Interboro Chevrolet Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 25, 1955

111 N.L.R.B. 783 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

INTERBORO CHEVROLET CO., INC. 783
The Board, on December 16, 1954, denied the Union's motion to quash
and extended the time to respond to the aforesaid notice to show cause
to January 17, 1955.
Thereafter, by letter to the Board dated January 12, 1955, counsel
for the Union stated that the Union "is prepared to demonstrate to
your Chief Field Examiner in the 20th Regional Office . . . that it
has complied with Section 9 (f) (B) (2) and (g) of the Act .. .
upon his request." The Union made no further response.
The Board, having duly considered the matter, finds that said letter
of January 12, 1955, does not show sufficient cause in response to the
Board's notice to show cause why a determination of noncompliance
should not issue. The Union's statement that it "is" prepared to show
that it has met all of the conditions necessary to valid compliance
status-not to the Board, as directed, but to its Chief Field Examiner
in San Francisco, upon his further request-is an utter failure to
comply with the Board's order in this proceeding. The order was
clear and unequivocal, and the Union chose to disregard it completely.
Accordingly, no cause having been shown why the Board should not
proceed as indicated in the aforesaid notice, and in the interest of
protecting its own processes from abuse, we find that National Union
of Marine Cooks and Stewards, Independent, has failed to show that
it has furnished to all its members copies of its financial report, as
prescribed in Section 9 (f) (B) (2) and (g) of the Act, and therefore,
has not fully complied with said provisions of the Act, and
IT IS HEREBY ADMINISTRATIVELY DETERMINED that National Union
of Marine Cooks and Stewards, Independent, has not been and is not
now in compliance with the requirements of Section 9 (f) (B) (2)
and (g) of the Act.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that no further benefits under the Act be
accorded to National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, Inde-
pendent, or to any of its affiliates or constituent units, until the Union
has complied with the requirements of Section 9 (f) (B) (2) and (g)
of the Act.
INTERBORO CHEVROLET CO., INC. and JOHN J. ROBINSON, JR., PETI-
TIONER and LOCAL 596, GARAGE, PARKING AND SERVICE STATION
EMPLOYEES' UNION, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL AND
LOCAL 724, DISTRICT 1, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
AFL. Case No. 4-RD-142. February 25, 1955
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Joseph A. Weston, hearing
III NLRB No. 127.
784 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer sells and services motor vehicles at its place of
business located at Glenolden, Pennsylvania. In 1953 it made out-
of-State purchases valued in excess of $1,000,000. During the period
from January to November 1954, the Employer's out-of-State pur-
chases were valued at approximately $989,500. Upon the foregoing
facts, and the entire record, we find, contrary to the Unions' conten-
tion, that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
in this case.2
2. The Petitioner asserts that the Unions are no longer the bar-
gaining representative, as defined in Section 9 (a) of the Act, of
certain employees of the Employer. As appears below, the Unions
are currently recognized by the Employer as the collective-bargaining
representative of the employees involved.
3. On September 16, 1954, the Unions and the Employer conducted
an election among the employees designated in the petition pursuant
to an agreement in which the Unions agreed that they would not "seek
representation" for a year if they should lose the election. A majority
of the employees in the unit voted for the Unions in that election.
The Employer has since recognized the Unions as the bargaining
representative of its employees. The Unions contend that the afore-
mentioned election is a bar to the instant decertification petition,
which was filed on November 5, 1954.
We do not believe that sufficient safeguards are provided in the type
of election in question to protect employees in the exercise of their
choice of a bargaining representative, and are therefore unwilling to
accord to the results of such an election the salve effect we would
attach to a determination of representatives based upon an election
conducted by a Government agency, or upon one privately conducted,
but with an impartial overseer in charge, wherein the true desires of
employees with respect to representation are reflected with a high
degree of certainty.' We find, therefore, that the election conducted
by the Employer and the Unions is no bar to a Board election at
this time.
Accordingly, we find that a question affecting commerce exists con-
cerning the representation of employees of the Employer within the
meaning of Section 9 ( c) (1) and Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
4. We find, in accord with the stipulation of the parties, that all
automotive maintenance and service employees employed by the Em-
1 For reasons set forth below, the Unions ' motion to dismiss is hereby denied.
z See William T Wilson and Mabel J. Wilson, d /b/a Wilson-Oldsmobile, 110 NLRB 534;
Clauson's Garage Company, 110 NLRB 1178.
3 The decision in Punch Press Repair Corporation, 89 NLRB 614, is overruled to the ex-
tent that it is inconsistent with the views exlnessed herein
INTERBORO CHEVROLET CO., INC. 785
ployer at its Glenolden, Pennsylvania, establishment, excluding office
clerical employees, new- and used-car salesmen, watchmen, and super-
visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b)
of the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
MEMBER MURDOCii, dissenting :
I concur in the majority's decision to overrule the principle estab-
lished in the Punch Press case with which I have always disagreed.
However, I cannot agree with the result my colleagues reach in this
case for I would go one step further than they and find that the elec-
tion conducted by the Employer and the Union on September 16, 1954,
bars the petition filed herein less than 2 months thereafter. I can
perceive no logical basis for holding, as the majority does, that the
results of that secret-ballot election which, so far as the record shows,
was free from any irregularities, must be disregarded by this Board
merely because the election was conducted by the interested parties
rather than the Board or a disinterested third party. I believe en-
couragement of voluntarism in collective bargaining should be of
prime concern to the Board for it is the base upon which industrial
stability is built. To this end, whenever possible, the Board should
give effect to any voluntary arrangement agreed to by the parties for
the purpose of resolving their differences without recourse to the
Board's processes. In my opinion, the majority's holding in this case
which limits the forum in which majority status may be determined
to the Board and impartial third parties, while a step in the right
direction, nevertheless constitutes an impediment to that voluntarism
which we should encourage. Moreover, by limiting the parties in their
selection of an election forum, the Board invites the unnecessary use
of its election machinery.
I believe that where, as here, an employer and a union by agreement
have conducted an election and there is nothing to indicate that the
election was conducted under improper conditions or that the results
would have been different had it been held under the auspices of the
Board, the results of that election should be given the same effect as
if it had been conducted by the Board. I suggest that the majority's
refusal to do so in this case is inconsistent with the Board's contract-
bar doctrine under which contracts based on voluntary recognition are
found to be bars notwithstanding the absence of evidence that the con-
tracting union represents a majority of the employees covered by the
contract. In such cases the Board acts on the presumption that the
union's majority status had been properly established prior to the
execution of the contract. The same presumption should be made
with respect to the majority status of the Union established by the
786 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
election conducted by the parties in this case. Had the election been
conducted by the Board, we would refuse to conduct another election
for 12 months pursuant to the statutory prohibition in Section 9 (c)
(3) of the Act. I believe that the Board should give full effect to the
policy of that prohibition in this case by refusing to redetermine the
Union's majority status on the basis of the decertification petition
filed by a dissident group of the very employees who 5 months ago
selected the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I would dismiss the
petition filed herein.
FLORIDA BUILDERS , INCORPORATED and CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION 531,
AFFILIATED WITH GULF COAST COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS , AFFILIATED
WITH UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA,
AFL. Case No. 10-CA-1881. February 28, 1955
Decision and Order
On June 18, 1954, Trial Examiner Lee J. Best issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and the
General Counsel entered into a stipulation setting forth various addi-
tional jurisdictional facts pertaining to the Respondent's operations.
The Respondent also filed a motion to dismiss,' exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report, and a brief in support of its motion and exceptions.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case, and finds merit in the Respondent's exceptions.2
1. As found by the Trial Examiner, Plant Superintendent Barrs
asked Kermit Kessel, a foreman, whether he had heard a rumor that
a union was trying to get into the plant. Barrs then instructed Kessel
to report any such rumor he heard. Kessel in fact never carried out
this direction. Relying on the Board's holding in the H. N. Thayer
1 The Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that its operations did
not satisfy the Board's jurisdictional standards During 1953, the Respondent had an
indirect inflow of goods or materials from outside the State valued in excess of $1,000,000.
This amount meets the indirect inflow standard recently announced by the Board in Jones-
boro Grave Drying Oooperative, 110 NLRB 481. Accordingly, the Respondent's motion
is denied
2 The Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied because the record and
the Respondent's exceptions and brief adequately present the issues and the parties'
positions
111 NLRB No. 130.