Inter-Coast International Training, Inc.(doing business as "Intercoast Colleges")

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Apr 7, 2016

31-CA-131805 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 7, 2016)

JD–(SF)–17–16
Northridge, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION OF JUDGES
INTER-COAST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING,
INC., d/b/a “INTERCOAST COLLEGES”
And Case 31-CA-131805
IRMA MALDONADO, an Individual.
Yaneth Palencia, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Neil C. Evans, Esq. (Law Offices of Neil C. Evans),
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LISA D. THOMPSON, Administrative Law Judge. This is another case involving issues
raised in D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012).1 Pursuant to a charge and amended charge
filed by Irma Maldonado (Charging Party or Maldonado) on June 30 and September 5, 2014,
respectively, the General Counsel alleges that Inter-coast International Training, Inc., d/b/a
Intercoast Colleges (Intercoast or Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act by: (1) maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires employees to
resolve all employment-related disputes solely through individual arbitration, and (2) seeking to
enforce that agreement since January 29, 2014, when it filed a motion to strike a class action
lawsuit in state court.2
On November 5, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Transfer the Case to the
Division of Judges and Joint Stipulation of Facts, requesting that the foregoing allegations be
decided without a hearing based on the stipulated record. I granted the parties’ motion and

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Jt. Mot. Stip. Facts” for the parties’ Joint Motion to Transfer
Proceedings to Division of Judges and Joint Stipulation of Facts, “Jt. Exh.” for the Joint Exhibits, “GC Exh.” for the General
Counsel’s exhibits, “R Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibits, “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief, and “R Br.” for Respondent’s
brief.
2 The original complaint was issued on November 28, 2014, and was subsequently amended on June 26, 2015. The
amended complaint appears to allege that certain earlier motions or pleadings that Respondent filed in 2012 and 2013 in response
to the class action lawsuit also constituted unlawful enforcement of the arbitration agreement, notwithstanding that they occurred
more than six months prior to the charge and amended charge in this proceeding. However, the parties’ stipulation of facts
indicates that only the Respondent’s state court motions and pleadings that were filed since January 29, 2014, are at issue.
JD–(SF)–17–16
2
directed them to submit briefs by December 10, 2015. However, counsel for Respondent
requested several extensions of time to file its brief, all of which were granted. Ultimately, the
posthearing brief deadline was extended to February 16, 2016.
After carefully considering the stipulated record, the parties’ statements of position and 5
their briefs, for the reasons set forth below, I find that Respondent violated the Act as alleged.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION10
The parties stipulated to, and I make, the following findings of fact as to the nature of
Respondents’ business and jurisdiction:
1. At all material times, Intercoast has been a private vocational educational institution 15
with an office and place of business in Northridge, California.
2. In conducting its operations during the 12-month period ending October 31, 2014,
Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $1,000,000 and purchased and received at its
Northridge, California facility goods valued in excess of $5,000 directly from points outside the 20
State of California.
3. Accordingly, at all material times, Respondent has been an employer within the
meaning of Sections 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
25
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Background Facts
30
1. Since at least March 14, 2012, Respondent's Employee Manual contained an
addendum titled, "Employee Acknowledgment and Agreement" (the Agreement). The
Agreement included an arbitration provision which, if signed by employees, required them to
submit all employment related claims to binding arbitration.3
35
2. With respect to the arbitration provision, the Agreement reads, in pertinent part:
I also acknowledge that the Company utilizes a system of alternative dispute
resolution which involves binding arbitration to resolve all disputes which may
arise out of the employment context. Because of the mutual benefit . . .which40
private binding arbitration can provide both the Company and myself, I and the
Company both agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either party
may have against one another . . .which would otherwise require or allow resort
to any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum between myself and

3 Jt. Mot. ¶12a.
JD–(SF)–17–16
3
the Company . . . arising from, related to, or having any relationship or
connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or
other association with the Company . . . (with the sole exception of claims arising
under the National Labor Relations Act which are brought before the National
Labor Relations Board . . .) shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by5
binding arbitration. I understand and agree that nothing in this agreement shall be
construed so as to preclude me from filing any administrative charge with, or
from participating in any investigation of a charge conducted by, any government
agency . . . however, after I exhaust such administrative process/investigation, I
understand and agree that I must pursue any such claims through this binding10
arbitration procedure. . .4
3. The Agreement represents Respondent’s current policies, regulations, benefits, and
terms and conditions of employment.5
15
4. Between March 14, 2012, and January 15, 2013, Respondent presented the Agreement
to its employees, including Charging Party Maldonado. Maldonado and some of the employees
signed the Agreement and returned it to Respondent.
5. Since about March 14, 2012, employees who signed the Agreement were bound by the 20
aforementioned arbitration provision.
6. Previously, in or around May 2011, Anthony Nguyen (Nguyen), a non-exempt, former
employee of Respondent, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Central
District on behalf of himself and other similarly situated former non-exempt employees of 25
Respondent.6
7. The complaint alleged numerous California Labor Code and the California Business
and Professions Code violations for earned, unpaid wages.
8. On May 31, 2012, Respondent filed with the court a Petition to Compel Arbitration,
Stay Proceedings and Stay Discovery. In its petition, Respondent sought an order staying the 30
complaint and compelling individual arbitration of all claims against Respondent by all class
members who signed arbitration agreements with Respondent, including Charging Party.7 In a
sworn declaration in support of the petition, Geeta Brown, Respondent’s president, stated, “all
personnel who commence or continue employment [at Intercoast] are required to comply with
the company’s alternative dispute resolution policy, which include the mandatory arbitration of 35
employment related claims.”8

4 GC Exh. 1(o) at Appendix A.
5 Id.
6 GC Exh. 9.
7 GC Exh. 10.
8 GC Exh. 10, p. 6.
JD–(SF)–17–16
4
9. On June 7, 2012, Nyugen opposed Intercoast’s petition to compel arbitration. Shortly
thereafter, on June 14 2012, the court denied Respondent's petition, essentially on the ground that
it was premature in the absence of a determination regarding the putative class.9
10. On January 3, 2013, Respondent appealed the State court’s Order denying its petition 5
to compel arbitration. In its brief, Respondent argued that its Employee Acknowledgement and
Agreement required all members of the class who signed the Agreement, including the Charging
Party, to individually arbitrate their claims.10
11. On August 21, 2013, the California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District 10
affirmed the State court’s Order denying Respondent's petition to compel arbitration.11
12. On January 29, 2014, Respondent filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike
Class Action Allegations from the Class Action Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior
Court.1215
13. On September 21, 2015, Superior Court Judge Michelle Rosenblatt granted Nguyen’s
Motion for Class Certification.13
14. On October 23, 2015, Respondent filed its Notice of Hearing on its initial Petition to 20
Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings.14
15. At present, Respondent maintains the arbitration provision contained in the
Agreement as described in paragraph 2 above.
25
III. DECISION AND ANALYSIS
A. Whether the Allegations are Barred by Section 10(b)
Before addressing the merits of the arbitration provision in Respondent’s Agreement, I 30
must determine whether the amended complaint allegations are time barred under Section 10(b)
of the Act. Respondent contends that this case should be dismissed as time barred because the
underlying charges were filed more than six months after: (1) March 14, 2012, the alleged date
the arbitration provision contained in the Agreement was promulgated, (2) May 31, 2012, the
date Respondent filed its petition to compel arbitration in state court, and (3) January 2013, when 35
Respondent presented the Agreement to its employee (including Charging Party) and appealed
the state court’s denial of its petition to compel arbitration.

9 GC Exh. 13.
10 GC Exh. 14.
11 GC Exh. 16.
12 GC Exh. 18.
13 GC Exh. 20.
14 GC Exh. 21.
JD–(SF)–17–16
5
Respondent’s argument is without merit. The Board has long held that an employer
commits a continuing violation of the Act throughout the period that an unlawful rule or policy is
maintained.15 It is also well established that an agreement entered into outside the 10(b) period
may still be found unlawful where it is enforced inside the 10(b) period.16
5
In this case, there is no dispute that the mandatory individual arbitration provision was
maintained during the 10(b) period. As for enforcement, Respondent’s January 29, 2014 Motion
to Strike was filed well within six months prior to the initial June 30, 2014 charge. Although it
was not the first attempt to enforce the provision in the class action suit (or the last), the Board
has held that an employer’s continued attempts to enforce an unlawful provision within the 10(b) 10
period constitute independent violations.17 Further, while the motion to strike did not itself
mention anything about the arbitration provision, Respondent’s purpose for filing the motion was
in essence to strike the class complaint from going forward and compel employees to comply
with its mandatory arbitration agreement. In fact, the only reason Respondent filed the motion to
strike was because its 2012 petition to compel was rejected by the superior court as premature. 15
Respondent’s motion to strike was consistent with, and must be considered in light of, its May
2012 petition to compel arbitration and January 2013 appeal of the superior court order, which
specifically argued that the arbitration provision in Respondent’s Agreement precludes
employees from filing a class action in court and requires them to individually arbitrate their
claims.18 As such, I conclude that the amended complaint allegations are timely.20
B. Whether Respondent Violated the Act as Alleged
As indicated above, the issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the Act by
maintaining and enforcing its mandatory arbitration provision requiring employees to submit all 25
employment-related disputes solely to individual arbitration. In D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277
(2012), the Board held that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it required its
employees, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement which mandated that all future
employment related claims against the company be determined individually by final and binding
arbitration.19 The Board held that the company’s mandatory arbitration agreement was unlawful 30
because, inter alia, it required employees to waive their substantive right under the NLRA to
pursue concerted (i.e., classwide or collective) legal action in any forum, arbitral or judicial. The
Board stopped short of requiring employers to permit both classwide arbitration and classwide
suits in a court or administrative forum, finding that “[s]o long as the employer leaves open a

15 See, e.g., Cowabunga, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 133, slip op. at 2 (2016), and cases cited there. See also Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998).
16 See, e.g., Cowabunga, above. See also Teamsters Local 293 (R. L. Lipton Distributing), 311 NLRB 538, 539 (1993);
Whiting Milk Corp., 145 NLRB 1035, 1037–1038 (1964), enf. denied on other grounds 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965).
17 See CPS Secuirity (USA), Inc., 363 NLRB No. 86, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2015) (holding that the fact that the employer
initially sought to enforce its unlawful arbitration policy outside the 10(b) period did not bar the General Counsel’s allegation that
the employer had unlawfully continued to seek enforcement of the policy inside the 10(b) period).
18 It is well established that events preceding the 10(b) period are properly considered to lend context to events occurring
within the 10(b) period. See Machinists Lodge 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 414–429 (1960).
19 D.R. Horton, supra, enf. denied in relevant part 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013), petition for rehearing en banc denied
No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014).
JD–(SF)–17–16
6
judicial forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA rights are preserved without
requiring the availability of classwide arbitration.”20
The Board reaffirmed the relevant holdings and reasoning of D.R. Horton in Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf denied in relevant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). 5
The Board in that case found that the employer likewise violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining mandatory individual arbitration agreements. The Board also found that the
employer violated 8(a)(1) by seeking to enforce the unlawful agreements by filing a motion in
court to dismiss a pending FLSA collective action and compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate their
claims individually.10
Respondent argues that the Board’s foregoing decisions should not be followed as
Federal and State courts have routinely rejected them and allow for class action/arbitration
waivers. However, D. R. Horton/ Murphy Oil represent current Board precedent that I must
follow unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court.21 While the Supreme Court has 15
increasingly shown great deference to enforcement of arbitration agreements, and has upheld the
enforcement of individual arbitration agreement in employment related matters, 22 the Court has
not expressly overruled D. R. Horton/Murphy Oil.
The Board’s decisions in D. R. Horton/Murphy Oil are therefore controlling. Further, as 20
discussed below, on the facts presented, they compel a finding that Respondent violated the Act
as alleged.
1. Unlawful maintenance of the arbitration agreement
25
The parties dispute whether the arbitration provision within Respondent’s Agreement is a
mandatory term and condition of employment. The General Counsel argues that the Agreement
is a mandatory term and condition of employment because: (1) the Agreement is silent regarding
whether employees may opt in or out, and (2) other record evidence demonstrates that employees
were required to comply with the Agreement; specifically, the 2012 sworn declaration by Geeta 30
Brown, Respondent’s president, that “all personnel who commence or continue employment [at
Intercoast] are required to comply with the company’s alternative dispute resolution policy,
which include the mandatory arbitration of employment related claims.” However, Respondent
argues that the Agreement is voluntary because nothing in the Agreement mandates participation
in the arbitration policy and only some employees signed the agreement. 35

20 D.R. Horton, supra at 16.
21 See Manor West, Inc., 311 NLRB 655, 667 fn. 43 (1993); see also Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 n. 14 (1984) (“We
emphasize that it is a judge’s duty to apply established Board precedent which the Supreme Court has not reversed. It is for the
Board, not the judge, to determine whether precedent should be varied”) (citation omitted).
22 See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011). In Concepcion, the Court emphasized that its
cases “place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.” The Court explained that the purpose of the
FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to its terms.” See Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989). Indeed, the Board also acknowledges that the
provisions of the FAA evince a “liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” See D. R. Horton, Inc., supra, slip op. at 8, so
long as the agreements do not preclude employees from exercising their substantive rights under Section 7 of the Act. Id. at 9.
JD–(SF)–17–16
7
I find, for the reasons stated by the General Counsel, that the arbitration provision in
Respondent’s agreement is a mandatory term and condition of employment. The unexplained
fact that only some employees signed the agreement containing the provision means little in light
of President Brown’s declaration that all employees were required to comply with the provision.
5
In any event, whether the agreement is mandatory is not dispositive of whether the
Agreement violates the Act. As indicated by the General Counsel, following D. R. Horton and
Murphy Oil, the Board addressed this issue in On Assignment Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No.
189 (2015). In that case, the Board found the employer’s arbitration policy violated the Act
regardless that it allowed employees to opt out of the agreement. Specifically, the Board made 10
clear that individual arbitration agreements that prevent an employee from engaging in concerted
legal activities (i.e., filing class or collective actions in court) must yield to the Act, whether or
not they were a condition of employment.23 Of particular import, the Board noted that,
“whether. . . [arbitration agreements] are imposed on employees by employers or whether
employees are free to reject them, makes no difference . . . to the legality of such agreements 15
under the NLRA. . .”24
Accordingly, I find that Respondent unlawfully maintained the mandatory individual
arbitration provision as alleged.
20
2. Unlawful enforcement of the arbitration agreement
As indicated above, Respondent sought to enforce the provision by filing its motion to
strike. Respondent avers that its motion to strike the class allegations is not the same as its
petition to compel arbitration, primarily because it never mentioned the arbitration agreement in 25
its motion to strike as it did in the petition to compel arbitration. As such, Respondent claims that
the General Counsel is improperly interpreting its motion to strike as a petition to compel
arbitration in an effort to support her untimely complaint allegations. However, as discussed
above, the motion to strike is properly considered in light of the previous motions and pleadings,
which specifically argued that the class allegations were barred by the arbitration agreement. 30
Moreover, Respondent clearly again sought to enforce its unlawful mandatory arbitration
provision when, on October 23, 2015, it requested a rehearing on its original petition to compel
arbitration. In so doing, Respondent admits that its petition directly challenges the class
members’ right to proceed with their class/collective action in state court. 35
Accordingly, I find that, by filing both the June 30, 2014 motion and the October 23,
2015 notice, Respondent unlawfully enforced its mandatory arbitration agreement.
40

23 On Assignment Staffing, 362 NLRB slip op. at 7.
24 Id.
JD–(SF)–17–16
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Intercoast Colleges is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
5
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a mandatory arbitration
provision in its Employee Manual which required employees to resolve all employment-related
disputes exclusively through individual arbitration and, both expressly and in practice, required
them to relinquish any right they have to resolve such disputes through joint, collective, or class
legal action.10
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by seeking to enforce its unlawful
arbitration provision by filing a January 30, 2014 motion to strike the class allegations and an
October 23, 2015 notice of hearing in California Superior Court which had the effect of
compelling arbitration and dismissing all collective and class claims.15
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate 20
the policies of the Act.
The General Counsel seeks reimbursement of Charging Party’s litigation expenses within
the 10(b) period, including, but not limited to, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses resulting from
opposing Respondent’s efforts to enforce the arbitration provision in state court since January 30, 25
2014, including the Respondent’s motion to strike. Respondent argues that the remedies sought
by the General Counsel are inappropriate and beyond the Board’s jurisdiction. However, the
Board has rejected such arguments and upheld awards of litigation expenses resulting from an
employer’s unlawful enforcement actions in State and/or Federal courts.25 Accordingly, I find
the General Counsel’s request for litigation expenses an appropriate make whole remedy and 30
fully effectuate the purposes of Act. Interest on the amounts due shall be computed in the
manner prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
The General Counsel also requests an unconditional notice-mailing remedy, i.e., that 35
Respondents be required to mail the notice to their employees regardless of whether Respondents
have gone out of business or have closed or ceased providing services at a particular facility.
However, the Board considers this to be an extraordinary remedy, and the General Counsel cites

25 See Ralphs Grocery, 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 3 n. 9 (in finding Respondent’s arbitration policy together with its
action in filing a motion to compel arbitration in California Superior Court, unlawful, the Board held, “Consistent with our
opinion in Murphy Oil, we. . . shall order the Respondent to reimburse Charging Party. . . and any other plaintiffs for all
reasonable expenses and legal fees, with interest, incurred in opposing the Respondent’s unlawful motion to compel individual
arbitration in the collective wage-and-hour litigation.”). See also Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983)
(“If a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their
attorneys’ fees and other expenses” as well as “any other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act.”).
JD–(SF)–17–16
9
no extraordinary circumstances justifying it here.26 The Board has not routinely included this
remedy in other cases under D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil (notwithstanding that it would be a
relatively simple matter for respondents to include a copy of the Board’s notice when they notify
their employees that the unlawful arbitration provision has been rescinded or revised).
Accordingly, I decline to order an additional notice-mailing remedy here.5
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended.27
ORDER10
The Respondent, Intercoast Colleges of Northridge, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from15
(a) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory arbitration provision that, either
expressly or impliedly, requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to
maintain joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
20
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
25
(a) Rescind or revise the arbitration provision in all of its forms to make it clear to
employees that the arbitration provision does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain
employment related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were required to sign 30
acknowledgements regarding the mandatory arbitration provision in any form that it has been
rescinded or revised, and if revised, provide them a copy of the revised provision.
(c) Notify the Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County, Central
District in Case BC461585, that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration provision, 35
and inform the court that it no longer opposes the action on the basis of the arbitration provision.
(d) Reimburse Charging Party Irma Maldonado and any other employees who joined
in the state court litigation in Case BC461585 for any attorneys’ fees, costs and litigation
expenses that they may have incurred in opposing Respondent’s efforts to enforce the arbitration 40
provision in that case since January 30, 2014, with interest compounded daily.

26 See J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11, 14 (2010).
27 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and
recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all facilities where the
arbitration agreement applied, copies of the attached notice marked “
English and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by 5
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive d
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet
or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees and former employees by such means. Respondent also shall duplicate and 10
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all former employees who were required t
the mandatory arbitration agreement
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pen
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, 15
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by th
2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director 20
Region 31 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
25
Dated: Washington, D.C.
30

28 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–
10
Appendix”
ays in conspicuous places including all
during their employment with Respondent. Reasonable
dency of these proceedings,
e Respondent at any time since
April 7, 2016
_______________________
Lisa D. Thompson
Administrative Law Judge
notice reading “Posted by Order of the
(SF)–17–16
28 in both
o sign
December 30,
for

Order of the
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement that, expressly or
impliedly, requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind or revise the arbitration agreement to make it clear to employees that the
agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain joint, class, or collective actions
in all forums.
WE WILL notify employees of the rescinded or revised agreement, including providing them
with a copy of the revised agreement or specific notification that the agreement has been
rescinded.
WE WILL notify the Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County, Central
District in Case BC461585, that we have rescinded or revised the unlawful mandatory arbitration
provision, and inform the court that we no longer oppose the action on the basis of the arbitration
provision.
WE WILL reimburse Charging Party and any other employees who joined in the state court
collective litigation in Case BC461585 for attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses they incurred
which were directly related to opposing our efforts in that case to enforce the arbitration
agreement since January 30, 2014, including our Motion to Strike Class Allegations and/or
Deem the Case a Non-Class Complaint, with interest.
INTER-COAST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING,
INC. d/b/a INTERCOAST COLLEGES
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge
or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office
set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
11500 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 600, Los Angeles, CA 90064
(310) 235-7352, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-131805 or by
using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by
calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE
WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (310) 235–7424.