9 Even where a conviction does not serve as a per se bar to applying for relief under the statute, it may have a strong or even conclusive effect on the immigration court’s exercise of discretion in deciding whether to grant that relief under governing agency precedent or regulations. See, e.g., Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (describing the factors immigration judges must consider in deciding whether to grant relief from removal, including “the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness”); Matter of Y-L-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002) (making “drug trafficking offenses” a presumptive bar to “withholding of removal,” a form of asylum offered to non-citizens who are more likely than not subject to persecution in their home country), overruled on other grounds, Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) (holding that “[t]he Attorney General, in general, will not favorably exercise discretion [to grant a criminal conviction waiver] under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2) . . . in cases involving violent or dangerous crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances” but that “ a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be insufficient to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion”).

Such offenses are also virtually always deemed "particularly serious crimes" that eliminate all possibility of relief from removal even for those who would be subject to persecution in their country of origin-except for an extremely small segment of individuals who can prove a greater than 50% probability of torture by or with the acquiescence of government actors (which individuals are still ordered removed but given a revocable "deferral" of that removal order during the time that the likelihood of tOliure exists; they may be detained throughout that period). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 15S(b)(2)(A)(ii),(B)(i); 1231(b)(3)(B); Matter ofT-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (AG 2002); 8 CFR § 120S.16(d)(2), 1208.17(a),(c).