2020002275 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2021)

International Automotive Components Group GmbH

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 24, 2021

2020002275 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/483,504 04/10/2017 Carter Scott CANNON IAC50369 5519 32047 7590 03/24/2021 GROSSMAN, TUCKER, PERREAULT & PFLEGER, PLLC 55 SOUTH COMMERCIAL STREET MANCHESTER, NH 03101 EXAMINER CATTANACH, COLIN J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2875 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/24/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): drobertson@gtpp.com jhobbs@gtpp.com lpelletier@gtpp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CARTER SCOTT CANNON Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 Technology Center 2800 Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, LILAN REN, and MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges. REN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “International Automotive Components Group GmbH.” Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An interior trim part of a motor vehicle, comprising: a support layer, a cover layer on a front side of the support layer and an illumination unit on an opposite rear side of the support layer, wherein the support layer includes a perforation, which forms an illuminated structure, when the illumination unit emits light through the perforation, wherein the cover layer is adhesively bonded to the support layer, and wherein the cover layer provides an outermost surface of the interior trim panel provided by at least one of a textile material layer, a non-woven material layer, a woven material layer, a knitted material layer, a foil layer, a synthetic leather layer, or a perforated leather layer. Claims Appendix (Appeal Br. 24). REFERENCES The prior art references relied upon by the Examiner are: Name Reference Date Meinke US 2006/0176710 A1 Aug. 10, 2006 Ureta US 2012/0327673 A1 Dec. 27, 2012 Dellock US 2015/0217681 A1 Aug. 6, 2015 Preisler US 2015/0307033 A1 Oct. 29, 2015 REJECTIONS Claims 1–4, 6, 9, 10, and 12–15 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Meinke. Final Act. 3. Claims 5, 17, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Meinke, in view of Preisler. Final Act. 5. Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 3 Claims 7 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Meinke in view of Dellock. Final Act. 7. Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Meinke. Final Act. 9. Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Meinke in view of Ureta. Final Act. 9. Claims 18 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Meinke in view of Preisler, and in further view of Dellock. Final Act. 10. Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis 1–4, 6, 9, 10, 12–15 102 Meinke 5, 17, 20 103 Meinke, Preisler 7, 8 103 Meinke, Dellock 11 103 Meinke 16 103 Meinke, Ureta 18, 19 103 Meinke, Preisler, Dellock OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf. Ex parte Frye, 2010 WL 889747, *4 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”)). After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s contentions, we are not persuaded that reversible error has been identified, and we affirm Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 4 the Examiner’s rejections for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Claims 1 & 172 Appellant argues that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding that the structure in Meinke meets the “interior trim part” requirement recited in the preamble of claim 1. Appeal Br. 9. Although Appellant acknowledges that Meinke specifically states that the prior art structure “can refer to any component located on the exterior or interior surface of the vehicle,” Appellant argues that we should overlook Meinke’s explicit teachings because a skilled artisan would have understood the illustrations in Meinke “to explicitly show an external trim component.” Id. at 10; Meinke ¶ 43 (cited in Appeal Br. 10). We are not persuaded because the argument is unsupported by evidence and is also inconsistent with the text of Meinke. Meinke explicitly states the component can be an exterior or interior trim component. Meinke ¶ 43. Moreover, “apparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Whether the structure is located inside the vehicle or outside is a matter of intended use. See Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that the absence of a disclosure relating to intended function does not defeat a 2 Appellant argues claims 1 and 17 together and do not argue separately for the patentability of 2–16 and 18–20. See Appeal Br. 8–23 (arguing for the patentability of claim 1 and 17 together based on Meinke alone although claim 17 is rejected under section 103 based on Meinke and Preisler). These claims stand or fall together. See id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 5 finding of anticipation). Appellant’s argument does not structurally distinguish the prior art structure and is therefore unpersuasive. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner improperly relied on multiple embodiments to reject claim 1 based on Meinke (Appeal Br. 11), Meinke’s statement that “the term ‘trim component’ can refer to any component located on the exterior or interior surface of the vehicle” is not limited to any particular embodiment. Meinke ¶ 43. Appellant’s assertion is also conclusory and does not explain sufficiently how the Examiner’s citation to Figs. 1–6A improperly combines various embodiments. In addition, Meinke’s description of these illustrations does not support Appellant’s assertion. For example, Meinke states that “FIG. 1 is a perspective view of a vehicle having an external trim component according to one embodiment of the invention” whereas Figs. 2–4 illustrate various “elevational view[s] of the external trim component of FIG. 1” and Figs 5– 6A are “exploded, perspective view” of the component in Figs. 1–4. Meinke ¶¶ 23–29. Appellant next argues that the Examiner reversibly erred by finding that mask 34 of Meinke is the recited “support layer.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues that a skilled artisan would have understood the claim term “support layer” to be a structure that “support[s] the other features of the interior trim part applied thereto” which is not disclosed by Meinke. Id. at 14 (emphasis removed). We decline to import limitations into the claim that are not recited. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We also decline to limit the claim term based on a particular embodiment in the Specification. “[T]he claims define the invention. . . . [L]imitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims.” Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 6 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“While a court may look to the specification and prosecution history to interpret what a patentee meant by a word or phrase in a claim, extraneous limitations cannot be read into the claims from the specification or prosecution history. . . . In other words, a court may not read into a claim a limitation from a preferred embodiment, if that limitation is not present in the claim itself.”). Read as broadly as is reasonable and consistent with the Specification, we interpret “support layer” to refer to any layer capable of performing a support function. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (and cases cited therein). Appellant’s argument that a skilled artisan would have understood “the substrate 30 of Meinke to be a support layer” (Appeal Br. 15, 17–21) is unpersuasive because it does not identify reversible error in the Examiner’s finding that the prior art structure mask 34 in Meinke is structurally identical to the recited support layer. See Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1468 (“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.”). Moreover, we note that Appellant’s acknowledgement that substrate 30 of Meinke is a support layer is consistent with the Examiner’s finding that both mask 34 and substrate 30 of Meinke “are reasonably capable of forming a support layer.” Ans. 10 (emphasis removed) (reasoning that the recited “support layer” lacks structural limitation and mask 34 of Meinke “reasonably supports layers 30 and 32 at least on an exterior surface thereof”).3 Structures such as machines and articles of manufacture must be distinguished from the prior art on the basis of structure, and where there is 3 We also note that paragraph 58 of Meinke (which is cited in the Examiner’s Answer at 8, 9, 10) provides that mask 34 may be a component that is “formed integrally with the substrate 30 . . . or by molding the substrate 30 with a mold . . . .” Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 7 reason to believe that the structure of the prior art is inherently capable of performing the claimed function, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the claimed function patentably distinguishes the claimed structure from the prior art structure. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1478; In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215 (CCPA 1981). Appellant in this case has not shown such a structural distinction. See Appeal Br. 14–16; see also Reply Br. 8. With regard to the limitation of “a cover layer,” Appellant acknowledges that “the Examiner is correct in understanding that, consistent with the Specification, the cover layer may comprise one or more layers.” Appeal Br. 22. Appellant does not otherwise identify reversible error in the Examiner’s finding that the prior art structure in Meinke discloses the recited cover layer. Id. at 21–22. Appellant argues that the Specification does not “refer to the support layer 10 as being a layer of the cover layer 14” (Appeal Br. 22) but does not explain why the claim language, when read in light of the Specification, requires any particular configuration of those layers as claimed. Absent structural distinction based on the claim language, Appellant has not identified reversible error in the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed. Appeal 2020-002275 Application 15/483,504 8 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–4, 6, 9, 10, 12–15 102 Meinke 1–4, 6, 9, 10, 12–15 5, 17, 20 103 Meinke, Preisler 5, 17, 20 7, 8 103 Meinke, Dellock 7, 8 11 103 Meinke 11 16 103 Meinke, Ureta 16 18, 19 103 Meinke, Preisler, Dellock 18, 19 Overall Outcome 1–20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED