Indigo Star, Inc. and H2d Properties, Inc.v.Patti’s Enterprises, L.L.C.Download PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardApr 7, 2014No. 91202190 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 7, 2014) Copy Citation Mailed: April 7, 2014 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ______ Indigo Star, Inc. and H2d Properties, Inc. v. Patti’s Enterprises, L.L.C. _____ Opposition No. 91202189 Opposition No. 91202190 (Consolidated) _____ Kathryn Jennison Schultz of Jennison Schultz PC for Indigo Star, Inc. and H2d Properties, Inc. Thomas J. Keuler of Denton & Keuler for Patti’s Enterprises, L.L.C. ______ Before Cataldo, Wellington, and Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge: Patti’s Enterprises, L.L.C. (“applicant”) seeks registration of the mark The Pink Tractor (in standard characters)1 and the following mark: 1 Serial No. 85226411, filed on January 26, 2011, alleging first use in commerce on September 1, 2009, under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). THIS OPINION IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 2 2 Applicant seeks registration for both marks in connection with “retail store services featuring a wide variety of women’s clothing, apparel, footwear, fashion accessories, and jewelry” in International Class 35. Opposer, H2d Properties, Inc. (“H2d”), filed notices of opposition against registration of applicant’s marks based on a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act, 15 USC §1052(d). H2d pleaded ownership of the following two previously registered marks: Registration No. 2163561 (The wording BRAND and JEANS, which appear in smaller lettering, have been disclaimed) for: “men’s, women’s, children’s clothing, namely, jeans, overalls, dresses, vests, jackets, shirts, skirts, tops and tee shirts” in International Class 25;3 and Tractor (in standard characters) Registration No. 3791799 for: 2 Serial No. 85226668, filed on January 26, 2011, alleging first use in commerce on September 1, 2009, under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). 3 Issued on June 9, 1998; renewed. Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 3 “women's, girls' and infant clothing, namely, jeans, pants, shorts, skirts, overalls, shortalls, skirtalls, tops, jackets, vests, coats, sweaters, sweat suits, sweat pants, sweat shirts, t-shirts, leggings and leg warmers” in International Class 25.4 H2d submitted copies from the Office TARR electronic database of the two pleaded registrations with the notices of opposition. Applicant filed answers to the notices of opposition admitting that it has “not used prior to September 1, 2009” the applied-for trademarks for the services recited in each application. Answers, Para. 7. Applicant otherwise denied the remaining salient allegations of the complaints. The opposition proceedings have been consolidated (see Board order dated March 5, 2012). In response to a motion filed by H2d, the Board acknowledged that Office records reflect an assignment of ownership of the pleaded registrations from H2d to Indigo Star, Inc. (“Indigo”) and joined Indigo as a party opposer (see Board order dated May 10, 2013). H2d and Indigo are hereinafter referred to collectively as “opposers.” Only opposers presented evidence at trial and filed a trial brief. While there is no indication that applicant actively defended its application, other than by filing an answer and consenting to extension requests, we are cognizant of the burden that remains with opposers, namely, 4 Issued on May 25, 2010. Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 4 establishing their pleaded case (in this case, their standing and Section 2(d) ground of opposition) by a preponderance of the evidence. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The evidence of record in these consolidated proceedings consists automatically of the files of applicant’s involved applications and the pleadings. In addition, the electronic copies of the pleaded registrations are of record. Finally, opposers submitted a notice of reliance on copies of requests for admissions they served on applicant. Applicant did not respond to the admission requests; they are therefore deemed admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). In pertinent part, these admissions include: 13. That TRACTOR is the dominant portion of Applicant’s Applied-for Marks. 14. That third parties have used the same trademark in connection with their retail clothing store services and the clothing sold in the retail clothing store. 15. That the color pink is associated with clothing for girls. Because the pleaded registrations are of record, and having established the assignment thereof from H2D to Indigo, we find that opposers have established their standing to oppose registration of applicant’s marks. See Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 5 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982). See also Cunningham, 55 USPQ2d at 1844. In addition, Section 2(d) priority is not an issue in this case as to the individual marks and goods covered by the pleaded registrations because said registrations are of record. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974). We now turn our attention to the likelihood of confusion analysis. Our likelihood of confusion determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). In considering the evidence of record in these consolidated proceedings, we keep in mind that “[t]he fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [and services] and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). We first consider the du Pont factors regarding the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks. Our focus is on whether the marks are similar in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 6 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In making our comparison, we focus on opposers’ standard character TRACTOR mark because it bears the strongest resemblance to applicant’s marks due to its lack of stylization, additional wording or design. In comparing applicant’s proposed marks, we find opposers’ previously registered mark, TRACTOR, is the dominant element in applicant’s marks, THE PINK TRACTOR (with and without design). Applicant has admitted this much. See Admission No. 13. It has not been shown that the term “tractor” has any significance with regard to clothing or retail clothing services; thus, the registered mark must be considered arbitrary and strong. This is not to say we have ignored the elements in applicant’s marks not found in the registered mark, including the term PINK or the stylized border and tractor design portion in one of applicant’s marks. However, as to the term PINK in applicant’s mark, applicant admits that the color pink is associated with girls’ clothing and thus it is suggestive in connection with both applicant’s recited retail services featuring women’s clothes. Also, with respect to the design portions, we have long held that in the case of a mark consisting of words and a design, the words are normally given greater weight because they would be used by consumers to request the products or services. In re Dakin's Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 7 Co., 2 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987). See also Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Food Service, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Furthermore, the design of a tractor in the mark in application Serial No. 85226668 serves to reinforce the word “tractor” therein. In sum, we find the parties’ marks to be overall more similar than dissimilar, given that applicant has incorporated the entirety of opposers’ TRACTOR mark as part of its marks. We further find that the additional elements found in applicant’s marks do not outweigh or overcome this similarity. Accordingly, this du Pont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. We turn now to the similarity or dissimilarity of the applicant’s retail women’s apparel store services and opposers’ recited apparel goods that includes women’s apparel items. We also consider their respective trade channels and classes of purchasers. We initially point out that, based on the descriptions of the goods and services, applicant’s retail store services featuring a “wide variety” of women’s apparel must be presumed to encompass the sale of all of opposer’s specifically-listed women’s apparel items, i.e., jeans, pants, shorts, skirts, overalls, shortalls, skirtalls, tops, Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 8 jackets, vests, coats, sweaters, sweat suits, sweat pants, sweat shirts, t-shirts, leggings and leg warmers. In other words and because there are no limitations on the trade channels, we must consider the possibility that opposers’ goods would be found in retail stores such as applicant’s. In addition, applicant has admitted that third parties use the same trademark in connection with their retail clothing stores and the clothing sold in the retail clothing stores. See Admission No. 15. With the above mind, we must consider the possibility that consumers will encounter opposers’ TRACTOR-branded clothing in applicant’s THE PINK TRACTOR (with and without design) retail stores and that the consumers are not unaccustomed to seeing the same trademark being used on clothing and for retail clothing stores. Accordingly, the aforementioned du Pont factors involving the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods, trade channels and classes of purchasers all favor finding a likelihood of confusion. There is no evidence of record to suggest that any of the du Pont factors favor a finding of no likelihood of confusion. In summary, we find that the involved marks are similar, the respective services and goods are related, and opposers’ goods will be marketed in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers, namely, women shopping for various apparel items. While there is no per Opposition Nos. 91202189 and 91202190 9 se rule, we have often held that confusion is likely where one entity uses a mark for goods and another uses the same or a similar mark for a retail store that sells such goods. In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (general merchandise stores and furniture); The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Management, Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1629, 1640, (TTAB 2007) (women's clothing stores and cosmetics). See also, J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §24:25 (2013) (“[w]here the services consist of retail sales services, likelihood of confusion is found when another mark is used on goods which are commonly sold through such a retail outlet.”). Ultimately in this case, upon weighing all of the relevant du Pont factors for which there is evidence or arguments, we find that applicant’s use of THE PINK TRACTOR, with and without the design, in connection with retail store services featuring a variety of women’s apparel is likely to cause confusion with opposers’ registered mark, TRACTOR, for women’s jeans, pants, shorts, skirts, overalls, shortalls, skirtalls, tops, jackets, vests, coats, sweaters, sweat suits, sweat pants, sweat shirts, t-shirts, leggings and leg warmers. Decision: The consolidated oppositions are sustained and registration to applicant is refused with respect to both applications. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation