International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1504

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 14, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 580 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

580 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, Local Union 1504 (Western Electric
Company, Inc.) and Betty Summerlot. Case
25-CB-1818
June 14, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On March 29, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
John F. Corbley issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,I and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent , International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local
Union 1504 , Indianapolis , Indiana, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order.
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C.A 3) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN F. CORBLEY, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
was held in this case on February 19, 1974, at Indianapolis,
Indiana, pursuant to a charge filed by Betty Summerlot, an
individual (sometimes referred to herein as Summerlot or
the Charging Party) on October 23, 1973, which charge was
Upon the unopposed motion of counsel for the General Counsel the
transcript of this proceeding is hereby corrected in certain particulars
served on International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, Local Union 1504 (sometimes referred to
herein as Respondent or the Union ) by registered mail on
or about the same day and pursuant to a complaint and
notice of hearing issued by the Regional Director for
Region 25 of the National Labor Relations Board on
December 28, 1973 , which was also duly served on
Respondent . The complaint alleges that the Respondent,
through its officers and agents , threatened to, and did,
cause the Employer, Western Electric Company, Inc., to
refuse the Charging Party's request for a transfer and
threatened to, and did , refuse to process the grievance of
the Charging Party regarding shift assignment , in each
instance because the Charging Party was not a member of
Respondent . By those acts , the complaint further alleges,
Respondent violated , variously, Section 8 (b)(1)(A) and (2)
of the Act . In its answer, which was also duly filed,
Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices.
For reasons which will appear hereinafter , I find and
conclude that Respondent refused to represent the Charg-
ing Party in her efforts to obtain ajob transfer because she
was not a member of the Respondent , and that Respon-
dent thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I will
further find that Respondent did not violate Section 2(b)(2)
of the Act , as alleged in the complaint.
At the hearing , the General Counsel and Respondent
were represented by counsel . All parties were given full
opportunity to examine and cross -examine witnesses, to
introduce evidence, and to file briefs . The General Counsel
and Respondent waived oral argument at the conclusion of
the hearing . Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel
and Respondent and have been duly considered.
Upon the entire records in the case , including the briefs
and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Employer, Western Electric Company, Inc., is and
has been, at all times herein, a corporation duly organized
under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of
Indiana.
At all times material herein, the Employer has main-
tained its principal office and place of business at
Indianapolis, Indiana, sometimes referred to herein as the
plant, and various other facilities throughout the United
States, and is, and has been at all times material herein,
engaged at said plant in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of telephone equipment and related products.
During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the
complaint, a representative period, the Employer in the
course and conduct of its business operations manufac-
tured, sold, and distributed at said plant products valued in
excess of $50,000 which were shipped from said plant
directly to States other than the State of Indiana.
211 NLRB No. 76
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1504
During this same 12-month period the Employer, in the
course and conduct of its business operations , purchased,
transferred, and delivered to its said plant goods and
materials valued in excess of $50 ,000 which were transport-
ed to said plant directly from States other than the State of
Indiana.
The complaint alleges , the parties stipulated , and I find
that the Employer is, and has been at all times material
herein , an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
II. RESPONDENT, THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
INVOLVED; ITS AGENTS
The complaint alleges , the parties stipulated , and I find
that the Respondent , International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers , AFL-CIO, Local Union 1504, is , and has
been at all times material herein , a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
The complaint further alleges , the parties stipulated, and
I find that the following named persons occupied the
positions set opposite their respective names , and have
been and are agents of the Respondent acting on its behalf,
and are agents within the meaning of Section 2 ( 13) of the
Act: Grace Teague , executive board member , Dean Girt,
executive board member, James M. Kent, president, and
Betty L. Graves, executive board member.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Sequence of Events
A collective-bargaining agreement exists, and has existed
at all times material herein, between the Respondent and
the Employer, wherein the Employer recognizes Respon-
dent , pursuant to a certification of the National Labor
Relations Board, as the exclusive bargaining representative
of all hourly rated nonsupervisory production and mainte-
nance employees of the plant. This. agreement permits
employees to resign their union membership; hence union
membership is not made a condition of employment.
The Charging Party was employed in the foregoing
production and maintenance unit at all times material
herein and has been employed by the Employer about 20
years. The Charging Party was a member of the Respon-
dent but resigned her membership about 1962. The
Charging Party was not a union member at any time
material herein.
This case deals with the Charging Party's efforts,
beginning about May 1973, to obtain work less physically
strenuous and on a different shift from that on which she
was employed in May 1973. Her employment at that time
was on the day shift (7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) in Department
#441 where she had worked for about 9 years. The
Charging Party was suffering from back pain at that time
2 The finding as to this date is based on the testimony of Teague who
seemed more positive of it than either Chandley or Summerlot . The official
date of the reassignment , September 9, 1973, was agreed to between
Respondent and the Employer, although it is not disputed that there was a
question as to its accuracy.
3 At this time the Charging Party was admittedly laboring under the false
impression that, if she could remain in #444 for 31 days, she could claim
that position as a permanent assignment . However, a section of the
581
and subsequent to the events in question-or following the
Thanksgiving Holiday in November 1973-she has had
back surgery. She was recuperating from this operation at
the time of the hearing.
In late May 1973, the Charging Party, Summerlot, spoke
to Frank Chandley, the department chief of departments
nos. 441 , 444, and 1221 . Summerlot requested Chandley to
have her reassigned from the day shift to the midnight shift
(11 p.m. to 7 a .m.) or to a different department. She
explained to him that her work at that time on conveyors
was, she thought, hurting her back and she felt that if she
could be assigned on a different shift in her department or
to another department her chances of obtaining bench
work-which would be less trying on her back-would be
enhanced . Also she said such a change would leave her free
to take back treatments during the day. Chandley advised
Summerlot that department #441 had no midnight shift
but that department #444, also under his supervision, did.
Chandley said that he would look around to see if there
was anything available to which Summerlot could be
transferred.
During the course of the summer of 1973 Summerlot
reminded Chandley of her request for reassignment on a
number of occasions and Chandley replied that he was
working on it.
Sometime in late August 1973, a need arose for
immediate augmentation of the work force in department
# 444 and Chandley asked Summerlot if the latter was still
desirous of transferring. She said that she was and he
informed her that he would like her to work in department
#444 for 6 to 8 weeks because the Employer was in need
of parts from that department . Summerlot replied that she
would give Chandley an answer the following day.
The following day the Charging Party agreed to accept
this reassignment to the midnight shift in department
#444 and she began work there on or about the Labor
Day weekend (i.e., about September 1, 1973).2 The basis of
her reassignment was temporary and was considered a
"loan" under the collective-bargaining arrangements in
effect between Respondent and the Employer at that time.
Under section 3 of the contract such loans are not to
exceed 4 weeks.
A week or two after the Charging Party went to work in
#444, Martha Harmon , a union member, spoke to Grace
Teague, a union executive board member , and informed
Teague that the Charging Party had been telling other
employees that when she, the Charging Party, "got her time
in," she was going to "bump" from the midnight shift to
the day shift in department #444.3 Since Harmon was the
lowest seniority employee on the day shift in #444 she was
the employee who would have been "bumped ." 4 About
this same time Sandra Lowe Bright, for whom the
Respondent was seeking a shift change from the day shift
to midnight shift in department #444, called Teague's
collective-bargaining agreement between the Company and Respondent
which had provided this right had been eliminated therefrom before the
events in question here. Further, the Charging Party admitted stating to
Coordinator John Davis, at about this time that she wanted her "card"
moved to #444 permanently since she had 30 days' service there.
4 By "bumping," a longer service employee can displace one with lesser
service.
582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
attention to the fact that the Charging Party-who had
come from department #444-was then working on the
third shift in department #444.
Teague then spoke to Section Chief Karasinski about the
matter . Karasinski referred Teague to Chandley. Chandley
told Teague that the Charging Party was only on loan for
30 days. Chandley further told Teague, however, that he
would like. to retain the Charging Party in department
#444. To this Teague objected pointing out that there
were employees with longer service than the Charging
Party who desired a shift change.5
Teague subsequently spoke to Gramlin, Chandley's
superior , who advised Teague to let the matter go, for he,
Gramlin, would not let the Charging Party "bump"
anyone. The conversation between Teague and Gramlin
took place a week or two after Teague's conversation with
Chandley because Teague was unable to reach Gramlin
sooner.
Teague also spoke to Kent, the Respondent's president,
about the matter in early October 1973 but Kent told
Teague not to bother with it because, said Kent, since the
Charging Party was only on loan in #444, she would be
unable to "bump" anyone in #444. Kent said if the
Charging Party desired to "bump" this would have to be
done by the Charging Party in the latter's own department
(#441, from which Summerlot was on loan).
In the meantime , by late September 1973, several other
employees were assigned from department #441 to #444
and this came to the Charging Party's attention . She then
called Chandley to inquire about her own situation.
Chandley told her he was working on a permanent transfer
for her but that she would stay in #444 until he told her to
go back.
In early October 1973, shortly before October 7, 1973,
Chandley was again approached by Grace Teague and also
by Respondent's chief steward, J. C. Howard, who
inquired what Chandley was going to do in connection
with the Charging Party's status in department #444.
Chandley told these union officials that he proposed to
return the Charging Party to #441 since her 30 day "loan"
period, which began officially on September 9, 1973, was
due to expire . He further told them, however, that after 1
day in #441, he was going to reassign the Charging Party
back to #444 for another 30 day "loan." Chandley also
informed these Respondent officials that he would like to
transfer the Charging Party to #444 permanently. They
objected to this procedure, however, stating that it was in
violation of the contract. Grace Teague also repeated that
there were other people with longer service than the
Charging Party who desired a shift change. In this same
conversation the union officials also mentioned to Chand-
ley that the Charging Party was not a union members
On or about October 7, 1973, Chandley assigned the
S Teague testified she objected because the contract permitted transfers
of only 30 days duration (as I will find infra, I conclude that Teague was
speaking of a separate conversation with Chandley). Chandley, however,
testified as I have found, supra. I credit Chandley because his version is
more consistent with the course of action taken by Teague particularly after
speaking to Lowe , who, of course , already worked in #444 and, as will
appear , thus had a greater claim that the Charging Party to work on that
department 's third shift.
6 The findings as to this conversation are based on the credible testimony
of Chandley in this regard and were not essentially disputed by the
Charging Party back to #441 for 1 day, as he had told the
Union officials he would do. Then on the following day he
reassigned her to #444 for another 30-day loan period.
After the Charging Party returned to #444 the second
time, Chandley spoke to Hooker, the Employer's section
chief of labor relations, and asked Hooker if an informal
agreement could be arranged whereby Summerlot could be
transferred permanently to the third shift in #444. Hooker
told Chandley he would get back to Chandley on the
matter.
By this time the Charging Party had learned that the
employees who moved from #441 to #444 in late
September 1973 had been transferred to #444 permanent-
ly. It should be mentioned, at this juncture, however, that
the instant transfers were of short-service employees who
had been declared "surplus" in #441. Under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between Respondent and the
Employer "surplus" employees have first call on job
vacancies.? The Charging Party, with around 21 years'
service , was of about middle seniority in #441 (which then
had a complement of about 140 employees). With her
middle seniority, the Charging Party had not been declared
"surplus" in #441.8
In any event, after learning that these employees had
obtained permanent transfers to #444, the Charging Party
about mid-October 1973 called Chandley and complained
to him, telling the latter that she thought she should receive
the permanent transfer because she was already on the job
and knew how to do the work. Chandley then told the
Charging Party that the Respondent had made an
"informal grievance" about Chandley's assignment of the
Charging Party to #444. Chandley continued, however,
that the Charging Party would remain in #444 on a loan
basis as long as she was needed and that he, Chandley,
would continue to seek a permanent transfer for the
Charging Party to #444.
Upon hearing that the Respondent had become involved
in the transfer matter, the Charging Party put in a
telephone call to Kent, the union president. She did not
reach Kent on this occasion but left a message to return
her call. Kent then referred the call to Dean Girt, a
Respondent executive board member and an admitted
agent of Respondent, who telephoned the Charging Party.
Girt did not previously know the Charging Party.
In this telephone conversation the Charging Party began
by telling Girt of her efforts to obtain a transfer. There is a
sharp conflict however in the testimony as to what was said
in the remainder of this conversation. Based on my
resolution of credibility, I conclude that Girt told the
Charging Party that there was no way she could be moved
from one department to another. In response to the.
Charging Party's repeated assertions that if she were a
testimony of Teague . While Teague testified that she only spoke to
Chandley once about the Summerlot matter I credit Chandley's recollection
over that of Teague . Teague's recollection that she told Chandley that a
permanent transfer would violate the contract jibes with Chandley's
recollection of what was said in this second conversation by the Union
officials to Chandley. Howard did not testify.
° See art. 28, Secs . 2 and 3 ofthat agreement (G.C. Exh. 3).
8 Only about 14 employees were transferred at this time to #444. All
were surplus in #441 or other departments at the plant.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS , LOCAL 1504 583
union member , Respondent would help her , Girt told
Summerlot that this had nothing to do with the matter .9
''ife'Charging'PArty then' telephoned Chandley to advise
him what Respondent had told her. In this conversation
Chandley told the Charging Party that Grace Teague was
one of the union officials who had spoken to him about the
Charging Party's presence in department #444.10 Teague
and the Charging Party already knew each other.
The Charging Party then telephoned Teague that same
day but was unable to reach Teague. The Charging Party
did, however, reach Teague the following day. The
Charging Party's husband , Don Summerlot, listened in on
the conversation.
The Charging Party informed Teague that she had heard
Teague was the union official opposing the Charging
Party's transfer, which Teague admitted. Teague also told
the Charging Party that Respondent would not represent
her or get her the transfer because the Charging Party was
not a union member and did not pay union dues. The
Charging Party then threatened to take the matter to the
Labor Board. To this Teague responded that maybe the
Board would make Respondent represent her but any
grievance the Charging Party would file would go to "the
bottom of the stack" where it would stay because
Respondent would process the grievances of union
members first and never get to the Charging Party's. The
conversation then degenerated into an argument over the
Charging Party's failure to join the Union and pay dues,
Teague stating at one point that if no one paid dues there
wouldn't be a union. After the Charging Party started
using "unpleasant words," her husband called a halt to the
conversation and directed her to hang up, which she did.11
About the same time as this last conversation took place
(about mid-October 1973) the Charging Party asked her
husband to place a call for her to Jim Kent, the union
president, at the union hall. Mr. Summerlot did so, but
being unable to reach Kent he left word for Kent to can
back.12
Also at about this same time but before he returned the
Charging Party's call, as will appear, Union President Kent
also received telephone calls from Sandra Lowe Bright and
Martha Harmon. When Kent returned Bright's call, Bright
complained to Kent that she, Bright, could not understand
why her, Bright's, change from an earlier shift to the
midnight shift in #444 could not be effected when the
Charging Party (who had come from a different depart-
ment) was already working on the instant shift in #444.13
Kent also returned Harmon's call and Harmon made the
same complaint to Kent that Harmon had previously made
to Teague about Summerlot.
Kent then called Hooker, the Employer's section chief of
labor relations, and told Hooker that the Charging Party
would have to be sent back to #441 because her continued
presence in #444 was in violation of the contract. Hooker
agreed.t4
Hooker then called Chandley back and told Chandley
that the Charging Party could not remain m #444 without
violating the contract.
Kent returned the Charging Party's call in the early part
of the week of October 21, 1973, and spoke to her at that
time.15
9 The Charging Party asserted that Girt at first told her that the Union
was wrong in blocking her transfer but, when Summerlot said she was not a
union member, Girt stated that this put a different light on the matter. He
then said , according to the Charging Party, that he would put the transfer
through "if she would promise to sign a union card ." Girt denied that he
made this offer and also denied that he had the authority to make it.
I credit Girt who appeared to me to testify in a sincere and
straightforward manner . Moreover , it seems to me unlikely that Girt would
make such a statement over the telephone to a person he did not know.
Further , I find no basis in this record to support the conclusion that Girt, as
a union representative , could "put a transfer through ." Finally, I note that
the Charging Party, in her ensuing conversation with Chandley, did not
mention any such offer by Girt.
I found the Charging Party to be a somewhat emotional and contentious
witness, who testified with tsars glistening in her eyes . Hence, in the main, I
have only credited her on conflicting matters where her testimony has been
corroborated by other witnesses.
10 Chandley did not recall giving the Charging Party Teague's name.
However, since Teague, in fact, had spoken to Chandley and since the
Charging Party promptly called Teague to pursue the matter , as will appear,
I conclude that Chandley was the source of the Charging Party's
information regarding Teague's involvement.
11 These findings are based on the credible testimony of the Charging
Party as essentially corroborated by her husband and in part admitted by
Teague . Specifically, Teague admitted asking the Charging Party in this
conversation why the latter did not join the Union-a question Teague said
she had raised with the Charging Party many times. And Teague admitted
telling the Charging Party that if no one paid dues there would be no union.
Teague also admitted that-in answer to the Charging Party's query, "For
me not to be a union member , would that make any difference?"-she,
Teague , responded "Well, it would help." Consequently I do not credit
Teague 's inconsistent and gratuitous-testimony that she never refused to
represent anyone nor her somewhat contrary version of the conversation.
Her further denial that she told the Charging Party that she would get the
latter's transfer through if she would sign a union card does not precisely
contradict the testimony of the Charging Party which I have credited.
12 Mr . Summerlot credibly so testified. There is a conflict whether the
message was for Kent to call Mr. or Mrs. Summerlot but since Kent did
return the call and spoke to the Charging Party I find it unnecessary to
resolve this conflict.
13 Bright denied that she called Kent about this matter I do not credit
this denial. Bright had already brought the matter to the attention of Teague
and from Bright's other testimony it is clear that Bright wanted the Union to
take action to have her shift assignment changed. Further I found Bright to
be very defensive-and consequently other than straightforward-in her
testimony when she was asked if she had made any complaints about the
Charging Party, who had been helpful to Bright in the past
Harmon did not testify.
14 Kent at first thought that he so informed Chandley rather than
Hooker but upon being refreshed with his affidavit , Kent recalled that it
was Hooker . Chandley did not recall any conversations with union officials
at this point in the events in question.
15 The precise date of this telephone call is not certain There is also a
conflict whether it occurred before or after Kent asked the Employer to
return the Charging Party to #441 . Kent testified that the Charging Party
called to complain about the prior decision to move her back to #441. The
Charging Party and her husband (who listened in on the conversation) said
that Kent stated in Kent's conversation with the Charging Party during this
call that he would immediately seek to have the Company put her back in
department #441 on the day shift. But the versions of the Summerlots are
not corroborative . Thus, the Charging Party said that Kent so stated at the
beginning of the conversation after which Kent changed his approach and
sought to have her agree to sign a union card if he would ask to have her
transferred. Mr. Summerlot said that the conversation closed with such a
statement by Kent after the Charging Party had refused to sign a card. I
conclude that the call took place after Kent had spoken to Hooker but
before the Charging Party was informed she was being returned to #441, as
will appear. I reach this conclusion not only because the Summerlots failed
to corroborate each other on this point but also because it would explain
Kent's belief that the Charging Party was calling to complain about going
back to #441. I further note that according to Mr . Summerlot there was a
lapse of about a week before Kent returned the call after it had originally
(Continued)
584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
There is a sharp conflict in the testimony of the Charging
Party and her husband (who listened in), on the one hand,
and Kent, on the other, as to what was said in this
conversation . For reasons set forth below I essentially
credit the Charging Party and her husband over that of
Kent.
The Charging Party began the conversation by starting
to explain the situation in respect to her efforts to obtain a
permanent transfer. Kent cut her off telling her he had
already spoken to Teague and knew about it. Kent then
inquired whether the Charging Party would sign a union
card if he, Kent, would work on her transfer. The Charging
Party refused, asserting that this was "blackmail." The
Charging Party then inquired whether or not there was a
requirement in the contract or in the law to the effect that
the Union had to represent union members and nonmem-
bers on an equal basis. Kent replied that if there were such
a requirement he would resign his post. Kent also,
admittedly, berated the Charging Party about her nonunion
status at some length during this conversation. The
Charging Party, being disgruntled by what Kent was
saying to her, told Kent that her husband was listening in
on the conversation. With this Kent hung up.16
About October 22 or 23, 1973, the Charging Party was
informed by her supervisor, "Scottie," that she would be
returned to #441 the following Monday (October 29,
1973).
The next day after Summerlot received this information
from Scottie, she called Chandley. Chandley confirmed
that the Charging Party was being sent back to #441 and
also stated that he had incorrectly told her previously that
the Union was trying to stop her transfer. He averred that
he should have said it was "the company, the contract, was
stopping" her. He further told her she could remain
another week in # 444 if she so desired.17
The Charging Party returned to #441 on October 29,
1973. She worked in that department for about 3 or 4
weeks until Thanksgiving 1973 when she took leave to have
her back operation. She was still on leave convalescing
from this operation at the time of the hearing.
B. Concluding Findings
Notwithstanding Respondent's inimical attitude towards
the nonunion status of the Charging Party, there is no
probative evidence here that the Respondent caused or
been placed to Kent by Mr. Summerlot.
I found Mr . Summerlot to be a calm witness whose testimony was
generally reliable unless otherwise noted.
16 These findings are based essentially on the mutually corroborative
versions of Summerlot and her husband. I do not credit Kent 's contrary
version of the foregoing significant aspects of the conversation. Kent's
manner on the stand was argumentative , hence I do not conclude that he
testified in a forthright fashion where his testimony conflicts with the
corroborated version of Mr . & Mrs. Summerlot . Moreover , Kent admitted
that his conversation with the Charging Party dealt at least in part with her
nonunion status which he said had been cause for complaint to him from
her fellow employees in #441 . Also he admitted telling her in this
conversation that it was a pity she didn 't belong to the Union because she
caused "a damn lot of trouble ." Finally, he did not deny making the
statement he would resign his post if required to represent nonmembers on a
basis equal to union members.
17 The findings as to this conversation are based on the essentially
corroborative versions of Summerlot and Chandley. I do not credit
Summerlot's further statement that Chandley said "his orders" came from
attempted to cause the Company to discriminate against
the Charging Party for this reason. The only bases upon
which Respondent told the Employer Respondent was
taking action to block a permanent transfer of the
Charging Party to #444 proceeded from complaints of
other employees (who, I find, were Harmon and Bright)
that such a transfer would have violated their rights
established by company policy and the collective-bargain-
ing agreement, and also proceeded from Respondent's own
view that the contract would have been thereby violated.
The undisputed testimony of Teague and Kent for the
Respondent and Hooker and Chandley establishes that the
Employer refused to make the transfer permanent because
it shared Respondent's view that the contract did not
permit it. Moreover, the Charging Party admitted that
Chandley told her that the contract was the cause of her
failure to obtain a permanent transfer to #444. And she
also admitted that John Davis, an employer coordinator or
supervisor in department #444, had likewise advised her
that the contract would not permit her to stay in #444.18
The record also indicates that the complaints of Harmon
and Bright were well founded. Thus, Chandley and Hooker
for the Employer and Kent for Respondent confirmed that
there is, and has been, a company policy whereby shift
changes are allowed within a department or within a
"universe" (distinct activity within a department). Under
this policy, as the witnesses explained, an employee who
has seniority may "bump" (move) from one shift to
another in his own department or universe thereby
displacing an employee with lower seniority.
This could have been Harmon's fate if Summerlot had
become permanent in #444 and had chosen to bump to
the day shift there. For Harmon was the least senior
employee in #444.
Bright's complaint was that she sought to change from
the day shift to the midnight shift in #444 but was
unsuccessful at a time when an employee from a totally
different department (Summerlot from #441) had ob-
tained an assignment on the midnight shift in #444. No
witness recalled that any individual has ever been
permitted to transfer voluntarily from one department to
another. The only such transfers resulted from situations
covered by the contract whereby employees, declared
"surplus" in their own department, were moved to another
Kent (along with Hooker) because,. as I have found, Kent did not speak to
Chandley about this matter , only Hooker, and Chandley did not
corroborate this aspect of his conversation with Summerlot . Nor do I credit
her statement that she told Chandley at this time that the Union had told
her definitely that she was going back . I rather credit Chandley's testimony
that she merely said she had spoken to an individual from the union hall,
and had requested that individual to let her transfer departments but the
individual refused . Chandley also testified that Summerlot told him
someone had told her she had to go back . I conclude that the "someone"
was "Scottie."
18 While Teague and Union Steward Howard told Chandley in Teague's
second conversation with Chandley that the Charging Party was not a union
member this fact developed only incidentally in the conversation and was
not shown to have motivated Chandley's decision to return Summerlot to
#441. Chandley, who impressed me as a sincere witness and who was
seeking to help the Charging Party to obtain her transfer throughout all
phases of the events in question here , conceded at the hearing that company
policy and the collective-bargaining agreement would not have allowed him
to transfer the Charging Party permanently to #444.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS , LOCAL 1504 585
department or returned to their former department within
2 years after leaving it,19 as will be discussed.
Nor does the contract ' itself contain any provision
authorizing or permitting such transfers.20 It rather
contains a provision-article 28, entitled "Movement of
Personnel"-which states (in sec . 1.1) that: "All adjust-
ments to the work force through upgrading, downgrading
or lateral transfer, or increases or decreases in the working
force in accordance with the provisions of this article shall be
made of the Company." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 2 of this article goes on to establish a procedure
for filling any vacancy which might occasion movement of
personnel . Under said section 2, first consideration must be
given to "surplus" employees (who if not placed must be
laid off under section 3.2) and second consideration must
be given to certain employees seeking to return to jobs
performed satisfactorily within the previous 2 years. Other
priorities follow in descending order but the first two are
sufficient for our purposes here.
In the present case all those who obtained permanent
transfers to #444 had been declared "surplus" in #441
and elsewhere in the plant. There is no showing that the
Charging Party was declared surplus-indeed it was shown
to the contrary. Even had it been shown that there were
insufficient surplus employees to fill all vacancies in #444,
Summerlot would not qualify under the second priority,
because she had not worked in #444 during the preceding
2 years-she had rather been employed since about 1964 in
#441 according to her own admission.
Inasmuch as the General Counsel has not established
that the Employer's refusal to grant Summerlot a perma-
nent transfer was based on Summerlot's nonunion status
and because it rather appears that the collective-bargaining
agreement would not have permitted her transfer-at least
not without previous exhaustion of certain priority group-
ings of employees in which she did not qualify for
inclusion-and, finally, since her transfer would have
interfered with the shift assignment rights of employees
already working in department #444, 1 am satisfied that
Respondent's request that the Employer return her to
#441 for these reasons did not violate Section 8(b)(2) of
the Act.21 I shall, accordingly, recommend dismissal of this
allegation of the complaint.
There is, however, no justification for the statements by
Teague to the Charging Party that Respondent would not
represent Summerlot, seek her transfer, or process her
grievances because Summerlot was not a union member.
Nor is there any license for Kent's statement to the
Charging Party that any effort by Respondent to seek her
transfer was conditioned upon her signing a union card.
19 There was an indication that the Respondent had obtained an
agreement from the Employer to enable such a transfer for Bright, a union
member, for medical reasons but Bright admitted that she rather sought and
obtained retention in #444 to which she had already been surplused.
20 The General Counsel sought to show that Kent had made a prior
inconsistent statement in this regard in a letter Kent sent to the Regional
Office in connection with the investigation of this case . In the letter Kent
stated "There are no provisions in the Union Contract for permanent
transfers ." On the other hand , he testified at the hearing that there is a
provision "covering" permanent transfers. I perceive no fatal inconsistency
here . Kent's position , with which I agree, is that the contract does not
provide "for" (i .e. permit ) permanent transfers as an employee right. But it
does "cover" such transfers in a manner which limits them to "surplus" or
These statements constituted a threat to the Charging
Party that, if she did not join the Union, it would not
represent her in her dealings with the Employer.
But the Charging Party has the right under Section 7 of
the Act not to engage in union activities and the collective-
bargaining agreement between Respondent and the Em-
ployer does not affect that right. It rather permits
employees to resign from the Union, as Summerlot did
many years ago.
Moreover, it is well established that Respondent is
obliged, based on its status as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees in the collective-
bargaining unit, to represent all employees in that unit
equally, regardless whether they be members of the Union
or not 22
In these circumstances I conclude that the statements of
Union Agents Kent and Teague restrained the Charging
Party in the exercise of her rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act 23
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices of Respondent set forth in
section III, above, occurring in connection with the
operations of the Employer described in section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action deemed necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
3. Kent, Teague, and Girt are agents of Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
4. By Kent's and Teague's above-found statements to
"return to former job within 2 years" situations, and other conditions as will
appear.
21 In reaching this conclusion I also rely upon my findings , supra, that
the efforts by Teague first, and Kent later , in approaching the Employer
about the Charging Party's status in #444 preceded, in each instance, the
Charging Party's telephone conversations with them, heretofore recounted,
and such efforts by the union agents rather proceeded directly from
complaints by other employees. In so concluding I also note that the
Charging Party's loan period had already exceeded the 28 days permitted by
sec. 3 of the collective-bargaining agreement.
22 Magma Copper Company, 200 NLRB No. 8, and cases cited therein.
23 Dow Chemical Company, 187 NLRB 968.
586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Charging Party, Respondent has coerced or restrained
the Charging Party in the exercise of her rights guaranteed practices not found herein.
by Section 7 of the Act and Respondent has thereby
violated , and is violating , Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not caused or attempted to cause
the Employer to discriminate against the Charging Party in
violation of. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, hence the Respon-
dent has not violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this proceeding,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor
24 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 .48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings , conclusions , and Order and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
25 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
ORDER24
Respondent International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union 1504, its officers, agents,
and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by threatening
employees that it will not represent them if they do not join
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-
CIO, Local Union 1504.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining employees
of Western Electric Company, Inc., in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 25 Copies of said
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 25, after being duly signed by the authorized
representative of Respondent , shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT restrain employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by
threatening employees that we will not represent them
if they do not join International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union 1504.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees of Western Electric Company,
Inc., in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
AFL-CIO LOCAL UNION
1504
(Labor Organization)
conspicuous places , including all places where notices to Dated By
members are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced,or covered by any other material.
(b) Furnish to the Regional Director for Region 25
signed copies of said notice for posting by Western Electric
Company , Inc., if willing, in places where notices to
employees are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, within 20 days of this Order what steps Respon-
dent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board 's Office , 150 W. Market Street, ISTA
Center, 6th Floor , Indianapolis , Indiana 46204, Telephone
317-633-7360.