International Association of Iron Workes, Local 229

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 11, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 271 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 229 271
International Association of Bridge , Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers , Local Union 229,
AFL-CIO (Bethlehem Steel Corporation) and
Floyd V. McClellan. Case 21-CB-3232
June 11, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, MCCULLOCH, AND BROWN
On July 18, 1969, Trial Examiner Stanley Gilbert
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that Respondent had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices and recommending that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
brief in support thereof; the General Counsel filed
an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has
reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion, the exceptions and the briefs, and the entire
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Ex-
aminer only to the extent consistent herewith.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent
Union violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the
National Labor Relations Act by failing to refer
Charging Party Floyd V. McClellan to certain weld-
ing jobs at Bethlehem Steel's Westgate Plaza Hotel
project. He found that the bargaining agreement
covering ironworkers at this project specifically en-
titled Bethlehem to "hire by name" without regard
to the applicant's position on the registration lists,
that Bethlehem exercised this right by requesting
McClellan for welding jobs on September 18-20,
1968, and that the Union denied the request, im-
posing a rule against "hustling" jobs that was not
sanctioned by the agreement. Citing the Radio Of-
ficers' decision,' the Examiner concluded that the
Union was compelling adherence to its own "uni-
laterally imposed" hiring practice, and was thus un-
lawfully encouraging membership in the Union.
The Union denies any illegality in its treatment of
McClellan. It insists that its failure to refer McClel-
lan finds sanction in the applicable contract.
The referral provisions of the contract are quite
complex. While employers are permitted to "em-
ploy directly" and/or "hire by name," there are
many conditions attached to such hiring and it is
not clear whether McClellan was entitled to be em-
ployed "directly" or "by name."
The record shows that McClellan was on the
Union's "B" list , whereas the contract accorded
"A" list ironworkers priority in referral. And "A"
list applicants were favored over McClellan when
the Union made its selections for dispatch to the
Bethlehem project. The Union informed McClellan
that there were "A" list welders available and that
he had violated a contractual ban on "hustling"
jobs directly from employers. The Union explained
to McClellan that "... no one is going to be called
by name to the Bethlehem job unless it's in ac-
cordance with the working agreement with the
Union."
The Union's treatment of McClellan raises some
close questions and fine distinctions as to what is
encompassed within the contractual language, but
it does not demonstrate any wholesale extension or
willful repudiation of the agreement. While it is dif-
ficult to determine upon this record whether the
Union's interpretation of the contract is the correct
one, its position does not appear to be so uncon-
nected with the contract as to evidence any uni-
lateral imposition of union membership obligations
or to demonstrate a purpose or effect of encourag-
ing union membership.' Nor does the record other-
wise indicate such a purpose or effect.
We find that the General Counsel has not carried
his burden of showing Respondent Union's conduct
towards McCellan violated Section 8(b)(2) and
(1)(A). Accordingly, we shall dismiss the com-
plaint.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
in this proceeding be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
Member Brown, concurring:
I would dismiss the complaint without reaching
the merits. The contract which provisions govern
the operation of Respondent' s hiring hall gives any
job applicant "aggrieved by the operation of the
' The Radio Officers" Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL
(A H Bull Steamship Company), 93 NLRB 1523, 1527, affd. 547 U.S 17
2 In the language of another decision , " Respondent 's construction is
at least a reasonable one, and consequently there is no basis for finding
that the treatment of [McClellan] necessarily violated [ or exceeded] the
terms of the contract ." New York Typographical Union Number Six , Inter-
national Typographical Union, AFL-CIO (The Neu York Times Company),
144 NLRB 1555, 1558, enfd 336 F 2d 115 (C A 2)
183 NLRB No 35-T-5
183 NLRB No. 35
272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hiring arrangement" the right to appeal for relief to
a tripartite panel, including an impartial umpire,
whose decision in the matter is final and binding.
McClellan, an aggrieved applicant, has not availed
himself of this contractual remedy for his referral
complaint, but rather has filed these unfair labor
practice charges. As the majority points out, the
differences between McClellan and the Union re-
late to some finely drawn distinctions and in-
terpretations of ambiguously worded referral
clauses in the contract. Given this within-the-con-
tract nature of the dispute, I think it would better
effectuate the policies of the Act to encourage the
parties to avail themselves of the existing contrac-
tual remedy. For the reasons stated in my dissenting
opinion in Lummus Company, 142 NLRB 517, I
would not now proceed to a determination of this
case on its merits.
Member Jenkins, dissenting:
I must dissent from my colleagues' view that the
General Counsel has not carried his burden of
showing Respondent Union's conduct towards Mc-
Clellan violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the
Act. This position, in my view, flies in the face of
the record evidence of this case and of the
teachings of the United States Supreme Court in
Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17.
The credited testimony of McClellan reveals that
Respondent Business Representative Stuckey told
him that he (McClellan) had been called by name
to work on the Westgate Plaza Hotel site as an
inner-shield welder, but that Stuckey was not going
to dispatch him to the job because he "had been
soliciting," that is, he had "hustled" the job directly
from Bethlehem, and that Stuckey felt such "hus-
tling" was contrary to the-contract. Unless contract
support exists for the Union's position, it is clear
from the foregoing that the Union, through
Stuckey, "unilaterally" imposed its own desired hir-
ing practice against McClellan.
My colleagues do not find such contractual sup-
port. Indeed they state only that the Union's treat-
ment of McClellan "does not demonstrate any
wholesale extension or willful repudiation of the
agreement" and does not "demonstrate a purpose
or effect of encouraging Union membership." The
Board and Supreme Court tests in Radio Officers'
do not require the General Counsel to establish
wholesale acts of discrimination to prove the uni-
lateral establishment of hiring practices beyond the
purview of the contract, nor does Radio Officers'
require the willful repudiation of a lawful hiring
agreement to establish "encouragement" or the
tendency to encourage union membership.
In my view, the tests set out by the Board and the
Supreme Court in Radio Officers' have been clearly
met by the credited evidence of the General Coun-
sel. McClellan was entitled to be called by name
under the contract. He was called by name. He was
not dispatched by the Union, at least in part,
because he had "hustled" the job directly and the
Union was therefore imposing its own hiring prac-
tices not encompassed within the contract upon
both McClellan and Bethlehem . Clearly, such con-
duct by Respondent encouraged a form of member-
ship by McClellan which Respondent is forbidden
to impose, and as such , in my view, Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STANLEY GILBERT, Trial Examiner: Based on a
charge filed by Floyd V. McClellan on October 11,
1969, the complaint herein was issued on
December 10, 1969. The complaint alleges that In-
ternational Association of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union 229,
AFL-CIO, herein variously referred to as the Iron
Workers, the Union, and the Respondent, violated
Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act by refusing
to dispatch McClellan through its hiring hall, when
it was requested to do so. Respondent, by its
answer, denies that it committed the unfair labor
practices alleged in said complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in San
Diego, California, February 18, 1969, before me.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses as they testified, I find
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, a Delaware cor-
poration with principal offices in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, operates steel manufacturing plants
throughout the United States, including California.
During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the
complaint it sold and shipped steel valued in excess
of $50,000 from its California plants directly to
customers located outside the State of California.
As is admitted by Respondent, the Employer is
now and has been at all times material herein an
employer engaged in commerce and in a business
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
As is admitted by Respondent, it is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IRON WORKERS, LOCAL 229 273
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Commencing September of 1968, Bethlehem en-
gaged in the completion of structural steel work for
the Westgate Plaza Hotel in San Diego, California,
which is the jobsite involved in this proceeding.
At all times material herein Respondent and
Bethlehem abided by the California area agreement
between the Iron Workers employers and District
Council of Iron Workers of the State of California
and the vicinity. Said agreement provides for hiring
hall procedures between employers and Respon-
dent, which permit the employers (with certain
limitations not involved in this proceeding) to
request workers by name to be dispatched to them. I
The issues involved herein are as follows: (1) Did
the Employer request the Charging Party, McClel-
lan, by name? (2) Was Respondent's refusal to
dispatch him violative of the Act? and (3) Is it ap-
propriate to require that McClellan exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement before the Board will entertain his
charge of unfair labor practices?
Summary of Events
There is no dispute as to the facts in this case.
The General Counsel called three witnesses, Harold
L. Mousseau, Bethlehem's superintendent in charge
of the job involved herein, McClellan, the Charging
Party, and William Bradshaw, a member of the
Respondent Union. The Respondent called no wit-
nesses . Set forth hereinbelow is a summary of the
material facts related to the issues herein based
upon the credited testimony of the above three wit-
nesses.
McClellan, who is a member of another local of
the Iron Workers and a qualified inner-shield
welder, worked as a welder for Bethlehem on two
other jobsites in San Diego for a period of approxi-
mately 5 months in the first part of 1968. On Sep-
tember 13, 1968, Mousseau arrived in San Diego to
commence work on the Bethlehem job, and on that
day had a conversation with William L. Stuckey,
Respondent's business representative, in which he
informed Stuckey that he would be starting the job
the following Monday, September 16, and would
need four men for a "raising gang."
On September 15, McClellan returned to San
Diego from Phoenix, Arizona. On September 16,
the four man "raising gang" reported for work.
Also on that day Gil Madrid, Mousseau's welding
foreman, gave Mousseau the name of several
,,good" inner-shield welders including that of Mc-
Clellan. On Tuesday, September 17, Mousseau
called the hiring hall to ask for three welders. He
testified that he "called for two men at the time by
name , Mr. Sullivan and McClellan, or someone
who could run inner-shield," ostensibly to report
the following day.
On the previous day, September 16, McClellan
received a message from Madrid through a friend
who was working on the job that if he wanted to
work to get in touch with him (Madrid) the next
day. On September 17, McClellan went to the job
and spoke to Madrid under whom he had worked
previously. McClellan's testimony as to their con-
versation is as follows:
When I walked up, I shook hands with him
and after that was over, he was in the process
of setting an inner-shield welding machine
when I walked up to him and Paul, this opera-
tor, and he told me, he says, "Get you a weld-
ing shield, McClellan, and help me set this
inner-shield welding machine, because this is
the one you will be using tomorrow," and, I in
return, says, "Well, you seem pretty sure I'm
going to work," and he says, "Oh yes, you're
already cleared," and he said, "If you wish,
you can go down today and pick up your work
order because you have already been called in
and cleared for this with the hall."
On the afternoon of that day, McClellan went to
the union hall and spoke to Stuckey. No reference
was made by either man with respect to McClel-
lan's referral to the Bethlehem job.
On the following morning , September 18, Mc-
Clellan reported to the union hall in time for the
dispatching of workers. Stuckey stated that he had
a job order for the Bethlehem job which called for
two certified welders, two men stood up, stated that
they were qualified and he dispatched them to the
job. About an hour or two later, McClellan spoke
to Stuckey in Bradshaw's presence. McClellan's
testimony as to their conversation which is cor-
roborated by Bradshaw is as follows:
I asked Mr. Stuckey if there had been a call
request for me to go to work on the Westgate
Plaza Hotel site as an inner-shield welder, and
he stated that there had been a call for me, but
that I wasn't going, that he wasn't going to
dispatch me to this job due to the fact that I
had been soliciting, and also that I wasn't a
local A list man.
Bradshaw testified as to statements that Stuckey
made including the following:
A. Well, he said that the phones had been
ringing off that wall about men hustling jobs
and that as of this date, no one was going to be
sent to the Bethlehem job unless it is in com-
pliance of the work agreement.
TRIAL EXAMINER: Unless it was what?
THE WITNESS: Beg your pardon, sir?
TRIAL EXAMINER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear.
Would you start again?
THE WITNESS: He said, "As of this date, no
one is going to be called by name to the
Bethlehem job unless it's in accordance with
the working agreement with the union."
' It was stipulated by the parties that there is no issue herein as to the
legality of the agreement or the hiring hall provisions
274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On that afternoon McClellan went to the
Bethlehem job and spoke to Mousseau. Mousseau
informed him that he had asked the Union to refer
McClellan and stated that he would call for him
again. Later that day Mousseau again called the
union hall and asked for five men. Mousseau
testified that among the men he asked for were
"Mr. McClellan and Mr. Sullivan or some inner-
shield welders." On Thursday the 19th, McClellan
went to the hiring hall in time for the dispatching
procedure. Stuckey called out the work orders in-
cluding a call for two more inner-shield welders for
the Bethlehem job "because the two the day previ-
ously that he had sent did not qualify at all." Mc-
Clellan was not among those dispatched to the
Bethlehem job.
On September 19 Mousseau again called the
union hall and asked for McClellan or some good
inner-shield welders, as well as for some plumbing
and bolting men. In the afternoon of the next day,
September 20, McClellan was referred by Stuckey
to the Bethlehem job as a "plumbing and bolting"
man. McClellan stated to Stuckey when he offered
him the referral as a plumbing and bolting man that
"they want me down there as a welder." Stuckey
replied, "Well, the welding job is filled and that's
all I have available right now."
McClellan reported for work that afternoon,
which was a Friday, worked the following Monday
and Tuesday and was laid off on Wednesday. He
did not work as a welder. Mousseau testified that
while it was his practice to move men from one
type of a job to another without regard to the
character of the referral, he did not place McClel-
lan on a welding machine because they were all full
and the men performing on them were performing
satisfactorily.
Concluding Findings
The General Counsel contends that the Respon-
dent's refusal to dispatch McClellan when he was
requested by name was because of its announced
belief that McClellan had solicited the job. The
record supports the finding that the refusal to
dispatch him was based on that reason.2 The
General Counsel argues that McClellan was entitled
to be called for by name and that by refusing to
dispatch him "Respondent sought to insert its own
hiring practices in place of those established by the
contract." In its brief the General Counsel sets
forth his argument as follows:
Respondent argued at the hearing that its
policy was one of fairly distributing the availa-
ble work. This is analogous to a job rotation
principle. However, the Board has held that
"discrimination aimed at compelling obedience
to union rules (in this case the job-rotation
principle) encourages membership in a labor
organization no less than discrimination
designed to combat dual unionism." The Radio
Officers' Union of the Commerical Telegraphers
Union, AFL, 93 NLRB 1523, 1527. Ac-
cordingly, the "union in causing the employer
to discriminate against [McClellan] into fol-
lowing the union's desired hiring practices
deprived [McClellan] of a protected right."
Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17,
42.
The tests set out by the Board and the
Supreme Court respectively in their Radio Of-
ficers' decisions have been clearly met here.
McClellan was entitled to be called for by
name under the agreement, was called for by
name, and was not dispatched by the Union in
order that the Union might impose its own hir-
ing practices, and not those established by the
contract, upon both McClellan and Bethlehem.
Such conduct on Respondent's part en-
couraged a form of union membership by Mc-
Clellan which Respondent is forbidden by the
Supreme Court's Radio Officers' decision from
doing. As such, it violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) of the Act.
The Respondent appears to admit that the refusal
was predicated on enforcing a union rule against
solicitation ("hustling"). However, it claims that it
did not violate the Act by so doing for three
reasons : First, Respondent contends that McClellan
was not called for by name since Mousseau
requested McClellan "or someone who could run
inner-shield"; secondly, Respondent contends "that
the collective bargaining agreement specifically
prohibits hustling of work because under the provi-
sions of Section 5-H-2-a all individuals seeking
employment must be available at the hiring hall
during dispatch hours so that everyone can be given
an even break at all the jobs that come in"; and,
thirdly, Respondent contends "even if the Agree-
ment does not spell out the `no hustling' rule, the
Union clearly has the right to impose such a rule if
the purpose of the rule is to spread job opportuni-
ties fairly among the workers which is obviously the
fact here."
As to the Respondent's first contention (that Mc-
Clellan was not called for by name), while Mous-
seau's request was in the alternative (in asking for
McClellan or someone who could run inner-shield),
nevertheless it is considered that by this request
Mousseau did not reasonably intend to give the
Union a choice of sending McClellan or someone
else it desired to send. The record clearly supports
the finding that Stuckey considered Mousseau's
request to be for McClellan by name and the
reasonable construction of the request was that
Mousseau wanted McClellan or someone else who
Y The General Counsel does not contend that the Union was attempting
to give preference to its own members , and it is clear that the record would
not support such contention
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 229 275
was competent, if McClellan were not made availa-
ble to him. The record further discloses that
Stuckey did not refuse to dispatch McClellan
because he understood that he was given the choice
by Mousseau to send McClellan or someone else.
Consequently it is concluded that McClellan was
called for by name which the employer was entitled
to do under the provisions of the agreement.3
The second contention that the collective-bar-
gaining agreement prohibited hustling of work
(because the individuals seeking employment must
be available at the hiring hall during dispatch
hours) appears to be of little merit; the requirement
of being in the hiring hall at the time of dispatch
neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits hustling. A
man seeking work could very well solicit an em-
ployer to call for him by name on one day and be in
the hiring hall the following day in order to be
dispatched. Whatever the reason for the require-
ment that he be in the hall in order to be
dispatched, the requirement is not reasonably
susceptible of the construction Respondent con-
tends (that it precludes hustling).
As to the third contention that the rule is a just
one, this contention is of no merit since the issue is
not whether the rule against hustling is good or bad.
It may very well be that employers desire to have
workers solicit them since it gives employers an op-
portunity of knowing who is available and thus
making a selection among them, instead of having
to take whomever the Union sends. In any event,
the rule was not incorporated in the hiring hall
procedures provided for in the collective-bargain-
ing agreement , and no purpose would be served in
speculating as to its desirability.
In the circumstances it is concluded that McClel-
lan was entitled to be dispatched upon Mousseau's
request for him by name and that Respondent's
refusal to do so in order to enforce its unilaterally
imposed rule against hustling is in violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act. Radio Officers'
cases, supra ; Hod Carriers' Building and General
Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 652,
AFL-CIO, 147 NLRB 380, 390.
Respondent further contends that the purposes of
the Act are not effectuated by considering the
charge in this case , because it emasculates the
grievance procedure available to McClellan and
that he should be required to exhaust his remedies
thereunder before the Board considers his unfair
labor practice charge. The fact that McClellan
failed to exhaust the administrative means available
to him under the grievance procedure is no bar to
this proceeding and does not constitute a defense to
the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Superior Roofing Company, 158 NLRB 657, 661.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, in-
timate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has en-
gaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be
recommended that Respondent cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
It having been found that Respondent dis-
criminated against Floyd V. McClellan by refusing
to dispatch him as a welder to the Bethlehem job
on three consecutive days commencing September
18, 1968, although he was entitled to be dispatched
by reason of the fact that he had been requested by
name in accordance with the provisions of the ex-
clusive hiring hall operated by Respondent, it will
be recommended that Respondent make him whole
for any loss of earnings he may have sustained as a
result of said discrimination. While it is true that he
was dispatched as a plumbing and bolting man on
the afternoon of September 20 and worked several
days in that capacity this fact does not militate
against his being entitled to what he would have
earned as a welder had he been dispatched on the
first day he was requested. It appears that he was a
competent welder and therefore it is appropriate to
assume that he would have remained on the job as
a welder as long as his services as a welder would
have been required.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. By refusing to dispatch McClellan as a welder
to the Bethlehem job upon his request by name in
accordance with the provision of the hiring hall
agreement in order to enforce its rule against hus-
tling , Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and
(1)(A) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an un-
fair labor practice affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law and the entire record in this
' Although there are certain limitations with respect to this privilege pro-
vided for in the contract, such limitations are not material to this proceed-
ing.
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 19
276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
case, it is recommended that International Associa-
tion of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, Local Union 229, AFL-CIO, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing to dispatch
Floyd V. McClellan when appropriately requested
by name in order to enforce its rule against hus-
tling.
2. Take the following affirmative actions which
are deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act:
(a) Make Floyd V. McClellan whole for any loss
of earnings he sustained by reasons of its dis-
criminatory refusal to dispatch him as a welder to
the Bethlehem job commencing on September 18,
1968.
(b) Post at Respondent's business offices and
meeting halls, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."4 Copies of said notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after
being duly signed by an official representative of
the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to its members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of the
receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.5
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words " a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words " a Decision
and Order "
In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE , STRUCTURAL AND
ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 229,
AFL-CIO
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board
and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended , we hereby
notify you that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to dispatch Floyd V.
McClellan when he is requested by name and
is entitled to be dispatched upon such request
in order to enforce our rule against hustling.
WE WILL make Floyd V. McClellan whole
for any loss of earnings he may have suffered
by reason of our discriminatory refusal to
dispatch him as a welder to the Westgate Plaza
Hotel site in San Diego commencing Sep-
tember 18, 1968.
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE,
STRUCTURAL AND
ORNAMENTAL IRON
WORKERS, LOCAL UNION
229, AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
If members have any questions concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia
Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles,
California 90014, Telephone 213-688-5200.