T-2076343
Decided by the Board May 22, 1953
Crime involving moral turpitude — Contributing to juvenile delinquency (Canada) — Violation of section 33 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act of 1929 (Statutes of Canada, 1929, c. 46, 19-20. Geo. V; R.S., 1927, c. 108).
The offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of section 33 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act of 1929 (Canada) involves moral turpitude where the conviction record shows the specific act to be that of sexual intercourse.
EXCLUDED:
Act of May 26, 1924 — Alien not in possession of an unexpired immigration visa.
Act of 1918 — Alien not in possession of a valid passport.
Act of Feb. 5, 1917 — One who admits and has been convicted of crime involving moral turpitude-contributing to juvenile delinquency.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from a decision of a board of special inquiry at Vancouver, B.C., Canada, dated January 26, 1953, excluding the alien on the above-enumerated grounds. Appellant, a 31-year-old native and citizen of Canada, applied for admission for permanent residence on October 7, 1952. She sought permission to join her United States citizen husband at his United States Navy station in San Diego, Calif. Appellant testified that she married her present husband on November 6, 1951, at Vancouver, B.C., Canada.
On July 31, 1951, appellant applied for admission temporarily at Blaine, Wash., to visit relatives. However, she was excluded by a board of special inquiry on September 12, 1951, as an alien who admitted the commission of and had been convicted of contributing to juvenile delinquency (sec. 3, act of 1917), (Ex. A.). This determination was affirmed by the Assistant Commissioner (Ex. B.).
According to the record, appellant was convicted on May 2, 1941, in the police court of Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, of vagrancy, for having no means of support and living a loose, idle, and disorderly life. She was sentenced to serve 3 months in Manitoba Women's Prison at Portage la Prairie.
The charge that the alien had admitted and had been convicted of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile, a crime involving moral turpitude (sec. 3, act of 1917) arose as a result of a conviction on October 10, 1945, in the police court for the city and county of Vancouver, B.C., Canada. According to the conviction record, appellant committed the crime sometime between April 1 and September 24, 1945, in that she "did willfully commit an act likely to make a child * * * a juvenile delinquent, to wit, by having sexual intercourse." Appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of $25 or in the alternative to serve 1 month in jail (Ex. C.).
The crime involved is defined in section 33 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act of 1929 (Statutes of Canada, 1929, c. 46, 19-20. Geo. V; R.S., 1927 c. 108).
Adults ( or juveniles) liable who contribute to delinquency: (1) Any person, whether the parent or guardian of the child or not, who knowingly or willfully, (a) aids, causes, abets or connives at the commission by a child of a delinquency; or (b) does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's being or becoming a juvenile delinquent or likely to make any child a juvenile delinquent; shall be liable on summary conviction before a juvenile court or a magistrate to a fine not exceeding $500 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 years or to both fine and imprisonment. * * *
Section 2 (g) of the same Act provides:
"Juvenile delinquent" means any child who violates any provision of the criminal code of any Dominion or Provincial statute or of any bylaw or ordnance of municipality, or who is guilty of sexual immorality or any similar form of vice, or who is liable by reason of any other act to be committed to an industrial school or juvenile reformatory under the provisions of any Dominion or Provincial statute; * * *
Section 33 is a broad one and acts which do not involve moral turpitude as well as those involving moral turpitude are included within its scope. Whether or not the statute is divisible is determined after consideration of section 2 (g), upon which section 33 depends. After full consideration of these statutes, we conclude that section 2 (g) is definitely divisible, particularly with reference to the portion which reads "any child * * * who is guilty of sexual immorality or any similar form of vice * * *."
It has been determined in similar situations that such acts involve moral turpitude, when the statutes penalize reprehensible acts in connection with immoral actions which involve young children. This charge is sustained. Cf., Matter of R---- P----, ( 4 IN Dec. 607) (BIA, 1952); Matter of O---- L----, 6303623 (BIA, July 12, 1946). Because of the base or the depraved type of offense involved, we feel that this crime is one involving moral turpitude and the ground of exclusion under section 3 is sustained. Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755 (C.C.A. 7, 1931).
It is noted in passing that counsel has submitted an affidavit from the child involved in the 1945 crime, to the effect that his testimony was false and no wrong doing by the alien was in fact involved at that time. (Ex. D.) However, judicial authority limits us in an exclusion proceeding to consideration of the conviction record (i.e., judgment and sentence) and the pertinent statute. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757 (C.C.A. 2, 1933); Meyer v. Day, 54 F.2d 336 (C.C.A. 2, 1931); Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (C.C.A. 2, 1931).
In addition, the documentary charges are also sustained (sec. 13, act of 1924; act of 1918) and serve as additional grounds of exclusion. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Order: It is hereby ordered that the appeal be dismissed.