Insight Global, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 23, 2016

15-CA-161491 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 23, 2016)

JD–113–16
Atlanta, GA
1
STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC
and Case No. 15–CA–161491
DALE FIRMIN, an Individual
Alexandra K. R. Schule, Esq.
for the General Counsel.
Lauren S. Novak, Esq.
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS M. RANDAZZO, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in New Orleans,
Louisiana on May 16, 2016. Dale Firmin, an Individual (the Charging Party) filed the instant
charge on October 7, 2015,1 and amended charges on December 1, 2015, December 18, 2015,
and February 2, 2016. The General Counsel issued the complaint on February 26, 2016, alleging
that Insight Global, LLC (the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) by unlawfully maintaining the following four rules in its Contract
Employee Agreement (CEA): Section 11 – “Confidentiality and Data Security,” Section 15 –
“E-Mail and Internet Policy,” Section 18 – “Non-Disparagement,” and Section 21 – “Neutral
binding arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative
claims.”2 In its answer, the Respondent denies that it violated the Act as alleged.
On the basis of the entire record,3 my determination of credible evidence, and after
considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following

1 All dates are in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The complaint further alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by refusing to hire the
Charging Party because he refused to sign the Contract Employee Agreement’s “Neutral binding
arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative claims.” Thereafter,
the parties reached a settlement with regard to the refusal to hire allegation, and on that basis, the General
Counsel issued an amendment to the complaint dated April 28, 2016, withdrawing the refusal to hire
allegations set forth in paragraphs 6(b) and 6(c) of the complaint. (GC Exh. 1(m))
3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “GC Brief.” for the General Counsel’s Brief; and
“R. Brief.” for Respondent’s brief.
JD–113–16
2
Findings of Fact
I. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction in General
5
The Respondent, a limited liability company with an office and a place of business in
Atlanta, Georgia, has been engaged in the operation of a staffing services firm. Annually, in
conducting its operations, the Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in
states other than the State of Georgia, and purchased and received at its Atlanta, Georgia facility
good valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Georgia. The 10
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
B. Jurisdiction Pertaining to the Allegations in the Amended Charges
15
The Respondent alleges that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the allegations in the three
amended charges and that those allegations should therefore be dismissed. The initial charge in
this case filed on October 7, 2015, alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by “maintaining an unlawful rule concerning forced arbitration” and by refusing to hire Firmin in
retaliation for his protected concerted activities based on his “complaints about unlawful 20
provisions of the contract.” (GC Exh. 1(a)) Thereafter, Firmin filed an amended charge on
December 1, 2015, a second amended charge on December 18, 2015, and a third amended
charge on February 2, 2016, alleging that the Respondent’s rules pertaining to confidentiality and
data security, email and internet policy, and non-disparagement were also unlawful.4
25
In the Respondent’s answer to the complaint, it asserts as an affirmative defense that the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the allegations in the amended charges which relate to Sections 11
(Confidentiality and Data Security Rule), 15 (Email and Internet Policy Rule), and 18 (Non-
Disparagement Rule) “because the charges were solicited by the Board and the General Counsel
and are not connected to the allegations raised by Firmin in his initial charge.” (GC Exh. 1(i))5 30
The Respondent argues in its brief that “[a]lthough [it] was precluded from putting on testimony
[regarding the jurisdiction issue], the overwhelming documentary evidence suggests that
[Firmin] did not raise the additional claims on his own.” (R. Br. at p. 34).6 In support of its

4 A copy of the third amended charge filed on February 2, 2016, is not found in the record. (GC Exh.
1) However, the Respondent admitted that the third amended charge was filed in its answer to the
complaint. (GC Exh. 1 (i))
5 The Respondent therefore does not assert a lack of jurisdiction with regard to the allegation that the
Respondent’s binding arbitration rule violates the Act. (Tr. 50)
6 Respondent is referring to the fact that in a pretrial conference call with the parties, it raised the
issue of subpoenaing Firmin to testify specifically with regard to his filing of the amended charges. The
General Counsel stated that it would object to such testimony as lacking relevance. In that conference
call, I indicated to the parties that such testimony would not be relevant based on the well- established
case law, and on that basis I indicated that at trial I would sustain any objections to such testimony. The
Respondent again raised that issue at the hearing in this matter, even though it had not subpoenaed Firmin
to testify for that purpose. In any event, at the hearing I reaffirmed my pretrial determination, and ruled
that such testimony would not be relevant and would be precluded from the record. (Tr. 54)
JD–113–16
3
defense, Respondent offered into evidence various email communications that occurred prior to
or shortly after the filing of the initial charge, between Firmin and Respondent’s recruiter,
Michelle Azzarello, and between Firmin and Respondent’s legal counsel, Lauren Novak, Esq.
and Henry Sledz, Esq. (R. Exh. 1 and 2) The Respondent asserts that the complaints raised by
Firmin during those initial communications with Respondent and his allegations in his initial 5
charge were “narrow and specific” as he only alleged that the arbitration clause violated the Act.
(R. Brief at p. 34) Respondent further argues that “the documentary evidence suggests that
[Firmin] did not raise the additional claims on his own” and “[i]t must therefore be inferred that
they were solicited by the Region.” (R. Br. at p. 34)
10
The Respondent’s assertion that the three amended charges are unrelated to the
allegations in the initial charge and that they were solicited by the Board and General Counsel
lack merit. Initially, I note that the Respondent does not allege that the Board or the General
Counsel’s Regional Office agents forced or coerced Firmin into amending his initial charge
against his will.7 Furthermore, the record fails to establish that the amended charges were in any 15
way unlawfully solicited by the General Counsel or the Board. The record also establishes that
the CEA provisions alleged to be unlawful in the amended charges are related to the allegations
in the initial charge. The policies alleged in the amended charges, as well as policy alleged in the
initial charge, are all contained in the Respondent’s CEA.
20
In addition, the email exchanges Respondent relies upon in support of its argument
actually establish that Firmin was concerned with, and objected to, allegedly unlawful provisions
of the CEA in addition to the arbitration policy. (R. Exh. 1 and 2) In an email to Azzarello dated
October 1, 2015, prior to the initial charge being filed on October 7, 2015, Firmin informed
Respondent that he had “a few issues regarding the contract employment agreement,” which 25
consisted not only of an objection to the neutral binding arbitration provision, but also to
provisions concerning “confidential information” and the “email and internet policy.” (R. Exh. 1)
Besides specifically expressing his objection to the email policy and the confidentiality policy,
Firmin noted in an October 5 email to Azzarello that “your contract [has] some very serious
violations of Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act” and “[t]here are a multitude of other 30
major violations of Federal and State laws and I will be making the appropriate complaints to
those agencies shortly” (R. Exh. 1) Firmin also informed Respondent’s legal counsel that
“[y]our client’s contract violates such a multitude of laws” (R. Exh. 2, email dated October 12,
2015). Thus, the record reveals that other provisions of the CEA such as the email policy and the
confidentiality policy, were believed to be unlawful and were objected to by Firmin prior to the 35
filing of his initial charge, and those additional violations were sufficiently related to the
allegations in the initial charge.
However, even assuming the filing of the amended charges occurred precisely as the
Respondent believes—namely, that the Board agent investigating the charge informed Firmin of 40
the potential violations with regard to the confidentiality, email, and non-disparagement policies,
and provided Firmin with an opportunity to file amended charges specifically alleging those

7 In this regard, the Respondent has not reported to the General Counsel that the Regional Director or
her agents committed any abuse of process by forcing Firmin to, against his will, file the amended
charges. (Tr. 50)
JD–113–16
4
potential violations—such conduct has no legal significance under extant Board law. Such
investigative procedure has been found by the Board majority in Leukemia and Lymphoma
Society, 363 NLRB No. 123 (2016), to conform with Section 10062.5 of the NLRB
Casehandling Manual (Part One) Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, and as such, has been found
to constitute a sufficient basis to deny a motion to dismiss a complaint for an alleged lack of 5
jurisdiction. Casehandling Manual Section 10062.5 states in relevant part: “Where the
investigation uncovers evidence of unfair labor practices not specified in a charge, Board
agents…must determine whether the charge is sufficient to support complaint allegations
covering the apparent unfair labor practices found…. If the allegations of the charge are too
narrow, not sufficiently specific or otherwise flawed, the charging party or its representative 10
should be apprised of the potential deficiency in the existing charge and given the opportunity to
file an amended charge.”
Thus, even assuming the investigating Board agent informed Firmin of the potential
additional unfair labor practice violations and provided him an opportunity to amend the charge, 15
such conduct is consistent with the Board agent’s performance of his or her duties. In fact,
bringing such information to the Charging Party’s attention is nothing short of the Board’s
obligation as a public servant. The Board and the courts have consistently found that it is
appropriate for Board agents to notify charging parties of deficiencies in their charges or
additional merit findings that could be corrected by amendment to incorporate additional 20
violations of the Act. See Petersen Construction Corp., 128 NLRB 969, 972 (1960) (Board
found that in the course of investigating the initial charges, the Regional Office discovered
evidence of a number of potential respondents, and “it was the duty of the General Counsel, in
discharging his responsibilities as a public official charged with enforcing public rights, to take
proper measures calculated to effectively remedy all of the unfair labor practices which had been 25
revealed by the investigation.”) In Petersen Construction, supra, the Board determined that the
Regional Office personnel’s furnishing the charging party with appropriately drawn charges and
instructions to sign them if he wished to do so, “was a legitimate exercise of the General
Counsel’s duty to bring to the Charging Party’s attention matters uncovered during the course of
the investigation and in no way interfered with his free choice in determining whether to stand on 30
the original charge or to expand it further by amendment.” Id. at 972; See Marbro Co., Inc., 284
NLRB 1303, 1313–1314 (1987) (where Board rejected respondent’s argument that a Board agent
improperly solicited the inclusion of new allegations in an amended charge); See also NLRB v.
Laborers Local 282, 567 F.2d 833, 835 (8th Cir. 1977) (where upon investigation of a charge the
Board’s Regional Office was justified in requesting that the charging party file a charge against a 35
joint venture employer as well as the union).
The Board has held that it is irrelevant “that the initial impetus to remedy the additional
unfair labor practice may have originated in [a] Regional Office” as “the Regional Office, and
not the Charging Party, conducted the investigation which uncovered the additional matters,” and 40
therefore, “this could hardly have occurred in any other sequence.” Petersen Construction, supra
at 973. The Board has also held that where “there is but ‘mere speculation’ that the Region’s
employees did anything other than fulfill their duties to take proper measures to prosecute unfair
labor practices revealed by an investigation,….the judge appropriately refused to order the Board
to produce either the witnesses or documents sought by the Respondent.” Earthgrains Co., 351 45
NLRB 733, 739 (2007).
JD–113–16
5
Finally, the Respondent’s assertions pertaining to the alleged lack of jurisdiction are
unavailing because the Respondent has failed to establish that the Board acted outside of the
situation which gave rise to the original charge. CSA RX Services, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 180, slip
op. at 1, fn. 3 (2016). In CSA RX Services, like the instant case, the respondent argued that the
charge was improperly solicited and it therefore should be dismissed. The Board found that 5
argument to be meritless for the reasons stated by the administrative law judge, which included
the judge’s determination that the Board had not acted “so completely outside the situation
giving rise to the (original) charge that it may be said to be initiating the proceeding on its own
motion.” Id. slip op. 11, citing NLRB v. Reliance Steel Products Co., 322 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir.
1963) and NLRB v. Kohler Company, 220 F.2d 3, 7 (7th Cir. 1955). In the instant case, the 10
original charge alleged that Respondent violated the Act by maintaining an unlawful rule in its
contract (Contract Employee Agreement) concerning “forced arbitration.” (GC Exh. 1(a)) The
charge also alleged that Firmin was discriminated against based on his “complaints about
unlawful provisions of the contract.” Id. As the confidentiality, email, and non-disparagement
policies are found in that same Contract Employee Agreement which is the subject of the 15
original charge, the amended charges arose from the same situation or contract that gave rise to
the original charge. As a result, informing the Charging Party of other potentially unlawful rules
or policies in that same Contract Employee Agreement was not so utterly extraneous to the
situation pertaining to the original charge that the Board could be viewed as “initiating the
proceeding on its own motion.” CSA RX Services, supra, slip op. at 11; See Alberici-Fruin-20
Colnon, 226 NLRB 1315, 1316 (1976), enfd. 567 F.2d 833 (1977) (charge against employer
alleging a discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(3) was not improperly solicited where the
original charge against the union alleged an unlawful attempt to cause the employer to
discriminate against the charging party in violation of Section 8(b)(2)).
25
Thus, the evidence fails to establish that the amended charges in the instant case were
improperly solicited, nor does it establish that there was any improper conduct by the General
Counsel’s Regional Office personnel which would affect the validity of the amended charges.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES30
A. Background, Stipulated Facts, and Exhibits
The relevant facts, as set forth below, are derived from the parties’ factual stipulations
and exhibits admitted into evidence that comprise the official record in this case. At the hearing 35
in this matter, the Respondent and General Counsel offered a Joint Motion and Stipulation of
Facts and Exhibits (Jt. Exh. 1), and a Joint Motion and Stipulation of Facts (Jt. Exh. 2) into
evidence, which were admitted and received into the record.8 In addition, GC Exhs. 1, 2, and 4,
R. Exhs. 1 and 2, and various other stipulations were received into the record.
40

8 The stipulations were made without prejudice to any objection either party may have as to the
relevancy of any of the stated facts therein. (Jt. Exh. 1) Neither party chose to call or examine any
witnesses at the trial.
JD–113–16
6
The Respondent operates an information technology staffing company in Atlanta,
Georgia that identifies candidates whom are referred for employment to its customers. (Jt. Exh.
1). The Respondent identifies candidates for employment in temporary and permanent positions
with its customers through various internally developed databases, online services, resume
posting websites, as well as other sources. Once the Respondent identifies a candidate, their 5
resume is screened, and if they have the requisite experience and availability for a position with
one of Respondent’s customers, the Respondent or its customer will interview the candidate. (Jt.
Exh. 1) Candidates who successfully pass the interview are provided preemployment
documents. If a candidate is seeking a work assignment at a customer’s site, one of the pre-
employment documents they receive, and must sign as a condition of employment, is 10
Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement. (Jt. Exh. 1) It is undisputed that the Respondent
maintains the provisions which are at issue in this matter, and the parties stipulated that from
April 2015 to May 16, 2016, applicants for employment with the Respondent who sought work
assignments at customer sites were hired by Respondent only if they signed the Contract
Employee Agreement.9 (Jt. Exh. 1; GC Exh.1(i))15
From October 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016, the Respondent hired and referred
approximately 15,405 employees for work assignments at customer worksites. (Jt. Exh. 1)
Those employees remained Respondent’s employees even though they worked at the customer’s
jobsite, and they continued to be bound by the Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement. (Jt. 20
Exh. 1) The Respondent hired and assigned employees to work for approximately 1,200
customers or clients during that last year. (Jt. Exh. 2)
The Respondent’s applicants for assignment at customer sites are not routinely advised or
invited to request modifications to the Contract Employee Agreement. However, if such 25
employees request changes to the CEA, only a recruiter, account manager, sales manager, or
director of operations can modify it. The relevant provisions of the Contract Employee
Agreement are not modified according to the identity of the customer. (Jt. Exh. 2) In addition, of
the approximately 15,405 applicants hired between October 1, 2015 and March 31, 2016, who
signed Contract Employee Agreements, only two requests for modifications were approved by 30
the Respondent. In those two instances, the requested modifications were to the Non-
Disparagement Policy wherein it was made mutual to both the Respondent and the applicant. (Jt.
Exh. 1) On at least two occasions since October 2015, the Respondent denied requests for
modifications to the Arbitration policy. (Jt. Exh. 1; GC Exh. 4; Tr. 49) Although Respondent
asserts certain business justifications for its Confidentiality Policy and Email Policy, it does not 35
routinely advise applicants of those justifications. (Jt. Exhs. 1 and 2) Finally, in October 2015,
the Charging Party requested a modification to the Contract Employee Agreement, but
Respondent denied that request.
40

9 While the record contains three versions of the Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement (GC
Exh. 2(a)-(c), the version in effect at the time the Charging Party filed his charge was GC Exh. 2(a). Any
modifications to the CEA provisions at issue in this matter are not material to this case.
JD–113–16
7
B. The Contentions of the Parties
As mentioned above, the General Counsel alleges that the Respondent’s Contract
Employee Agreement contains four policies that are overbroad and unlawful which violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: (1) Confidentiality and Data Security; (2) E-Mail and Internet Policy; 5
(3) Non-Disparagement; and (4) Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury,
and waiver of class or representative claims. The Respondent denies that its maintenance of
these four policies violates the Act as alleged.
C. Analysis10
1. The legal standard
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 [of the 15
Act].” Section 7, the cornerstone of the Act, provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 20
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities.
The rights under Section 7 have been found to “necessarily encompass[] the right
effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite.” Beth 25
Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978). This includes employee communications
regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S.
451, 459 (1972); Parexel International, LLC, 356 NLRB 516, 518 (2011). As mentioned above,
under Section 7, employees also have the right to engage in activity for their “mutual aid or
protection,” which also includes communicating regarding their terms and conditions of 30
employment. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978). Thus, a core activity protected by
Section 7 is the right of employees to discuss, debate, and communicate with each other
regarding their workplace terms and conditions of employment. Consequently, the Board has
held that employees’ concerted communications regarding matters affecting their employment
with other employees, their employer’s customers, or with other third parties such as 35
governmental agencies, are protected by Section 7 and, with some exceptions not applicable
here, cannot lawfully be banned. See Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171, 1171–
1172 (1990). The Board reasoned that prohibitions against employees communicating with
others such as third parties “reasonably tends to inhibit employees from bringing work-related
complaints to, and seeking redress from, entities other than the Respondent, and restrains the 40
employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.” Id. at 1172; see also Trinity Protection Services, Inc., 357 NLRB
1382, 1383 (2011).

It is well established that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if it maintains 45
workplace rules that would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7
JD–113–16
8
rights. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646 (2004), citing Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Valley Health System
LLC d/b/a Spring Valley Hospital Medical Center, 363 NLRB No. 178 (2016); T-Mobile USA,
Inc, 363 NLRB No. 171 (2016); Triple Play Sports Bar, 361 NLRB No. 31, slip op. 6 (2014);
Hills & Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 5 (2014). The analytical 5
framework for determining whether maintenance of rules violate the Act is set forth in Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, supra. Under Lutheran Heritage, a work rule is unlawful if “the rule
explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7.” 343 NLRB at 646 (emphasis in the original).
If the work rule does not explicitly restrict protected activities, it nonetheless will violate Section
8(a)(1) if “(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; 10
(2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.” Id. at 647.
In this case, the General Counsel does not allege that the policies or rules in question
were promulgated in response to union activity, or that they have been discriminatorily applied 15
to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. Rather, the General Counsel argues that under the first
prong of the test, the challenged rules are overbroad on their face such that employees would
reasonably construe the language in the policies at issue to prohibit their Section 7 activities.
In determining whether employees “would reasonably construe the [rule’s] language to 20
prohibit Section 7 activity,” the Board adheres to certain guidelines in its analysis. The Board
will determine that an employer rule is overbroad “when employees would reasonably interpret it
to encompass protected activities.” Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, supra, slip op. at 7. The
Board has found that its “task is to determine how a reasonable employee would interpret the
action or statement of her employer, and such a determination appropriately takes account of the 25
surrounding circumstances.” Roomstore, 357 NLRB 1690, 1690 fn. 3 (2011). The Board, in
analyzing work rules, “must give the rule a reasonable reading…,” and “refrain from reading
particular phrases in isolation, and… must not presume improper interference with employee
rights.” Id. at 646. In addition, the Board does not require that an employer actually apply a rule
for it to be found unlawful. “Where the rules are likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 30
rights, the Board may conclude that their maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even absent
evidence of enforcement.” Layayette Park Hotel, supra; see also Farah Mfg. Co., 187 NLRB
601, 602 (1970), enfd. 450 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1971) (the mere maintenance of the rule itself
inhibits the engagement in otherwise protected organizational activity and is not precluded by the
absence of evidence that it was invoked). 35
An employer’s rule does not violate the Act if a reasonable employee merely could
conceivably read it as barring Section 7 activity. Rather, as stated above, the inquiry is whether a
reasonable employee would read the rule as prohibiting Section 7 activity. Id. Furthermore, any
ambiguity in the rule must be construed against the drafter of the rule, which in this case is the 40
Respondent. Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB 1131, 1132 (2012), enfd. 746 F.3d 205 (5th
Cir. 2014).10 This principle stems from the Act’s goal of preventing employees from being

10 The Board’s decision in Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, supra, was subsequently invalidated as a case
decided by a panel that included two persons whose appointments to the Board were not valid. See Noel
Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014). The Board has since found however, that reliance on Flex Frac
JD–113–16
9
chilled in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, whether or not such an effect on their rights is
intended by the employer, instead of being tasked with dispelling such chill once it is manifest.
Id.; See, e.g. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB at 828.
While it is undisputed that the four policies at issue in this case are applicable to 5
applicants for employment who have not yet established their employment relationship with the
Respondent, the Board and courts have made it clear that the protection of the Act has been
extended to applicants for employment. Briggs Mfg. Co., 75 NLRB 569, 571 (1947) (where the
Board found that the statutory definition of “employee” was broad enough to cover “applicants
for employment”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185–186 (1941) (the Supreme 10
Court held that Section 8(a)(3) applied to job applicants); E.g., NLRB v. Town & Country
Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 88 (1995) (summarizing Phelps Dodge as holding that the “statutory
word ‘employee’ includes job applicants”); see also Toering Electric Co., 351 NLRB 225
(2007).
15
During the operative time period in this case, the Respondent required over 15,000
applicants to forfeit or restrict their rights to share information with employees, applicants and
other parties by virtue of its confidentiality, email, non-disparagement, and arbitration policies.
While Board law certainly addresses employer efforts to restrict Section 7 rights of employees,
such legal precedent is similarly applied to other forms of employer policies and rules applicable 20
to applicants for employment in preemployment agreements, like the Respondent’s Contract
Employee Agreement at issue in this case. See Haynes Bldg. Serv., LLC, 363 NLRB No. 125
(2016) (preemployment agreement mandatory arbitration provision); Flex Frac Logistics, LLC,
358 NLRB 1131 (2012). As Board law is applicable to preemployment agreements such as the
Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement, I must now apply those legal standards to the four 25
policies or rules at issue in this case.
2. The Respondent’s Confidentiality and Data Security rule
The Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement contains a rule or provision entitled 30
“Confidentiality and Data Security.” That provision states:
11. Confidentiality and Data Security. Contract Employee agrees that all
information relating to the business operations of Insight Global or Customer
shall be held in strict confidence and not disclosed without the prior written 35
consent of Insight Global or Customer, whichever is appropriate.
Without the prior written approval of Insight Global or Customer, as
applicable, Contract Employee will not, at any time (whether during or
subsequent to the period of this Agreement), disclose to others, or use Contract
Employee’s own benefit, confidential information belonging to Insight Global, 40
Customer, or the licensers, licensees, affiliates or customers of Insight Global or

Logistics is appropriate because the panel’s decision was enforced by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit prior to the issuance of Noel Canning. 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014). The Board has
also noted that there is no question regarding the validity of the court’s judgment. T-Mobile, USA, Inc.,
363 NLRB No. 171, slip op. at 2, fn. 5 (2016); See also UPMC, 362 NLRB No. 191 fn. 5 (2015).
JD–113–16
10
Customer including, but not limited to, all information belonging to Insight
Global, Customer, or the licensers, licensees, affiliates or customers of Insight
Global or Customer related to their respective services and products, customers,
business methods, strategies, and practices, internal operations, pricing and
billing, financial data, costs, personnel information (including, but not limited to, 5
names, educational background prior experience and availability), customer and
supplier contacts and needs, sales lists, technology, software, computer programs,
computer systems, inventions, developments, and trade secrets of every kind and
character, acquired by Contract Employee during the period of, or in connection
with, Contract Assignment.10
Contract Employee shall comply with all policies and procedures of
Insight Global and/or Customer provided or known to Contract Employee
regarding data security and privacy and, in any event, use reasonable care to
protect the confidential data of Insight Global, Customer or their licensors,
licensees, affiliates or customers, including by diligently using passwords, 15
encryption and other security measures made available to Contract Employee,
reasonably securing from theft or loss equipment provided to Contract Employee
by Insight Global or Customer, and promptly notifying Insight Global in the event
of any unauthorized use or disclosure of confidential data when discovered by
Contract Employee. (GC Exh. 2(a))20
The General Counsel asserts this rule violates the Act because it restricts employees from
communicating with other employees and third parties about protected topics if approval is not
first obtained from the Respondent or its customer. (R. Br. at p.7) The Respondent denies its
maintenance of this rule is unlawful. Instead, it argues that the confidentiality and data security 25
provision protects the confidential information of Respondent’s customers, and prevents
disclosure of Respondent’s trade secrets, including its personnel information and lists, and that
employees would not reasonably interpret the policy to restrict their Section 7 rights. (R. Br. at
pp. 2 and 7)
30
While this policy does not expressly prohibit disclosure of topics protected by the Act, it
does restrict employees from disclosing to others and third parties, confidential information. The
prohibition is actually set forth by the Respondent in two distinct phases. In the opening
paragraph of the policy, it sets forth a blanket prohibition that “all information relating to the
business operations of [Respondent or its customer]… shall be held in strict confidence and not 35
disclosed without the prior written consent of the [Respondent or customer].” In the second
paragraph of the policy, the Respondent sets forth that same prohibition with more precise
descriptions of the confidential information restricted from disclosure by employees, for their use
as their “own benefit.” In that connection, the confidential information prohibited from
disclosure includes, but is not limited to, “business methods, strategies, and practices, internal 40
operations, pricing and billing, financial data, costs, [and] personnel information (including, but
not limited to, names, educational background[,] prior experience, and availability)” The
Respondent does not set forth in the policy, nor does it routinely explain to applicants, its
justification for this provision. (Jt. Exh. 2)
45
JD–113–16
11
I find that this policy is unlawfully overbroad on several bases. An employer rule is
unlawfully overbroad when employees would reasonably interpret it to encompass protected
activities. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, supra, slip op. at 7. The blanket prohibition on
disclosing “all information relating to the business operations [of Respondent or its
customer]…without the prior consent of [Respondent or its customer]” is ambiguous and 5
overbroad as it fails to define or limit the impermissible conduct. The Board has routinely found
such blanket prohibitions as overbroad and unlawful. Advance Transportation, 310 NLRB 920,
925 (1993) (where the Board found a rule prohibiting employees from discussion of “company
affairs, activities, personnel, or any phase in operations with unauthorized persons” unlawful on
its face); See also Fremont Mfg. Co., Inc., 224 NLRB 597, 603–604 (1976), enfd. 558 F.2d 889 10
(8th Cir. 1977) (a rule prohibiting employees from “making any statement or disclosure
regarding company affairs, whether expressed or implied as being official, without proper
authorization from the company” is an unlawful restriction on employee rights). Under this
ambiguous blanket prohibition in the first paragraph of the policy, employees would reasonably
believe or interpret the rule as proscribing any discussions about their terms and conditions of 15
employment, such as wages, hours, and working conditions that the Respondent may deem to be
“confidential information.”
Furthermore, the prohibition in the second paragraph of the policy stating that “[w]ithout
the prior written approval of [Respondent or its customer]” the employee “will not, at any time..., 20
disclose to others, or use for [that employee’s] own benefit, confidential information belonging
to [Respondent or its customer], but not limited to, all information… related to their respective
services and products, customers, business methods, strategies, and practices, internal operations,
pricing and billing, financial data, costs, personnel information (including, but not limited to,
names, educational background prior experience and availability” is similarly overbroad. The 25
policy’s ambiguous language and a reading of the policy as a whole, establishes that employees
would reasonably understand the policy as prohibiting disclosing or discussing terms and
conditions of employment with each other or third parties. The Respondent’s specific
prohibition on the disclosure of “personnel information” would reasonably be understood by
employees to encompass wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. In 30
addition, prohibiting the disclosure of personnel information for the employees’ “own benefit” is
further evidence that employees would reasonably believe they would be precluded from
discussing wages and other important terms and conditions of employment because those topics
would clearly be beneficial to them. Critically, there is no provision exempting discussions
about wages, hours and other working conditions, and there is nothing in the policy that even 35
arguably suggests that protected communications are excluded from its parameters. As such, the
policy is overbroad and unlawful.
The Board has repeatedly held that nondisclosure policies or rules with similar language
prohibiting employees from disclosing this type of employee personnel information violates 40
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board has reasoned that rules with such language are unlawfully
overbroad because employees would reasonably believe they were prohibited from discussing or
otherwise communicating with others concerning wages and other terms and conditions of
employment, which is an activity clearly protected under Section 7 of the Act. In Quicken
Loans, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 94 (2014), affirming 359 NLRB 1201 (2013), the Board found 45
unlawful a “Proprietary/Confidential Information” rule prohibiting the disclosure of information
JD–113–16
12
defined as: (1) “non-public information relating to or regarding…personnel” and (2) “personnel
information including, but not limited to, all personnel lists, rosters, personal information of co-
workers” and “handbooks, personnel files, personnel information such as home phone numbers,
cell phone numbers, addresses, and email addresses,” noting that the Board has found that rules
prohibiting employees from disclosing this type of information about employees violates the Act.5
359 NLRB at 1201 fn. 3. Similarly, in Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB 1131, 1132 (2012),
enfd. 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014), the Board found that an employer’s prohibition on
“[d]isclosure” of “personnel information and documents” to persons outside the organization was
unlawfully overbroad as it would reasonably be understood to include “wages or other terms and
conditions of employment with nonemployees.” Id. at 1131. In addition, in Hyundai America 10
Shipping Agency, Inc., 357 NLRB 860, 871 (2011), enfd. in part and reversed in part, 805 F.3d
309 (D.C. Cir. 2015), the Board found that an employer rule prohibiting “[a]ny unauthorized
disclosure from an employee’s personnel file,” was unlawful. See also IRIS U.S.A., Inc., 336
NLRB 1013, 1013 fn. 1, 1015, 1018 (2001) (where the Board found an employer rule unlawful
that stated information about “employees is strictly confidential” and defined “personnel 15
records” as confidential).
The Board and courts have likewise found policies containing language similar to the
Respondent’s restriction on the disclosure of confidential information belonging to Respondent
or its customers “related to their respective services and products, customers, business methods, 20
strategies, and practices, internal operations, pricing and billing, and financial data costs,” to be
unlawfully overbroad. See e.g., Cintas Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d 463, 469–470 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(approving the Board’s finding that a rule requiring employees to maintain “confidentiality or
any information concerning the company, its business plans, its partners, new business efforts,
customers, accounting and financial matters” was unlawfully overbroad), enfg. 344 NLRB 943 25
(2005); Advance Transportation, Co., 310 NLRB 920, 925 (1993) (Board found rule prohibiting
employees from discussing “company affairs, activities, personnel, or any phase in operations
with unauthorized persons” is unlawful on its face); Brockton Hospital v. NLRB, 294 F.3d. 100,
106 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (approving the Board’s finding that a rule prohibiting discussions of
“[i]nformation concerning patients, associates, or hospital operations…except strictly in 30
connection with hospital business” was unlawfully overbroad), enfg. 333 NLRB 1367 (2001).
In addition, the requirement that employees obtain prior written consent or approval from
the Respondent or its customers before disclosing the information mentioned above to others is
unlawful. It is well settled that employees have the right to communicate regarding their terms 35
and conditions of employment. Eastex, supra. Employees are not required to obtain their
employer’s permission to engage in such protected activity. A rule imposing such a requirement
as a precondition to engaging in protected activity, such as in the instant case, is therefore
unlawful. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 4 fn. 10 (2015); Ivy Steel &
Wire, Inc., 346 NLRB 404, 422 (2006); Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 331 NLRB 858 (2000); 40
Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 794–795 (1987).
In support of its argument that its confidentiality policy did not violate the Act, the
Respondent relies, inter alia, on case law that is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
One such case the Respondent cites is Mediaone of Greater Florida, Inc., 340 NLRB 277, 279 45
(2003). In that case, the Board held that a handbook’s confidentiality provision that restricted
JD–113–16
13
disclosure of “customer and employee information, including organizational charts and
databases,” did not violate the Act because employees would not reasonably read the rule as
prohibiting the discussion of wages and working conditions among employees or with a union.
Id. at 279. That case, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. Although that provision
restricted disclosure of “customer and employee information, including organizational charts and 5
databases,” that restrictive phrase appeared within the larger provision prohibiting disclosure of
“proprietary information, including information assets and intellectual property” and was listed
as an example of “intellectual property.” Id. The rule in Mediaone of Greater Florida stated:
Proprietary Information10
You’re responsible for the appropriate use and protection of company and third
party proprietary information, including information assets and intellectual
property. Information is any form (printed, electronic or inherent knowledge) of
company or third party proprietary information. Intellectual property includes, 15
but is not limited to:
-business plans
-technological research and development
-product documentation, marketing plans and pricing information
-copyrighted works such as music, written documents (magazines, trade 20
journals, newspapers, etc.), audiovisual productions, brand names and the
legal rights to protect such property (for example, patents, trademarks,
copyrights)
-trade secrets and non-public information
-customer and employee information, including organizational charts and 25
databases
-financial information
-patents, copyrights, trademarks, service marks, trade names and goodwill.
While it’s not improper for you to use proprietary information in the general 30
course of doing business, you must safeguard it against loss, damage, misuse,
theft, fraud, sale, disclosure or improper disposal. Always store proprietary
information in a safe place.
You may not use or access the proprietary information of the company or others 35
for personal purposes or disclose non-public information outside the company.
Doing so could hurt the company, competitively or financially…. (Bold and
italics in original)
In the instant case, the restrictive phrases are part of a confidentiality and data security 40
provision pertaining in general to “information relating to the business operations” of the
Respondent and its customers. The restrictive phrases do not appear within a larger provision
prohibiting disclosure of proprietary information, information assets, or intellectual property, nor
are they listed as examples of intellectual property. While the provision does list information
which could reasonably be characterized as intellectual property that arguably might be rightfully 45
prevented from disclosure, such as “customer and supplier contacts and needs, sales lists,
JD–113–16
14
technology, software, computer programs, computer systems, inventions, developments, and
trade secrets…,” it also prohibits disclosure of business practices, pricing and billing, financial
data, costs, and personnel information, all of which employees would reasonably believe to
include wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment protected by
Section 7 of the Act. Unlike the facts in the instant case, the facts of Mediaone of Greater 5
Florida revealed that employees, reading the rule as a whole, would reasonably understand that it
was designed to protect “the confidentiality of the [r]espondent’s proprietary business
information rather than to prohibit discussion of employee wages.” Id. Respondent’s reliance on
that case is therefore unpersuasive.
10
The Respondent also cites Super K-Mart, 330, NLRB 263 (1999) in support of its
position. In that case, the confidentiality provision barred disclosure of “Company business and
documents.” Id. The Board majority reasoned that employees would understand that the
confidentiality provision was designed to protect the Company’s “legitimate interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of its private business information, not to prohibit discussion of 15
wages or working conditions.” Id. Super K-Mart, however, is also distinguishable from the
instant case, where the Respondent’s confidentiality rule precludes disclosure of topics beyond
just business documents. Instead, as mentioned above, it prohibits disclosure of personnel
information which clearly would be understood to include wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 20
The instant case is also distinguishable from Lafayette Park Hotel, supra, cited by the
Respondent, where a majority of the Board upheld a standard of conduct that prohibited
employees from “[d]ivulging Hotel-private information.” While the term “Hotel-private” was
not defined in the provision, the Board determined that it would not be reasonably read to 25
include employee wage discussions. Id. In the instant case, unlike in Lafayette Park Hotel, the
policy specifically prohibits “personnel information” which relates to employees’ wages and
conditions of employment. In fact, as mentioned above, it also prohibits “pricing and billing,”
“financial data,” and “costs,” all of which would reasonably be believed to encompass employee
wage information. Because of this, the substance of the policy implicates information about 30
employee wages and other working conditions in a manner that the provision in Layayette Park
Hotel did not.
Finally, in support of its position, the Respondent also relies on Palms Hotel and Casino,
344 NLRB 1363, 1388 (2005). The Administrative Law Judge in that case upheld a 35
confidentiality provision prohibiting employees from discussing its “policies and procedures”
with “outsiders” or “non-privileged” team members by dismissing the complaint allegation that it
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. In that case, however, the Board noted that there were no
exceptions to that complaint allegation dismissed by the judge. 344 NLRB at 1363, fn. 1. Since
that finding by the judge was never before the Board for its review, and it therefore was never 40
ruled on by the Board, it has no precedential value and the Respondent’s reliance on it is
misplaced.
In defense of its confidentiality policy, the Respondent offers that the asserted business
justification for its policy is to help further its and its customers’ security, privacy, and 45
confidentiality needs (Jr. Exh. 2). Specifically, the Respondent argues that it has “a legitimate
JD–113–16
15
business reason for the restriction on disclosure of employee names and other unique personnel
information used for placement purposes.” (R. Br. p. 23) While I have given Respondent’s
asserted business justification consideration, I find it is not sufficient to warrant the provision’s
overbroad language and its potential infringement on the employees’ rights protected by Section
7 of the Act. Initially, I note that Respondent argues in its post-hearing brief that the restriction 5
on disclosure of “personnel information” is not overbroad because it “clearly defines ‘personnel
information’ as ‘names, educational background, prior experience and availability.”11 That
assertion, however, is not supported by the record which establishes the policy is applicable to
personnel information “including, but not limited to,” names, educational background, prior
experience and availability (emphasis added). The Respondent also asserts that “[a] reasonable 10
employee would know that this provision is designed to keep personnel lists out of the hands of
Insight Global’s competitors and does not serve as a restriction on …Section 7 rights.” (emphasis
added) (R. Br. at p. 24) That assertion, however, is also without support in the record because
the Respondent’s policy is not limited to the disclosure of “personnel lists.” However, even
assuming that the Respondent’s policy was limited to “personnel lists,” the Board has found that 15
the prohibition against disclosure of such material is unlawful. See Quicken Loans, Inc., 361
NLRB No. 94 (2014), affirming 359 NLRB 1201 (2013) (where the Board found unlawful a
confidentiality rule prohibiting the disclosure of information defined as “personnel information
including, but not limited to, all personnel lists,” noting that prohibiting employees from
disclosing that type of information about employees violates the Act. 359 NLRB at 1201 fn. 3).20
In addition, while the Respondent may wish to protect certain information from
disclosure and illicit use, such interests do not necessitate or justify the inclusion of topics
protected by the Act, such as communicating about wages, hours, or other terms and conditions
of employment with other employees of third parties, or engaging in other protected concerted or 25
union activities. See Flamingo-Hilton Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 288 fn. 3, 291–292 (1999)
(where Board found an employer’s asserted business interests failed to justify its broad
confidentiality policy that was understood to include topics protected by the Act). This finding is
especially true given that Respondent’s asserted justifications for the policy appear to be
theoretical as the evidence fails to establish any breach or potential breach of the policy. (Tr. 39) 30
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Respondent’s customers and their businesses require such
a restrictive confidentiality policy, nor is there evidence that a less restrictive policy would be
insufficient to protect the customers’ interests. Id.; see also Flex Frac Logistics, LLC., 358
NLRB 1131, 1131 (2012) (finding no merit in employer’s asserted legitimate business interest in
the rule). 35
Finally, I note that whether the Respondent specifically intended to restrict employees’
rights under Section 7 of the Act with its overly broad confidentiality policy is immaterial. The
Board has held that its focus in such cases is on whether employees would reasonably construe a
policy or rule to restrict their Section 7 rights. See Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 40
NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004) (employer rules that are facially neutral violate the Act if
“employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity.”); See also
Flex Frac Logistics, LLC., supra at 1131 (finding employer’s admission that it did not mean to
infringe on employees protected discussions about wages indicates that it never had “a legitimate

11 R. Br. at p. 23.
JD–113–16
16
business interest in a confidentiality rule that broadly prohibits the discussion of wages or other
terms and conditions of employment”).
Base on the above, I find that the Respondent’s policy is overbroad as employees would
reasonably believe or interpret it as proscribing discussions about their terms and conditions of 5
employments, such as wages, hours and working conditions that Respondent may consider as
confidential. The fact that the policy fails to contain a provision exempting discussions about
wages, hours, and other working conditions also supports finding its restrictive terms overbroad.
Thus, the Respondent’s maintenance of the provisions discussed above in its confidentiality and
data security rule constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.10
3. The Respondent’s E-mail and Internet Policy rule
As mentioned above, the Respondent hired and assigned employees to work for
approximately 1,200 customers during the last year. (Jt. Exh. 2) The parties stipulated that some 15
of Respondent’s employees have access to Respondent’s customers’ email systems. Pursuant to
that access, the Respondent maintains in its Contract Employee Agreement the following email
policy which places a blanket prohibition on employees’ nonwork use of all the Respondent’s
customers’ email systems:
20
15. E-Mail and Internet Policy. Contract Employee acknowledges and agrees
to adhere to all applicable policies, procedures and rules of both Insight Global
and Customer with respect to the use of Insight Global and/or Customer’s e-mail
and internet systems. Contract Employee acknowledges that Customer’s e-mail
and internet systems are to be used solely for the purposes of completing the 25
Contract Assignment. In addition, Contract Employee agrees that the use of
Customers systems to transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials,
language, profanity, offensive images, or any other inappropriate material is
prohibited. Contract Employee is expressly prohibited from using any of Contract
Employee's personal computer resources, including, without limitation, Contract 30
Employee's personal internet, e-mail and instant messaging accounts, to perform
the Contract Assignment, without Customer's prior express written authorization.
Contract Employee agrees that Customer may inspect, at any time, the entire
contents of any electronic data storage device or any e-mail or instant messaging
account used to perform the Contract Assignment. Contract Employee 35
acknowledges that Customer may monitor, track and, in some instances, ascertain
the identity of the authors, recipients, and contents of computer-based
communications by Contract Employee, and Contract Employee knowingly and
voluntarily consents to being monitored and to having his/her communications
reviewed by Customer. Contract Employee is aware that he/she has no individual 40
rights to the contents or use of Customer's computer resources, and all data on or
material created using Customer's computer resources is Customer's property.
Contract Employee further acknowledges that he/she has no expectation of
privacy for any Internet or other use via Customer-owned or -provided
connections or while using Customer’s computer resources. Any breach of the E-45
Mail and Internet Policy section of this agreement will be grounds for immediate
JD–113–16
17
termination, and Contract Employee will be liable for any and all suits and claims
arising out of any breach of this section. (GC Exh. 2(a))
The General Counsel specifically alleges that the policy is unlawful in that it provides:
“Contract Employee acknowledges that Customer’s e-mail and internet systems are to be used 5
solely for the purposes of completing the Contract Assignment. In addition, Contract Employee
agrees that the use of Customers systems to transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials,
language, profanity, offensive images, or any other inappropriate material is prohibited” and that
the “Contract Employee is aware that he/she has no individual rights to the contents or use of
Customer’s computer resources.” 10
In Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 126 (2014), the Board held that
employee “use of email for statutorily protected communications on nonworking time must
presumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to give employees access to their
email systems.” Id. slip op. at 1. The Board noted that employers do not have to provide such 15
access to employees, but if they chose to do so the employer can only implement a total ban on
nonwork use of email if the employer is able to demonstrate “special circumstances [that] make
the ban necessary to maintain production or discipline.” Id. Specifically, the employer must
show:
20
…the connection between the interest it asserts and the restriction. The mere
assertion of an interest that could theoretically support a restriction will not
suffice. And, ordinarily, an employer’s interests will establish special
circumstances only to the extent that those interests are not similarly affected by
employee email use that the employer has authorized. Id. slip op. at 14.25
If the Respondent’s email policy contained a similar restriction on employees’ use of
Respondent’s own email system or if Respondent’s customers maintained such a policy
themselves, such restrictions would arguably constitute violations of the Act under the principles
of Purple Communications. However, in this case, the Board’s holding in Purple 30
Communications is not directly on point because the Respondent’s policy restricts only the use of
third party email systems. There are no Board cases that directly address the issue of whether an
employer can limit employee use of third party email systems. However, the General Counsel
submits that the Board’s holding in Purple Communications should be applied to the instant
case. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that Purple Communications should not apply 35
to this case because the policy restricts employee’s use of email and internet of its customers,
and does not apply to use of the Respondent’s own email systems.12
The Respondent further asserts that its business justification for this policy is to: (1)
protect the security of the customer’s computer systems, (2) prevent unauthorized access, 40
disclosure, or use of the private or confidential data stored on the customer’s computers, (3)
protect the intellectual property of the customer from disclosure, loss, or theft, and (4) prevent
unlawful harassment and discrimination in the customer’s workplace. (Jt. Exh. 2, para. 1; R. Br.

12 The Respondent does not have a policy which restricts employee use of its email system. (Jt. Exh.
2).
JD–113–16
18
at pp. 7–8). The Respondent argues that the policy does not violate the Act because employees
have no Section 7 right to access and use of the email of a third party, and that the policy restricts
employee use of customer email, not the Respondent’s email, and therefore the Board’s decision
in Purple Communications should not apply. Moreover, the Respondent argues that even if
Purple Communications does apply, the Respondent has met its burden of showing that the 5
restriction on employee use of customer emails meets the special circumstances test outlined in
that case. (R. Br. at p. 2) Furthermore, the Respondent argues that even if the Board finds that
employees have a Section 7 right to utilize a customer’s email and internet, the policy’s
restriction on using the system to “transmit, download or distribute offensive materials,
language, profanity, offensive images or any other inappropriate material” is not unlawful 10
because the restriction is sufficiently narrow. (R. Br. 19)
The Board recognized in Purple Communications that email is a form of speech and
communication used by employees in the workplace, noting that “[t]here is little dispute that
email has become a critical means of communication, about both work-related and other issues, 15
in a wide range of employment settings.” 361 NRLB slip op. at 6. The Board also acknowledged
that “e-mail has, of course, had a substantial impact on how people communicate, both at and
away from the workplace.” Id; citing Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110, 1116 (2007), enfd. in
relevant part and remanded sub nom. Guard Publishing v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
I find that the Board’s decision in Purple Communications is applicable to the instant case. In 20
addition, in applying the standard articulated in Purple Communications and its rationale, I find
the Respondent’s restriction of employees’ email use when those employees have general access
to the customers’ email system, infringes on their Section 7 rights and is unlawful in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. When the Board’s principles concerning employee email use are
taken into consideration, it is clear that employees’ Section 7 rights are being infringed upon by 25
the Respondent. The fact that Respondent is maintaining and enforcing a policy restricting
communications by its employees, which could include communications protected by the Act, in
a system of communication the employees have access to and use in the course of their
employment with Respondent, is unlawful. The fact that the Respondent is restricting its
employees’ use of third party email systems, as opposed to its own email system, is in essence, 30
inconsequential. As the General Counsel has correctly pointed out, “[t]o find otherwise would
excuse Respondent’s unlawful policy and leave the employees negatively affected by the Policy
without recourse.” (GC Br. at p. 13)
To find merit in the Respondent’s argument would essentially mean that its employees 35
are excluded from the protection of the Act simply because they are performing work for the
Respondent’s customers and are using the customer’s email system. Such a finding would be
theoretically opposed to the Board’s findings in cases where employment relationships and
protections under the Act have been examined. In one such case, New York New York Hotel &
Casino, 356 NLRB 907, 912 (2011), the Board held that employees of a contractor who work 40
regularly on another employer’s property should not be accorded diminished rights under the Act
based merely on the location of their workplace. In that case, the Board held that “linking full
Section 7 rights to the existence of a particular employment relationship might create an
incentive for businesses to structure their relationships with each other and thus with workers so
as to restrict workers’ statutory rights, in contravention of the declared congressional policy of 45
‘protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-organization.’” Id.
JD–113–16
19
On this issue, the Board stated for example that employees who are employed to “work regularly
in an office building not owned by their employer should not be denied Section 7 rights on the
sole ground that they work on the property of an employer other than their own.” Id. In addition,
the Board explained that “the National Labor Relations Act expressly does not require that
employees be employed by a particular employer in order to confer rights on the employees” Id. 5
In addition, in the instant case the Respondent has restricted its employees’ access to
third party channels of communication used by its employees when they are working for those
third parties, but where it has no property interest. As such, the Respondent is “plac[ing] itself
within the orbit of the Board’s corrective jurisdiction.” Fabric Services, 190 NLRB 540, 542 10
(1971), quoting NLRB v. Gluck Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847, 855 (8th Cir. 1944). In fact, since
the Respondent has no property rights to its customers’ email systems, it cannot lawfully impose
restrictions on its use. See, e.g., Ambrose Electric, 330 NLRB 78, 79–80 (1999) (where Board
found it unlawful to restrict a union official’s access to a jobsite shared by both union and
nonunion employees and where the contractor did not own or control the jobsite). As such, the 15
Respondent’s employees have a presumptive right to use the Respondent’s customers’ email
system to engage in Section 7 protected communications during nonworking time.
As mentioned above, the Respondent’s policy requires that employees agree “that the use
of Customers systems to transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials, language, 20
profanity, offensive images, or any other inappropriate material is prohibited.” This policy refers
to emails as well as other forms of electronic communication systems. In analyzing this policy
under the Board’s rationale in Purple Communications, I find its requirement that employees
agree “that the use of Customers systems to transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials,
language, …offensive images, or any other inappropriate material is prohibited” is ambiguous 25
and unlawfully overbroad.13 It is well established that employees have the right under Section 7
of the Act to engage in activity for their “mutual aid or protection,” which includes
communicating regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556, 565 (1978). Thus, employees have the right to discuss, debate, and communicate with
each other regarding their workplace terms and conditions of employment and other protected 30
topics. It is recognized that sometimes in the workplace these communications can become
contentious, but that type of speech does not lose the protection of the Act even if it includes
“intemperate, abusive, and inaccurate statements.” Linn v. United Plant Guards, 383 U.S. 53
(1966). The Board has held that broad prohibitions on offensive language, without context or
examples, are overly broad. NCR Corp., 313 NLRB 574, 577 (1993) (affirming Administrative 35
Law Judge’s finding that an employer’s rule against bulletin board posting containing “offensive
language” is overly broad); UPMC, 362 NLRB No. 191, slip op. at 2, fn. 5 (2015) (Board found
an employer’s email policy unlawful based on its ambiguity). In addition, a policy or rule
prohibiting unprotected behavior may still constitute a violation of the Act if it also includes
language that is overly broad and could be understood as prohibiting protected conduct. See 40
Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NRLB 287, 288 fn. 4, 294 (1999) (rule prohibiting unprotected
conduct unlawful because it also prohibits statements that are “merely false,” which could be
understood to include union propaganda).

13 The Board has specifically held that a rule prohibiting profane language is not unlawful on its face.
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra.
JD–113–16
20
The instant policy states that “offensive” materials, language, and images, as well as “any
other inappropriate material” are prohibited. The policy is ambiguous and fails to define or
describe “offensive” or “inappropriate” materials, language, or images. It also does not contain
any examples to illustrate exactly what is prohibited, and the language used is general enough
that it would be reasonably interpreted to include protected statements or acts. Three D, LLC,5
361 NLRB No. 31 (2014); UPMC, 362 NLRB No. 191, slip op. at 2, fn. 5 (2015). As the Board
explained in Whole Foods Market, 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 4, fn. 11 (2015), “[w]here
reasonable employees are uncertain as to whether a rule restricts activity protected under the Act,
that rule can have a chilling effect on employees’ willingness to engage in protected activity.”
Critically, I also note that there is no language in the policy that exempts statements, matters, or 10
images that are protected by the Act. As such, I find that employees would likely refrain from
protected communications due to a reasonable concern that their statements or actions could be
viewed as running afoul of the policy.
In Valley Health Systems LLC, 363 NLRB No. 178, slip op. at 1–2 (2016), the Board 15
found that a rule prohibiting “offensive” conduct to coworkers was unlawfully overbroad. In
that case, the Board reasoned that the “broad prohibition” “[did] not appear among a list of
serious forms of objectively clear misconduct that would help employees understand its
contours,” and it was not “accompanied by any other descriptive language that would help
employee interpret what types of ‘offensive’ conduct the rule [was] targeting.” Id. In addition, in 20
First Transit Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2–3 (2014), the Board found that an employer
rule prohibiting “inappropriate attitude or behavior” was sufficiently imprecise and unlawfully
overbroad. In the instant case, the use of “offensive” and “inappropriate” are sufficiently
imprecise and employees would reasonably understand those terms to encompass statements or
actions protected by Section 7 of the Act, and the policy’s prohibitions are therefore unlawfully 25
overbroad.
Under Purple Communications, supra, having determined that the Respondent’s
employees have a presumptive right to use the customers’ email systems to engage in protected
communications during nonworking time, and that the policy infringes on its employees’ Section 30
7 rights, the Respondent may rebut that presumption by demonstrating special circumstances
necessary to maintain production or discipline that justify restricting its employees’ rights. 361
NLRB slip op. at 14. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the Respondent has failed to
rebut that presumption.
35
The Respondent asserts its business justification for this policy is to protect the security
of the customer’s computer systems by preventing unauthorized access, disclosure, or use of the
private or confidential data stored on the customer’s computers, and to protect the intellectual
property of the customer from disclosure, loss, or theft. The parties have stipulated that the
email policy helps Respondent meet the security, privacy, and confidentiality needs of its 40
customers (Jt. Exh. 2) However, the Respondent’s concerns are theoretical and there is no
evidence that employees have ever breached the policy or that consequences from a breach of the
policy have occurred. (Tr. 39) In Purple Communications, the Board held that “[t]he mere
assertion of an interest that could theoretically support a restriction will not suffice.” Id. The
record is devoid of evidence establishing that the policy outweighs the infringement on the 45
employees’ Section 7 rights. There is also no evidence that the customers are incapable of
JD–113–16
21
securing their computer data and intellectual property, or that the approximately 1200 customers
that Respondent had in the last year would all have the same security concerns or that they would
all require such a broad policy to address those concerns.
The Respondent also asserts that another business justification is to prevent unlawful 5
harassment and discrimination in the customer’s workplace. The Respondent’s policy, however,
does not articulate or describe what that harassment or discrimination is, and instead it has
implemented a vague and broadly reaching prohibition applicable to all non-work related emails.
The Respondent’s policy also fails to make any attempt at excluding protected actions or speech
from the policy. The record also establishes that, like its asserted security justification, there is 10
no evidence demonstrating that the harassment and discrimination provision has been breached
or that it is a problem in the workplace that justifies being addressed by such a broad restriction
on non-work use of emails.
Based on the above, I find that the Respondent’s maintenance of the Email Policy 15
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The Respondent’s Non-Disparagement rule
The Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement contains a rule or provision entitled 20
“Non-Disparagement.” That provision states:
18. Non-Disparagement. Contract Employee agrees that during his/her
employment with Insight Global, Contract Employee will abide by all Insight
Global and Customer policies regarding employee communications. Following 25
the termination of Contract Employee’s employment for any reason, Contract
Employee further agrees that he/she will not make any derogatory or disparaging
statement about Insight Global, Customer, or any of their products or services,
employees, consultants, officers, directors, or shareholders, or any of them, nor
directly or indirectly take any action which is intended to embarrass any of them.30
(GC Exh. 2(a))
While Respondent’s policy prohibits employees whose employment with Respondent has
ended from making “derogatory or disparaging statement[s] about [the Respondent, its
customers] or… employees, consultants, officers, directors, or shareholders, or… directly or 35
indirectly take any action which is intended to embarrass any of them,” it does not define or
identify the conduct that would be prohibited as “derogatory,” “disparaging,” or “embarrassing.”
The General Counsel contends that under this policy, the Respondent’s prohibition
against former employees making “derogatory or disparaging statements” about the Respondent 40
or its customers, or “any action which is intended to embarrass them” both constitute violations
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that its non-
disparagement clause protects it from disparaging statements after an employee has left their
employment with the company. (R. Br. at p. 3) The Respondent asserts that a restriction on
postemployment statements does not invoke Section 7 protection because those individuals are 45
no longer employees subject to the protection of the Act. The Respondent further argues that
JD–113–16
22
even if such individuals have statutory protection for postemployment statements, the provision
is lawful because a reasonable employee would not construe the provision was restricting
Section 7 rights. (R. Br. at p. 24–25)
I find that Respondent’s “Non-Disparagement” policy prohibiting derogatory or 5
disparaging statements about Respondent, its customers, managers, or employees, etc., is clearly
overbroad and unlawful as those restricted individuals would reasonably interpret it to preclude
statements protected under Section 7 of the Act. The prohibition against “derogatory or
disparaging statements” is vague and ambiguous, and there is nothing in the policy that states or
even arguably suggests that protected communications are excluded from the parameters of this 10
policy. The Board has long held that it is unlawful for an employer to prohibit employees from
making derogatory or disparaging statements, which could include truthful statements about the
employer’s business practices or management team, or statements protected by Section 7 or the
Act. In William Beaumont Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162, slip op. at 2 (2016), the Board found
unlawful a rule that prohibits “negative or disparaging comments about the …professional 15
capabilities or an employee or physician to employees, physicians, patients, or visitors.” The
Board determined the rule was unlawful because it would “reasonably be construed to prohibit
expressions of concerns over working conditions” Id. In Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824
(1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the employer maintained a rule prohibiting making
“false, vicious, profane or malicious statements toward or concerning [the hotel] or any of its 20
employees.” The Board, relying on Cincinnati Suburban Press, Inc., 289 NLRB 966, 975
(1988), and American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126 (1978), enfd. 600 F.2d 132 (8th Cir.
1979), held that the rule reasonably tended to chill employees exercise of Section 7 rights. Id. at
836. In addition, in Quicken Loans, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 94 (2014), affirming 359 NLRB 1201
(2013), the Board found an employer “Non-disparagement” provision in an employment 25
agreement which provided employees will not “publicly criticize, ridicule, disparage or defame
the Company or its products, services, policies, directors, officers, shareholders, or employees,
with or through any written or oral statement or image” was overbroad and unlawful. See South
Maryland Hospital Center, 293 NLRB 1209 (1989), enfd. 916 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1990)
(rule prohibiting derogatory attacks on “fellow employees, patient, physicians or hospital 30
representatives” violates the Act as this could prohibit even the most basic forms of union
propaganda).
I also find the prohibition of any actions intended to “embarrass” the Respondent, its
customers, managers, or employees, etc., is also overbroad and unlawful. While the policy fails 35
to define, identify, or provide examples of conduct that would be intended to embarrass the
company or its officials, one can presume that such statements or actions, like those described as
“derogatory or disparaging,” could safely be described or classified as “negative” toward the
Respondent. The Board has found that rules prohibiting “negative” speech or behavior are
unlawful. For example, in Hills & Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 70 (2014), the Board 40
found a rule prohibiting “negative comments about fellow team members” and “negativity” to be
overly broad and unlawful. In addition, in Roomstore, 357 NLRB 1690, 1690 fn. 3 (2011), the
Board found a rule that prohibited “any type of negative energy or attitudes” to be unlawful. See
Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB 832, 832 (2005) (a rule prohibiting “[n]egative
conversations about associates [employees] and/or managers” found unlawful); See also Beverly 45
Health & Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 332 NLRB 347, 348 (2000), enfd. 297 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.
JD–113–16
23
2002) (unlawful rule prohibited “[m]aking false or misleading work-related statements
concerning the company, the facility or fellow associates”). On the other hand, the Board has
found rules to be lawful when they address conduct that is reasonably associated with actions
that fall outside the protection of the Act, such as conduct that is abusive, malicious, injurious,
threatening, intimidating, coercing, profane, or unlawful. See e.g. Lutheran Heritage Village-5
Livonia, 343 NLRB at 647–649 (rule addressing “verbal abuse,” “abusive or profane language,”
and “harassment”); Palms Hotel and Casino, 344 NLRB 1363, 1367–1368 (2005) (rule
addressing “conduct which is injurious, offensive, threatening, intimidating, coercing, or
interfering with” other employees).
10
In the instant case, as mentioned above, action intended to “embarrass” is broad and
ambiguous, and the provision does not contain any defining or explanatory language pertaining
to that term. The fact that the policy does not contain any explanation of the offending action or
contain lists or examples of what “embarrassing” conduct would consist of to assist employees in
understanding its contours, supports finding this rule overly broad. Valley Health Systems, LLC, 15
363 NLRB No. 178, slip op. at 2 (2016) (the Board found a prohibition against “offensive”
conduct that did not “appear among a list of serious forms of objectively clear misconduct that
would help employees understand its contours,” to be overly broad and unlawful). The Board
has found that employees “should not have to decide at their own peril what [conduct] is
…subject to such a prohibition.” Id.; citing Hyundai America Shipping Agency, Inc., 357 NLRB 20
860, 871 (2011), enfd. in part and reversed in part, 805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015). However, this
is exactly the situation the Respondent’s policy places its employees in, just as it does with its
prohibition of “derogatory or disparaging statements.”
There is also no restrictive language that excludes the rule’s application to protected 25
communications or actions. In such instances, the ambiguity must be construed against the
Respondent. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824 at fn. 1. Therefore, employees would
reasonably interpret the policy as proscribing them from making statements or engaging in
activities that may be critical of the Respondent concerning their working conditions or desire to
engage in union or protected concerted activities under the protection of Section 7 of the Act, but 30
which the Respondent may view as “embarrassing.” See, First Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72,
slip op. at 3 (2014) (finding a rule prohibiting “inappropriate attitude or behavior…to other
employees” unlawful due to its “patent ambiguity”); See also Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No.
148, slip op. at 3 (2014) (where Board found a rule prohibiting “insubordination or other
disrespectful conduct” unlawful as phrase “disrespectful conduct” is so ambiguous that 35
employees would reasonably read the rule as encompassing Section 7 activity).14

14 Specifically with regard to the prohibition from engaging in conduct that is “intended to embarrass”
the Respondent, its customers, managers, officers or employees, etc., the General Counsel cites Costco
Wholesale Corp., 358 NLRB 1100, 1100–1101 (2012), where the Board found a policy prohibiting
employees from making statements that “damage the Company, defame any individual or damage a
person’s reputation” to be unlawful because the rule had no “accompanying language that would tend to
restrict its application” to legitimate business concerns. This decision, however, was subsequently
invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, a Division of the Noel Corp., 134
S.Ct. 2550 (2014), so it has no precedential value, and I do not rely on it to support my findings.
JD–113–16
24
Finally, I find that it is not dispositive that the non-disparagement policy, which must be
signed by all applicants prior to the start of their employment relationship with the Respondent,
only applies to employees after their employment relationships have ended. It is well established
that the Board has recognized former employees enjoy the protections of the Act despite the lack
of a continuing employment relationship with their employer. In Briggs Mfg. Co., 75 NLRB 5
569, 571 (1947), the Board found that the statutory definition of “employee” was broad enough
to cover “former employees of a particular employer.” See also Little Rock Crate & Basket Co.,
227 NLRB 1406 (1977), and Town & Country Electric, Inc., 309 NLRB 1250, 1255 (1992),
enfd. 106 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1997). More recently, in Quicken Loans, 359 NLRB 1201, 1204
(2013), affirmed and incorporated in 361 NLRB No. 94 (2014), the Board reviewed provisions in 10
an employment agreement that the employer was enforcing against an employee who had
voluntarily resigned her employment with the company. In that case, the Board, in reviewing the
rules and finding them unlawful, did not distinguish between the rules that were enforceable
before and/or after the employment relationship ended. Id.; See also Frye Electric, Inc., 352
NLRB 345, 357 (2008) (where an employer unlawfully interrogated a former employee); 15
Redwood Empire, Inc., 296 NLRB 369, 391 (1989) (where an employer’s statements to a former
employee constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board affirmed the judge’s
finding that the former employee was “still an ‘employee’ as that term is defined in a broader
sense in Section 2(3) of the Act,” and that even though he was not an employee of that particular
respondent at the time the statement was made, he “still had the protection of the Act as being a 20
person who met the definition of an employee in Section 2(3) of the Act.) Thus, the
Respondent’s assertion that a restriction on postemployment statements does not invoke Section
7 protection because those individuals are no longer employees subject to the protection of the
Act, is not supported by well-established case law and it is therefore unavailing.
25
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s “Non-Disparagement” policy is overly broad
and unlawful, and that its maintenance constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The Respondent’s Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury, and
waiver of class or representative claims rule30
The Respondent’s Contract Employee Agreement contains a rule or provision entitled
“Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury, and waiver of class or
representative claims.” That provision states:
35
21. Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury, and
waiver of class or representative claims. Except as set forth in the final
paragraph of this Section 21, in the event of any dispute or claim arising out of or
relating to Contract Employee's application for employment with Insight Global,
Contract Employee's employment with Insight Global, the termination of Contract40
Employee's employment, or otherwise relating to this Agreement (collectively,
"Disputes"), Contract Employee and Insight Global agree that all such Disputes
shall be fully, finally and exclusively resolved by confidential, binding, individual
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").
Contract Employee and Insight Global agree that a confidential arbitration 45
is the sole and exclusive forum for resolution of any and all Disputes and hereby
JD–113–16
25
mutually waive their right to trial before a judge or jury in federal or state court in
favor of arbitration under this Agreement. Any arbitration shall be governed by
the terms herein and the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures ("Rules") then in effect, except as modified herein, but shall not be
subject to the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations. In the event of a 5
conflict between the Rules and this Section 21, the terms of this Section 21 shall
govern. The arbitration shall proceed before a single arbitrator who is a member
of the AAA Panel of Employment Arbitrators and is an attorney licensed and in
good standing in the state where Contract Employee last performed services for
Insight Global, with not less than fifteen years' experience practicing employment 10
law. Contract Employee and Insight Global hereby agree that all Disputes must be
brought solely on an individual basis; neither Insight Global nor Contract
Employee may submit a class, collective, or representative action for arbitration
under this Arbitration Provision ("Class Action Waiver"). To the maximum extent
permitted by law, and except where expressly prohibited by law, arbitration on an15
individual basis pursuant to this Arbitration Provision is the exclusive remedy for
any Disputes that might otherwise be brought on a class, collective, or
representative action basis.
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, CONTRACT EMPLOYEE AND
INSIGHT GLOBAL EACH IRREVOCABLY WAIVES HIS/HER/ITS RIGHT 20
TO A JURY TRIAL AND HIS/HER/ITS RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A
CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION BECAUSE ALL CLAIMS WILL BE
RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION.
CONTRACT EMPLOYEE AND INSIGHT GLOBAL AGREE THAT EACH
MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN HIS/HER/ITS 25
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND NOT AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS
MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE
PROCEEDING.
While Contract Employee and Insight Global agree that an arbitrator shall
resolve any Dispute in individual, binding arbitration, an arbitrator shall not have 30
the authority to determine the scope, enforceability, revocability, or validity of
this Arbitration Provision or any portion thereof (e.g., the Class Action Waiver);
nor shall an arbitrator have the authority to determine whether a given Dispute is
subject to arbitration. Rather, Contract Employee and Insight Global agree that
such issues may only be resolved by a civil court of competent jurisdiction.35
This provisions set forth above shall not be construed to prevent you from
filing a charge or a claim with the National Labor Relations Board, the U.S.
Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or any
similar state agencies if applicable law allows you to do so. Nothing in this
agreement shall be deemed to preclude or excuse you or Insight Global from 40
bringing an administrative claim before any agency in order to fulfill an
obligation to exhaust administrative remedies before making a claim in
arbitration. The provisions of this Section 21 also do not cover: (1) claims for
workers compensation, (2) state disability or unemployment insurance benefits,
(3) any criminal complaint or proceeding filed by a governmental agency, (4) 45
claims for restitution or civil penalties owed by an employee for an act for which
JD–113–16
26
the Company sought criminal prosecution, (5) claims for benefits under any
employee benefit plan sponsored by the Company and covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or funded by insurance, or (6) disputes
that may not be subject to pre-dispute arbitration agreement as provided by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Public Law 5
111.203), or by any other applicable law. (GC Exh. 2(a))
The Respondent requires as a condition of employment that employees sign its Contract
Employee Agreement which includes this arbitration policy that expressly and repeatedly
precludes employees from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, 10
or other terms and conditions of employment. The General Counsel argues that the
Respondent’s policy violates the Act under existing Board law.
As mentioned above, when evaluating whether a rule, including an arbitration agreement,
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board applies the analytical framework set forth in 15
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB at 646. See U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB
375, 377 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Under Lutheran Heritage, the first
inquiry is whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If it does, the rule
is unlawful. If it does not, it nonetheless will violate Section 8(a)(1) if “(1) employees would
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in 20
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7
rights.” Id. at 647.
Because the Respondent’s arbitration provision explicitly prohibits employees from
pursing employment-related claims on a class or collective basis, I find it violates Section 8(a)(1) 25
of the Act. The right to pursue concerted legal action, including class complaints, addressing
wages, hours, and working conditions falls within the protection of Section 7. In Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. denied in part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), the
Board reaffirmed its earlier decision in D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in
relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), which held that an employer violates the Act “when it 30
requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement
that precludes them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or
other working conditions against their employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.” Id. at 2277.
Such agreements improperly interfere with the substantive rights of employees, under Section 7
of the Act, to engage in collective action to improve working conditions. The Board has clearly 35
held that the “right to engage in collective action—including collective legal action—is the core
substantive right protected by the NLRA,” and because the Act does not conflict with the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), a ban on an employee’s right to pursue class actions interferes with the
employee’s rights under Section 7 of the Act. Id. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566
(1978) (Section 7 protects employee efforts seeking “to improve working conditions through 40
resort to administrative and judicial forums”). Accordingly, an employer rule or policy that
interferes with such actions violates Section 8(a)(1). D. R. Horton, supra; Murphy Oil, supra;
See also, e.g., Chesapeake Energy Corp., 362 NLRB No. 80 (2015); Cellular Sales of Missouri,
362 NLRB No. 27 (2015); Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 184 (2015).
45
JD–113–16
27
The Respondent argues that the Board’s interpretation in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil
fails to comply with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Board has repeated rejected this
argument, as articulated in the cases cited above, among others.15 The Respondent also contends
that its arbitration clause is lawful because employees would understand the provision to permit
the filing of charges or claims with administrative agencies, in particular with the NLRB. In this 5
connection, the Respondent points out that the provision specifically states it shall not be
construed to prevent employees from “filing a charge or a claim with the National Labor
Relations Board….[and other agencies] if applicable law allows you to do so.” I find, however,
that the Respondent’s provision is unlawful despite its inclusion of such a “savings clause,”
excepting NLRB charges or claims from its mandatory arbitration provision. The Board has 10
found that such clauses are insufficient to protect otherwise unlawful policies or rules.
In the instant case, the policy allows employees to file claims with the NLRB or other
agencies “if applicable law allows you to do so,” but it fails to provide any further explanation.
In Solarcity Corp., 363 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 1 (2015), the Board addressed the issue of 15
whether an employer’s arbitration policy that forecloses access to court and requires employees
to individually arbitrate employment-related claims is lawful—notwithstanding the Board’s
holding in D. R. Horton—because the policy permits employees to file claims with
administrative agencies, which may then choose to pursue a judicial remedy on behalf of
employees as a group. Id. In that case, the Board determined that “access to administrative 20
agencies is not the equivalent of access to a judicial forum where employees themselves may
seek to litigate their claims on a joint, class, or collective basis.” Id. Thus, the Board held that
“the exception in the Agreements that permits the filing of claims or charges with administrative
agencies does not satisfy the requirement of an alternative judicial forum for the pursuit of joint,
class, or collective claims.” Id. slip op. at 2. As such, the Respondent’s arbitration policy in the 25
instant case compelling employees to individually arbitrate their employment related claims,
even with the exception that it does not preclude filing claims with administrative agencies such
as the Board, fails to provide employees with a forum to pursue joint, class, or collective claims,
and it is therefore unlawful and a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. slip op. at 4; RPM
Pizza, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 82, slip op. 1, fn. 3 (2015). 30
In addition, I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining its
arbitration policy that prohibits the filing of NLRB charges in that it requires all disputes to be
resolved by private arbitration. This finding is warranted even though the policy states that it
shall not be construed to prevent the filing of NLRB or other administrative agency charges, “if 35
applicable law allows you to do so.” In Solarcity Corp., the Board also addressed this issue. In
that case, the employer’s agreement broadly required all disputes to be resolved by an arbitrator,
but the employer argued that no violation could be found because the agreement allowed charges
with the NLRB and administrative agencies. Id. slip op. at 4. That agreement, however, allowed
such NLRB charges “only if, and to the extent, applicable law permits.” Id., slip op. at 4. In that 40
case, the Board analyzed the legal issue under the Lutheran Heritage test to determine whether a
reasonable employee would construe the agreement as prohibiting the filing of Board charges,
thereby raising the prospect that the employee would be chilled from doing so. Id. Noting that

15 The Board has also addressed fully the relationship between the FAA and both the National Labor
Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
JD–113–16
28
preserving and protecting access to the Board is a fundamental goal of the Act (as reflected in
Section 8(a)(4), which makes it unlawful to discharge or discriminate against employees for
coming to the Board), the Board recognized that rank-and-file employees lack the legal expertise
necessary to analyze the employer’s rules and determine the “precise nature of the rights
supposedly preserved” by the savings clause which purports to except, or “save,” employees’ 5
legal rights from restrictions on their conduct. Id. slip op. at 5. Board decisions have indicated
this is so even where the exceptions refer to NLRB charges. Id.; Jurys Boston Hotel, 356 NLRB
927, 943 (2011). In Solarcity Corp., the Board held that the rationale underlying these decisions
is that “absent language more clearly informing employees about the precise nature of the rights
supposedly preserved, the rule remains vague and likely to leave employees unwilling to risk 10
violating the rule by exercising Section 7 rights.” Id. slip op. at 5. In that case, the Board found
the agreements at issue were vague even with the provisions stating the agreements did not
extend to the filing of Board charges. Id.
In applying this well-established Board law, the arbitration provision in the instant case is15
also unlawful because it is ambiguous, vague, and somewhat contradictory. It repeatedly states
that employees have to individually arbitrate any employment dispute they have with
Respondent, and that they are prohibited from “class, collective, or representative actions,”
thereby conveying to employees that, as a condition of employment, they must forfeit their
substantive Section 7 right to act in a collective manner in pursuing an employment dispute or 20
claim in any other forum. This explicit unlawful restriction is not nullified or neutralized by the
later provision stating that the filing of charges with administrative agencies is permitted because
the contradictory language only serves to create confusion over whether an employee
understands the filing of charges are permitted. Noting that Board law is well settled that
ambiguous work rules or policies that would reasonably be read by employees to have a coercive 25
meaning are construed against the employer, I find that under the arbitration provision in this
case, employees would reasonably construe the language to adversely affect their right to file
charges with the Board. See Solarcity Corp., slip op. at 6. See also Hyundai America Shipping
Agency, Inc., 357 NLRB 860, 871 (2011), enfd. in part and reversed in part, 805 F.3d 309 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (prohibition on unauthorized disclosure of information from an “employee’s personal 30
file” unlawfully ambiguous because it could be read to prohibit protected discussion of wages
and other employment terms, and “employees should not have to decide at their peril what
information is not lawfully subject to such a prohibition”).
Finally, the Respondent notes that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has overruled the 35
Board’s decisions in both D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, holding that those arbitration and class
action waiver agreements were found lawful because there was no substantive right under the
Act for employees to pursue legal claims through class actions. Id. at 357. The Respondent
argues that under circuit court precedent, in particular the Fifth Circuit precedent, its arbitration
provision should be found enforceable and the complaint allegation should be dismissed. The 40
Respondent further asserts, as mentioned above, that consistent with Circuit Court precedent, the
rights afforded employees under the Act do not override the FAA. On that basis, Respondent
asserts that I should decline to apply the Board’s reasoning in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil, and
issue a decision consistent with the Fifth Circuit Court’s ruling in those cases. In finding that
this arbitration provision violates the Act under well-established Board law, contrary to the 45
findings of the Fifth Circuit and other Circuit Courts of Appeal, I note that I am bound to follow
JD–113–16
29
Board law unless the Supreme Court dictates otherwise. Manor West, Inc., 311 NLRB 655, 667
fn. 43 (1993); See Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 fn. 14 (1984) (where the Board held “[w]e
emphasize that it is a judge’s duty to apply established Board precedent which the Supreme
Court has not reversed. It is for the Board, not the judge, to determine whether precedent should
be varied.”); See also Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963) (“it is a judge’s duty 5
to apply established Board precedent which the Supreme Court has not reversed”). Thus, any
arguments regarding the legal integrity of Board precedent are properly addressed to the Board.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s maintenance of its arbitration provision violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged. 10
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Insight Global, LLC, is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 15
2. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following acts and conduct:
(a.) Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule in its Contract Employee
Agreement under the heading “Confidentiality and Data Security” that prohibits20
disclosure of all information relating to the business operations of the Respondent or
its customer without the prior written consent of the Respondent or its customer; and
prohibits disclosure by employees, or use for their own benefit, confidential
information belonging to Respondent or its customer related to their respective
business methods, strategies, and practices, internal operations, pricing and billing, 25
financial data, costs, and personnel information (including, but not limited to, names,
educational background, prior experiences, and availability).
(b.)Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule in its Contract Employee
Agreement under the heading “E-Mail and Internet Policy” that limits employee use 30
of Respondent’s customer’s email and internet systems solely for the purposes of
completing the contract assignment, and prohibits use of the customer’s systems to
transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials, language, offensive images, or
any other inappropriate material, and provides that the employee has no individual
rights to the contents or use of the customer’s computer resources. 35
(c.) Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule in its Contract Employee
Agreement under the heading “Non-Disparagement” that prohibits employees, after
their employment with Respondent ends, from making any derogatory or disparaging
statements about Respondent, its customer, or any of their products or services, 40
employees, consultants, officers, directors, or shareholders, and prohibits, directly or
indirectly, taking any action which is intended to embarrass any of them.
(d.)Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule in its Contract Employee
Agreement under the heading “Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before 45
judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative claims” that requires any
JD–113–16
30
employment dispute or claim to be resolved solely and exclusively by final and
binding arbitration; expressly precludes employees from filing joint, class, or
collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment, by requiring employees to waive their right to trial before a judge or
jury in federal or state court, and requires employees to agree that all disputes be 5
brought solely on an individual basis; and requires that employees agree to a class
action waiver wherein employees waive their rights to a jury trial, class, or
representative actions because all claims must be resolved exclusively through
individual arbitration.
10
3. The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
15
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent’s maintenance of overly broad
policies, provisions, or rules in its Contract Employee Agreement are unlawful, Respondent shall
be ordered to rescind or revise those policies, provisions, or rules and advise employees in 20
writing that said policies, provisions, or rules have been so revised or rescinded. Having found
that Respondent maintained an unlawful “Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before
judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative claims” provision, the Respondent shall be
ordered to revise or rescind this policy, provision, or rule and acknowledge and advise its
employees in writing that this policy, provision, or rule has been so revised or rescinded. This is 25
the standard remedy to assure that employees may engage in protected activity without fear of
being subjected to an unlawful policy, provision, or rule. See Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809,
812 (2005), enfd. in relevant part 475 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hills & Dales General
Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 2 (2014). Respondent may comply with this order of
rescission by reprinting the policies, provisions, or rules of its Contract Employee Agreement 30
without the unlawful language or, in order to save the expense of reprinting the whole Contract
Employee Agreement, it may supply its employees with inserts stating that the unlawful policies,
provisions, or rules have been rescinded, or with lawfully worded rules on adhesive backing that
will correct or cover the unlawfully broad policies, provisions, or rules until it republishes the
policy without the unlawful provisions. Any copies of the Contract Employee Agreement and/or 35
policies that include the unlawful policies, provisions, or rules must include the inserts before
being distributed to employees. Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB at 812 fn. 8; Hills & Dales
General Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 2–3.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the 40
following recommended:16

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–113–16
31
ORDER
The Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:5
(a) Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule that prohibits disclosure of all
information relating to the business operations of the Respondent or its customer
without the prior written consent of the Respondent or its customer; and disclosure by
employees, or use for their own benefit, confidential information belonging to 10
Respondent or its customer related to their respective business methods, strategies,
and practices, internal operations, pricing and billing, financial data, costs, and
personnel information (including, but not limited to, names, educational background,
prior experiences, and availability).
15
(b) Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule that limits employee use of
Respondent’s customer’s email and internet systems solely for the purposes of
completing the contract assignment, and prohibits use of the customer’s systems to
transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials, language, offensive images, or
any other inappropriate material, and provides that the employee has no individual 20
rights to the contents or use of the customer’s computer resources.
(c) Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule that prohibits employees, after
their employment with Respondent ends, from making any derogatory or disparaging
statements about Respondent, its customer, or any of their products or services, 25
employees, consultants, officers, directors, or shareholders, and prohibits, directly or
indirectly, taking any action which is intended to embarrass any of them.
(d) Maintaining or enforcing a policy, provision, or rule that requires any employment
dispute or claim to be resolved solely and exclusively by final and binding arbitration; 30
expressly precludes employees from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing
their wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment, by requiring
employees to waive their right to trial before a judge or jury in federal or state court,
and requires employees to agree that all disputes be brought solely on an individual
basis; and requires that employees agree to a class action waiver wherein employees 35
waive their rights to a jury trial, class, or representative actions because all claims
must be resolved exclusively through individual arbitration.
(e) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.40
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, revise or rescind the policy, provision, or rule in
its Contract Employee Agreement under the heading “Confidentiality and Data 45
Security” that prohibits disclosure of all information relating to the business
JD–113–16
32
operations of the Respondent or its customer without the prior written consent of the
Respondent or its customer; and disclosure by employees, or use for their own
benefit, confidential information belonging to Respondent or its customer related to
their respective business methods, strategies, and practices, internal operations,
pricing and billing, financial data, costs, and personnel information (including, but 5
not limited to, names, educational background, prior experiences, and availability).
(b) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, revise or rescind the policy, provision, or rule in
its Contract Employee Agreement under the heading “E-Mail and Internet Policy”
that limits employee use of Respondent’s customer’s email and internet systems10
solely for the purposes of completing the contract assignment, and prohibits use of the
customer’s systems to transmit, download, or distribute offensive materials, language,
offensive images, or any other inappropriate material, and provides that the employee
has no individual rights to the contents or use of the customer’s computer resources.
15
(c) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, revise or rescind the policy, provision, or rule in
its Contract Employee Agreement under the heading “Non-Disparagement” that
prohibits employees, after their employment with Respondent ends, from making any
derogatory or disparaging statements about Respondent, its customer, or any of their
products or services, employees, consultants, officers, directors, or shareholders, and 20
prohibits, directly or indirectly, taking any action which is intended to embarrass any
of them.
(d) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, revise or rescind the policy, provision, or rule in
its Contract Employee Agreement under the heading “Neutral binding arbitration, 25
waiver of trial before judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative claims” that
requires any employment dispute or claim to be resolved solely and exclusively by
final and binding arbitration; expressly precludes employees from filing joint, class,
or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment, by requiring employees to waive their right to trial before a judge or 30
jury in federal or state court, and requires employees to agree that all disputes be
brought solely on an individual basis; and requires that employees agree to a class
action waiver wherein employees waive their rights to a jury trial, class, or
representative actions because all claims must be resolved exclusively through
individual arbitration.35

(e) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the Contract Employee Agreement that
(1) advise that the unlawful policies have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language
of a lawful policy; or publish and distribute a revised Contract Employee Agreement
that (1) does not contain the unlawful policies, or (2) provides the language of lawful 40
rules.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Atlanta, Georgia, and
at its facilities throughout the United States,17 copies of the attached notice marked

17 In its post-hearing brief the General Counsel included a recommended order that set forth in
JD–113–16
33
“Appendix.”18 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 15, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed 5
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the 10
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since October 5, 2015.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn 15
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 23, 201620
__________________________
Thomas M. Randazzo25
Administrative Law Judge

specific locations in the United States where the Respondent’s Notices should be posted. That
information, however, is not found in the record. I find that the specific locations of the postings are a
matter more appropriately left for the compliance stage of this proceeding.
18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
0„lt,, /1,../.,,..4y,-
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a policy, provision, or rule in our Contract Employee
Agreement or elsewhere, under the heading of “Confidentiality and Data Security” that prohibits
your disclosure of all information relating to the business operations of the Company or our
customer without the prior written consent of the Company or our customer; and prohibits
disclosure by you, or use for your own benefit, confidential information belonging to the
Company or our customer related to our respective business methods, strategies, and practices,
internal operations, pricing and billing, financial data, costs, and personnel information
(including, but not limited to, names, educational background, prior experiences, and
availability).
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a policy, provision, or rule in our Contract Employee
Agreement or elsewhere, under the heading “E-Mail and Internet Policy” that limits your use of
our customer’s email and internet systems solely for the purposes of completing the contract
assignment, and prohibits your use of our customer’s systems to transmit, download, or distribute
offensive materials, language, offensive images, or any other inappropriate material, and
provides that you have no individual rights to the contents or use of our customer’s computer
resources.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a policy, provision, or rule in our Contract Employee
Agreement or elsewhere, under the heading “Non-Disparagement” that prohibits you, after your
employment with us ends, from making any derogatory or disparaging statements about us, our
customer, or any of our products or services, employees, consultants, officers, directors, or
shareholders, and prohibits, directly or indirectly, your taking any action which is intended to
embarrass any of us.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a policy, provision, or rule in our Contract Employee
Agreement or elsewhere, under the heading “Neutral binding arbitration, waiver of trial before
judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative claims” that requires any employment dispute
or claim to be resolved solely and exclusively by final and binding arbitration; expressly
precludes you from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing your wages, hours, or other
terms and conditions of employment, by requiring you to waive your right to trial before a judge
or jury in federal or state court, and requires you to agree that all disputes be brought solely on an
individual basis; and requires that you agree to a class action waiver wherein you waive your
rights to a jury trial, class, or representative actions because all claims must be resolved
exclusively through individual arbitration.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, revise or rescind the unlawful policies,
provisions, or rules in our Contract Employee Agreement under the headings “Confidentiality
and Data Security,” “E-Mail and Internet Policy,” “Non-Disparagement,” and “Neutral binding
arbitration, waiver of trial before judge or jury, and waiver of class or representative claims,”
mentioned above, and WE WILL advise you in writing that we have done so and that the unlawful
policies, provisions, or rules will no longer be enforced.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Contract Employee Agreement that (1) advise
that the unlawful paragraphs in the policies have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of
lawful policies; or WE WILL publish and distribute a revised Contract Employee Agreement that
(1) does not contain the unlawful policies, provisions, or rules, or (2) provides the language of
lawful policies, provisions, or rules.
INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC
(Employer)
Dated: ____________ By: ______________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
National Labor Relations Board, Region 15
600 South Maestri Place, 7th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70130-3413
(504) 589-6362
Hours: 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. CT
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/15-CA-161491 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE
WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (504) 589-6362.