A-7398042
Decided by Hearing Officer May 21, 1952. Approved by Board August 7, 1952.
Suspension of deportation, economic detriment — Section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended — Exercise of discretion.
(1) The exercise of the discretionary power to grant suspension of deportation pursuant to section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, is not warranted in the case of a native and citizen of Cuba, who recently arrived in the United States in 1948 and whose husband, a native and citizen of Cuba, resides there, even though she has a dependent, native-born United States citizen child.
BEFORE THE HEARING OFFICER
(May 21, 1952)
Discussion: This record relates to a 23-year-old married female, a native and citizen of Cuba, whose only entry into the United States occurred at the port of Miami, Fla., by plane, on March 7, 1948, at which time she was admitted as a visitor under section 3 (2) of the Immigration Act of 1924 for a temporary period until April 6, 1948. That entry has been verified. She has testified that at the time of entry it was her intention to return to Cuba prior to expiration of her temporary admission. As a consequence of her meeting her present spouse, she has remained here continuously although she never applied for nor received an extension of her temporary admission. As of record, she was a bona fide visitor at the time of entry; such entry was a lawful one. Having remained beyond the period of her lawful admission, she is now amenable to deportation under the Immigration Act of 1924.
The record shows that the alien was legally married on June 11, 1948, to a native and citizen of Cuba who has resided in Cuba ever since about October 18, 1950. They have one minor citizen child who is residing with the respondent. The respondent is employed as an armhole baster, earning $50 to $60 a week; her assets consist of $500 which includes amount in bank and $1,000 in general assets. She testified that her husband, who is residing in Cuba, has been ill and unemployed. It is the respondent's allegation that the child is wholly and completely dependent upon her for support. Upon the basis of the foregoing, the record supports the respondent's allegation that her deportation would result in a serious economic detriment to her citizen minor child.
A check of the appropriate local and Federal records has failed to reveal an arrest. Inquiry has disclosed membership by the respondent in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, and, through such membership, she has become party to an insurance policy on which she pays $10 a year. The respondent was unable to disclose the name of the carrier of this alleged insurance. She has, however, denied any membership in the International Workers order. She has produced affidavits of witnesses sufficient to establish that she has been a person of good moral character since her arrival in the United States.
The record discloses that the respondent has no close family in the United States other than her daughter; her husband is residing in Cuba. She alleges that he is endeavoring to make application for an immigration visa for permanent residence.
Suspension of deportation is a form of relief which is discretionary in its nature; it may not be claimed as a matter of right. In view of the respondent's comparatively short residence in the United States, her husband's presence in Cuba, it is believed that suspension of deportation is not warranted in the present matter.
The alien has established her eligibility for voluntary departure and that relief is the maximum which will be granted to her as a matter of administrative discretion. To assure compliance with the grant of this privilege, deportation will be directed to follow in the event the alien fails to avail herself promptly of the grant of voluntary departure.
Findings of Fact as to Deportability: On the basis of all the evidence in the case, it is found that:
(1) The respondent is an alien, a native and citizen of Cuba.
(2) The respondent's only entry into the United States occurred at the port of Miami, Fla., by plane, on March 7, 1948, at which time she was admitted as a visitor under section 3 (2) of the Immigration Act of 1924 for a temporary period not to exceed April 6, 1948.
(3) Although the respondent never applied for or received an extension of her temporary admission, she has remained here continuously and for a longer time than permitted.Conclusion of Law as to Deportability: On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, it is concluded:
(1) That under sections 14 and 15 of the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, the respondent is subject to deportation on the ground that, after admission as a visitor she has remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted under said act or regulations made thereunder.Order: It is ordered that the alien be required to depart from the United States without expense to the Government within such period and under such conditions as the officer in charge of the district deems appropriate.
It is further ordered that if the alien fails to depart when and as required, the privilege of voluntary departure shall be withdrawn without further notice or proceedings and the alien deported from the United States pursuant to law on the charge stated in the warrant of arrest.
Upon consideration of the entire record, it is ordered that the appeal from the decision of the hearing officer be and the same is hereby dismissed.