Integral Development Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 8, 2020

2020000825 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 8, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/214,305 03/14/2014 Vikas Srivastava INDE/0010US
2426.067526
2943
107456 7590 07/08/2020
Artegis Law Group, LLP
John Carey
7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104
Houston, TX 77095
EXAMINER
JACOB, WILLIAM J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/08/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
jmatthews@artegislaw.com
kcruz@artegislaw.com
sjohnson@artegislaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VIKAS SRIVASTAVA, PATRICK BARKHORDARIAN, and
MICHELLE YIP CHEN
Appeal 2020-000825
Application 14/214,305
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, LARRY J. HUME, and JAMES W. DEJMEK,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME,Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–41, which are all rejections pending
in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
WeAFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Integral Development
Corp. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claims are directed to a method and system for calculating and
utilizing realized spread in financial transactions. See Spec. (Title). In
particular, Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention
“relate[] generally to realized spread and related analytics to create a
flexible, expandable data mining platform covering data sources and trading
relationships and, more specifically, to a method and system for calculating
and utilizing a realized spread in financial transactions.” Spec. ¶ 3.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 19, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on Appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitations):
1. A system for generating and utilizing financial
trading metrics, comprising:
a data-obtaining module comprising a computer program
executing on a processor,
the data-obtaining module configured to implement
programmatic control to obtain raw financial trade data via at
least one of an http listing query directed to a log server and an
http request directed to a source, wherein the raw financial
trade data includes at least one of a globally unique identifier
and a counter-party identifier;
a data-normalizing module, operatively connected to the
data-obtaining module and configured to convert the raw
financial-trade data into normalized financial-trade data;

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
May 20, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Nov. 12, 2019); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 9, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Nov. 16, 2018); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Mar. 14, 2014) (claiming benefit of US 61/801,123, filed Mar. 15, 2013).
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a metric-generating module, operatively connected to the
data-normalizing module and configured to generate financial-
trade metrics based on the normalized financial-trade data; and
an intelligence-generating module, operatively connected
to the metric-generating module and configured to
communicate the financial-trade metrics to a device associated
with a trader.
19. A computer-implemented method for calculating
realized spreads in financial transactions, comprising the
following steps:
obtaining, via programmatic control of a computer
program being executed by one or more processors, one or
more data files comprised of raw financial transaction data a
via at least one of an http listing query directed to a log server
and an http request directed to a source, wherein the raw
financial trade data includes at least one of a globally unique
identifier and a counter-party identifier;
converting the raw financial data into normalized
financial transaction data;
generating one or more financial-trade metrics from the
normalized financial data; and
communicating the one or more financial-trade metrics to
a device associated with a trader.
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Fishman et al. (“Fishman”) US 6,507,818 B1 Jan. 14, 2003
Khalfan et al. (“Khalfan”) US 2003/0097323 A1 May 22, 2003
Toffey US 2005/0234807 A1 Oct. 20, 2005
Ogg et al. (“Ogg”) US 2005/0246263 A1 Nov. 3, 2005
Sattler et al. (“Sattler”) US 2006/0026137 A1 Feb. 2, 2006
Janian US 2006/0178981 A1 Aug. 10, 2006
Swearingen et al. (“Swearingen”) US 2009/0204548 A1 Aug. 13, 2009
Shin et al. (“Shin”) US 2012/0005069 A1 Jan. 5, 2012
Nyhoff et al. (“Nyhoff”) US 2013/0024347 A1 Jan. 24, 2013
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 1-41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea) without significantly
more. Final Act. 2.3
R2. Claims 1, 19, and 38 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, and Sattler.
Final Act. 5.
R3. Claims 2–5, 7, 20, 21, 23, 25, 39, and 40 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Fishman,
Nyhoff, Sattler, and Janian. Final Act. 7.

3 On this record, it appears that claims 6, 10, 12–17, 22, 27, 29–34, and 41
stand rejected only under § 101 Rejection R1, and have no prior-art
rejections.
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R4. Claims 8 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, Sattler, and
Ogg. Final Act. 8.
R5. Claims 9, 11, 26, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler, and Khalfan. Id.
R6. Claims 18 and 37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, Sattler, and
Swearingen. Final Act. 9.
R7. Claim 35 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, Sattler, and Toffey.
Final Act. 10.
R8. Claim 36 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, Sattler, and Shin.
Id.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 10–21) and our
discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of patent-
ineligible subject matter Rejection R1 of claims 1–41 on the basis of
representative method claim 19; we decide the appeal of obviousness
Rejection R2 of claims 1, 19, and 38 on the basis of representative system
claim 1.
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Remaining claims 2–5, 7–9, 11, 18, 20, 21, 23–26, 28, 35–37, 39,
and 40 in Rejections R3 through R8, not argued separately, stand or fall with
the respective independent claim from which they depend.4
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–41
and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as
our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 19 for
emphasis as follows.
1. § 101 Rejection R1 of Claims 1–41
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 10–17; Reply Br. 3–10) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-

4 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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ineligible subject matter is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Under the USPTO’s Revised Guidance, informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, is claim 19 patent ineligible under
§ 101?
Principles of Law
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.5
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement

5 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the USPTO’s patent-
eligibility analysis under § 101. MPEP § 2106.
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risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
Examples of claims that do not recite mental processes because they
cannot be practically performed in the human mind include: (a) a claim to a
method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver and an
absolute time of reception of satellite signals, where the claimed GPS
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receiver calculated pseudoranges that estimated the distance from the GPS
receiver to a plurality of satellites, SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International
Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010); (b) a claim to
detecting suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing
network packets, SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 930 F.3d
1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019); (c) a claim to a specific data encryption method
for computer communication involving a several-step manipulation of data,
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (distinguishing TQP Development, LLC v. Intuit Inc., 2014 WL
651935 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014)) (the specific data encryption method
“could not conceivably be performed in the human mind or with pencil and
paper”). Whereas a claim limitation to a process that “can be performed in
the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” qualifies as a mental
process, a claim limitation that “could not, as a practical matter, be
performed entirely in a human’s mind” (even if aided with pen and paper)
would not qualify as a mental process.6
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having

6 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 1375-
76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is
now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘“inventive
concept”’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Revised Guidance
The PTO published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised
Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-
07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf). All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal
agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also
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October 2019 Update at 1 (October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility)
(hereinafter “October 2019 Update”).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes);7 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).8
See Revised Guidance 52–53.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.9
See Revised Guidance 56.

7 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
8 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
9 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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Step 2A(i) – Abstract Idea
Informed by our judicial precedent, the Revised Guidance extracts and
synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain
that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of subject
matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Revised Guidance 52 (footnotes omitted).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance.10

10 In the rare circumstance in which an examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
of the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Revised
Guidance, Section III.C.
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However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea
enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim
requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception
in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,11
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception

11 See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer
to revision [R-08.2017]. Sections 2106.05(a), (b), (c), and (e) are indicative
of integration into a practical application, while §§ 2106.05(f), (g), and (h)
relate to limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical
application.
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(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment
See Revised Guidance 55.
If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above, then the claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-
eligibility inquiry ends. See Revised Guidance 54. If not, then analysis
proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
Under our reviewing courts’ precedent, it is possible that a claim that
does not “integrate” a recited judicial exception under Step 2A(ii) is
nonetheless patent eligible. For example, the claim may recite additional
elements that render the claim patent eligible even though one or more claim
elements may recite a judicial exception.12 The Federal Circuit has held
claims eligible at the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B)
because the additional elements recited in the claims provided “significantly
more” than the recited judicial exception (e.g., because the additional
elements were unconventional in combination).13 Therefore, if a claim has
been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under Revised Step
2A, we must also evaluate the additional elements individually and in

12 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
13 See, e.g., Amdocs, Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive
concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
than the exception itself).14
Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance,
Section III.B.15

14 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
15 In accordance with existing Step 2B guidance, an Examiner’s finding that
an additional element (or combination of elements) is well understood,
routine, conventional activity must be supported with at least one of the four
specific types of evidence required by the USPTO Berkheimer
Memorandum, as shown above. For more information concerning evaluation
of well-understood, routine, conventional activity, see MPEP § 2106.05(d),
as modified by the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum (USPTO
Commissioner for Patents Memorandum dated Apr. 19, 2018, “Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter
“Berkheimer Memo”).
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In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine, or conventional unless the
examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s). . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of
the additional element(s). . . .
See Berkheimer Memo 3–4.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, the
claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for lack of
subject matter eligibility.
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Analysis
Step 1 – Statutory Category
Claim 19, as a method (process) claim, recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue
before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that the claims are directed to “a
fundamental economic practice;” in the form of “determining ‘spreads’ (as
used in the instant application) in trading, and generating and utilizing
financial trading metrics based thereupon (e.g., effective spread, realized
spread, etc.), so as to optimize trades, profit, etc.” Ans. 4.
We conclude claim 19 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either
natural phenomena or laws of nature. We evaluate, de novo, whether
claim 1 recites an abstract idea based upon the Revised Guidance.
First, we look to the Specification to provide context as to what the
claimed invention is directed to. In this case, the Specification discloses that
the invention “relates generally to realized spread and related analytics to
create a flexible, expandable data mining platform covering data sources and
trading relationships and, more specifically, to a method and system for
calculating and utilizing a realized spread in financial transactions.” Spec.
¶ 3.
Appellant’s Abstract describes the invention as:
A system for generating and utilizing financial trading
metrics, comprising: (i) a data-obtaining module configured to
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obtain raw financial trade data; (ii) a data-normalizing module,
operatively connected to the data-obtaining module and
configured to convert raw financial-trade data into normalized
financial-trade data; and (iii) a metric-generating module,
operatively connected to the data-normalizing module and
configured to generate financial-trade metrics based on the
normalized financial-trade data.
Spec. 39 (Abstract).
With respect to this phase of the analysis, Appellant makes several
similar arguments, relying upon the holdings in Finjan, McRO, Visual
Memory, DDR Holdings, and Trading Technologies to allegedly
demonstrate non-abstractness of the claims, as discussed below.
Finjan
Appellant argues, “[f]irst, in compliance with Finjan . . . the present
claims recite specific limitations that effect a useful result or technological
improvement. In particular, the claims recite specific limitations that effect
the useful result or technological improvement of providing a more effective
way of generating real-time financial trading metrics for use in electronic
trading platforms.” Appeal Br. 12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s comparison (id.) of the claims to
the claims in Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). In Finjan, the court found that claims directed to a behavior-
based virus scan constituted an improvement in computer functionality over
the “traditional, ‘code-matching’ virus scans.” Id. at 1304. The court
determined that the claimed method employs a new kind of file, allows
access to be tailored for different users, and allows the system to accumulate
and use newly available, behavior-based information about potential threats.
Id. at 1305. The court ultimately held that the claims are “directed to a non-
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abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea
of computer security,” and “recite specific steps—generating a security
profile that identifies suspicious code and linking it to a downloadable—that
accomplish the desired result.” Id.
Unlike the claims of Finjan, claim 19 fails to employ, either explicitly
or by analogy, a newly generated file containing security profile in a
downloadable, and does not use a new file to enable a computer security
system to improve on or add a computer functionality by reciting specific
steps accomplishing the desired security results. Thus, we are not persuaded
that either of Appellant’s claims 1 or 19 is sufficiently analogous to the
claims in Finjan.
McRO
In McRO, the claims were not held to be abstract because they recited
a “specific . . . improvement in computer animation” using “unconventional
rules that relate[d] sub-sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight
sets.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1302–
03, 1307–08, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In McRO, “the incorporation of the
claimed rules, not the use of the computer,” improved an existing
technological process. Id. at 1314.
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues, similar to arguments presented
with respect to Finjan (Appeal Br. 12), the “claims recite specific limitations
that effect a useful result or technological improvement,” and thus are
sufficiently similar to those held patent eligible in McRO. See also Reply
Br. 5 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at1344); see SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing McRO):
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The claims in McRO were directed to the creation of something
physical—namely, the display of “lip synchronization and
facial expressions” of animated characters on screens for
viewing by human eyes. Id. at 1313. The claimed improvement
was to how the physical display operated (to produce better
quality images), unlike (what is present here) a claimed
improvement in a mathematical technique with no improved
display mechanism. The claims in McRO thus were not abstract
in the sense that is dispositive here. And those claims also
avoided being “abstract” in another sense reflected repeatedly
in our cases (based on a contrast not with “physical” but with
“concrete”): they had the specificity required to transform a
claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of
achieving it.
SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis added).
Appellant does not, however, identify how claim 19 improves an
existing technological process. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (explaining that
“the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing
technological process”). Rather, claim 19 concerns a business problem, i.e.,
a “computer-implemented method for calculating realized spreads in
financial transactions.” Appeal Br. 23. In addition, Appellant does not
direct us to any evidence that the claimed “obtaining,” “converting,”
“generating,” and “communicating” steps correspond to unconventional
rules in a manner similar to McRO.
Visual Memory
Appellant generally argues “in compliance with Visual Memory, the
claimed approach is directed towards a technological improvement.”
Appeal Br. 13 (citing Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253
(Fed. Cir. 2017)). “In particular, the claimed approach enables financial
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trading metrics to be generated more effectively for use in real-time
electronic trading platforms.” Id.
In Visual Memory, the Federal Circuit held the claims were “directed
to an improved computer memory system, not to the abstract idea of
categorical data storage. Claim 1 requires a memory system ‘having one or
more programmable operational characteristics, said characteristics being
defined through configuration by said computer based on the type of said
processor,’ and ‘determin[ing] a type of data stored by said cache.’” Visual
Memory, 867 F.3d at 1259.
The ‘740 patent’s teachings obviate the need to design a
separate memory system for each type of processor, which
proved to be costly and inefficient, and, at the same time, avoid
the performance problems of prior art memory systems. . . .
[and] in addition to enabling interoperability with multiple
different processors, the ‘740 patent specification explains that
the selective definition of the functions of the cache memory
based on processor type results in a memory system that can
outperform a prior art memory system that is armed with “a
cache many times larger than the cumulative size of the subject
caches.”
Id. (citations omitted).
On this record, we see insufficient analogy of Appellant’s claims,
directed to systems and method for calculating realized spreads in financial
transactions, to those found patent eligible in Visual Memory, i.e., an
improved computer memory system.
DDR Holdings
Appellant’s reliance on DDR (Appeal Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 7) is
misplaced as the recited claims do not improve the computer. In DDR, the
claims at issue involved, inter alia, “web pages displays [with] at least one
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active link associated with a commerce object associated with a buying
opportunity of a selected one of a plurality of merchants” (claim 1 of US
7,818,399). The Federal Circuit found the claims in DDR to be patent-
eligible under step one of the Alice test because “the claimed solution is
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings v.
Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Specifically, the Federal
Circuit found the claims addressed the “challenge of retaining control over
the attention of the customer in the context of the Internet.” Id. at 1258. We
find the rejected claims in this Appeal are quite dissimilar to DDR’s web
page with an active link, and the Specification does not support the view that
the computer related claim elements are unconventional. See Fig. 1; Spec.
¶ 57 (“Processor and storage arrangements of the types illustrated in FIG. 1
are well known to those having ordinary skill in the art.”).
Trading Technologies
Appellant further argues, similar to the non-precedential holding in
Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F.App’x 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2017), “the pending claims are directed towards electronic trading
systems that generate and utilize financial trading metrics via programmatic
control. The claimed invention obtains raw financial transaction data, under
the programmatic control of a computer program, via at least one of an http
listing query directed to a log server and an http request directed to a
source.” Reply Br. 8; see also Appeal Br. 14.
In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit agreed with the court
below that “rather than reciting ‘a mathematical algorithm,’ ‘a fundamental
economic or longstanding commercial practice,’ or ‘a challenge in business,’
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the challenged patents ‘solve problems of prior graphical user interface
devices . . . in the context of computerized trading[ ] relating to speed,
accuracy and usability.’” Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1004. Further,
the Federal Circuit agreed that the patents at issue “are directed to
improvements in existing graphical user interface devices that have no ‘pre-
electronic trading analog,’ and recite more than ‘setting, displaying, and
selecting’ data or information that is visible on the [graphical user interface]
device.’” Id. (citations omitted).
On this record, we see no analogous improvement by the claims on
Appeal that utilize financial trading metrics via programmatic control, to
graphical user interfaces or improvements in computerized trading relating
to speed, accuracy, or usability as in Trading Technologies.
Method Claim 19 Analysis
In TABLE I below, we identify in italics the specific claim limitations
in method claim 19 that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We
additionally identify in bold the additional (non-abstract) claim limitations
that are generic computer components and techniques, and underline
limitations representing extra- or post-solution activity:
TABLE I
Independent Claim 19 Revised Guidance
A computer-implemented
method for calculating realized
spreads in financial transactions,
comprising the following steps:
A process (method) is a statutory
subject matter class. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever
invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
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Independent Claim 19 Revised Guidance
conditions and requirements of this
title.”).
[L1a] obtaining . . . one or more
data files comprised of raw
financial transaction data [ ]

[L1b] [wherein said obtaining is]
via programmatic control of a
computer program being
executed by one or more
processors,
“[O]btaining . . . one or more data
files” represents data gathering which
is merely insignificant extra-solution
activity that does not add significantly
more to the abstract idea to render the
claimed invention patent-eligible. See
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other
grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“[T]he
involvement of the machine or
transformation in the claimed process
must not merely be insignificant
extra-solution activity”); see also
MPEP § 2106.05(g); and see
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(computer receives and sends
information over a network).
Programmatic control of a computer
program executed by a processor for a
specific purpose represents generic
computer components and
functionality.
[L2] via at least one of an http
listing query directed to a log
server and an http request
directed to a source,
wherein the raw financial trade
data includes at least one of a
globally unique identifier and a
counter-party identifier;
An http listing query directed to a log
server and an http request directed to
a source represents well-understood,
routine, and conventional computer
techniques.
[L3] converting the raw
financial data into normalized
financial transaction data;
“[c]onverting . . . data” into another
form of data is an abstract idea. See
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
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Independent Claim 19 Revised Guidance
71–72 (1972) in which the claim
converted binary-coded-decimal
(BCD) into pure binary form, and
simply stated a judicial exception
(e.g., law of nature or abstract idea)
while effectively adding words that
“apply it” in a computer.
[L4] generating one or more
financial-trade metrics from the
normalized financial data; and
“[G]enerating . . . metrics from . . .
data” is an abstract idea, as either an
observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as
a mental process, or alternatively as a
mathematical calculation. See Revised
Guidance 52 and n.12 citing SAP
America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of
mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to
abstract ideas).
[L5a] communicating the one
or more financial-trade metrics

[L5b] to a device associated
with a trader.
Transmitting or communicating
information, e.g., for display or other
presentation to a user, is insignificant
extra-solution activity. Revised
Guidance 55, n.31; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g).
As recited, “a device associated with a
trader” is a generic computer
component.
Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.).
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Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard,16 and aside
from any computer-related aspects, we conclude limitations [L1] through
[L5] recite steps that would ordinarily occur when calculating realized
spreads in financial transactions. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–5. For
example, obtaining and converting raw financial data into normalized data
(limitations [L1a] and [L3]) are operations that generally occur prior to
generating or calculating financial trade metrics representing the financial
data. Further, we conclude limitations [L3] (“converting the raw financial
data into normalized financial transaction data”), and [L4] (“generating one
or more financial-trade metrics from the normalized financial data”) recite
abstract ideas, whether initiated person-to-person, on paper, or using a
computer.
We determine that claim 19, overall, recites a certain method of
organizing human activity in the form of a fundamental economic practice
that may also be performed by pen and paper. This type of activity, i.e.,
calculating realized spreads in financial transactions, as recited in limitations
[L1] through [L5] of claim 19, for example, and aside from any computer-
related aspects, includes longstanding conduct that existed well before the

16 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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advent of computers and the Internet, and could be carried out by a human
with pen and paper. See CyberSource 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely
mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).17
Thus, under Step 2A(i), we agree with the Examiner that claim 19’s
method for calculating realized spreads in financial transactions recites a
judicial exception and, under our Revised Guidance, we conclude claim 19
recites a judicial exception of a certain method of organizing human activity,
i.e., a fundamental economic practice, and thus is an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a judicial exception, as we conclude above, we
proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) in which we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and

17 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “[t]he Board’s
slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability
analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract ideas does not
render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math)
to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see
also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination
of abstract ideas).
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(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
With respect to this step of the analysis, Appellant contends:
The claimed approach is directed towards the practical
application of generating real-time financial trading metrics for
use in electronic trading platforms. More particularly, in the
claimed approach, a computing device obtains raw financial
transaction data, under the programmatic control of a computer
program, via at least one of an http listing query directed to a
log server and an http request directed to a source, where the
raw financial transaction data includes at least one of a globally
unique identifier and a counter-party identifier. The raw
financial data is then converted into normalized financial
transaction data, and financial-trade metrics are generated based
on the normalized financial data. As a result, raw financial
transaction data can be obtained and normalized with
decreased delay, enabling metrics to be generated from the
transaction data and communicated in real-time to a computing
device coupled to an online trading platform. See Application at
¶¶ [0018], [0061], and [0063]. Because the present claims recite
limitations that integrate any purported abstract idea into a
practical application, the present claims are not directed
towards an abstract idea.
Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments because the purported
benefits which Appellant asserts, e.g., “real-time financial trading metrics”
and “decreased delay,” are not recited in the claims.
As to the specific limitations, we find limitation [L1a] recites
insignificant data gathering. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Data gathering, as
performed by the steps or function in Appellant’s claims, is a classic
example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545
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F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
We also find limitation [L5a] (“communicating”) recites insignificant
post solution activity. The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition
against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by’ . . . adding
‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
Further, we determine that limitations [L1b] (“programmatic control
of a computer program”), [L2] (“http listing query” or “http request”), and
[L5b] (“a device associated with a trader”) of claim 19 recite generic
computer components, functionality, and techniques. On this record, we are
of the view that Appellant’s claims do not operate the recited generic
computer components in an unconventional manner to achieve an
improvement in computer functionality. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
We find each of the limitations of claim 19 recite either abstract ideas,
extra or post-solution activity, or generic computer components
and techniques, as identified in Step 2A(i), supra and, contrary to
Appellant’s allegations, none of the limitations integrate the judicial
exception of calculating realized spreads in financial transactions into a
practical application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections
cited above. The claim as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a
tool to perform the abstract idea.
Under analogous circumstances, the Federal Circuit has held that
“[t]his is a quintessential ‘do it on a computer’ patent: it acknowledges that
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[such] data . . . was previously collected, analyzed, manipulated, and
displayed manually, and it simply proposes doing so with a computer. We
have held such claims are directed to abstract ideas.” Univ. of Fla. Research
Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see
also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“Though lengthy and numerous, the claims do not go beyond
requiring the collection, analysis, and display of available information in a
particular field, stating those functions in general terms, without limiting
them to technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an
advance over conventional computer and network technology.”).
Therefore, we conclude the claim as a whole merely uses instructions
to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a
computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Thus, on this record,
Appellant has not shown an improvement or practical application under the
guidance of MPEP section 2106.05(a) (“Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field”) or section
2106.05(e)(“Other Meaningful Limitations”). Nor does Appellant advance
any arguments in the Brief(s) that are directed to the Bilski machine-or-
transformation test, which would only be applicable to the method (process)
claims on appeal. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(b) (Particular Machine) and
2106.05(c) (Particular Transformation).
Therefore, we conclude the abstract idea is not integrated into a
practical application, and thus the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
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Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, and not integrated
into a practical application, as we conclude above, we proceed to the
“inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we must “look with more specificity
at what the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether they identify
an “inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible subject matter’ to
which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1258.
In applying step two of the Alice analysis, our reviewing court guides
we must “determine whether the claims do significantly more than simply
describe [the] abstract method” and thus transform the abstract idea into
patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are any “additional
features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby
rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an
abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be
more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79.
Limitations referenced in Alice that are not enough to qualify as
“significantly more” when recited in a claim with an abstract idea include, as
non-limiting or non-exclusive examples: adding the words “apply it” (or an
equivalent) with an abstract idea18; mere instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer19; or requiring no more than a generic computer

18 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–23.
19 Alice, 573 U.S. at 222–23, e.g., simply implementing a mathematical
principle on a physical machine, namely a computer.
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to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.20
With respect to this step of the analysis, Appellant argues:
In this regard, the claims recite the limitations of obtaining raw
financial transaction data, under the programmatic control of a
computer program, via at least one of an http listing query
directed to a log server and an http request directed to a source,
where the raw financial transaction data includes at least one of
a globally unique identifier and a counter-party identifier. As
discussed below, these particular limitations are novel and non-
obvious in view of the prior art, indicating that the limitations
are unconventional and non-routine. In addition, these
particular limitations are specific to implementing the inventive
functionality of the claimed approach and, therefore, cannot be
considered conventional or routine.
Reply Br. 9 (emphasis added).
In response, we note the Supreme Court emphasizes, “[t]he ‘novelty’
of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 188–89 (emphasis added). Our reviewing court further guides that
“[e]ligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see
also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “[e]ven assuming” that a particular claimed
feature was novel does not “avoid the problem of abstractness”).

20 Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (explaining using a computer to obtain data, adjust
account balances, and issue automated instructions involves computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, conventional activities).
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The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1325. In particular, “[t]he question of whether a
claim element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and
conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.”
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
In satisfying the evidentiary requirement under Berkheimer, the
Examiner cites various sources as evidence to confirm the well-understood,
routine, and conventional nature of the recited computing devices and
techniques.
The claim limitations, considered individually and as a
whole, fail to offer significantly more than the abstract idea
itself. It is noted that the invention recites several “modules” in
the body of the claim; however, the specification makes clear
that the modules may be both software and hardware, and may
be distributed among one or plural computing devices. . . . As
such, the extraneous limitations are directed towards generic
computing technology and methods for obtaining data, the
particular data/metric being manipulated, and specific
operational steps to normalize the data. Each of these
computing steps/statistical tools are well-known, routine and
conventional methodologies. Taking Official Notice, see also,
MPEP 2106.05. As such, they fail to offer significantly more.
Ans. 4–5 (citing Spec. ¶ 60); see also Appeal Br. 3–4.
In support of the taking of Official Notice with respect to the
recitation of “programmatic control of a computer program being executed
by one or more processors,” in method claim 19, the Examiner additionally
cites to https://arachnoid.com/cpptutor/index.html, “Programing/C++
tutorial” to support the finding that the recited “programmatic control” is
well-understood, routine, and conventional computer activity. Ans. 5.
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We further find Appellant has not properly traversed the Examiner’s
taking of Official Notice with respect to the well-understood, routine, and
conventional nature of the recited computing steps and tools.
In addition to the Examiner’s evidentiary finding above, and as further
evidence of the conventional nature of the recited “one or more processors,”
“log servers,” and “a device associated with a trader” in method claim 19,
and similarly for system claim 1, we point to Appellant’s Figure 1 and
paragraphs 57 through 59 of the Specification. For example, we note
“[p]rocessor and storage arrangements of the types illustrated in FIG. 1 are
well known to those having ordinary skill in the art.” Spec. ¶ 57.
Thus, because the Specification describes the additional elements in
general terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim
limitations may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional
computer components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s
Specification, as cited and quoted above.21
The MPEP, based upon our precedential guidance, provides additional
considerations with respect to analysis of the well-understood, routine, and
conventional nature of the recited computer-related components.
Another consideration when determining whether a claim
recites significantly more than a judicial exception is whether
the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the
words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere
instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on

21 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account
whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to
transform a judicial exception into a patent-eligible application,
the additional element or combination of elements must do
“‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding
the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. __,
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example,
claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply
the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an
abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358, 110
USPQ2d at 1983. See also 134 S. Ct. at 2389, 110 USPQ2d at
1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the
draftsman’s art”) . . . .
In Alice Corp., the claim recited the concept of
intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer.
The Court found that the recitation of the computer in the claim
amounted to mere instructions to apply the abstract idea on a
generic computer. 134 S. Ct. at 2359-60, 110 USPQ2d at 1984.
The Supreme Court also discussed this concept in an earlier
case, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673,
676 (1972), where the claim recited a process for converting
binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary
numbers. The Court found that the claimed process had no
substantial practical application except in connection with a
computer. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, 175 USPQ at 676. The
claim simply stated a judicial exception (e.g., law of nature or
abstract idea) while effectively adding words that “apply it” in a
computer. Id.
MPEP § 2106.05(f) (“Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception”).
With respect to the Step 2B analysis, we conclude, similar to Alice, the
recitation of a method that includes the generic components and techniques
identified in TABLE I above for method claim 19, and similarly for system
claim 1 and computer-readable medium claim 38, is simply not enough to
transform the patent-ineligible abstract idea of calculating realized spreads in
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financial transactions here into a patent-eligible invention under Step 2B.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“[C]laims, which merely require generic
computer implementation, fail to transform [an] abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.”).
Thus, after evaluating representative claim 19 under step 2 of the
Alice analysis, we conclude it lacks an inventive concept that transforms the
abstract idea of calculating realized spreads in financial transactions into a
patent-eligible application of that abstract idea.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 1–41, considered as a whole, is
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a
practical application and does not include an inventive concept.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 19, and grouped claims 1–18 and 20–41 which fall therewith. See
Claim Grouping, supra.
2. § 103(a) Rejection R2 of Claims 1, 19, and 38
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 18–21; Reply Br.10–15) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, and Sattler is in error. These contentions
present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests “[a] system for generating and utilizing financial trading
metrics” that includes the limitation of “a data-obtaining module comprising
a computer program executing on a processor,” wherein, inter alia, “the
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data-obtaining module [is] configured to implement programmatic control to
obtain raw financial trade data via at least one of an http listing query
directed to a log server and an http request directed to a source, where the
raw financial trade data includes at least one of a globally unique identifier
and a counter-party identifier,” as recited in claim 1?
Analysis
The Examiner relies upon the combination of Fishman, Nyhoff, and
Sattler as teaching or suggesting the contested limitations. Final Act. 5–7.
http listing query / http request
Appellant contends “Nyhoff fails to disclose any techniques that
include obtaining, via at least one of (i) an http listing query directed to a log
server and (ii) an http request directed to a source. . . . In the Final Office
Action, the Examiner maps the http request recited in claim 1 to the email
communication links that are implemented by the system 600 disclosed in
Nyhoff.” Appeal Br. 19 (citing Final Act. 6).
Instead, the above portions of Nyhoff cited by the
Examiner — relating to the “parties” and the “email
communication links” — refer to two separate and distinct
systems disclosed by Nyhoff. Specifically, Nyhoff discloses
that information identifying the parties for futures contracts and
offsetting contracts is received by the clearinghouse module
142 that is included in the exchange computer system 100. See
Nyhoff at Fig. 1 and ¶ [0025]. By contrast, the communication
links to various trade data sources, including email
communication links to brokers and/or other entities, are
implemented by system 600, which is a separate and distinct
system from the exchange computer system 100. See id. at Fig.
6 and ¶ [0063]. Notably, Nyhoff fails to disclose that the email
communication links associated with the system 600 are
implemented, in any manner, by the exchange computer system
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100 in order to identify parties to a futures contract or offsetting
contract. Further, Nyhoff fails to disclose that the system 600
implements the email communication links to obtain any such
information.
Appeal Br. 19.
In response, the Examiner concludes Appellant’s argument that
Nyhoff is deficient because its teachings occur in two separate embodiments
is unpersuasive, citing our reviewing court’s guidance that “[c]ombining two
embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not
require a leap of inventiveness.” Ans. 15 (citing Boston Scientific Scimed,
Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
The Examiner continues by responding “[t]he prior art references of
record continue to teach each and every aspect of the claims. Nyhoff
pertains to financial-trades and teaches the limitations of the claim
(including email communication servers), wherein the recited terms are
afforded their broadest reasonable interpretation. . . . [and] Sattler teaches
programmatic control of a computer program being executed by a
processor.” Ans. 15–16. The Examiner further finds, and we agree,
“Nyhoff, teaches receiving financial trade data from other sources via, for
example [‘]email communication links to brokers and/or other entities that
perform trading operations’ ([0066]), which teaches obtaining data via http
request directed to a source under programmatic control (e.g., internet
email program control).” Ans. 16 (emphasis added).
As a matter of claim construction, we conclude claim 1 does not
require obtaining raw financial trade data via both “an http listing query
directed to a log server” and “an http request directed to a source.” Instead,
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the claim alternatively recites “obtain[ing] raw financial trade data via at
least one of an http listing query directed to a log server and an http request
directed to a source under programmatic control.” Claim 1 (emphasis
added). The Examiner responds to this alternative language by citing
Nyhoff’s teaching of “email communication links to brokers and/or other
entities that perform trading operations” as teaching or suggesting
“obtain[ing] data via http request directed to a source under programmatic
control.” Ans. 16 (citing Nyhoff ¶ 66).
Paragraph 66 of Nyhoff discloses:
Engine 601 may also have one or more communication
links to trade data sources 605. As explained in more detail
below, engine 601 may obtain trade data from sources 605 as
part of calculating an alternate cash settlement price. Trade
data sources 605 may comprise one or more internal or external
databases that provide bid and ask prices for commodities
overtime periods of interest. Trade data sources 605 could also
include email communication links to brokers and/or other
entities that perform trading operations.
Nyhoff ¶ 66 (emphasis added).
We note the Specification is silent on an explicit definition of an “http
request directed to a source under programmatic control.”22 Under a broad
but reasonable interpretation (see Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054), we agree with

22 Appellant indicates the contested limitation is “supported by at least
paragraphs [0060], [0063], [0064], [0067], and [0074]–[0076] and Figures 2
and 3 of the Application.” Appeal Br. 7 (“Summary of Claimed Subject
Matter”). We find paragraph 63, for example, merely provides an exemplary
implementation, without specifics, i.e., “[t]he data-obtaining module 202
may also obtain raw financial-trade data 240 from those sources or from
another source by executing an http request under programmatic control
264.” Spec. ¶ 63.
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the Examiner that Nyhoff’s disclosure in paragraph 66 of communication
links to trade sources, including email communications links to brokers or
other trading entities, teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. We agree
with the Examiner because under a broad but reasonable interpretation, and
lacking any contrary interpretation in the Specification, we conclude the
recited “http request directed to a source under programmatic control” reads
on Nyhoff’s teaching (¶ 66) of “one or more communication links to trade
data sources” that can include “email communication links to brokers and/or
other entities that perform trading operations.”23
Globally Unique Identifier
Appellant also contends “Nyhoff fails to disclose any techniques that
include obtaining . . . raw financial trade data that includes at least one of (i)
a globally unique identifier and (ii) a counter-party identifier.” Appeal
Br. 19 (citing Final Act. 6) (emphasis added).
Appellant further argues:
Given this [broadest reasonable interpretation] standard,
the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “globally
unique identifier” is an identifier that is unique at a global level.
This definition of the term “globally unique identifier” is
consistent with the usage of the term in the present
Specification. In particular, the Specification states that
individual trade data extracted from individual records of raw
financial-trade data includes a Globally Unique Identifier
(GUID) for the quote, among other data. See Application at
¶ [0064]. The Specification does not include any language that
defines “globally unique identifier” in a manner that is different
from the ordinary and customary meaning of the term.

23 The Examiner cites to Sattler for teaching or suggesting programmatic
control of a computer program being executed by a processor. Ans. 16.
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Therefore, the ordinary and customary meaning of “globally
unique identifier” to those skilled in the art and consistent with
the Specification, is an identifier that is unique at a global level.
Reply Br. 14 (emphasis added).
We note, with respect to any “definition” of “Globally Unique
Identifier,” paragraph 64 of the Specification singularly discloses, “[t]he
individual trade data 244 extracted from the individual records of raw
financial-trade data includes, but is not limited to, a Globally Unique
Identifier (GUID) for the quote, a Counter-Party Identified (CPID), date of
the trade (YMD), time of the trade (HMS), price of the trade, and the size of
the trade.” Spec. ¶ 64. We note this is the only use of the phrase “Globally
Unique Identifier” or “GUID” in the Specification. We find this sole
mention of the phrase in the Specification does not rise to the level of an
explicit definition.
We further point out that Appellant only provides attorney argument
with no evidence as to how a person with skill in the art would interpret the
disputed phrase, or what the “ordinary and customary meaning of the term”
is. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported
by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116
F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699,
705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7-8
(BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd09004693.pdf. See In re
Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board
reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in
an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked
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assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”);
cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is
not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than
argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior
art.”). Arguments not made are therefore waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Lacking evidence of record to the contrary, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding (Ans. 16) that the phrase “globally unique identifier” has
not been expressly defined in Appellant’s Specification, and, under a broad
but reasonable interpretation, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that “the
name of an instrument is construed to be a globally unique identifier, as is
often, though not always, the case.” Id.24
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 19 and 38 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.

24 We are not persuaded by Appellant’s somewhat circular argument (Reply
Br. 14) that the ordinary and customary meaning of the phrase “globally
unique identifier” “is an identifier that is unique at a global level,” nor are
we persuaded that this recited phrase does not read on Nyhoff’s disclosure of
a name of an instrument. See Ans. 16.
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3. Rejections R3–R8: Claims 2–5, 7–9, 11, 18, 20, 21, 23–26, 28, 35–37,
39, and 40
In view of the lack of any substantive or separate arguments directed
to obviousness Rejections R3 through R8 of claims 2–5, 7–9, 11, 18, 20, 21,
23–26, 28, 35–37, 39, and 40 under § 103(a) (see Appeal Br. 21), we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of these claims. Arguments not made are waived.25
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 3–16) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position
in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Under our Revised Guidance, governed by relevant case law,
claims 1–41 are patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we sustain the
rejection.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness
Rejections R2 through R8 of claims 1–5, 7–9, 11, 18–21, 23–26, 28,

25 Appellant merely argues, “Appellant submits that claim 1 and all claims
dependent thereon are in condition for allowance. Further, independent
claims 19 and 38 recite limitations similar to those discussed above in
connection with allowable claim 1. Therefore, claims 19 and 38 and all
claims respectively dependent thereon, respectively, are in condition for
allowance for at least the reasons set forth herein.” Appeal Br. 21.
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and 35–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combinations of
record, and we sustain the rejections.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis /
References Affirmed Reversed
1–41 101 Subject Matter Eligibility 1–41
1, 19, 38 103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler
1, 19, 38
2–5, 7, 20,
21, 23, 25,
39, 40
103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler, Janian
2–5, 7, 20,
21, 23, 25,
39, 40

8, 24 103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler,
Ogg
8, 24
9, 11, 26,
28 103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler, Khalfan
9, 11, 26, 28
18, 37 103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler, Swearigen
18, 37
35 103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler, Toffey
35
36 103(a)
Obviousness
Fishman, Nyhoff,
Sattler, Shin
36
Overall
Outcome 1–41
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FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED