INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS AND ALLIED

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 7, 2014

28-CB-107693 (N.L.R.B. May. 7, 2014)

JD(SF)–19–14
Las Vegas, NV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION OF JUDGES
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL
STAGE EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE
TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS AND ALLIED CRAFTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES
AND CANADA, LOCAL 720, AFL-CIO, CLC
(Global Experience Specialists)
and Case 28-CB-107693
STEVEN LUCAS, an Individual
and Case 28-CB-113281
JAMY RICHARDSON, an Individual
Andrew S. Gollin, Esq., for the General Counsel.
William A. Sokol and Kristina L. Hillman, Esqs.
(Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld),
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LISA D. THOMPSON, Administrative Law Judge. This consolidated case was tried in Las
Vegas, Nevada, on January 21 and 22, 2014. Steven Lucas (the “Charging Party” or “Lucas”)
filed a charge against Respondent, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
Moving Picture Technicians, Artists, and Allied Crafts of the United States, et al. (the
“Respondent” or “IATSE”) on June 21, 2013. The Regional Director for Region 28 of the
National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB” or the “Board”) issued the complaint and notice of
hearing on August 30, 2013 (Case 28-CB-107693).
Jamy Richardson (the “Charging Party” or “Richardson”) also filed a charge and an
amended charge against Respondent (Case 28-CB-113281) on September 13, 2013, and
November 26, 2013, respectively. On November 27, 2013, the Regional Director issued the
complaint on Richardson’s charge, consolidated both Lucas’ and Richardson’s cases, and issued
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a notice of hearing. The consolidated complaint was amended on December 5, 2013, and again
on January 21, 2014, the day of the hearing.1
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA” or the “Act”) when it refused to allow Lucas to
review hiring hall/dispatch records to determine if the hall was being operated in a
discriminatory manner. The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (b)(2) of the Act when it refused to refer Richardson for employment until he paid fines
levied against him by Respondent. Respondent filed its answer, denying all facts and allegations,
including inter alia all jurisdictional allegations, the Board’s jurisdiction, its status as a labor
organization, the names and job titles of its officers and agents, and that it served as an exclusive
hiring hall and referral source for employees who perform stagehand work in Las Vegas.
Respondent also set forth its affirmative defenses to the complaint.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Before delving into the merits of this case, I must rule on an outstanding motion raised by
counsel for the General Counsel (CGC) during the hearing. Prior to the hearing, on December
24, 2013, I granted in part and denied in part Respondent’s Petition to Revoke.2 In so doing, I
ordered Respondent to produce 18 categories of documents at the hearing which were responsive
to the General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350.3 Those documents included, but
were not limited to: information concerning the names and job titles of Respondent’s officers and
agents, documents relating to any contracts or agreements between Respondent and Encore
Productions, Inc. (“Encore”),4 documents related to the collective-bargaining agreement,
including the employees’ terms and conditions of employment with Encore and whether and to
what extent Respondent was the exclusive source of employee referrals for Encore, written
materials, correspondence, and/or documents concerning the employee referral system, as well as
its rules and regulations therein.
At the hearing, Respondent again objected to the production of the subpoenaed
documents for the reasons previously denied in its Petition to Revoke. I again overruled
Respondent’s objection on those grounds. However, Respondent further objected to the
production of the subpoenaed documents essentially, from what I gathered, in protest to Region
28’s and the San Francisco Division of Judges’ denial of Respondent’s request for continuance
and its order requiring Mr. Sokol (versus co-counsel Kristina Hillman) to appear at the hearing.5

1 GC Exh. 2. Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s
exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s exhibit; and “R. Br.” for Respondent’s brief.
2 GC Exh. 3a.
3 GC Exhs. 2, 3c.
4 The General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350 originally listed Encore Productions, Inc. as the signatory
employer in this case. However, Respondent denied all allegations regarding Encore, including that Encore is an employer within
the meaning of the Act and that Encore served as one of the signatory employers for whom IATSE Local 720 referred employees.
More importantly, Respondent refused to produce any of the subpoenaed documents concerning its relationship with Encore. In
light of this, I granted the CGC’s motion to amend the consolidated complaint to change the employer from Encore Productions,
Inc. to Global Experience Specialists. See Sec. 102.17 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations.
5 Tr. 6-11, 35-37.
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Respondent also failed to produce subpoenaed witnesses John Hanson, Jeff Foran, and
Daniel Cook for the General Counsel’s case on grounds that the witness subpoenas were not
properly served on the above-named individuals.6 Nevertheless, Respondent, through counsel,
advised it did not intend to comply with either subpoena absent a court order. The CGC objected
to Respondent’s failure to produce the subpoenaed documents and the failure to make the
subpoenaed witnesses available for trial. I held these issues in abeyance pending the completion
of the General Counsel’s case-in-chief.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel’s case, the CGC decided against enforcement
of the subpoenas and rested his case. At that point, Respondent sought to introduce various
documents, marked Union Exhibits 1-10, during its case-in-chief. However, those documents
were responsive to the General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350 which were not
produced to the CGC during his case-in-chief. Additionally, Respondent called John Hanson as a
witness but failed to produce him for the CGC’s case.
As such, the CGC objected and moved to strike the admission of all of Respondent’s
exhibits as well as the testimony of John Hanson due to Respondent’s deliberate refusal to
comply with the General Counsel’s subpoenas and my Order granting in part and denying in part
Respondent’s Petition to Revoke. I reserved ruling on the CGC’s motion, pending receipt of the
parties’ post-hearing briefs.
Section 102.113(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the Board provide that “subpoenas
shall be served upon the recipient either personally, by registered or certified mail, by telegraph,
or by leaving a copy . . . at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be
served.” See also Offshore Mariners United, 338 NLRB 745 (2002). Subpoenas served by
regular United States Mail also constitute effective service. Section 102.113(d) of the Board’s
Rules, see also Best Western City View Motor Inn, 327 NLRB 468, 468-469 (1999). More
importantly, a party need not serve the subpoena on the person specifically authorized to accept
service in order to prove effective service. Control Services, 303 NLRB 481, 483 fn. 13 (1991),
enfd. mem. 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992) (leaving a copy of the subpoena with the receptionist at
the respondent’s principal place of business was effective service on the respondent’s officer
under Section 102.113(c), even if respondent had not authorized the receptionist to accept
service).
Once service is effectuated, a party has an “obligation to begin a good faith effort” to
gather and produce the responsive documents. A party who ignores a subpoena pending a ruling
on a petition to revoke does so at his/her own peril. McAllister Towing & Transportation Co.,
341 NLRB 394, 396-397 (2004), enfd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding judge’s
imposition of evidentiary sanctions against respondent for failing to substantially comply with
the subpoenas upon issuance of the judge’s order partially denying its petition to revoke on the
first day of hearing) (emphasis added). Similarly, the judge can impose sanctions where a party
fails and/or refuses to timely or properly comply with a subpoena. See McAllister Towing, supra.

6 GC Exhs. 4-6; see also Tr. 44-55.
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In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the judge must consider the following
factors: (1) the initial scope and specificity of the subpoena(s) directions; 2) the volume of the
records addressed, and those produced; (3) the nature of the call, or request for production, and
the nature and type of prior responses; (4) other factors of record indicative of the opponent’s
actual intended compliance with subpoena direction, including whether there has been voluntary
prehearing and hearing response, or response to a subsequent ruling on dispute thereon; (5) the
status of the record showing a claim made of prior conduct of a reasonable and diligent search;
(6) the nature of the explanations offered for any late production; (7) the point in the hearing at
which the records were produced; and (8) any other factors reasonably tending to establish that
there was good faith in adherence to the Board’s subpoena process. See People’s Transportation
Service, 276 NLRB 169, 225 (1985).
After considering all of the evidence, including the parties’ arguments in their post-
hearing briefs, I find that sanctions are appropriate against Respondent for refusing to comply
with the General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350, my Order regarding its Petition to
Revoke, and for refusing to produce witness John Hanson (and other witnesses) during the
CGC’s case-in-chief. Respondent’s arguments for its noncompliance are meritless.
First, I find that the subpoenas in question were properly served on Respondent pursuant
to the Board’s Rules.7 Second, the record clearly reveals that the General Counsel’s subpoenas
were clear and unambiguous regarding the documents requested and the witnesses to be
produced. While Respondent argued that production of the subpoenaed documents were
overbroad and unduly burdensome, I previously overruled that argument and, except for three
categories of documents, ordered production of the documents at the hearing. Rather,
Respondent, through counsel, willfully refused to produce any of the subpoenaed documents
despite my ruling and failed to make any of the subpoenaed witnesses available for the CGC’s
case.
I further find that Respondent, by virtue of its Exhibits 1-10, actually located documents
responsive to the subpoena but simply refused to produce them to the CGC. Moreover,
Respondent was fully aware that the CGC properly subpoenaed witness John Hanson (among
others) to testify during the CGC’s case-in-chief, but only made Hanson available for its case-in-
chief. Lastly, but for Respondent’s Exhibits 1-10, none of the documents subpoenaed were
produced at the hearing, and I find Respondent’s rationale for its conduct; i.e., that it sought a
continuance of the hearing so that the attorney originally assigned to the case could try the case,
unpersuasive, at best, and more likely, obstructionist and a wanton disregard of the orders and
authority of the Board. Accordingly, the CGC’s motion to strike is GRANTED.
Because I find that Respondent deliberately refused to comply with the General
Counsel’s subpoenas and my prior Order, I will:
(1) Strike from admission into the record and give no weight to Respondent’s
Exhibits 1-10 proffered during the hearing, see Equipment Trucking Co., 336 NLRB 277, 277 fn.
1 (2001).

7 GC Exhs. 4-6.
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(2) Strike from admission into the record and give no weight to the testimony of
John Hanson who testified on behalf of Respondent, Id.
(3) Permit the CGC to use secondary evidence to prove any element of his case-
in-chief.
Therefore, based upon the record primarily made by the CGC, including my observations
of the demeanor of CGC’s witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the CGC and
Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Global Experience Specialist (GES) is an Arizona corporation, with an office and place
of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.8 GES is an event company engaged in the business of
assembly at trade shows and conventions in Las Vegas and across the United States.9 During a
12-month period ending in December 2013, GES derived gross revenue in excess of $100
million.10 At its Las Vegas location, in 2013, GES purchased and received goods and services
valued in excess of $1,000,000 from points outside the State of Nevada.11 Accordingly, at all
times material, I find that GES is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Although Respondent denied that it is or functions as a union, I find that, at all times
material, Respondent was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Similarly, despite that Respondent refused to identify the names and job titles of its officers,
I find the following individuals held the positions set forth opposite their names and have been
agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act:
Dan’l Cook (Cook) President
Ron Poveromo Secretary Treasurer
John Hanson Business Representative12

8 Tr. 61-62.
9 Id.
10 Tr. 63-64.
11 Tr. 67-68.
12 GC Exhs. 7, 10-12. Jeff Forman (Forman) replaced John Hanson as Respondent’s business representative in January
2014. Respondent objected to the admission of GC Exhs. 11 and 12 on the grounds that the website, www.iatselocal720.com,
could not be properly authenticated as the official website of IATSE Local 720. However, I overrule Respondent’s objection, on
the ground that, since Respondent deliberately refused to produce subpoenaed documents to determine its status, I will allow the
CGC to admit GC Exhs. 11 and 12 as secondary evidence to prove that IATSE Local 720 is, in fact, a labor organization.
Alternatively, I take judicial notice that www.iatselocal720.com is a public website containing the information documented in
GC Exhs. 11 and 12.
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III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent’s Hiring Hall
Respondent operates an exclusive referral service that provides signatory employers with
skilled labor to perform stagehand work at conventions and trade shows in the Las Vegas area.
Respondent has collective-bargaining agreements (“CBA”) with several signatory employers,
including GES, wherein employers are contractually obligated to utilize Respondent as its
exclusive source of employee referrals before the employer can hire employees from another
source.13 These CBAs also govern the terms and conditions of employment for employees
referred out for stagehand work. Respondent has also been the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative for employees working for GES and other employers within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.14
While the specifics of each employer’s referral procedures with Respondent differs
slightly, generally speaking, Respondent’s referral process begins when the signatory employer,
like GES, initiates a call request to Respondent to request employee referrals.15 For each
project, the employer will complete and submit a requisition sheet, specifying the location, date,
and times of the project, as well as the number of positions that need to be filled.16 The
employer may request employees by name for certain positions or have an open call, where
Respondent (versus the employer) determines the best qualified employees for the particular
project.17 Employers also may request that Respondent refrain from referring certain member
users to their jobsites.18
Once Respondent receives a referral request, it must ensure that it expeditiously refers
qualified employees to fulfill the employer’s call request. Prior to 2012, much of the referrals
were handled by telephone calls between the employee users and Respondent’s dispatchers. For
example, prior to 2012, when an employee user was referred work, the employee called the
dispatcher directly to accept or decline work. Also, employee users and the employer often
telephoned one another directly regarding the specifics of a project, including arrival locations
and time changes.
However, in 2012, Respondent implemented a new computerized dispatch system.
Namely, after receiving call requests from employers, like GES, Respondent’s dispatchers would
input the request into an automated or computerized system.19 Thereafter, the automated system
contacts the individual employee to determine if they are available for the project.20 Employee

13 GES is a party to a collective-bargaining agreement requiring that Respondent be the exclusive source for its employment
referrals. See GC Exh. 7
14 Tr. 78-79.
15 Tr. 80-81.
16 GC Exh. 8.
17 Tr. 81-83; 88-90, 108; see also GC Exhs. 7-9.
18 Tr. 109.
19 Tr. 173-175.
20 GC Exhs. 14-15.
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users of the new system were required to register to utilize the automated system and were given
codes and passwords that identified them and allowed them to access and respond to the
automated dispatch system. Also, instead of telephoning the employee user directly, under the
new system, the employer spoke directly with Respondent’s dispatchers to convey any changes
to the project, the dispatchers input the changes into the automated system, and the automated
system would contact the employee user. The effect of the new system essentially eliminated
much of the direct telephone contact between the employee users, Respondent’s dispatchers and
the signatory employer.
B. The Lucas Allegations
1. Facts
Charging Party Lucas is a registered user of Respondent’s referral service. He has used
Respondent’s service for over 30 years. Over the years, Lucas has filed multiple unfair labor
practice (ULP) charges against Respondent challenging almost every aspect of how Respondent
operates its referral service.21 The litigation has spanned over several years and resulted in
substantial acrimony and mistrust between Respondent and Lucas. This mistrust is important to
note, because it forms the backdrop for Respondent’s defense to Lucas’ complaint. Nevertheless,
the acrimony between Lucas and counsel for Respondent was palpable at the hearing.22
In any event, turning to the facts of this case, in early spring of 2013, Lucas began having
concerns over several dispatch errors that he believed cost him work. Specifically, on February
26, 2013, Lucas was referred for work as a tape operator at Caesars Palace (the “Tape operator
job”). Toward the end of his shift, Lucas was asked by Caesars to return the next day, February
27, to continue the job. Lucas agreed to the call back, but he was already scheduled to be sent on
a head audio job (the “A1 job”) at Caesars on February 27.23
Sometime during the evening of February 26, Lucas called Respondent’s dispatcher,
Jennifer Schaffer (“Schaffer”) about the schedule change. However, instead of informing
Schaffer that he was being recalled for the tape operator job on February 27, Lucas simply told
Schaffer to cancel the A1 referral.24 For his part, Lucas admitted that he did not explain to
Schaffer why he canceled the A1 job but indicated that, according to Respondent’s work rules,
he was not required to do so. While Lucas is technically correct that Respondent’s work rules
provide that, when a registered user is called for a job, the user is only required to accept or
decline availability, I find Lucas’ reliance on this technicality disingenuous, because nothing in
Respondent’s work rules prohibited him from disclosing or explaining his unavailability either.

21 See Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visual), 332 NLRB 1 (2000), revd. by Lucas v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 927
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 341 NLRB 1267 (2004); and Stage
Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 352 NLRB 29 (2008) (parties litigated over appropriate remedy); and
Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support Services), 352 NLRB 1081 (2008).
22 Lucas’ responses during cross-examination were oftentimes vague and unresponsive. Lucas initially leaned back in his
chair with a stiffened countenance and body stance, but in answering Respondent counsel’s questions, would lean forward and
cut off counsel to make his point before counsel completed his question. However, Respondent’s counsel’s tone in questioning
Lucas was intended to provoke him to anger.
23 Tr. 212-213.
24 Tr. 213-214.
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Rather, I find, as set forth below, that Lucas was intentionally evasive with his availability and
that evasiveness contributed to the confusion as to his availability the next day.
Despite informing Schaffer that he was unavailable for work on February 27,
Respondent’s automated system continued to call Lucas with referrals. Lucas again called
Schaffer to complain about the repeated automated calls and told her to sign him out from
receiving referrals for 24 to 48 hours.25
Still later that same evening, Carmen Gomez (“Gomez”), a Caesars Palace labor
coordinator, called Respondent and told Schaffer to have Lucas report to Caesars at 8 a.m. versus
7 a.m. on February 27.26 Gomez was referring to the Tape operator job which Lucas was
recalled. However, since Schaffer was unaware that Lucas had been recalled for the tape operator
job, she mistakenly thought that Gomez was calling about the A1 job which Lucas declined. As
such, Schaffer told Gomez that Lucas was unavailable for work on February 27, and Gomez
found another employee to perform the work. When Lucas arrived on February 27 to continue
the Tape operator job, he was told he was no longer needed.27 Lucas was also concerned about
similar dispatching errors that occurred on February 28 and March 10, 2013.28
As a result of these incidents, on March 11, 2013, Lucas emailed Respondent’s Business
Representative, Hanson, Treasurer Poveromo, and President Cook concerning the botched
dispatches.29 Lucas demanded $1500 for his lost wages resulting from the botched referrals and
threatened to file a lawsuit in Clark County, Nevada’s small claims court if he and Respondent
could not resolve the matter. Cook did not take kindly to the litigation threat but agreed to look
into the matter.30
At the hearing, Lucas explained his concerns about the botched dispatches, but he was
vague and evasive in his answers on cross-examination concerning why he failed to disclose his
unavailability to Schaffer. While Lucas testified that he refused to disclose to Respondent his
unavailability for referrals because he thought he would be accused of violating Respondent’s
work rules against job jumping,31 there was no evidence presented that Lucas had ever been
accused of job jumping. Rather, I credit the portion of Lucas’ testimony on cross-examination
where he acknowledged that part of the confusion with his dispatches, and particularly, the
Caesars’ referral, stemmed from his unfamiliarity with Respondent’s new automated system, but
more so, his unwillingness to disclose information to Respondent regarding his availability.
In any event, on or around March 22, 2013, Lucas arrived at Respondent’s offices to pick
up his paycheck. He spoke with Hanson and Cook about the botched dispatches and gave further

25 Tr. 229.
26 Tr. 216-217.
27 GC Exh. 16, see also Tr. 218-222. While Business Representative Hanson testified regarding Respondent’s version of the
Caesars Palace mix-up, his testimony will not be considered based upon my previously imposed sanction against Respondent.
28 GC Exh. 16.
29 Id.
30 GC Exh. 17.
31 Tr. 223.
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details about the Caesars Palace mix-up.32 According to Lucas, Hanson acknowledged that the
dispatchers did not know the difference between an A1 and Tape operator job, something Lucas
believed the dispatchers should have been able to differentiate.33 In any case, Hanson told Lucas
that Lucas could file a claim with Respondent for the botched referrals, and if Respondent found
merit to the claim, it would pay him $100 for any losses resulting from the botched dispatch.34
Lucas’ account of the conversation stands uncontroverted.35
Later that same day, Lucas emailed Hanson and Cook, stating that he considered $100
insufficient to reimburse him for his lost wages. However, in order to get to the bottom of the
botched dispatches, Lucas requested access to Respondent’s dispatch records so he could clarify
how the dispatching referrals were handled. Lucas told Hanson and Cook that he would pursue a
ULP charge with the Board if he did not receive the requested information.36
In response to Lucas’ email, on March 27, 2013, Hanson emailed Lucas and attached
Lucas’ “current years dispatch record,” which included his referrals for a 3-month period from
January through March 2013.37 Lucas testified that he believed the information provided was
unresponsive to his request because it only contained information on his referrals; and as such,
he was unable to determine how the mix-up in the dispatches occurred. Because of this, Lucas
grew suspicious that Respondent was not only withholding information but was unfairly
referring him out for work.38 Thereafter, Lucas filed a lawsuit in small claims court and, on April
29, 2013, filed a ULP charge against Respondent (Case 28-CB-103922).39 On May 21, 2013,
Lucas withdrew the ULP charge.40
Despite withdrawing the ULP charge, Lucas remained suspicious that Respondent was
“hiding something” from him concerning the botched dispatches. Specifically, Lucas testified:
JUDGE THOMPSON: Did you have reason to believe—and I think this is what
Mr. Gollin just asked—that there were other anomalies in your dispatching?
THE WITNESS: Yes, they weren't giving me any information. So I had reason to
believe, in the past, dispatch had been operated—they fired a dispatcher for the
hiring hall being operated in an unfair and discriminatory manner. And they would
not respond to me with the information I wanted. So I was suspicious that there's
thing[s] that were being kept from members or non-members or registrants. So
that's what led me to request information so I could determine if the hiring hall was
being operated in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.41

32 Tr. 185-186.
33 Id.
34 Tr. 184-186.
35 I will not consider Hanson’s testimony regarding this discussion due to the previously imposed sanction against
Respondent. See supra at 4-5.
36 GC Exh. 18.
37 GC Exh. 19.
38 Tr. 188-192.
39 GC Exh. 20.
40 GC Exh. 21.
41 Tr. 195-196.
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Therefore, on June 4, 2013, Lucas emailed a second, more specific information request to Cook,
Hanson, and Poveromo. This request stated:

Dear John Hanson, Business Representative IATSE Local 720 Stagehands, Danl'
Cook, President IATSE Local 720 Stagehands, Ronald Poveromo, Secretary
Treasurer IATSE Local 720 Stagehands,
I wish to review all dispatch records to insure the IATSE 720 Stagehands hiring
hall is operated in a non discriminatory fashion. I am also requesting the current
rules and procedures to be eligible for dispatch through IATSE Local 720
Stagehands hiring hall.
To emphasize, I respectfully request to review all dispatch records, for all jobs
Local 720 stagehands has dispatched any referent, to any employer signatory to a
contract with 720 Stagehands.
Myself and other referents are seeking the IATSE Local 720 Stagehands dispatch
records of all referents, and all jobs, to all employers signatory to a collective
bargaining agreement with Local 720 Stagehands from May 2012 to April 30,
2013.
Additionally, Steven Lucas and other referents are requesting dispatch records of
all referents, and all jobs, to all employers signatory to a collective bargaining
agreement with Local 720 Stagehands from December 4, 2012 to June 4, 2013.
Provide the requested dispatch information within 14 days of this writing
otherwise I have no alternative than to file an Unfair Labor Practice with the
National Labor Relations Board.
Very truly yours,
Steven Lucas
Referent #10163242
It is undisputed that Respondent received Lucas’ June 4 letter but did not respond to it.43
It is also undisputed that Respondent never contacted Lucas regarding the request, never told him
that it had concerns about responding to the request, and never provided him with any of the
requested information.

42 GC Exh. 22.
43 Tr. 402-405.
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2. Analysis
Counsel for the General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
(b)(2) of the Act when it refused to give Lucas access to over 1 year’s worth of Respondent’s job
referral records showing the names of all member user’s that were referred jobs and the names of
the employers to whom they were referred between May 2012 and June 2013.
Under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, a union, acting as an exclusive hiring hall, owes its
member users a duty of fair representation by operating that hall in a fair and nondiscriminatory
manner. Radio Electronics Officers Union, 306 NLRB 43 fn. 2 (1992). Concomitant with that
duty, the union is also required to provide users with information sufficient so they can
intelligently challenge the hiring hall structure and determine whether it operates fairly. Id.
Therefore, the union violates the Act when it arbitrarily denies a request for job referral
information if the request is reasonably directed toward ascertaining whether the user has been
treated fairly. However, the union can avoid liability if it can show that its refusal to provide the
requested information is necessary to vindicate legitimate union interests.44
In this case, Respondent advances several arguments in denying liability. First,
Respondent avers that it is not a hiring hall. This argument is completely without merit.
In Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employees Assn.), 317 NLRB 1099 (1995), the
Board adopted specific elements to establish whether a labor organization is an exclusive hiring
hall. First, Respondent must be a “labor organization,” and, second, its actions must have
affected “employees.” Regarding the first element, despite Respondent’s denials, I have already
determined that Respondent is and has always been a “labor organization” within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. My conclusion is based upon record evidence; and specifically, that
under Section 2(5): (a) Respondent is an organization in which employees participate; (b) it
exists inter alia for the purpose of dealing with grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, and/or
other terms and conditions of work of persons performing stagehand work within the Las Vegas
area and the surrounding counties; and (c) it admits that it is the “sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit,” under Article 3 of
Respondent’s CBA with GES.45 In addition, prior Board decisions have concluded that
Respondent is a labor organization.
For the second element, Respondent’s actions have “affected employees” as Lucas fell
into the general class of jobseekers using Respondent’s hiring hall, so he was an “employee” for
purposes of Section 8(b)(1)(A).46

44 Carpenters Local 608 (Various Employers), 279 NLRB 747 (1986), enfd. 811 F2d 149 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied 484
U.S. 817 (1987); Carpenters Local 35 (Construction Employees Assn.), 317 NLRB 18 (1995) (Board found respondent union
violated Act by refusing to disclose and make copies of requested hiring hall records showing job referrals for all users during 6-
month period); see also Boilermakers Local 197 (Northeastern State Boilermaker Employers), 318 NLRB 205 (1995), citing
Carpenters Local 35, supra; and NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 139, 796 F.2d 985, 992-994 (7th Cir. 1986).
45 GC Exh. 7.
46 See Houston Chapter, AGC, 143 NLRB 409, 412 (1963).
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Now, when a union is alleged to have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to fulfill its
duty of fair representation in connection with operating a hiring hall, a third element must be
established. That is, the union's hiring hall is an ‘exclusive’ one; “for absent that showing, the
duty of fair representation does not attach.”47 A union’s hiring hall is “exclusive” if it is an
employer’s initial or primary source for employees.48
In this case, this element is also met as Respondent’s agreement with GES specifically
provides that Respondent serves as GES’ sole and exclusive source of referrals of employees for
GES’ stagehand work.49 Moreover, I credit Noel Cummins’, GES’ rigging department’s senior
operations manager, uncontroverted testimony that Respondent and GES have, in practice, an
exclusive referral arrangement.50 Finally, and most importantly, the Board has repeatedly found
Respondent to be an exclusive hiring hall so it is unclear to me why Respondent chose to argue
this point in the first place.51 Nevertheless, I find that Respondent is clearly a union that acts and
continues to act as an exclusive hiring hall for its users looking for stagehand work in the Las
Vegas metropolitan area.
Because I have concluded that Respondent is a union that acted as an exclusive hiring
hall, the duty of fair representation attaches to Respondent regarding the operation of its hiring
hall. As such, Respondent must provide its users with sufficient information, if requested, so they
can determine whether they are being treated fairly. On this point, Respondent argues that it was
justified in denying Lucas’ information request because he “is not a member of” the union. Yet,
Respondent cites absolutely no authority for this proposition. In fact, it cannot rely on Board
precedent because the Board has held that a union that acts as a hiring hall owes a duty of fair
representation to all users of the hall regardless of union membership.52 What’s more,
Respondent, by virtue of being the opposing party in multiple charges filed by Lucas, was and
remains fully aware that Lucas has challenged being denied access to job referral information
when he was not a member of Local 720.53
Equally unavailing is Respondent’s argument that it was justified in denying Lucas’
information request because the request “was not directed toward ascertaining whether or not he
had been treated fairly.”54 Respondent’s argument, made for the first time during the hearing
and in its post-hearing brief, is premised on the fact that Lucas’ request for approximately one
years’ worth of dispatch records was overbroad and unreasonable given the “one” botched

47 Carpenters Local 102, supra at 1102, citing Teamsters Local 460 (Superior Asphalt), 300 NLRB 441 (1990).
48 See Stage Employees IASTE Local 7, 339 NLRB 214, 216-217 (2003) (exclusive referral service exists where parties’
contract states that employer “will give the Union first opportunity to furnish, and the Union agrees to furnish, applicants for
employment with the requisite skills”).
49 GC Exh. 7.
50 Tr. 90-92.
51 See Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visual), 332 NLRB 1 fn. 5 (2000), revd. on other grounds by Lucas
v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 341 NLRB 1267
(2004); and Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 352 NLRB 29 (2008); and Stage Employees IATSE
Local 720 (Production Support Services), 352 NLRB 1081(2008).
52 See Carpenters Local 608, supra; see also Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 89 (1989).
53 See, e.g., Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support Services), 352 NLRB 1081 (2008).
54 R. Br. at 15.
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referral in February 2013 that cost him the Caesars Palace call back. Respondent relies on the
Board’s decision in Millwrights to limit a request for dispatch records to 6 months. However, the
Board never set such a definitive limit.55 In Millwrights, the charging party filed a charge against
respondent union, an exclusive hiring hall, for denying his request for approximately one year’s
worth of dispatch records. The charging party requested these records because he believed the
union breached a prior settlement agreement between he and respondent that was signed
approximately a year prior to the records request. Yet the Board, in adopting the judge’s
decision, found that the parties previously agreed between themselves that the charging party
was entitled to six months worth of dispatch records and noted no precedent limiting the look
back period to six months. In fact, it was unclear whether “it was legally appropriate to equate an
employee’s look back rights with Section 10(b)’s 6-month rule.”56
However, even assuming that Lucas is limited to requesting six months worth of dispatch
records, Respondent failed to provide even those records. In fact, it never responded in any way
to Lucas’ request and offered no explanation or justification to Lucas for its refusal to comply
with his request. As the judge held in Millwrights, I find that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(2) and (1)(A) by refusing to provide any of the requested records.
Finally, Respondent avers that its decision to deny Lucas’ records request was not
arbitrary because it had a duty to protect the privacy and safety of its members and Lucas had no
compelling reason for requesting the records. However, this defense is also unpersuasive for
several reasons. First, Respondent has not shown that the dispatch records contained such
“confidential” information for which it had to protect. In fact, Lucas was only requesting
referant’s dispatches, i.e., what jobs registered users were referred, when and by whom. Even if
Lucas would have been privy to confidential information such as a referant’s name, address, or
social security number, Respondent could have (and should have) redacted that information from
the records. Instead, it simply refused to turn over the requested documents.
Second, although Respondent raises a myriad of First Amendment defenses, these
constitutional protections do not attach to the release of dispatch records (versus the release of a
union’s membership list) which the Board clearly determined do not infringe upon one’s First
Amendment rights.57 Third, even if First Amendment protections were at issue here, not only has
Respondent failed to show that the referants on its list had any reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding the disclosure of their names, addresses, telephone, or social security numbers
(assuming that this information was contained on Respondent’s dispatch records), Respondent
never raised any of these concerns with Lucas at the time of his request (or at any time prior to
submitting its post-hearing brief); for if Respondent had, Lucas and Respondent could have dealt
with those concerns accordingly. Again, Respondent ignored Lucas’ June 2013 information
request.
I also find Lucas had a compelling reason (assuming he needed one) for requesting
Respondent’s dispatch records. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion that Lucas’ “one botched”

55 Millwrights, supra at 1099 fn. 2. The Board passed on the question of whether a registered user of a hiring hall is limited
to requesting only 6 months of dispatching records.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Millwright, supra, Carpenters Local 608, supra.
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referral did not warrant his request for over a year’s worth of dispatch records, the record reveals
that Lucas became concerned about Respondent’s operation back in 2012. Lucas challenged
Respondent’s denial of his information requests in separate litigation. Then, in 2013, Lucas
experienced three “botched” referrals that occurred between February and March 2013. Once
this occurred, Lucas requested job referral information from Respondent but Respondent’s
disclosures were not responsive to his request. Thus, it was the series of events over a span of
two years that raised Lucas’ concern about Respondent’s operation. That fact alone, I conclude,
was sufficient for Lucas’ June 2013 request for records from Respondent.58
Respondent further argues that Lucas’ June 2013 request was made in bad faith. Here,
Respondent points to Lucas’ persistent evasiveness with Respondent about his availability which
contributed to the confusion with the Caesars Palace call back. However, Lucas’ behavior did
not make his June 2013 request any less compelling.59 Rather, I must consider Lucas’ reason for
requesting the dispatch records to determine if the request was “reasonably directed toward
determining whether [Lucas] was treated fairly.”60 Respondent, relying on the litigiousness and
animosity between it and Lucas, infers that Lucas’ reasons for his June 2013 request was made to
further harass Respondent. However, I could posit that that same animosity is what motivated
Respondent to ignore Lucas’ request. Be that as it may, while it is clear from the record that there
is no love lost between Lucas and Respondent, I find no evidence that Lucas’ request for
Respondent’s dispatch records was made in bad faith. Rather, I credit Lucas’ testimony that he
grew suspicious overall of Respondent’s operation when he kept experiencing “botched”
referrals, requested referral information from Respondent (March 2013) to get to the bottom of it
but was only provided with his referrals. Lucas grew even more concerned that Respondent was
withholding information and requested more specific information on all user’s job referrals (June
2013), but after doing so, received no response from Respondent. Although I cannot award
Lucas backpay since I find that his evasiveness regarding his availability contributed to the
February 2013 “botched” referral and I have no evidence in the record as to his lost wages for
any of the other “botched” referrals, Lucas’ reasons behind his March and June 2013
information requests were nevertheless made in good faith. Simply put, Respondent’s arguments
fail to protect it from liability.
Accordingly, I find Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act when it
breached its duty of fair representation owed to Lucas by arbitrarily refusing to comply with his
June 2013 information request.

58 GC Exh. 22.
59 At the hearing, Respondent also attempted to show that Lucas’ information request was made in bad faith by painting
Lucas as a paranoid, violent, racist, and sexist individual who takes no responsibility for his own actions. These allegations
are more thoroughly delineated in the CGC’s brief. However, all of these assertions are irrelevant in determining whether
Respondent violated the Act by failing/refusing to provide Lucas with the information he requested. Moreover, to the
extent Respondent proffered documents or testimony to support its theory, they are striken and given no weight due to the
previously imposed sanction against it.
60 See fn. 44, supra.
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C. The Richardson Allegations
1. Facts
Charging Party Richardson is a registered user of Respondent’s referral service. He has
used the service for 10 years.61 In late 2012, at Respondent’s offices, Richardson was involved
in a verbal confrontation with coworker, Antoine (Jersey) Gilliam.62 During the confrontation,
Richardson threatened Gilliam with physical harm. After the altercation, Richardson met with
Business Representative Hanson for assistance in dealing with Gilliam. However, Richardson
felt that Hanson failed to act on his concerns, and he became frustrated, loud, and verbally
abusive with Hanson.
On December 27, 2012, Hanson sent Richardson a letter advising that:
In accordance with Article VIII of Work Rules and Procedures for Referents,
which we have included for your reference, you are in violation of Article VIII,
Section 1B(iv): Verbal assault against or threatening harm to any referent, Union
employee, Job Steward, Union official or Employer representative while at work,
or in connection with work. This includes threatening or abusive language to the
employees at the Union office.63
The letter added that Richardson was being fined $1000 for his conduct toward Gilliam and
Hanson. Additionally, Richardson would be suspended from the referral service if he failed to
pay the fine. Richardson was advised that the fine and suspension would be held in abeyance if
he appealed the fine. 64
Under Respondent’s work rules, disciplinary infractions are divided into three categories:
major, moderate, and minor offenses. Major offenses include, but are not limited to: conviction
of felony related to work, physical assaults, or theft at work. Moderate offenses include but are
not limited to: harassment, verbal assault, conduct or behavior damaging to union’s contractual
relations, or consumption of alcohol or controlled substances at work. Minor offenses include but
are not limited to: failure to appear before the rules committee, chronic tardiness (defined as
three (3) times in twelve (12) consecutive months), job jumping, failure to notify the Union
before performing nonunion work that falls within the traditional scope of the Union's
jurisdiction, or failure to maintain current valid address with Local 720.65
Each category of offenses results in a fine but the amount of the fine depends on the type
and number of offenses. Specially, article VIII, section 2 provides:

61 Tr. 273.
62 Tr. 406-407.
63 GC Exh. 23
64 Id.
65 GC Exh. 13
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Major Offenses:
i) First offense in a twenty-four (24) month period $2,000 fine
ii) Second offense in a twenty-four (24) month period $5,000 fine
iii)Third offense in a twenty-four (24) month period $10,000 fine
Moderate Offenses:
i) First offense in a twenty-four (24) month period $1,000 fine
ii) Second offense in a twenty-four (24) month period $2,000 fine
iii)Third offense in a twenty-four (24) month period $5,000 fine
Minor Offenses:
i) First offense in a twelve month period $100 fine
ii) Second offense in a twelve month period $200 fine
iii) Third offense in a twelve month period $300 fine
iv) Four minor offenses within a twelve-month period equal a moderate
offense66
Section 3 of article VIII provides:
. . . . Failure to pay a minor offense fine within fourteen (14) days from the time
the fine is imposed shall result in removal from the Local 720 referral system
until such fine is paid. Failure to pay a moderate or major fine with in thirty five
(35) days, from the time the fine is imposed shall result in removal from the
Local 720 referral system until such fine is paid.67
Additionally, article VII, section 2 provides:
. . . . Failure to pay the fine in the allowed period of time as per Article VIII,
Section 3, will result in automatic suspension from the Local 720 referral system
until such fine is paid. In case of appeal, no penalty shall be imposed until the
appeal procedure has been completed.68
It is undisputed that Richardson successfully appealed his fine and suspension. However,
he was warned that if he was involved in a similar infraction within a 24-month period, he would
be suspended from the referral service and fined $2000.69 Unfortunately, Richardson did not
heed the warning.
In or around March 28, 2013, Richardson was involved in another confrontation with
Gilliam. This time, however, the altercation led to Richardson physically assaulting Gilliam
outside of Respondent’s offices. On April 3, 2013, Hanson sent Richardson a letter advising him

66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id., see also GC Exh. 13.
69 GC Exh. 24.
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that he had again violated Respondent’s work rules, was being fined $2000 for his conduct and
that he would be suspended until he paid the fine.70 Richardson again appealed the fine and
suspension.71
On July 11, 2013, Respondent denied the appeal, fined Richardson $4000 and informed
him that if he failed to pay the fine, he would be suspended from the referral list.72 It is
undisputed that Richardson did not pay the fine, and he was suspended from the referral list
effective June 25, 2013.73 Thereafter, he filed the instant unfair labor practice charge.
At the hearing, Richardson testified that, in late November 2013, he called President
Cook to discuss his fine and suspension.74 According to Richardson, he asked Cook if Cook
would allow him return to work and work off the $4000 fine by deducting set amounts from his
paycheck. Cook declined this suggestion and told Richardson he needed to pay the fine in full
before he could return to the referral list. Yet, seemingly in the next breath, Cook also mentioned
that he might consider allowing Richardson to pay off the fine in installments but it is undisputed
that Richardson did not work off the fine.75 In any event, Richardson remained off work
following this conversation. Because Respondent declined to cross-examine or recall
Richardson, Richardson’s testimony stands uncontroverted.76
Richardson testified that, after Region 28 issued its Consolidated and Amended
Consolidated Complaint in late November 2013, Cook called him into Respondent’s offices.
According to Richardson, Cook told him that he would rescind the $4000 fine and return him to
work if he agreed to withdraw his ULP charge against Respondent. Richardson verbally agreed,
and in or around January 2, 2014, Respondent began referring Richardson out for work.
However, Richardson felt that Respondent continued to harass him and only allowed him to
return to work because he agreed to withdraw his ULP charge. Richardson did not withdraw his
ULP charge.
It is undisputed that Richardson was suspended from Respondent’s referral service from
June 25, 2013, to January 2, 2014. Respondent again declined to cross-examine or recall
Richardson, so his testimony stands uncontroverted.
2. Analysis
The CGC alleges that Respondent violated the Act when it suspended Richardson from
its referral list and prevented him from working until he paid a $4000 fine for violating
Respondent’s work rules. Respondent counters, arguing that it was justified in suspending

70 GC Exh. 25.
71 Tr. 276-278.
72 Tr. 278-279, see also GC Exh. 27.
73 Tr. 279-280.
74 Tr. 280-281.
75 Tr. 281.
76 Respondent offered Hanson’s testimony concerning Richardson’s threats and the actions taken against Richardson in
response to him violating Respondent’s work rules. Respondent also offered various documents to support Hanson’s testimony.
However, I struck Hanson’s testimony and will give no weight to any of Respondent’s documented evidence due to the
previously imposed sanction.
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Richardson from its referral service in order to protect the safety of its employees and staff from
Richardson’s threatening and violent behavior.
In his brief, the CGC argues that, based upon Board precedent, I should determine that
any union hiring hall rule that suspends users from its referral service to enforce a fine is patently
unlawful.77 I decline to so find. Rather, the Board has consistently held that a union rule
suspending a user from its referral service for failing to pay a fine/assessment is presumptively
unlawful unless the union can show that the rule was necessary to the effective performance of
its representative functions.78 Although the Board has found that a union cannot necessarily tie
an employment-related sanction (i.e., not referring an employee) to the collection of a fine,79 the
Board nevertheless evaluates the reasons behind the union imposing the fine.80
In this case, I find that both Respondent’s rule and how it was applied to Richardson,
violates the Act. Initially, Respondent argues, for the first time at hearing, that it never intended
to collect the $4000 fine from Richardson. Rather, Respondent avers that it only imposed the fine
so Richardson would “chill out” from his threatening behavior. However, the plain reading of
Respondent’s disciplinary letter clearly indicates that it intended to suspend Richardson from its
referral service until he paid the $4000 fine. In fact, I credit Richardson’s unrebutted testimony
that, when he tried to make arrangements with Respondent to pay the fine in installments and
return to work, Cook declined to return him to work until the fine was paid in full. To that end, I
find this case identical to the Board’s decision in Fisher Theatre, where the Board adopted the
judge’s finding that Respondent violated the Act when it unlawfully suspended two employees
from its referral services who violated union work rules and refused to return them to work until
their fines were paid in full.81
Respondent next argues that it rebutted the presumption that its actions regarding
Richardson were unlawful because Richardson’s suspension was necessary to protect the safety
of its staff and others from his continuing threatening behavior.82 However, the Board has
previously found this very argument unpersuasive in rebutting that presumption.83 Thus, while
Respondent is certainly free to impose fines/assessments when users violate its internal work
rules, it simply cannot enforce the fine by excluding users from its service.

77 GC Br. at 36-40.
78 Fisher Theatre, 240 NLRB 678, 691 (1979) (a union rule that prohibits referrals for nonpayment of fine is ordinarily
unlawful regardless of why the fine was imposed) (emphasis added).
79 See, e.g., Longshoremen ILWU Local 13 (Pacific Maritime Assn), 228 NLRB 1383, 1385 (1977).
80 See Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support Services), 352 NRLB 1081, 1086 (2008) (the ALJ determined that
“. . . nonpayment of a fine, per se, has nothing to do with the union’s representative function. It is the reason for imposing the
fine that must be scrutinized. As the cases above have demonstrated, there may be legitimate and lawful reasons for imposing
fines that result in removal from a referral system. These cases must be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis.”) (emphasis added).
81 Fisher Theatre, supra at fn. 77.
82 Respondent again introduced testimonial and documentary evidence through John Hanson concerning how Richardson’s
outbursts and continued threatening behavior was so pervasive it caused employers to issue “no hire” letters for Richardson.
However, as previously stated, I give this testimonial and documentary evidence no weight due to the sanction against
Respondent.
83 Longshoremen ILWU Local 13 (Pacific Maritime Assn), 228 NLRB at 1385, enfd. 581 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
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Respondent also claims its actions in fining/suspending Richardson were not unfair,
arbitrary or unlawfully motivated. However, the fact that Respondent initially asserted that it
never intended to enforce the fine against Richardson reinforces the fact that its actions were
arbitrary. Moreover, I find the evidence supports that Respondent had an unlawful motive as I
credit Richardson’s unrebutted testimony that Respondent only tolled the fine and returned
Richardson to work when he verbally agreed to withdraw the instant charge.
Lastly, Respondent raised several affirmative defenses in its answer (i.e., the complaint
was untimely, unconstitutional, inequitable, and a waste of Board resources) but failed to
elaborate or present any evidence to support these defenses. Thus, Respondent’s defenses are
hereby waived. Furthermore, to the extent Respondent argues the equitable defenses of
estoppels, unclean hands, laches and waiver, the Board has declined to recognize these defenses
in its proceedings.84 Accordingly, all of Respondent’s arguments and defenses fail to rebut the
presumption that its rule and how it was applied to Richardson were unlawful.
Therefore, I find Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act when it
breached its duty of fair representation owed to Richardson by suspending him from its referral
service and preventing him from returning to work until he paid all fines levied against him.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent IATSE Local 720 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act when it breached its duty of
fair representation it owed Charging Party Steven Lucas by failing/refusing Lucas’ June 2013
request for access to job referral records.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act when it breached its duty of
fair representation it owed to Charging Party Jamy Richardson by suspending him from
Respondent’s referral service and preventing Richardson from returning to work until he paid all
fines levied against him.
4. By engaging in the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the

84 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 271 NRLB 343, 346 (1984); Woodworkers (Kimtruss Corp.), 304 NLRB 1 (1991);
NLRB v. J.H. RutterRex Mfg Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969); Gulf States Mfg, Inc., 598 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1979).
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following recommended85
ORDER
The Respondent, IATSE Local 720 of Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Arbitrarily refusing to allow Steven Lucas access to referral/dispatch
records or other job referral information that would assist Lucas to determine his relative
referral position or ascertain whether he is being or has been treated fairly regarding job
referrals.
(b) Enforcing a fine levied against Jamy Richardson for violating
Respondent’s Work Rules by suspending him from Respondent’s referral service.
(c) Maintaining a rule, policy and/or practice of enforcing a fine levied against
a member user/referant for violating Respondent’s work rules by excluding a member-
user/referant from its referral service until full payment of the fine is received.
(d) Threatening, encouraging, coercing or offering a “quid pro quo” to any
member-user/referrant to withdraw or not to pursue a charge or complaint against
Respondent with the National Labor Relations Board in exchange for nonpayment of a
fine levied against them.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Allow Lucas to look at, take notes on, and/or photocopy (at his expense), all job
referral/dispatch records in Respondent’s possession, of all referants and all jobs, to all signatory
employers to a collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent for the period from May 2012
to June 4, 2013, to help Lucas determine his relative referral position or ascertain whether he is
being or has been treated fairly regarding job referrals by Respondent.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for
examination and copying, all records matching the foregoing descriptions in paragraph (a).
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its offices or hiring halls,
wherever they may be maintained copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix 1”86 in both

85 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and
recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
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English and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 28, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees and members are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
Respondent customarily communicates with its members and employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced
or covered by any other material.
(d) Rescind or revise Respondent’s work rules to make clear to employees, members
and/or referants that Respondent will no longer enforce a fine levied against a referant/registered
user for violating Respondent’s work rules by suspending or otherwise causing a referant to be
excluded from its referral service until full payment of the fine has been received.
(e) Notify all employees, member users and/or referants of the rescinded or revised
rule to include providing them a copy of the revised policy/rule or specific notification that the
policy/rule/practice has been rescinded.
(f) Calculate and reimburse Jamy Richardson for all wages lost resulting from his
suspension from Respondent’s referral service during the period from June 25, 2013, to January
2, 2014.
(g) Calculate and make Richardson whole for any loss of any other monetary benefits,
retirement contributions and/or any other benefits suffered as a result of the unlawful suspension.
(h) Remove or expunge from its files and records all references to Richardson’s
suspension from Respondent’s referral service for failing to pay fines levied against him, and
within 3 days thereafter, notify Richardson in writing that Respondent has done so and that it
will not use the unlawful suspension against Richardson in any way.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its offices or hiring halls,
wherever they may be maintained copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix 2”87 in both
English and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 28, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees and members are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
Respondent customarily communicates with its members and employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced
or covered by any other material.
_________________________
86 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
87 Id.
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(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification by a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply with this Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 7, 2014
_________________________________
Lisa D. Thompson
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX 1
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union.
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer.
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection.
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT arbitrarily refuse to respond to or arbitrarily deny your request for access to
referral/dispatch records or other job referral information to help you ascertain whether you are
being or have been treated fairly regarding job referrals.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL maintain our duty of fair representation as guaranteed you by the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL allow Charging Party Steven Lucas to look at, take notes about, and/or photocopy (at
his expense), all job referral/dispatch records in our possession, of all referants and all jobs, to all
signatory employers to our collective bargaining agreement for the period from May 2012 to
June 4, 2013, to help Lucas determine whether he is being or has been treated fairly regarding
job referrals.
WE WILL preserve, and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for
examination and copying, all records matching the foregoing descriptions.
IATSE LOCAL 720
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800, Phoenix, AZ 85004-3099
(602) 640-2160, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CB-107693 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (602) 640-2146.
APPENDIX 2
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union.
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer.
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection.
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a policy, rule or practice of enforcing a fine levied against you for
violating our internal Work Rules by suspending or otherwise excluding you from our referral
service.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, encourage or offer you a “quid pro quo” where we state,
offer, refer or in any way suggest that you not pursue or file or that you withdraw a charge(s) or
complaint(s) against us with the National Labor Relations Board in exchange for rescinding a
fine levied against you.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL maintain our duty of fair representation as guaranteed you by the National Labor
Relations Board
WE WILL rescind or revise our internal Work Rules to make clear to you that we will no longer
enforce a fine levied against you for violating our internal work rules by suspending or otherwise
excluding you from our referral service until full payment of the fine is received.
WE WILL notify all employees, member-users and/or referrants of the rescinded or revised
rule, policy and/or practice to include providing you with a copy of the revised policy/rule or
specific notification that the policy/rule/practice has been rescinded
WE WILL reimburse Charging Party Jamy Richardson for wages lost resulting from his
suspension from our referral service during the period from June 25, 2013 to January 2, 2014.
WE WILL remove or expunge all records of and references to Charging Party Richardson’s
suspension from our referral service for failing to pay fines levied against him.
IATSE LOCAL 720
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800, Phoenix, AZ 85004-3099
(602) 640-2160, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CB-107693 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (602) 640-2146.