Ileana R.,1 Complainant,v.Ryan D. McCarthy, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 8, 2020Appeal No. 2019002411 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 8, 2020) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Ileana R.,1 Complainant, v. Ryan D. McCarthy, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 2019002411 Hearing No. 450-2016-00275X Agency No. ARRRAD15JUL02507 DECISION On March 19, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s February 13, 2019 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Heavy Mobile Equipment Mechanic, WG-11, at the Agency’s Red River Army Depot located in Texarkana, Texas. On October 20, 2015, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when: 1. effective August 23, 2015, the Chief, Combat/Travel Division (S1) suspended Complainant for seven days, citing (a) absence without leave (AWOL) for 1.6 hours on June 23, 2015, (b) 5.6 hours of AWOL and 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2019002411 2 failure to follow established leave procedures on June 24, 2015, (c) 1.1 hours of AWOL on June 25, 2015, and (d) submitting a false leave record on June 15, 2015; and 2. on June 24, 2015, the Chief, Boat Section (S2) charged Complainant 5.6 hours of AWOL, which negated her eligibility for a pending temporary duty assignment (TDY). The Agency accepted Complainant’s complaint for EEO investigation. During the investigation, Complainant denied being AWOL as alleged in (a) June 23 and (b) June 24. Specifically, for June 24, Complainant stated that she forgot to sign back-in after training. Conversely, Complainant acknowledged that she was AWOL as alleged in (c) June 25. For June 25, Complainant stated that she was conversing with other employees to obtain information and failed to log in and out. As to (d), Complainant stated that she signed her timesheet but left a code for training blank because she did not know it. She stated that a manager later entered the training code. The Combat/Travel Chief, S1, stated that he decided a seven-day suspension was appropriate based on three AWOL charges and because Complainant’s statement that she was not AWOL was unsubstantiated. (That was a reduction from the proposal of a 14-day suspension.) S1 noted that there is a Maintenance policy that any one discipline within two years will exclude an employee from TDY assignments. Management stated that it conferred with Human Resources before proposing and implementing the suspension. The Boat Section Chief, who was Complainant’s immediate supervisor, S2, stated that he walked the workroom floor and did not see Complainant after training on June 24. S2 stated that he looked for Complainant and she did not return to work that day. Following the EEO investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The assigned AJ found “no material facts in dispute,” and, on February 1, 2019, issued a summary judgment decision finding no discrimination. The AJ found that the evidence of record did not show that management’s actions were based on Complainant’s protected classes. Subsequently, the Agency issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal from Complainant followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). 2019002411 3 See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Here, Complainant has failed to point with any specificity to particular evidence in the investigative file or other evidence of record that indicates such a dispute. For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor. Therefore, we find that the AJ properly issued a decision here by summary judgment. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). Here, we find, assuming arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race or sex, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Agency stated that a seven-day suspension was appropriate based on three AWOL charges and because Complainant’s statement that she was not AWOL was unsubstantiated. 2019002411 4 The Agency noted that the seven-day suspension was a reduction from the 14 days proposed. The Agency stated that any one discipline within two years excluded an employee from TDY assignments. Complainant acknowledged that there were occasions that she did not sign back-in or failed to log in and out. Complainant did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reasons proffered by the responsible Agency officials for the disputed actions were a pretext masking discrimination. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final agency decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 2019002411 5 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations January 8, 2020 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation