Indianapolis Mack Sales And Service, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 26, 1988

288 N.L.R.B. 1123 (N.L.R.B. 1988)

INDIANAPOLIS MACK SALES & SERVICE 1123
Indianapolis Mack Sales and Service, Inc. and Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, District Lodge No. 90. Case 25-
CA-11470
May 26, 1988
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
CRACRAFT
On September 28, 1984, the National Labor Re-
lations Board issued a Decision and Order in this
proceeding,' finding that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive representative of the Respondent's service em-
ployees. On September 25, 1986, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied
enforcement of the Board's Order and remanded
the case to the Board for further proceedings con-
sistent with the court's opinion. 2 The Board there-
after accepted the court's remand and notified the
parties that they could file statements of position.
The General Counsel and the Respondent filed
statements of position. On Jane 4, 1987, the Board
issued an Order remanding the case to the adminis-
trative law judge to make additional rulings, fmd-
ings, and conclusions in light of the court's opinion.
On November 27, 1987„ Administrative Law
Judge Arline Pacht issued the attached supplemen-
tal decision. The General Counsel filed exceptions
and a supporting brief and the Respondent filed
limited cross-exceptions and a supporting and an-
swering brief. The General Counsel filed an an-
swering brief to the Respondent's limited cross-ex-
ceptions, and the Respondent filed a motion to
strike the General Counsel's answering brief to the
Respondent's limited cross-exceptions.3
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board accepts the court's decision as the
law of the case. The Board has considered the
judge's supplemental decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided
1 272 NLRB 690 (1984)
2 802 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1986).
3 Sec 102 46(1) of the Board's Rules and Regulations provides that a
party filing an answering brief to cross-exceptions must address only the
questions raised in the cross-exceptions. The General Counsel's answering
brief fails to address the Respondent's limited cross-exceptions. Accord-
ingly, we grant the Respondent's motion to strike the General Counsel's
answering bile*
to affirm the judge's rulings, fmdings, 4 and conclu-
sions3 and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative
law judge is adopted and the complaint is dis-
missed.
4 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge's credibility
findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings
We agree with the judge that the facts of this case indicate that the
service employees do not share a community of interest distinct from that
of the parts employees and that a separate service unit is inappropriate In
so doing, we do not rely on the judge's discussion of merger of umts.
5 We also agree with the judge's conclusion that the Respondent, as
the challenger of historically separate service and parts units, bOre the
burden of showing that the histotical units are no longer appropriate. We
do not, however, rely on the judge's rationale that the court resolved the
burden issue by stating that the Respondent "would have been better ad-
vised to have made an offer of proof." We find that the judge's conclu-
sion is fully supported by the Board's longstanding policy that a mere
change m ownership should not uproot bargaining units that have en-
joyed a history of collective bargaining unless the units no longer con-
form reasonably well to other standards of appropriateness. See NLRB v.
Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972), and Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 246 NLRB 202, 203 (1979).
The General Counsel argues as an alternative theory that even if a
combined unit of service and parts employees is the only appropriate
unit, the Respondent still unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union
because the Union had majority support in that combined unit at the time
of its initial recognition demand. The complaint, however, specifically al-
leged that the Respondent refused to recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the service employees and did
not allege a refusal to bargain in a combined unit. The General Counsel
never contended, in her case-in-chief, that the Respondent refused to bar-
gain with the Union as the exclusive representative of a combined service
and parts unit. Rather, the General Counsel presented this alternative ar-
gument for the first time m her brief to the judge after the close of the
supplemental hearing. In these circumstances, we reject the General
Counsel's argument as untimely raised.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
ARLINE PACHT, Administrative Law Judge. A supple-
mental proceeding was held before me in Indianapolis,
Indiana, on 10 and 11 August 1987, to determine wheth-
er a separate bargaining unit including only service de-
partment employees is appropriate following Respond-
ent's acquisition of Mack Trucks, Inc. The parties were
afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, to argue
orally, and to submit briefs. Taking into account the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the entire
record, together with the parties' posttrial briefs, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case originally came to trial on 2 February 1983.
On 31 May 1983, I issued a decision finding that Re-
spondent was a successor to Mack Trucks, Inc. and, as
288 NLRB No. 126
1124 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
such, had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
refusing to recognize and bargain with the incumbent
Union that continued to represent a representative com-
plement of the Company's service employees. Respond-
ent appealed this decision to the Board, excepting among
other matters to the finding that the unit that excluded
parts department employees was appropriate.
On 28 September 1984, the Board (Chairman Dotson
dissenting) affirmed the decision and adopted my recom-
mended Order, fmding, inter alia, that the service depart-
ment employees constituted an appropriate unit given the
employees' common work interests and 18-year history
of separate representation. 272 NLRB 690 fn. 4 (1984).
The Board distinguished Graneto Datsun, 203 NLRB 550
(1973) (which holds that a single unit of service and
parts employees is presumptively appropriate unless it is
affirmatively shown that so substantial community of in-
terest exists between the the groups) as a case applicable
in initial organization. Ibid.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit subsequently denied the Board's petition for en-
forcement and remanded the case, ruling that the record
contained insufficient evidence to sustain the conclusion
that a separate unit for service employees alone was ap-
propriate. NLRB v. Indianapolis Mack Sales, 802 F.2d
280 (7th Cir. 1980). In reaching this conclusion, the court
observed that the Board had failed to explain its exclu-
sion of the instant case from the Graneto Datsun pre-
sumption that parts and service departments should be in
one bargaining unit. Ibid. at 284. 1 Further, the court
noted that bargaining history alone was insufficient to
support the Board's conclusion that a separate unit of
service department employees was appropriate without
inquiry into the parts department employees' community
of interest. The court suggested that the Board could
modify or repudiate the Graneto Datsun rule, or deter-
mine on the basis of further evidence that the specific
facts in the instant case justify segregating the two units.
Ibid.
Thereafter, in response to the Board's request, the par-
ties submitted statements of position. Without comment-
ing on these statements, the Board issued an Order on 4
June 1987 remanding the case to me for further hearing
and "to make additional rulings, findings, and conclu-
sions in light of the court's opinion."
II. EVIDENCE BEARING ON THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
QUESTION
The record shows that in 1963 the predecessor em-
ployer, Mack Trucks, Inc., executed a collective-bargain-
ing agreement that recognized the Union as the exclusive
representative for the following unit:
All leadmen, mechanics, and porters employed by
the Employer at its Indianapolis branch; but exclud-
ing office clerical employees, guards, watchmen,
1 The court cited in support of this rule Honda of San Diego, 254
NLRB 1248, 1263 (1981), Gregory Chevrolet, 258 NLRB 233, 238 (1981),
Graneto Datsun, supra, and Harry Brown Motor Co., 86 NLRB 652, 654
(1949). Id Each of these cases involved an initial union organizational
effort.
service employees, all stockroom employees and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
General Counsel's Exhibit 4 further establishes that in
November 1963, the Board certified the Union as the
bargaining representative for a separate unit including:
All parts department employees at the Employer's
Indianapolis, Indiana establishment; but excluding
all office clerical employees, all leadmen, mechanics
and porters and all professional employees, watch-
men, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The first of a series of labor contracts was executed on
behalf of the parts employees in January 1964. 2 Thereaf-
ter, the predecessor and Union negotiated a series of sep-
arate agreements for each unit through 1984. However,
in 1982, in light of the Respondent's purchase of Mack
Trucks, the parties terminated the labor contracts with
one memorandum of agreement containing identical
terms for employees of both departments.
As established in the original proceeding, following its
acquisition of the predecessor's business, Respondent
continued to sell and service Mack trucks at the same lo-
cation in the same general market area. It also retained
the predecessor's organizational structure that was com-
prised of four departments: clerical, sales, service, and
parts. At the time of the supplemental hearing, 23 or 24
employees were included in these latter two depart-
ments; 16 in the service department and 7 in parts. 3 Em-
ployees in these two units continued to work in adjacent
areas with only a wall separating their contiguous work
space. A fire door remained opened at all times with
easy access between the two departments.
III. EMPLOYEES' JOB FUNCTIONS AND INTERCHANGE
Both under the predecessor and the Respondent, parts
and service employees shared the overall goal of servic-
ing and repairing customers' trucks. Of course, there was
a division of labor between the groups. As conceded at
the first trial, Respondent's service department employ-
ees are directly responsible for repairing vehicles, relying
on the same skills and tools that they used when em-
ployed by the predecessor. Parts employees continued to
be primarily engaged in selling parts to customers, issu-
ing parts to mechanics, receiving new parts, and storing
them in Respondent's stockroom.
The collective-bargaining agreements show that under
the predecessor, service department employees were
classified as leadmen, journeymen, class B mechanics, ap-
prentices, and porters. Respondent has abandoned these
discrete categories. Now, everyone in the service depart-
2 The recognition clause of these agreements refers to parts employees
as "stock room employees"
3 In its first decision in this case, the Board affirmed my finding that
on the date the Union requested recognition and bargaining on behalf of
the service department employees, Respondent had hired 10 mechanics, 8
of whom, as holdovers, constituted a clear majority in a representative
complement. 272 NLRB 690, fn. 3, 694. Respondent's records also show
that it commenced operations with five parts department employees,
three of whom had worked for the predecessor Thus, it may be pre-
sumed that at that time the Umon enjoyed continuing majority support
among a relevant complement of parts department employees as well.
INDIANAPOLIS MACK SALES & SERVICE 1125
ment is simply designated a mechanic regardless of his
level of skill. The State of Indiana does not require that
mechanics be certified and neither the predecessor nor
the Respondent insisted on certification either before or
after employment. Respondent's current sales manager,
Donald Ingram, who previously served as the predeces-
sor's service department supervisor, testified credibly,
however, that Respondent prefers to employ experienced
personnel in both parts and service. Indeed, Peter Sotos,
a mechanic who worked 14 years for the predecessor
before continuing as Respondent's most senior mechanic,
has had no training other than that acquired in the job.
The record also contains nothing to suggest that any
mechanic, even the most skilled, specializes in a particu-
lar task. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that Re-
spondent assigns mechanics, skilled and unskilled, to a
wide range of jobs. However, lesser skilled mechanics,
who comprised approximately 50 percent of the depart-
ment at the time of the instant hearing, do not perform
the more complex jobs alone. Rather, they serve as help-
ers, assisting their more experienced coworkers. They
also are assigned more menial tasks such as running for
parts for delivery to parts and service personnel, mowing
grass, and mopping floors.
In performing their work, mechanics rely extensively
on parts departinent employees who spend an estimated
20 percent of their shift locating specific items needed by
mechanics. Often a parts department employee will ac-
company a mechanic to a disabled vehicle to assist in de-
termining the precise part needed for the repair. To en-
hance the workflow between the two departments, Re-
spondent has created a position of parts-service coordina-
tor.
If their regular work schedule is slack, mechanics may
be assigned temporarily to the parts department to
unload new parts or pack parts under warranty for re-
shipment to the factory. Parts employees are primarily
responsible for serving Respondent's customers, and
spend 20 percent of their time doing so. Mechanics, too,
however, have customer contact, obtaining parts for
them or responding to their inquiries. Particularly during
second and third shifts, when the service supervisor is
not present, mechanics are more involved in serving cus-
tomers, which may include preparing the necessary pa-
perwork and completing transactions. Some five or six
mechanics are trained to enter sales data into a computer
in their department which, like the computer in the parts
department, is programed to track stock as it moves in or
out of the parts inventory. Ingram estimated that the
service department generates 40 to 50 percent of the
parts sales volume.
Under Respondent's flexible management practices,
parts department employees can and do perform a varie-
ty of semiskilled tasks usually performed by service de-
partment employees. For example, they may undertake
minor electrical repairs, change windshield wipers, tail
lights, or mud flaps. They also assist with preventive
maintenance, which includes oil changes and lubrica-
tions. Them,also may install new aerquip lines. Parts em-
ployees do not maintain a personal set of expensive hand-
tools as mechanics do, but from time to time, they may
borrow the mechanics' tools or use others which the Re-
spondent supplies.
Joint training opportunities offered since Respondent's
takeover underscore the close working relationship be-
tween the two units. Except for several mechanics who
were sent to a special Mack Truck factory training pro-
gram shortly after Respondent assumed control of the
Company, there has been little offsite training for em-
ployees classified as mechanics. Instead, Mack Truck
representatives offer in-house training to parts and serv-
ice employees together in an effort to familiarize them
with new stock. In addition, Mack Truck field service
representatives visit Respondent's facility every 6 to 8
weeks to advise employees about any problems that may
arise.
Under the predecessor, employees rarely transferred
between the parts and service departments, although
Ingram recalled that one parts employee had moved into
the service department. Under Respondent, such trans-
fers have become more common. Thus, the General
Counsel offered into evidence as Exhibit 3, a summary
prepared by the Respondent which shows that between
1982 and 1987, five service department employees trans-
ferred to the parts department while four parts employ-
ees transferred into the service department.4
Respondent also retained the predecessor's departmen-
tal supervisory structure. While service and parts super-
visors continued, however, to manage the day-to-day
work of their respective groups, they no longer had au-
thority to hire or fire or commit their employer's credit
as they did under the predecessor. Instead, Respondent's
president, Lewis Richardson, assumed ultimate authority
over such matters and was solely in control of wage de-
cisions. He also unilaterally instituted an experimental
bonus program that affected several selected employees
in both parts and service, although the method of calcu-
lating the bonus differed for each group. 5 Richardson
testified that he had n 6 schedule for granting pay in-
creases but would periodically review each employee's
rate and decide whether a raise was appropriate. Based
on Respondent's business records, the General Counsel
determined that in 1987, 22 mechanics employed by Re-
spondent earned on the average $9.28 per hour. During
the same period, parts employees' average hourly wage
was $5.50. These disparities generally reflect the differ-
ences in wage scales set for parts and service unit em-
ployees in the collective-bargaining agreements.
4 Counsel for the General Counsel submits that the Respondent's pay-
roll records failed to substantiate these transfers It is true that counsel
questioned Respondent's president about the existence of other docu-
ments that might reveal when the transfers occurred. By offering Exh. 3
into evidence, however, the General Counsel apparently accepted that
document as authentic and relevant Although my search was not exhaus-
tive, I found evidence in Respondent's payroll records that employee
Russ Hargiss transferred from service to parts and that employee Bob
Edwards moved from parts to service In addition, Ingram's testimony
was undisputed that transfers have occurred with greater frequency since
Respondent's acquisition of the business.
5 The bonus for parts employees was based on the total volume of
parts sales whereas the service employees' bonus was based on the timeli-
ness with which a particular task was completed
1126 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE
PREDECESSOR
The collective-bargaining agreements establish that
separate contracts were executed for the parts and serv-
ice department units between 1963 and 1984. A compari-
son of the parts and service contracts reveals, however,
that with the exception of different job classifications and
higher hourly wages for mechanics, their other terms are
almost identical. For example, employees of both the
parts and service units shared the same holidays, the
same vacation policy, the same overtime and premium
pay policies, and the same grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure. Verbatim provisions in these agreements guaran-
teed both groups of employees the same life insurance,
retirement, and medical plans Ingram, who as the prede-
cessor's service department supervisor participated in ne-
gotiations leading to the last few collective-bargaining
agreements, testified without refute that negotiations for
the parts and service department units proceeded simul-
taneously. Thus, although two separate contracts were
endorsed, bargaining was conducted as if parts and serv-
ice were a single unit.
Respondent has continued the custom established
under the collective-bargaining agreement of providing
employees in both units the same fringe benefits. Thus,
parts and service employees are covered by the same life
and accident insurance policy, the same pension program
(until the Company suspended it), and the same group
medical policy. In addition, parts and service employees
continue to share other common working conditions just
as they did under the predecessor. They are paid accord-
ing to an hourly rate, receive their paychecks on the
same day, and assigned to one of three shifts that over
the same 8-hour time periods, use the same entrances,
share locker room facilities, eat together in Respondent's
lunchroom at the same time and park in the same area
adjacent to the facility.
Discussion and Concluding Findings
Whether a bargaining unit remains appropriate follow-
ing a change in ownership is unquestionably a relevant
inquiry in a successorship case. The General Counsel
contends that in answering this inquiry in accordance
with Board precedent, a Successor employer is obliged to
bargain with the incumbent union that represents a ma-
jority of employees as long as the unit is appropriate and
remains intact. Thus, counsel maintains that the correct
test is whether the successor employer has introduced
changes significant enough to render the unit inappropri-
ate. He claims that the Respondent failed to prove that
such changes occurred. Therefore, he argues, the service
department continued to be appropriate and intact and
Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union as the ex-
clusive representative of that unit violates Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
Based on its reading of the court of appeals' decision
in this case, the Respondent argues that the General
Counsel bore the burden of proving that there was no
substantial community of interest between service and
parts department employees and that his failure to do so
leads to the conclusion that a unit composed solely of
service department employees was and continues to be
inappropriate.
Respondent has stretched the circuit court's decision
beyond its intended borders. Surely, the court did not
mean to depart from settled Board principles governing
the proper test for determining an appropriate unit in a
successor situation as correctly stated in cases cited by
the General Counsel such as Saks Fifth Avenue6 and
White-Westinghouse Corp. ? The Board and the courts
have long recognized the need to preserve established
bargaining units that have enjoyed a history of stable
collective bargaining, if in fact, that is the case. 8 A mere
change in ownership should not uproot such units as
long as they remain appropriate and retain their separate
identity. See NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S.
272, 279 (1972). However, the Board "will not adhere to
the historical bargaining unit where that unit does not
conform reasonably well to other standards of appropri-
ateness."
The circuit court's opinion should be construed in
light of these precedents. Accordingly, I understand that
the court remanded this case so that the Board might
clarify its position with respect to the applicability of the
Graneto Datsun doctrine in this successorship situation
or, alternatively, to determine whether the Respondent's
service and parts departments should be segregated for
reasons other than bargaining history alone. However, in
commenting that "Indianapolis Mack would have been
better advised to have made an offer of proof,"" the
court seems to suggest that as the purported successor,
the Respondent bears the burden of adducing sufficient
evidence to establish that a single unit of service and
parts employees is warranted in accordance with the
Graneto Datsun rule." In other words, in an automotive
successorship case such as this, the party challenging his-
torically separate service and parts units must affirma-
tively prove that a substantial community of interest
exists between the units before they are joined for collec-
tive-bargaining purposes. Given this burden, Respond-
ent's motion to dismiss at the close of the General Coun-
sel's case-in-chief was premature and is denied. Based on
evidence adduced by the Respondent on remand and on
the totality of circumstances, however, I find that the
Respondent has met its burden.
At the original hearing, the General Counsel estab-
lished that the Respondent continued the predecessor's
business at the same location, retained the same depart-
mental structure, and began operations with a representa-
tive complement of mechanics, a majority of whom had
been employed by the predecessor and represented by
the Union. With some insignificant modifications, the
mechanics continued to perform the same functions,
using the same skills, with the same tools as they had in
the past. At the present hearing, the General Counsel
further proved that parts employees performed different
6 247 NLRB 1047 (1980), enfd. 634 F 26 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1980).
'229 NLRB 667, 674 (1977), enfd. 604 F.2d 689 (D.0 Cir. 1979).
8 See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 153 NLRB 1549, 1550 (1965).
9 Crown Zellerbach Corp., 246 NLRB 202, 203 (1979).
10 802 F.2d at 284.
" Wigmore terms this "the risk of nonpersuasion." 9 Evidence § 2485.
INDIANAPOLIS MACK SALES & SERVICE 1127
,
tasks than did the mechanics and were paid according to
a lower wage scale. Collective-bargaining agreements
also were introduced which showed that separate con-
tracts were concluded for the two units over several dec-
ades. Without more, such evidence might be considered
sufficient for a prima facie showing that the two units
continued intact. Although it is true that the Board usu-
ally groups parts and service employees in a single unit,
"a smaller unit is acceptable if it has been agreed to by
the parties and is not repugnant to the . . Act." NLRB
v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, 647 F.2d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 1981).
Thus, since the predecessor employer recognized segre-
gated units in separate contracts, the smaller unit of serv-
ice employees alone was appropriate within the intend-
ment of the Act, even if a unit which combined parts
and service employees might have been more appropri-
ate,
The Respondent presented evidence, however, which
overcame the claim that the parts and service units were
separate either before or after the takeover. As the facts
unfolded at the supplementary hearing, it became evident
that in reality, and for all practical purposes, the Union
and the predecessor had treated the groups of employees
as one unit for many years. Ingram's uncontroverted tes-
timony established that at least since 1972, collective bar-
gaining was carried out in unison for both units and re-
sulted in contracts that provided parts and service em-
ployees terms and conditions of employment that were
identical in almost every respect except for job classifica-
tions and hourly wage structure. The Respondent contin-
ued to treat parts and service employees alike with re-
spect to holidays, vacations, and many other employment
benefits. The Board, heretofore, has recognized that indi-
vidually certified or voluntarily recognized units may
merge into a single-integrated unit through the agree-
ment of the union and employer or by Board order. See
White-Westinghouse Corp., supra at 674-675. Merger may
occur even when the units are geographically isolated
and the employees in the various units have no inter-
change. Id. at 674. Where, as here, the parts and service
employees work in contiguous areas under one roof and
have frequent contacts, a de facto merger is all the more
likely and reasonable. If a successor employer may not
insist on bargaining for individual units when the merged
unit remains substantially intact after a takeover, neither
may a union.
Since the takeover, Respondent has continued business
practices of its predecessor and introduced new practices
that strengthen the mutual interests of the parts and serv-
ice employees. Thus, as discussed above, interaction be-
tween parts employees and mechanics occur with even
greater frequency under Respondent's administration
than under the predecessors. Transfers of employees in
and out of these units also has increased. As the Board
stated in Harry Brown Motor Co., 86 NLRB 652, 654
(1949), "it is perfectly clear that the service departments
are heavily dependent upon the parts departments and in
fact cannot function without [them]." In the Harry Brown
case, the Board did not find that the sale of parts to the
general public by the parts employees destroyed the
community of interest between that department and the
service unit. Id. at 654. In light of that finding, even
more reason exists in the present case to find a communi-
ty of interest between service and parts employees be-
cause the mechanics also have significant dealings with
customers.
Indeed, the record in this case is barren of evidence to
support the conclusion that Respondent's service depart-
ment employees constitute a separate appropriate craft
unit. Unlike the mechanics described in Dodge City of
Wauwatosa, 282 NLRB 459 (1986), Respondent's service
department employees are not certified before or after
hiring, are not afforded outside expert training, and do
not have specific specialties. They interact consistently
with parts department employees, have sales-related
functions, and frequently serve customers. In addition,
mechanics may assist in the parts department while parts
employees may perform minor mechanical repairs. Given
this blurring of functions, it cannot be said as it was in
Dodge City that Respondent's mechanics are a "distinct
and homogeneous group of highly trained and skilled
craftsmen .' . . ." Id. at 460.
Apart from their functional integration, employees in
both units have significant interchange through other
means: they work in adjacent sections of the same build-
ing, eat lunch together, use a single locker room, the
same parking area, and common entrances.
In sum, the facts adduced at the supplementary hear-
ing compel a resolution of this case that reconciles Board
precedent governing appropriate units in successorship
cases with the Graneto Datsun doctrine. The record
clearly establishes that parts and services employees have
shared a wide range of interests for many years, and per-
haps because of this were treated by the predecessor and
the Union as if they were a single-integrated unit, con-
sistent with the spirit of the Graneto Datsun rule. Be-
cause the Respondent has not altered its operations in
any way that would impinge on the mutual interests link-
ing the the groups, a segregated unit including only serv-
ice employees is inappropriate. It follows that because
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union
on behalf of a separate service department unit, the com-
plaint should be dismissed."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the totality of circumstances in this some-
what unusual case, I conclude that the unit described
below is not appropriate within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act:
All leadmen, mechanics and porters employed by
the Employer at its Indianapolis branch, but exclud-
ing office clerical employees, guards, watchmen,
service employees, all stockroom employees and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
12 The finding in the original decision in this case that there was sub-
stantial continuity in the employing industry following Respondent's
takeover and that union members constituted a majority of representative
complements m both service and parts departments at the time that the
Union requested recognition and bargaining is unaffected by evidence
produced at the supplementary hearing.
1128 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Therefore, the Respondent's refusal to recognize and
bargain with the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 90; did not
violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in
the complaint. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I recommend issuance of the following"
ORDER
The complaint in Case 25-CA-14790 is dismissed.
Order shall, as provided m Sec 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the

13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-

Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended poses.