In the Matter of U

Board of Immigration AppealsMar 20, 1947
2 I&N Dec. 830 (B.I.A. 1947)

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Decided by Board March 4, 1947. Approved by Attorney General March 20, 1947.

Suspension of deportation — Section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended — Good moral character — Discretion.

A showing of good moral character is not precluded because of the commission of perjury before this Service during the 5-year statutory period required for suspension of deportation under the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.

CHARGE:

Warrant: Act of 1924 — No immigration visa.

BEFORE THE BOARD


Discussion: The respondents are husband and wife, the former 50 years of age, a native of Russia, stateless, and the wife 44 years of age, a native of Roumania (formerly Russia), stateless. The respondents entered the United States in the summer of 1925 at an unknown place on the Canadian border. Both intended to remain permanently at that time, but neither was in possession of an immigration visa.

Findings of Fact: Upon the basis of all the evidence presented, it is found:

(1) That the male respondent is an alien, a native of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now stateless);

(2) That the female respondent is a native of Roumania (formerly Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), now stateless;

(3) That the respondents last entered the United States during the summer of 1925 at an unknown point along the Canadian border;

(4) That the respondents, on the occasion of their last entry, intended to remain in this country permanently.

(5) That the respondents were not in possession of immigration visas.
Conclusions of Law: Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, it is concluded:

(1) That under sections 13 and 14 of the Immigration Act of 1924 the respondents are subject to deportation in that at the time of entry they were not in possession of immigration visas:

(2) That under section 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917 the respondents are deportable to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at government expense.
Factors Relating to Discretionary Relief: The Acting Commismissioner has denied the application for suspension of deportation because the respondents have failed to establish good moral character for the preceding 5-year period. It appears that within the 5-year period, namely, during 1942, the respondents made false statements before the Immigration and Naturalization Service with respect to their time of entry. They stated that their last entry occurred prior to July 1, 1924, whereas in truth and in fact they last entered in the summer of 1925. They repeated these false statements on at least two other occasions.

Counsel asserted that the respondents were a little careless with the truth because of their eagerness to remain in the United States. They themselves indicated that they didn't realize the seriousness of their false statements and that their true motive was to adjust their immigration status.

Concededly, the false testimony given by the respondents with reference to their last entry into the United States amounted to perjury. The issue then is whether, because of perjury committed by them, they are estopped from showing good moral character for the required period of time so as to render them eligible for suspension of deportation. We have held that false testimony during deportation proceedings does not necessarily preclude a finding of good moral character ( Matter of R----, 56124/971, Jan. 8, 1944). Good moral character should not be construed to mean moral excellence, nor is it destroyed by a single lapse. It is a concept of a person's natural worth derived from the sum-total of all his actions in the community ( Matter of B----, 56130/885, Nov. 23, 1943; Matter of M----, 55964/176, Apr. 17, 1944; Matter of A----, 56052/439 (renumbered A-3595874), Dec. 28, 1943.) These views have also been expressed by the courts ( In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128). It has been said that depravity of character and violation of law are not necessarily wedded together (Petition of Schlau, 41 F. Supp. 161). The term "good moral character" is elusive and difficult of definition. On this theory it was said In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561 and Turley v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 696, that it should not be construed to mean moral excellence or that it should be destroyed by a single lapse, but that it is something that measures up as good among the people of the community in which the party resides, that is, up to the standard of the average citizen; that in determining moral character the standard of the average American citizen as it exists today should be applied. Reputation which will pass muster with the average man is required; and that not every violation of law establishes bad moral character.

We have stated that the false statements by the respondents amounted to perjury. Of course, they could be viewed as false swearing. In any event, the offense they committed, that is, false swearing or perjury, arises as the result of their admission of the commission thereof; there is no conviction thereof involved. Another peculiarity is that when the false statements were made, the apparent purpose was to secure registry, that is, legalization of their immigration status on the basis of an illegal entry prior to July 1, 1924; yet, there was available to them at that time suspension of deportation, the precise result which registry would have given them. The only ground of deportation is that they did not have immigration visas when they entered this country in 1925.

They voluntarily came forward and stated they last entered the United States illegally during January 1925 and not prior to July 1, 1924, as previously stated. Both before and since the giving of the false statements the record of the respondents has been without blemish.

The respondents have been married since 1924 and have an American-born child, now 17 years of age, entirely dependent upon them for support. They are both employed; the wife is a stitcher, earning $60 a week, and the husband a floorwalker, earning $71 a week. They have assets amounting to $764.54. Their personal effects are valued at $3,000. They also have war bonds amounting to $3,300 and the female respondent has a separate account of her own amounting to $1,080.37.

The report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is completely favorable, as is the testimony of witnesses who have known them for many years, as well as the results of an independent neighborhood character investigation.

Applying the foregoing standards to this case as a whole, we conclude that the respondents have established good moral character for the required 5-year period last past and that their application for suspension of deportation should be granted.

Order: It is ordered that deportation of the aliens be suspended under the provisions of section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as amended.

It is further ordered, That if Congress takes no action adverse to the order granting suspension of deportation, and when the required fee is paid, proceedings be canceled.

As the cases involve suspension of deportation of aliens pursuant to the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, in accordance with the provisions of title 8, section 90.12, Code of Federal Regulations, the Board refers the cases to the Attorney General for review of its decision.


The findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of the Board of Immigration Appeals suspending the deportation of the respondents under the provisions of section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, are hereby approved and adopted.