In the Matter of V

Board of Immigration AppealsMar 25, 1944
2 I&N Dec. 78 (B.I.A. 1944)

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  • reversing public charge determination where the respondent was employed and "has always been self-supporting" other than during a period of hospitalization

    Summary of this case from New York v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

56091/232

Decided by Board March 25, 1944.

Public Charge — Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 — Treatment at State Hospital at State expense under Illinois Statute — Section 10, Chapter 91½, Illinois Revised Statutes (1943).

Where an alien is committed after entry to a State Hospital in a State which provides by statute that treatment therein be at State expense and for which reason tender of payment for treatment is declined, he is not deportable as having become a public charge thereby.

CHARGES:

Warrant: Act of 1917 — Likely to become a public charge. Act of 1917 — Became a public charge within 5 years after entry.

BEFORE THE BOARD


Discussion: The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico, age 26, and was first admitted to the United States for permanent residence, accompanied by her mother, at the age of two. She last entered at Laredo, Tex., on February 20, 1939, following an absence of a few hours in Mexico. The respondent was committed to the Manteno State Hospital on June 26, 1940, where she remained until October 26, 1940, when she was paroled and finally discharged January 26, 1941. She was again committed thereto on December 5, 1941, paroled February 8, 1942, and discharged May 21, 1942. She was readmitted to that institution on March 24, 1943, and was paroled therefrom on October 17, 1943.

The respondent's condition was originally diagnosed as dementia praecox, catatonic type; as of March 24, 1943, her condition was diagnosed as schisophrenia, catatonic type.

The respondent's mother made an attempt to reimburse the hospital for the care and treatment the alien received but was advised that reimbursement would not be accepted. Dr. Marianne Wallenberg, Clinical Director of the Manteno State Hospital, appeared in the respondent's behalf and testified that there was a possibility that she would recover from her illness. Accordingly, the hearing was reopened to ascertain whether payment would be accepted in this case and the progress and her prognosis of the respondent's condition.

At the reopened hearing Dr. Wallenberg testified that the respondent was paroled from the institution on October 17, 1943, as already stated, and that following the usual 3-month parole period which would be about February 19, 1944, she would be discharged. She further stated that it was impossible to predict prognosis of the respondent's condition but that she has made surprisingly good improvement and that complete recovery is possible. She admitted, however, that a recurrence of the affliction is possible but that complete recovery would be more likely if she were permitted to remain in her present surroundings; that is, with her family.

Dr. Wallenberg stated that payment cannot be accepted because section 10, chapter 91½ of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1943, provides that mentally ill persons admitted to any state hospital for mentally ill, shall be maintained and treated while in the hospital at the expense of the State, but the cost of clothing, transportation and other incidental expenses not constituting any part of the maintaining or treatment shall be defrayed at their own expense or that of the country from which they were admitted.

Under the pertinent immigration statute, a person does not become a public charge until there has been a failure or refusal to pay for treatment and care accorded by the institution, nor, we believe, does such a person become deportable where a statute, as here, provides that such cost shall be at the expense of the state. In other words, there is no debt owing to the Manteno State Hospital under the Illinois statute, either by the alien or her relatives.

In Nocchi v. Johnson, 6 F. (2d) 1, the court held: The fact alone that an alien boy, within 5 years after his entry, was sent to a state school for defective children, where he was maintained at public expense, is not ground for his deportation as having become a public charge within the five years, where his parents were able to pay for his support and education, and liable therefor under the laws of the state, and especially where they were willing to pay, but did not understand that they should do so.

The court expressed the view, and we agree, that Congress never intended that an unfortunate alien committed to a state institution for curative treatment, having parents able to pay proper charges, should thereby become pauperized "a public charge" and on that ground deported (See also Ex parte Kichmiriantz, 283 Fed. 679; U.S. v. Tod, 300 Fed. 916).

The Illinois statute involved is not merely for the purpose of a particular class of persons but for the benefit of all classes without regard to their ability or inability to pay. The state is interested in centralizing in one place the best available medical treatment for the benefit of its citizens and, if possible, to bring about their rehabilitation and restoration to society. Hence, a person of means may choose that type of place rather than a private institution which may not have comparable facilities.

In the case before us it is established that the respondent's mother attempted to reimburse the institution for the treatment accorded her daughter. Payments were declined by those in charge of the institution in accordance with the statutory sanction. Therefore, as previously stated, there is no debt due the institution by either the respondent or anyone else interested in her welfare and therefore it must follow that she has not become a public charge within the meaning of the immigration statute. We recently adopted this view In re L---- A----, No. 55834/369.

Findings of Fact: Upon the basis of all the evidence presented, it is found:

(1) That the respondent is an alien, a native and citizen of Mexico;

(2) That the respondent was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on June 8, 1919 at Laredo, Tex.;

(3) That the respondent last entered the United States at that port on February 28, 1939 following an absence of a few hours in Mexico;

(4) That the respondent was admitted to the Manteno State Hospital, Manteno, Ill. as a patient from June 26, 1940 to October 26, 1940; from December 5, 1941 to February 8, 1942 and from March 24, 1943 to October 17, 1943;

(5) That the respondent's condition has been diagnosed as schizophrenia, catatonic type;

(6) That hospitals for the mentally ill in Illinois are not permitted to accept reimbursement for treatment and care accorded patients;

(7) That the respondent's mother has offered to make reimbursement.
Conclusions of Law: Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, it is concluded:

(1) That under section 10, chapter 911/2, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1943, the respondent or her relatives has not incurred a debt for treatment accorded her at the Manteno State Hospital, Manteno, Ill.;

(2) That, accordingly, the respondent did not become a public charge within 5 years of entry within the meaning of the immigration statute;

(3) That under sections 3 and 19, Immigration Act of 1917, the respondent is not subject to deportation on the ground that she was a person likely to become a public charge at the time of entry;

(4) That under section 19, Immigration Act of 1917, the respondent is not subject to deportation on the ground that she became a public charge within 5 years after entry.
Other Factors: As stated, the respondent has resided in the United States practically continuously since she was 2 years of age. Her father is deceased and her mother, brothers, and sisters all reside in Chicago, Ill. Her brothers and sisters are citizens of the United States. Her only relative in Mexico is an uncle.

The respondent is presently employed by the National Biscuit Co., Chicago, Ill., as a packer at a salary of $26 weekly. Other than the periods she was in the hospital in question she has always been self-supporting. We find, therefore, that the evidence is insufficient to support the view that she was a person likely to become a public charge at the time of her last entry.

Order: It is ordered that the warrant of arrest, dated November 8, 1941, be cancelled, and this proceeding closed.