I.L.L.A. S.P.A.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 30, 2018

No. 79190461 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2018)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: October 30, 2018

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re I.L.L.A. S.P.A.
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Serial No. 79190461
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Rebeccah Gan of Wenderoth LLP,
for I.L.L.A. S.P.A.
Colleen Dombrow, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 101,
Ronald R. Sussman, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Taylor, Wolfson, and Coggins,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Coggins, Administrative Trademark Judge:
I.L.L.A. S.P.A. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard character mark OLLIA-TECH for the following goods:
Non-stick coatings for pans, cookware, baking trays, small
electric kitchen apparatus and utensils, in International
Class 2; and
Frying pans; skillets; earthenware saucepans; saucepans;
pots for cooking; household utensils, namely, graters;
kitchen utensils, namely, splatter screens, in International
Class 21.1

1 Application Serial No. 79190461 was filed June 16, 2016, under Section 66(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141(f), requesting extension of protection based on International
Registration No. 1306160 with a priority filing date of December 16, 2015.

Serial No. 79190461
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The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration as to the goods
identified in Class 212 under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d),
based on a likelihood of confusion with the standard character mark OLIA DESIGN,
with DESIGN disclaimed, for “glass wares, namely, decorative, and handcraft art
objects of glass; beverage glassware; mugs; cups and mugs.”3
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
When the question is likelihood of confusion, we analyze the facts as they relate
to the relevant factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311,
65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the
goods or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098,
192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976). We discuss the du Pont factors for which Applicant and
the Examining Attorney have presented evidence and arguments. “Not all of the [du
Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the
particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,

2 Although the involved application also covers goods in Class 2, the Examining Attorney
“refused registration of the trademark only as to Applicant’s goods in International Class
021.” Examiner’s Brief, 11 TTABVUE 3. The refusal does not pertain to the goods in Class 2.
3 Registration No. 4881407, issued January 5, 2016. The registration contains the following
statement: “The wording ‘OLIA’ has no meaning in a foreign language.”
Serial No. 79190461
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668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf
Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We first consider the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks
and compare them, as we must, in their entireties in terms of sound, appearance,
meaning and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir.
2005). However, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more
or less weight has been given to a particular feature of the mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re
Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). That is, “[t]he
proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the
marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that
persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between
the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 101 USPQ2d at 1721
(citation omitted). See also San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components
Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977); Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc.,
23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d mem. unpublished, No. 92-1086 (Fed. Cir.
June 5, 1992). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average customer, who
retains a general rather than specific impression of the marks. L’Oreal S.A. v.
Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Oliver &
Winston, Inc., 207 USPQ 335, 344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co.,
Serial No. 79190461
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190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975). Here, the average customer includes ordinary
members of the general public who buy kitchen utensils, cookware, and beverage
glassware.
Applicant’s mark is OLLIA-TECH and Registrant’s mark is OLIA DESIGN. The
marks are similar in appearance in that each is comprised of two terms with the first
term being either OLLIA or OLIA. These similar first terms both begin with OL- and
end with -IA. The additional L positioned in the middle of Applicant’s first term does
little to distinguish OLLIA in appearance from the term OLIA in Registrant’s mark,
and may not even be noticed.
Applicant argues that the term OLLIA in its mark is likely to be pronounced as
“oll-ee-ah” while the term OLIA in Registrant’s mark would be pronounced as “oh-
lee-ah.” Main Brief, pp. 8-9 (9 TTABVUE 14-15). There is no correct pronunciation of
a trademark term, like Applicant’s OLLIA and Registrant’s OLIA, which are not
words, but coined terms. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1399,
1409 (TTAB 2010). These terms may be pronounced in an identical manner.
Notwithstanding that possibility, which must be taken into account, we note that the
pronunciations proposed by Applicant are themselves similar in sound. The similarity
in sound between OLLIA and OLIA arises from the similarity in spelling, which also,
as discussed above, contributes to the similarity in appearance. See Eveready Battery
Co. v. Green Planet Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1511, 1519 (TTAB 2009) (citing Krim-Ko Corp.
Serial No. 79190461
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v. Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if
the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)).
Applicant has not offered any evidence to refute the statement in the cited
registration that “[t]he wording ‘OLIA’ has no meaning in a foreign language,” or to
show that either OLIA or OLLIA has any meaning at all. Therefore, as to connotation,
in the context of the goods, on this record the terms OLIA and OLLIA appear to be
arbitrary when used on kitchen goods. Thus, as least with respect to related goods,
see discussion below, consumers would likely perceive the terms OLIA and OLLIA as
having a similar arbitrary meaning and commercial impression.
As noted, OLLIA and OLIA are the first terms in the respective marks. These lead
terms are likely to be impressed as the dominant portion of the cited marks, and
consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable
in any trademark or service mark. Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9
USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“[I]it is often the first part of a mark which is most
likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making
purchasing decisions). See also Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1692 (“The presence
of this strong distinctive term as the first word in both parties’ marks renders the
marks similar, especially in light of the largely laudatory (and hence non-source
identifying) significance of ROYALE.”). OLLIA, being the first term in the applied-
for mark, is similar in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression
to OLIA, the first term of the cited mark.
Serial No. 79190461
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We acknowledge the presence of TECH as the second word in Applicant’s mark
and DESIGN as the second word in Registrant’s mark, which partially differentiate
the marks. Applicant argues that the TECH portion of its mark conveys a commercial
impression “of being tech-forward in the cookware space,” while the DESIGN portion
of Registrant’s mark conveys an impression “of being related to design.” Main Brief,
pp. 8-8 (9 TTABVUE 14-15).
The definition of neither TECH nor DESIGN was made of record. In an effort to
fully consider the commercial impression that each term may lend to its respective
mark, we take judicial notice that the definitions of TECH, TECHNOLOGY, and
DESIGN include multiple meanings including the following:4
• TECH
o technology.

• TECHNOLOGY
o the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area.
o a capability given by the practical application of knowledge.
o a manner of accomplishing a task especially using technical processes,
methods, or knowledge.

• DESIGN
o an underlying scheme that governs functioning, developing, or
unfolding.
o a plan or protocol for carrying out or accomplishing something (such as
a scientific experiment).
o the arrangement of elements or details in a product or work of art.
o the creative art of executing aesthetic or functional designs.

4 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries
that exist in printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB
2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Threshold.TV Inc. v.
Metronome Enters. Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1031, 1038 n.14 (TTAB 2010). The definitions are taken
from MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY at www.merriam-webster.com, accessed September
28, 2018.
Serial No. 79190461
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From these definitions, we cannot say that TECH and DESIGN have meanings so
diverse as to confer disparate commercial impressions when each immediately follows
the term OLLIA or OLIA. In fact, as defined, there appears to be a relationship
between TECH and DESIGN such that technology arises out of design.
We also note that DESIGN has been disclaimed in Registrant’s mark. This
supports our determination that OLIA would be the more dominant portion of
Registrant’s mark. See In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (the court may place
more weight on a dominant portion of a mark, for example if another feature of the
mark is descriptive or generic standing alone; however, the ultimate conclusion
nonetheless must rest on consideration of the marks in total); In re Dixie Rests., Inc.,
105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (DELTA, not the
disclaimed generic term CAFE, is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA
CAFE); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751.
While we acknowledge the differences between the two marks, the differences do
not outweigh the strong similarities created by the highly similar first terms OLIA
and OLLIA in the marks, or the connotation and overall commercial impression
engendered by the marks as a whole. Based upon the above analysis, we find that the
mark OLLIA-TECH is more similar than dissimilar to the mark OLIA DESIGN in
terms of appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. As a result,
consumers encountering OLLIA-TECH could mistakenly believe that it represents a
variation on the registered mark used to identify kitchen goods emanating from a
Serial No. 79190461
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common source. This is particularly the case because, as noted earlier, the proper
focus is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but consideration of the
recollection of the average customer who retains a general rather than specific
impression of the marks.
In view thereof, the first du Pont factor regarding the similarity of the marks
favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and
Classes of Customers
We next turn to the goods, channels of trade, and classes of consumers. We must
make our determinations under these factors based on the goods as they are
identified in the application and cited registration. See In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105
F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also Stone Lion Capital
Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001,
1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Computs. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937,
16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found if the
respective products are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Applicant’s goods at issue (i.e., the Class 21 goods) are “frying pans; skillets;
earthenware saucepans; saucepans; pots for cooking; household utensils, namely,
graters; kitchen utensils, namely, splatter screens.” Registrant’s goods are “glass
Serial No. 79190461
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wares, namely, decorative, and handcraft art objects of glass; beverage glassware;
mugs; cups and mugs.”
The Examining Attorney made of record pages from commercial Internet websites
showing that Applicant’s and Registrant’s types of goods may emanate from the same
source under the same mark, and that both sets of goods travel through the same
online channels of trade and are purchased by the same classes of customers, i.e.,
ordinary members of the general public who buy kitchen utensils, cookware, and
beverage glassware. Such evidence is probative of the relatedness of the goods, and
the similarity of the channels of trade and classes of customers. See, e.g., In re Davey
Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys.
Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009). See, for example:
• Cuisinart.com: wine glasses, cheese graters, skillets, saucepans, and
stockpots5;
• LeCreuset.com: wine glasses, glass tumblers, cups, mugs, frying pans,
cooking pots, and splatter guard screens6;
• SurLaTable.com: wine glasses, double old fashioned glasses, mugs, graters,
splatter screens, skillets, and saucepans.7
• Williams-Sonoma.com: mugs, cups, beverage glassware sets, wine glasses,
champagne flutes, graters, frying pans, and saucepans.8
• ZwillingOnline.com: graters, wine glasses, saucepans, and frying pans.9
• KateSpade.com: mugs, frying pans, saucepans, cooking pots.10

5 May 8, 2017 Final Office Action, TSDR 9-16.
6 Id. at TSDR 17-31.
7 Id. at TSDR 32-51
8 Id. at TSDR 51-70.
9 Id. at TSDR 71-74.
10 Id. at TSDR 77-79.
Serial No. 79190461
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• BedBathAndBeyond.com: skillets and mugs.11
• CrateAndBarrel.com: mugs and splatter screens.12

In addition, the Examining Attorney made of record at least 18 third-party
registrations that include some goods from both Applicant’s and Registrant’s
identifications.13 These third-party registrations, based on use in commerce, suggest
that the listed goods may emanate from the same source. In re Aquamar, Inc., 115
USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d
1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470
n.6 (TTAB 1988), aff’d mem., 864 F.2d 149 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See, for example:
• Registration No. 5046957: cheese and cooking graters, wine and drinking
glasses, and mugs.14
• Registration No. 5044340: splatter screens, cups, cheese and cooking
graters.15
• Registration No. 5045515: cooking pots and cups.16
• Registration No. 4939229: cooking graters, cooking pot sets, cocktail
glasses, coffee cups, mugs, drinking glasses, graters, metal cooking pans,
and saucepans.17

11 Id. at TSDR 84-85.
12 Id. at TSDR 86-87.
13 Even excluding the four third-party registrations that Applicant argues do not contain
goods of the type identified in both Applicant’s application and the cited registration (i.e.,
Registration Nos. 5042119, 5035209, 5035540, and 5040254), the record still contains, as
Applicant acknowledges, see Main Brief, pp. 13-14 (9 TTABVUE 19-20), 18 use-based third-
party registrations showing at least some goods identified in both Applicant’s application and
Registrant’s registration.
14 September 27, 2016 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR 11.
15 Id. at TSDR 17.
16 Id. at TSDR 25.
17 Id. at TSDR 28-29.
Serial No. 79190461
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• Registration No. 4936034: beverage glassware, pots, pans, skillets, cups,
and mugs.18
• Registration No. 5012554: cups, beverage glassware, and earthenware
saucepans.19
• Registration No. 5021545: earthenware saucepans, porcelain mugs,
drinking vessels, and works of art of glass.20
• Registration No. 4989575: drinking cups, drinking glasses, and graters.21
• Registration No. 5050794: beverage glassware, cooking pots, cups, works of
art of glass.22

This record evidence suggests that at least some of Applicant’s and Registrant’s
goods (i.e., frying pans, skillets, saucepans, cooking pots, graters, splatter screens,
beverage glassware, cups, and mugs) come from a single source under the same mark
and that consumers are accustomed to seeing some of the applied-for and registered
goods originating from the same source. It is sufficient for a refusal based on
likelihood of confusion that relatedness is established for any item encompassed by
the identification of goods in a particular class in the application. Tuxedo Monopoly,
Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1409 (TTAB 2015); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v.
Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014).
Because there are no limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers
in Applicant’s or Registrant’s identifications of goods, we must presume that

18 Id. at TSDR 31.
19 Id. at TSDR 34.
20 Id. at TSDR 36.
21 May 8, 2017 Final Office Action, TSDR 91.
22 Id. at TSDR 94.
Serial No. 79190461
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Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods move, or will move, in all channels of trade usual
for these goods, including online and in specialty home and kitchen supply stores, and
are, or will be, purchased by the usual classes of purchasers which, in this case,
include ordinary consumers. See In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908; In re Linkvest
S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).
Applicant’s argument that the Examining Attorney’s website evidence does not
support similar channels of trade because two of the stores, specifically Crate &
Barrel and Williams-Sonoma, are big-box retailers is misplaced. See Main Brief, p. 12
(9 TTABVUE 18). The evidence does not reveal that the online stores cited by the
Examining Attorney are “mass retailers” or “mega-sized stores” selling all manner of
goods under the same roof. Indeed, Applicant offered no evidence to support such a
contention. The website excerpts reveal that the stores appear to be focused on
kitchen and/or home goods, not mass retailers of goods from diverse industries. For
example, the web menu bar for Williams-Sonoma.com lists the following subjects:
cookware, cooks’ tools, cutlery, electrics, bakeware, food, tabletop & bar,
homekeeping, outdoor, and sale.23 Similarly, the web menu bar for
CrateAndBarrel.com lists: furniture, outdoor, dining & entertaining, kitchen, decor
& pillows, rugs & curtain, lighting, bed & bath, and organization.24 Even if the online
stores could be considered mass retailers of goods from diverse industries, it would
“not foreclose further inquiry into” likelihood of confusion. Federated Foods, Inc. v.

23 Id. at TSDR 51.
24 Id. at TSDR 86-87.
Serial No. 79190461
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Fort Howard Paper Co., 192 USPQ at 29 (CCPA 1976). The evidence of third-party
registrations corroborates the website evidence to suggest that the listed goods
emanate from the same source.
Contrary to Applicant’s additional argument, see Reply Brief, p. 3 (12 TTABVUE
7), the Examining Attorney did not argue a per se rule as to the relatedness of
consumer goods that are stored or used in the kitchen. Instead, the Examining
Attorney has demonstrated by the evidence of record that Applicant’s and
Registrant’s specific goods are related.
At bottom, the evidence of record establishes that Applicant’s goods are related to
Registrant’s goods and that these goods are sold, at a minimum, in overlapping
channels of trade to the same consumers. As such, the second, third, and fourth du
Pont factors weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. Analyzing the Factors
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record, including those
not specifically discussed herein, and all relevant du Pont factors. In view of the
similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods, and the overlapping channels of trade
and classes of customers, we find that Applicant’s mark so resembles Registrant’s
mark as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the source of
Applicant’s goods.
Serial No. 79190461
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II. Decision
The Section 2(d) refusal to register Applicant’s mark OLLIA-TECH for the goods
in Class 21 is affirmed. The application will proceed with respect to the goods in Class
2 only.