, the non-transitory, computer- readable storage medium being coupled to the data bus, the computer program code interacting with a plurality of computer operations and comprising instructions executable by the processor and configured for: 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Br.,” filed June 17, 2019); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 18, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 14, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed July 14, 2015). Appellant did not file a Reply Brief in response to the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Examiner’s Answer. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 3 receiving crowdsourced data from the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets via the network, each of the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets comprising a respective motor vehicle, each of the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets comprising a respective data collection agent, the respective data collection agent providing respective data to the complex asset analysis system, the crowdsourced data being received via a crowdsourcing operation, the crowdsourcing operation comprising obtaining the crowdsourced data by soliciting contributions from a group of complex assets, the crowdsourced data corresponding to a common information model, the crowdsourced data specifying a configuration of a complex asset of the plurality of crowdsourced complex assets, a snap shot of asset performance parameters during problems of the complex asset and associated maintenance and repair experience of the complex asset; aggregating the crowdsourced data received from the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets via the complex asset analysis system; and, performing the complex asset analysis operation based upon the crowdsourced data received from the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets, the complex asset analysis operation providing an information brokerage function for a community of complex assets by managing shared information from the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets; and, controlling at least one complex asset to control operator actions based upon individual complex asset data and crowdsourced data relating to a particular type of complex asset. 9. The system of claim 7, wherein: each of the plurality of complex assets register respective complex asset data and subscribe for content notifications based on a type and configuration of the complex asset. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 4 Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: McClellan et al. (“McClellan”) US 2008/0294690 A1 Nov. 27, 2008 Koch US 2014/0277902 A1 Sept. 18, 2014 Rejections on Appeal3 R1. Claims 7–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking written description support. Final Act. 3. R2. Claims 7–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention. Final Act. 6. R3. Claims 7, 8, and 10–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Koch. Final Act. 7. R4. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Koch and McClellan. Final Act. 15. CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellant’s arguments (Br. 3–8) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of written description and indefiniteness Rejections R1 and R2 of claims 7–18 on the basis of representative claim 7; and we decide the appeal of anticipation Rejection 3 We note the Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 7–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 2. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 5 R3 of claims 7, 8, and 10–18 on the basis of representative claim 7. We address separately argued obviousness Rejection R4 of claim 9, infra.4 ISSUES AND ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We agree with particular arguments advanced by Appellant with respect to written description Rejection R1 and indefiniteness Rejection R2 of claims 7–18, and we do not sustain the rejections, as discussed below. However, we disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to anticipation Rejection R3 of claims 7, 8, and 10–18 and obviousness Rejection R4 of claim 9 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 7 and 9 for emphasis as follows. 4 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 6 1. § 112(a) Written Description Rejection R1 of Claims 7–18 Issue 1 Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 3–5) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking written description support is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the originally filed disclosure fails to provide adequate written description support for the limitation of “controlling at least one complex asset to control operator actions based upon individual complex asset data and crowdsourced data relating to a particular type of complex asset,” as recited in independent claim 7? Principles of Law The test for compliance with the written description requirement is “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id.; see also PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 112, first paragraph (now § 112(a)), “requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element”); cf. U.S. v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 7 disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). Analysis The Examiner finds the Specification “fails to disclose with enough specificity, the . . . limitations [of] ‘controlling at least one complex asset to control operator actions based upon individual complex asset data and crowdsourced complex asset data relating to a particular type of complex asset.’ However, the Specification does not describe how that is performed.” Final Act. 3. We disagree with the Examiner because, as argued by Appellant, the contested limitation “is at least impliedly [disclosed] by the present application as it was originally filed and art to which the claimed invention belongs is mature and the predictable nature of the art mandates a generally lower showing of possession.” Br. 4. Appellant cites to paragraphs 57, 58– 66, and Figures 3 and 6 of the Specification as providing adequate description of the contested “controlling” limitation. Id. We note in particular, the disclosure in paragraph 57 that states, in pertinent part: [T]he master complex asset analysis system 322 [is enabled] to generate unique models which can predict and diagnose machine failures as well as encourage adjustment of operator actions that optimize asset usage. In various embodiments, the operator actions can include driving conditions, speeding, abrupt braking, etc. Also, in certain embodiments, the complex asset analysis system 301 can provide certain controls over the complex asset to adjust the operator actions. For example, the complex asset analysis system 301 might have the ability to control acceleration and/or top speed of a vehicle under certain conditions to increase the operating efficiency of the complex asset. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 8 Spec. 57 (cited with emphasis in Br. 4–5). In agreement with Appellant, we find the originally-filed disclosure adequately supports the contested “controlling” limitation of claim 7, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s Rejection R1 of claims 7–18. 2. § 112(b) Indefiniteness Rejection R2 of Claims 7–18 Issue 2 Appellant argues (Br. 3–5) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in concluding the phrases “individual complex asset data” and “crowdsourced data relating to a particular type of complex asset” are indefinite under § 112(b) in the context of independent claim 7? Principles of Law We apply the indefiniteness test approved by In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam): “A claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear,” and “claims are required to be cast in clear–as opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite–terms.” See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1310, 1313; Ex parte McAward, Appeal No. 2015- 006416 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) at *8–11 (explaining because of different approaches to indefiniteness before the PTAB and the courts, the PTAB continues to follow Packard after the Supreme Court’s Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014) decision). [W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 9 describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b). Packard, 751 F.3d at 1311. Further, we give pending claims “their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” and “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Analysis In rejecting the claims for indefiniteness, the Examiner concludes “[i]t is unclear whether if ‘individual complex asset data’ and ‘crowdsourced data relating to a particular type of complex asset’ are the same as the ‘receiv[ed] crowdsourced data from the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets’ of the first limitation or new/different set of data (‘individual complex asset data’ and ‘crowdsourced data relating to a particular type of complex asset’).” Final Act. 6. Appellant responds by contending: These terms refer to different data. This difference can specifically be seen in the element “controlling at least one complex asset to control operator actions based upon individual complex asset data and crowdsourced data relating to a particular type of complex asset” (emphasis added). Specifically, the term “individual complex asset data” is discussed at Paragraph [0057] of the application as filed and the term “crowdsourced data” is discussed at Paragraph [0052] of the application as filed. Br. 6 (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 10 We agree with Appellant that the recited terms refer to different data, and further note the contested terms represent the first instance or recitation of these specific limitations in claim 7. We further determine that the Examiner has not shown the meaning of the claims are unclear to one skilled in the art. See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1310. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s Rejection R2 of claims 7–19 for indefiniteness. 3. § 102(a)(1) or § 102(a)(2) Rejection R3 of Claims 7, 8, and 10–18 Issue 3 Appellant argues (Br. 6–7) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) or § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Koch is in error. These contentions present us with the following issues: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses a system that includes a processor executing instructions configured for, inter alia: [a] receiving crowdsourced data from the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets via the network, each of the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets comprising a respective motor vehicle, each of the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets comprising a respective data collection agent, the respective data collection agent providing respective data to the complex asset analysis system, wherein [b] the crowdsourced data corresponding to a common information model, the crowdsourced data specifying a configuration of a complex asset of the plurality of crowdsourced complex assets, a snap shot of asset performance parameters during problems of the complex asset and associated maintenance and repair experience of the complex asset, Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 11 as recited in claim 7? Principles of Law Anticipation of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102 occurs when each claimed element and the claimed arrangement or combination of those elements is disclosed, inherently or expressly, by a single prior art reference. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A reference inherently discloses an element of a claim “if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Analysis The Examiner provides a detailed mapping of the contested limitations [a] and [b] above to the Koch reference. See Final Act. 9–10 (citing Koch at multiple paragraphs, and Figs. 1 and 5). With respect to limitation [a], Appellant contends “the [E]xaminer cites to a portion of Koch which discloses three crowdsourcing modules (a community diagnostics module 132, a community road health module 134 and a community driver health module 136) (see e.g., Koch, Figure 1 and Paragraph [0021]) as well as a portion of Koch which discloses that in- vehicle devices can report information to a vehicle management system 110 (see e.g., Paragraph [0022]).” Br. 6. Appellant generally argues, without specific analysis, “the claimed respective data collection agents which provide respective data to the complex asset analysis system are patentably distinct from the in-vehicle devices disclosed by Koch.” Id. Appellant then Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 12 concludes Koch doesn’t disclose contested limitation [a]. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s allegation. We are not persuaded because mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7–8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd09004693.pdf. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). Arguments not made are therefore waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Similarly, with respect to limitation [b], Appellant contends: [T]he examiner cites to portions of Koch which disclose collecting summarizing characteristics of fleet applications as a list where variables are annotated in time (see e.g., Koch, Paragraph [0085]). However, it is respectfully submitted that crowdsourced data which corresponds to a common information model and which specifies a configuration of a complex asset of the plurality of crowd sourced complex assets, a snap shot of asset performance parameters during problems of the complex asset and associated maintenance and repair experience of the complex asset is are patentably distinct from the list of summarizing characteristics disclosed by Koch. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 13 Br. 7. Again, we disagree with Appellant’s contentions, which amount to a general allegation that the cited prior art does not disclose the disputed limitation [b]. See Br. 7 (“Accordingly, nowhere within Koch, taken alone or in combination, is there any disclosure or suggestion of [limitation [b]]”). The Examiner makes further findings in the Answer (6–9) which Appellant does not rebut by filing a Reply Brief. Therefore, based upon the unrebutted findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 7, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting finding of anticipation. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 7, and grouped claims 8 and 10–18 that fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. 4. § 103 Rejection R4 of Claim 9 Issue 4 Appellant argues (Br. 7–8) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Koch and McClellan is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests the system of claim 7, wherein “each of the plurality of complex assets register respective complex asset data and subscribe for content notifications based on a type and configuration of the complex asset,” as recited in claim 9? Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 14 Analysis The Examiner cites McClellan at paragraphs 92 through 99 as teaching or suggesting plural recited vehicle (complex asset) registrations. Final Act. 16. Appellant appears to admit that McClellan discloses automated registration of a vehicle and a driver performance database. Br. 8 (citing McClellan ¶¶ 57 and 97). Appellant argues “[h]owever, nowhere within the cited portions of McClellan (nor anywhere else in McClellan) is there any disclosure or suggestion of each of the plurality of complex assets register respective complex asset data, much less subscribing for content notifications based on a type and configuration of the complex asset, as required by claim 9.” Br. 9 (emphasis omitted). In the Answer, the Examiner further explains the rejection with respect to the disclosure of McClellan, and cites “para[graphs] [0017], [0046], [0048], [0066], [0072] [for] disclos[ing] transmitting of subscribed notification based on driver performance which comprising vehicle type and monitored configuration (i.e. speed, acceleration, impact, accident).” Ans. 10. Again, Appellant does not rebut the Examiner’s additional findings by filing a Reply Brief. Therefore, based upon the unrebutted findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 9, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting conclusion of obviousness. Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 15 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection R4 of dependent claim 9. CONCLUSIONS (1) The Examiner erred with respect to written description Rejection R1 of claims 7–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), and we do not sustain the rejection. (2) The Examiner erred with respect to indefiniteness Rejection R2 of claims 7–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), and we do not sustain the rejection. (3) The Examiner did not err with respect to anticipation Rejection R3 of claims 7, 8, and 10–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) or § 102(a)(2), and we sustain the rejection. (4) The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejection R4 of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection. Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). Appeal 2020-000128 Application 14/799,082 16 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis / References Affirmed Reversed 7–18 112(a) Written Description 7–18 7–18 112(b) Indefiniteness 7–18 7, 8, 10–18 102(a)(1) or 102(a)(2) Koch 7, 8, 10–18 9 103 Koch, McClellan 9 Overall Outcome 7–18 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation