Ideal Baking Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJul 12, 1968172 N.L.R.B. 1183 (N.L.R.B. 1968) Copy Citation IDEAL BAKING COMPANY, INC. Ideal Baking Company , Inc. and Bakers Tri-State Local 363 of American Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union , AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-2966 July 12, 1968 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On May 15, 1968, Trial Examiner Sidney J. Bar- ban issued his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found that the Respondent had not engaged in cer- tain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com- plaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup- porting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross- exceptions and a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions 2 and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner , as modified herein , and hereby orders that the Respondent Ideal Baking Company , Inc., Batesville , Arkansas, its officers, agents , successors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the following modifica- tions: 1. Add the following as paragraph 2(b) and re- letter paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) accordingly: "(b) Notify any of the above employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the 1183 United States, of their right to full reinstatement, upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces." 2. Add the following as the last indented para- graph in the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision: WE WILL notify any of the above em- ployees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement, upon application, in ac- cordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. i The Respondent 's brief raises questions as to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board 's established policy, however, not to overrule a Trial Examiner 's resolutions with respect to credibility un- less the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc , 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F 2d 362 (C.A 3) We find no such basis for disturbing the Trial Examiner 's credibility findings in this case Y We have not passed on the General Counsel's exceptions to the Trial Examiner 's failure to find additional violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act based on the Respondent 's conduct as set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision , as such findings would be cumulative TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF CASE SIDNEY J. BARBAN, Trial Examiner: This matter was heard before the Trial Examiner at Batesville, Arkansas, on March 13 and 14, 1968, upon allega- tions in the complaint, issued on February 12, 1968 (pursuant to charges filed on January 5 and 31, 1968), that the Respondent had engaged in activi- ties in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which activities are alleged to have caused a strike by employees of Respondent on December 20, 1967. Respondent's answer, as amended, denies the commission of any unfair labor practices alleged, or that such activities caused the employees' strike. Upon the entire record in this case, from obser- vation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Respondent and the Charging Party, the Trial Ex- aminer makes the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, an Arkansas corporation, in the course and conduct of operation of a bakery at Batesville, Arkansas, in a recent 12-month period, received at its Batesville plant from places outside the State of Arkansas, products of a value in excess 172 NLRB No. 120 1184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of $50,000. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Charging Party, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues Aside from issues as to whether Respondent en- gaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint , the parties are principally in dispute as to whether a strike, beginning on December 20, and current at the time of the hearing , was caused by, or was the result of, such alleged unfair labor practices . General Counsel and the Union assert that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike and that , in accordance with normal Board prac- tice, Respondent should be ordered to reinstate the employees upon their unconditional offer to return to work. See, i .e., Tom Thumb Stores, Inc., 123 NLRB 833, 835-836. Respondent contends that the strike was completely economic, designed to force Respon- dent to sign a collective -bargaining contract with the Union prior to the 1967 Christmas holiday, and, assertedly , resulted from an erroneous conviction that the Respondent was stalling in its bargaining efforts and was not negotiating in good faith. Respondent points to the fact that the complaint does not allege a refusal to bargain in good faith, nor does the General Counsel in this proceeding contend that Respondent was engaged in bad-faith bargaining prior to the strike .' Respondent con- tends that the strikers have been replaced , and, in any event , should not be ordered reinstated because of misconduct during the strike. B. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion of Employees 1. Statements to the effect that Respondent would not sign a collective -bargaining contract (a) Cochran , according to employee witnesses, first broached his opposition to signing a contract with the Union in his initial speech to the em- ployees on August 12, opposing the Union's or- ganizational efforts. It was testified that Cochran repeated these matters substantially in a second speech on August 26. According to employee Johnny Melvin Keller, Cochran " stated that he wouldn 't sign a contract ' Although the Union's initial charge alleged that Respondent had refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, this allegation was dropped in the amended charge in this matter In the circumstances, no litigation of this issue was permitted. ' According to Keller, on December 18, just before the strike, Cochran again stated, in terms similar to the above, that if he signed a contract it unless it benefited the Bakery, and if he did sign one it might take six months to five years."2 Em- ployee Donald Howard stated that during these speeches, Cochran "said there had to be a contract ... before anything could be done and that he wasn't going to sign a contract unless the Union could show him that it was going to benefit the Bakery." The testimony of other employee wit- nesses was consistent with that set forth. (b) On August 14, in the course of an incident during which Cochran threatened to fire him because of a report that he was smoking on the job, Donald Howard asserts Cochran "said, 'You know there has to be a contract between the company and the union before anything can be done,' and he said, 'He wasn't going to sign no God damn con- tract unless they could show him that it would benefit the Bakery.' He hesitated and he said, 'My employees."' Howard states that in this conversa- tion Cochran also said "that he could stall the union but he couldn't stall the Federal Govern- ment." (c) Employee John W. Johnson testified that, about the time of the election, Superintendent Beaverson told him that "we was wasting our time, that Mr. Cochran would never sign a contract and he said that he didn't know what we was fooling with it for." Johnson said that Beaverson spoke to the employees in this vein both before and after the election. (d) Bartley Levitt, who quit Respondent's em- ployment in October, stated that, in the course of a conversation prior to the election, Beaverson told him that "Mr. Cochran would close down the Bakery before he would sign a union contract." (e) Employee Raymond Odell Cason testified that, on an occasion within 2 weeks after the elec- tion, in a conversation in which Cochran stated he was disappointed in the outcome of the election, Cochran also "said, 'They got the union voted in but' he said, 'They don't have a contract and I doubt if they'll ever get one."' (f) In another conversation, occurring in November, Donald Howard testified that Cochran said he "was not going to sign a contract until the union can show me it would benefit this Bakery." (g) On December 18 and 19, Cochran met with the employees singly, or in small groups, in an at- tempt to discourage them from engaging in a strike. During these conversations, according to the em- ployee witnesses, Cochran also made statements to them substantially similar to those stated above. (h) Union Business Agent Goade testified that during a conversation with Cochran immediately after the election, Cochran told Goade that he "Would never sign a contract unless it benefits his might take as much as 5 years Employees Donald Howard and Larry 0 Coombs testified that about the same time, Cochran made similar state- ments to them . Employee Smith testified that during August speeches, Cochran stated that he would "never sign a contract as long as I live unless they can show me how it would benefit this business " IDEAL BAKING COMPANY, INC. 1 185 company." Goade asserted that Cochran repeated this at every meeting with the Union. This testimony was largely uncontroverted and is credited.3 Although Cochran denied, generally, that he had ever said that he would not sign a contract he did not specifically deny any of the statements attributed to him by the employee witnesses. How- ever, with respect to Howard's testimony set forth in paragraph "(b)" above, and at some other points in his testimony, Cochran did indicate a general answer, or, statement of position, with respect to the employee testimony. In particular, Cochran as- serted that, when he spoke of bargaining for a con- tract, he considered that the interests of Respon- dent and the interests of the employees were identi- cal. As Cochran stated, "When I speak of the best interest of the Bakery now, some of the boys in here [employee witnesses] said that I just said the best interest of the Bakery. Maybe at times I did say that, but most of the time I said the best interest of the Bakery and the employees. When I speak of the best interest of the Bakery I mean the best interest of the employees because for the simple reason they are the Bakery." Cochran stated that he told Howard, inter alia , ". . . we've definitely got to have a contract that we can live with before I sign one. In other words, it's got to be in the best interest of the Bakery and the employees."4 It would also appear from Cochran's testimony, as well as that of some employees, that he advised them that although they had voted the Union in, in reality nothing had been accomplished, unless a contract was agreed to, which Cochran conceived as a process between himself and the Union, in which the employees had no part. Cochran states that he told Howard, ". . . there is a difference in voting a union in and getting a contract. It's no good until the contract is signed and there is nothing you boys can do about it until the Union and me gets this negotiated. "5 From the record and from my observation, Cochran emerges as a strong, purposeful, and determined personality, accustomed to direct, sometimes strong language , with an intense sense of pride in his achievement at Respondent's bakery. There is no question that he saw the Union as a threat to his personal position, and sought to discourage adherence to the Union both before and after the election. As part of this effort, Cochran sought to convince the employees that union representation would be of no value to them without a union contract, and that no contract would be obtained (except possibly on terms per- sonally acceptable to him, and after a long period of time). Such conduct clearly was intended to con- vince the employees that because of the adamant resistance of the Respondent the selection of and reliance upon the Union as a bargaining agent would be a futile act. Respondent suggests in its brief that this conduct should be considered as no more than permissible "statements of anticipated hard bargaining," and not violative of the Act. But the evidence here clearly goes beyond that point, and by its pervasive persistence, continuing to the very eve of the strike in December, sought rather to drum into the em- ployees the fact "that they would have no union un- less [Cochran] wanted one," see Bon-R Reproduc- tions, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 309 F.2d 898, 903 (C.A. 2, 1962), and, therefore, the futility of joining, choos- ing, or adhering to the Union. This conduct clearly violated the Act. Arkansas Grain Corporation, 163 NLRB 625, enforced on this point 390 F.2d 824 (C.A. 8, 1968); also Ross Porta-Plant, Inc., 166 NLRB 494. 2. Threatening statements; promises of job security (a) In addition to matters heretofore noted, it is found that Superintendent Beaverson threatened employees in respect to the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act by the following activi- ties ; (1) By telling employee Bartley Levitt's wife, in his office, before the election, that if Levitt did not vote for the Union, they would do well to buy the house they were renting, that he would assure Levitt of a job, but that if he voted against it, there would be no need to buy the house; (2) by advising Bartley Levitt and his wife, at their home, and Bart- ley Levitt on other occasions, before the election that his job security depended on his being against, and not for the Union; (3) by telling employee Howard, before the election, that "if this [the Union] goes through, [Cochran] will close down ' Beaverson (in reference to Johnson 's testimony ) did assert that he did not, to his "knowledge ," in "those words ," " tell them that they were wast- ing time, that Mr Cochran would never sign a contract " Beaverson stated, "I said a lot of times, I don't think he will, or maybe he will and sometimes the next week I'd say, 'I know damn well,' I mean, 'I know darn well he will."' Beaverson is not credited Although Beaverson testified that he did not care "one way or another " if the Union came in, the evidence is that he was vitally concerned and sought to prevent the Union winning the elec- tion The record is convincing that Beaverson acted as he understood Cochran wanted , and that the testimony of Johnson and Levitt set forth above accurately reflected Beaverson 's understanding of Cochran 's posi- tion ' With respect to whether, on most occasions , Cochran said that any con- tract would have to benefit Respondent , only, as the employee testimony indicates or, "most of the time," said that the contract must benefit both the Bakery and the employees , as Cochran asserts, the conflict is, the Trial Examiner believes, more apparent than real The message conveyed was that no contract would ensue unless it was personally satisfactory to Cochran , a decision-making process in which he expected the employees to play no part On the whole, moreover, the preponderance of the evidence rather supports the employees' version It is noted that this is supported by Goade's testimony set forth above, which was not denied , as well as the statements ascribed to Beaverson, which clearly reflected Cochran's posi- tion, and by the testimony of Carson, noted above, which was also not specifically controverted and has been credited 5 In his speeches before the election , Cochran states that he told the em- ployees, inter alia, that if they voted the Union in, " it would be strictly up to me and the Union to get this contract , and they had done their part after they voted " After the election , in speaking to groups of employees in an effort to secure "harmony," Cochran states he told them, among other things, that "it was up to me now to get them a contract " During his talks with the employees, in December , in an effort to discourage them from striking, Cochran testified that among his remarks, he told them, " there wasn't a union in there yet, it hadn't been negotiated " 1186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the plant"; (4) by telling employee Smith, before the election, in the context of this record that "the union is no good and in fact we're not going to have it"; (5) by telling Howard, at the time Bartley Levitt was leaving Respondent's employment in Oc- tober, "Well, there goes one of your union mem- bers I won't have to worry about .... There is al- ways a way to get rid of a man without getting in trouble with the Union"; and (6) by telling em- ployee Fields, in November (after asking if other employees had talked to him about the Union), that he didn't want Fields to join the Union, and if Fields did so, Fields "would come up without a job." To the extent that Beaverson 's testimony con- flicts with the above findings, it is not credited.6 (b) Employees Howard, B. Levitt, Treadway, and Wilkes testified to threats by Beaverson and Cochran if they talked to others about the Union, or working conditions. Respondent contends that to the extent this may have occurred, it was directed only at preventing such activities from interfering with work. B. Levitt related an occasion in August when he and another employee, during a 10-minute rest break, were discussing the union activities of a mu- tual friend who worked for another employer. On Levitt's way back to work, Beaverson called him into the latter's office and told him that he did not want Levitt "talking to any employees about anything that related to union activity at the Bakery and if he should catch me doing so, that he would fire me without any excuse and watch my family go hungry." Beaverson admittedly spoke to Levitt about this conversation occurring during the rest break, but states that, "I just told him I didn't want that kind of talk when people were working .... Other peo- ple had a job to do and they didn't have time to listen to him." On cross-examination , Levitt ad- mitted that Beaverson said that he was not to talk about the Union "to any more employees while they were working." Treadway testified that while he was on his break period, Beaverson came over to him and told him that if he talked to any employees in the Bakery, or to anyone else, about the Union, he would be fired. Beaverson also asked him, Treadway states, about a union meeting the night before. On cross- examina- tion, Treadway also agreed that Beaverson said that he did not want the employees talking about the Union "while they were working," but added "and also he put in there, if he caught me talking union in church or anywhere outside he would." Tread- way agreed that he knew he could talk about the Union in church or elsewhere outside the plant ' With respect to these matters, Beaverson referred only (1) to the meet- ing with the Levitts at their home , emphasizing in his version that he made no promises to Levitt, other than that he would have a job as long as he took care of it, whether he joined the Union or not , and (2 ) to Howard's testimony of the threat , made before the election, to close the plant down, which Beaverson denied Beaverson's testimony was often generalized and imprecise , sometimes vague and on occasion clearly inaccurate The Trial Examiner does not consider it reliable Respondent 's brief candidly admits without fear or reprisal. Beaverson did not refer to Treadway's testimony although he testified generally that he told the employees that he did not want any union activities going on while they were "working there on duty." Howard testified that about November 22, Beaverson called him in and told him that he had heard employees were talking union in Howard's department; that Beaverson further said if Howard would send "any people talking union" to Beaver- son, he would fire them, and "If I catch anybody talking to Bill Wilkes, I'll fire right then." Beaver- son, in effect, states that he merely told Howard and the other employees that he did not want "any of that stuff going on" while the people were work- ing, because the Bakery ran on a tight schedule. Wilkes testified to an occasion in Cochran's of- fice, about November 28, in which Cochran ad- vised Wilkes that Beaverson had reported Wilkes was "raising hell" about holidays with new em- ployees and causing them to leave. [In fact, Wilkes had been complaining about holiday pay for Thanksgiving.] Wilkes states Cochran said Wilkes just wanted something for nothing, and "wasn't nothing but a G-d Damn Communist," and that "if he heard me talking union to anyone anywhere at any time, in church or anywhere, he'd fire my G-d Damn A-." Cochran's version of the incident is that he merely said to Wilkes, in less colorful language, that this must not happen again, "if he had any grievance in any way, that wasn't to be dis- cussed out there during working hours," and that Wilkes was talking "like some communist" in his claim for more money in relation to the holiday. This evidence, and the record as a whole, is con- vincing that Respondent's conduct was intended to, and had a reasonable tendency to, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of legitimate Union activities generally, and not merely while they were at work. Thus it is noted that Beaverson's forceful admonition to Levitt was occasioned by Levitt's legitimate activity during a break period (which Beaverson, and, apparently, Levitt con- strued as working time ). Treadway, without any ap- parent cause on his part, was also admonished dur- ing his break period on the same score by Beaver- son, who placed a wide ranging blanket prohibition on Treadway's union activities.' Wilkes, as Howard's testimony shows, was a particular object of Respondent's attention. Cochran's testimony, as a whole, indicates that he was most concerned about the influence of Wilkes over the new em- ployees in agitating holiday pay. Mixed with this, undoubtedly, was some concern over possible (p 10) that it is possible " Beaverson may have made some of these coer- cive statements which a few of the employees attribute to him." ' Since the intended and reasonable tendency of Beaverson 's statement would improperly inhibit the employees ' proper union activities, its illegali- ty is not lessened because it may not have had the desired effect with Treadway See N L R B v Ford Brothers, 170 F 2d 735, 738 (C A 6, 1948) IDEAL BAKING COMPANY, INC. 1187 disruption of production, and in the course of harsh words for Wilkes about his activities, Cochran very likely included a warning about disrupting em- ployees' work, as he testified. However, considering his forceful nature, and the vehemence of his at- titude toward Wilkes and the Union, I am also sure that his admonition to Wilkes to desist from union activities went beyond actual working time, as Wilkes testified. By the acts and conduct set forth above, and in the light of the record as a whole, it is found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with discharge for joining or assisting the Union or engaging in union activities protected by the Act, and by promising Levitt job security if he would oppose the Union.8. 3. Statements to job applicants; interrogation; impression of surveillance (a) When Larry Coombs applied for employ- ment in September, he was asked by Cochran what he thought of unions. When Coombs stated that he knew nothing about them, Cochran advised that his employees were pushing a union, that he was trying to get out of it, and that if Coombs was going to be "for this Union" he could "go home." Coombs stated that he needed the job, wasn't for the Union and knew nothing of it. He was hired. Coombs' testimony is credited.9 (b) According to Quinton Hamilton's undenied testimony, when he applied for work in October, he was asked by Beaverson what he thought about unions. When Hamilton replied that he didn't think they were worth much in Arkansas, Beaverson in- dicated that Hamilton would be and he was hired. (c) In addition to instances of interrogation previously noted, employee Johnny Keller related that, after the election, Cochran asked whether he had joined the Union or paid dues; when he replied in the negative, Beaverson stated that "we know you voted for the Union," "because everyone who voted against it told me." 10 According to Keller, Cochran thereupon indicated that he would be ter- minated, but relented on condition that Keller not join the Union, and advised that he would make a place for Keller in the sales department. Cochran recalled only that Keller and another employee, on one occasion, had advised him in his office that they were not involved with the Union, for which he expressed his appreciation. Keller's testimony, in these circumstances, is credited. (d) According to the credited testimony of B. Levitt, the day before the election, Beaverson told him that after the election, Respondent would know who was for and who was against Respon- dent. Levitt asked how this could be done, since the election was by secret ballot. Beaverson stated that Respondent had "ways of finding out." The matters set forth, as well as those previously discussed, in the context of this record as a whole, show that Respondent engaged in coercive inter- rogation of employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, the Trial Examiner is not convinced that the evidence shows that Respondent gave the employees an impression that it was engaged in surveillance of their union activi- ties. What the cited evidence, and some other even less persuasive comments in the record, indicates is that Respondent enjoyed sources of employee in- formation about these matters, with which it sought to discomfit Union adherents. The General Counsel, however, also alleges that Respondent solicited such reports from employees on union matters , apparently relying upon two items in the testimony of employee Howard; (1) that Cochran, in August, told him to find out about the Union and keep the employees from talking about it, and (2) that Beaverson, in November, told Howard that if he found any persons talking about the Union, they should be sent to Beaverson and they would be discharged. These seem both to be part of the issue, already discussed, of Respondent's attempted restrictions of employee discussion of union matters, and not sufficiently weighty to be considered a separate violation. It will be recom- mended that those allegations of the complaint that Respondent created an impression of surveillance of union activities and solicited reports on union activities be dismissed. 4. Threats of reprisal against employees for striking; refusal to grant wage increases Following a bargaining session between the Union and the Respondent on December 7, a union meeting was held at which the employees took a preliminary strike vote. The following day, Cochran wrote Union Representative Goade requesting per- mission to grant specified wage increases effective the first week in January 1968. Goade shortly thereafter sent Cochran a full contract proposal and requested an early meeting on the contract and on the proposed wage increases , as discussed hereinafter. The parties met on December 19, but apparantly no agreement was reached upon wage increases to be put into effect in January. " In this section of the decision , as well as in consideration of other al- legations of the complaint, certain incidents which were litigated at the hearing have not been discussed since they would unnecessarily lengthen the decision without in any way affecting the remedial order indicated " Respondent contends Coombs' testimony , which was not denied, should be rejected because of an alleged inconsistency in a prior statement The alleged inconsistency , however, is neither clear or critical . Coombs specifically asserted the version given at the hearing was correct In the absence of any denial , I see no reason to reject it 10 Beaverson agreed, on cross-examination, that he had told the em- ployees that he had ways of finding out how the employees voted in the election Although Beaverson further stated that he knew of 6 employees who came to him to say they had voted against the Union (the actual vote was 10 for and 5 against the Union), he was able, with the assistance of a list of employees, to name only 5, one of whom was later shown not to have been employed at the time of the election. 1188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On December 19, and the preceding day, Cochran met with the production employees in Beaverson's office, singly, or in twos and threes, ad- mittedly to discourage them from striking. Among other things, Cochran told the employees that he had proposed wage increases to the Union, which he read off to some, if not all, employees, told them that the Union had refused permission, and that he could not, therefore, give the increases, for his hands were tied . Cochran also made statements, which have been previously considered, to the ef- fect that there was no union in the plant as yet because a contract had not been negotiated, and that there would be no contract until he was satisfied that it was to the benefit of the Bakery, which might take a considerable period of time. As to the consequences of their striking, Cochran testified that he told the men that if they went on strike he would replace them with other employees. Eleven employees testified with respect to these meetings ; of those who were asked , almost without exception, they agreed that Cochran had told them that they would be replaced if they went out on strike. However, it is also clear by the express threats made by Cochran and the vehemence of the animosity expressed toward those who might strike, that Cochran also threatened that any person who struck would thereafter be disqualified from em- ployment with Respondent. Thus, employee Coombs testified that Cochran said, "Boys .... I'm going to tell you right now ... If you do go out on strike ... By God, you're just out on the street for good ... You'll never work for me again ... I can pick up the phone right now and call men to come right in and replace you right now ... If you want to go on strike ... You walk out that door, By God you won't come back in." Wilkes related that Cochran stated that if the em- ployees struck, "We wouldn't work for him any more." Smith heard Cochran tell employee John- son, "I guess you know your butt has had it if you walk out." Cochran denied that he had said that the strikers "would never set foot in that Bakery again." How- ever, from observation of the witnesses and analysis of the entire record, I am satisfied that Cochran conveyed to the employees in these meetings sub- stantially the message that they reported. These statements do not , in my opinion , constitute a discharge of the strikers, as contended by General Counsel, but they do constitute threats of reprisal against employees for striking which violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The General Counsel and the Union argue that Respondent also violated the Act by Cochran's statements to the employees that he had proposed wage increases to the Union , which he could not grant since the Union had turned it down. The Trial Examiner disagrees. Unquestionably, it is not a violation of the Act for an employer in good faith " McCormick Longmeadow Stone Co ., 158 NLRB 1237, cited by the Union, is an instance in which the employer 's actions were not in good to seek the bargaining representative's consent to a change in working conditions, and to refuse to make the changes when the Union refuses to agree. I would take it that the employer also may, where acting in good faith, truthfully apprise the em- ployees of what has occurred." Respondent 's actions here are suspicious. It would appear from Cochran's testimony that he had formulated at least tentative plans for the wage increases before his meeting with the Union on December 7, but did not bring the matter to the Union's attention at that meeting. Further, when the Union sought a meeting with Respondent at which the proposed wage increases could be discussed, Cochran resisted meeting before January 11, although he did consent to meet with the Union on December 19, when Goade and International Representative Liesen came to his office without appointment . Also, notwithstanding Respondent's claim that the increases were in line with its usual practice , Respondent had failed to give a raise the previous year . However, while these circumstances, in the context of this record , raise real' questions as to Respondent 's good faith in proposing the wage increases and in using the Union's refusal as an ar- gument to discourage the employees from striking, there is not that preponderance of proof that would justify a finding of violation of the Act by Respon- dent 's actions in regard to the wage increases, and it is recommended that this allegation of the com- plaint be dismissed. C. The Strike 1. The circumstances of the strike The first bargaining session between Respondent and the Union occurred on October 23. The parties met again on November 15 and December 7. Dur- ing the meeting on that date, another bargaining conference was set for January 11, 1968. At the union meeting which followed, on the evening of December 7, a preliminary strike vote was taken. The attitude of the employees at that meeting was credibly described by Union Business Agent Goade: Well, they were disturbed. Of course, they were a group of employees that seemed disturbed. I wasn 't too well acquainted with them but they felt that the company was stalling us in our bargaining . In fact one of the boys ... Donald Howard, made the statement to me that ... he had worked seven years, I be- lieve, for the company, and he knew them real well and that they had told him that they would never sign a contract .... * ... He said that Mr. Cochran had even made the statement to him that he could stall that faith See also The Food Mart , 158 NLRB 1294, enfd 386 F 2d 192 (C.A 1, 1967) IDEAL BAKING COMPANY, INC. 1189 damn union, but he couldn't stall the Federal Government. ... They were real disturbed about this Janua- ry the 1 1 th meeting because they felt like the company was setting these, or more or less stalling these meetings off ... some of the em- ployees [felt] if a strike vote was taken ... that [would] possibly bring pressure to bear on the company to meet earlier.12 Following this union meeting, Union Repre- sentative Goade wrote Cochran, advising that the employees had voted to strike "unless a satisfactory agreement was reached between the parties, prior to the forthcoming holidays," and requested "an immediate meeting within the next 5 days to continue negotiations," and for discussion of Cochran's proposed wage increases. On December 13, Cochran, replied to Goade, re- minding him of the agreement to meet on January 11, 1968, and stating that because of his "many obligations this time of the year," it would not be possible to meet at an earlier date. Goade and Union International Representative Liesen, nevertheless went to Batesville to seek a meeting with Cochran on December 19. Though Cochran at first stated, when they appeared unan- nounced at his office that day, that he would not negotiate with them prior to the meeting set for January 11, it appears that he did discuss matters related to the contract with them in a meeting last- ing a number of hours, during which, Cochran, to show his good faith, signed a statement prepared by Liesen, agreeing that if a contract was not reached before January 20, 1968, all economic terms would be retroactive to that date. Liesen, investigating the reasons for the em- ployees' earlier strike vote, had met informally with the employees on the preceding evening , December 18, and was informed of various conduct of Cochran and Beaverson, alleged herein as viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On the following evening , December 19, at a union meeting , Goade and Liesen sought to dis- suade the employees from striking, citing the progress made in the bargaining so far, the im- minence of the holidays, and Respondent's commit- ment to make economic gains retroactive to Janua- ry 20. The following portions of Goade's credited testimony fairly set forth the events of the union meeting that evening: A. Well, again the employees met at the Motel and they were anxious to know what our progress had been in our meetings with the company. We explained and went through again some of the areas of the contract. We discussed some of the things that Mr. Cochran and Mr. Liesen had talked about that after- noon. ... I showed them the ... I showed them the ... statement that Mr. Liesen and Mr. Cochran had initialed making any economic factor of the contract retroactive to January the 20th. I told them that I thought we had made progress in the meeting. * ... many of the employees was asking different questions about the different type of progress. They were wondering about what the company had done on some areas of the contract; ... They asked if the company had changed its position, you know, any on the holidays factor of the contract. I told them no, they hadn't that we were hopeful that they would. We ... [were] requesting the company to offer one holiday even as a token thing for us to kind of show the employees that some progress was being made. Of course the company refused this. The employees, they brought up several things in the meeting. They were worried about the company stating that they would never sign a contract. Many employees brought this up.13 * Q. What else? A. They were worried about the training of employees in the plant , the possibility that if this thing continued . . . the employees might not all be there to enjoy a contract if there was one secured. Many employees brought up the 12 There is also some indication that certain employees were interested in an agreement on pay for the approaching holidays . However , the record as a whole is convincing that , at the time the strike began a principal concern of the employees, was with the treatment of workers by supervision in the plant , which grievances they expected would be alleviated through a col- lective-bargaining contract , rather than any specific economic gain to be obtained " The evidence shows that the employees were quite concerned about these comments and the fact that Cochran had repeated them that after- noon and the day before Coombs stated that his reason for going on strike was that Cochran came "right out and said , ' 1 will not sign a contract "' Cason stated that it was his opinion and that of the other employees at the union meeting that Cochran was stalling "because he had told us that same day and the day before that he would never sign a contract " It appears that because of these consistent comments by Cochran and Beaverson, the em- ployees had no confidence in statements of the union representatives that progress was being made. As Keller testified , "we just came to the conclu- sion that he [ Cochran] was telling us one thing and them [ the union representatives ] something else." Several of the employees who went out on strike testified that they came to the conclusion that the Respondent was not bargaining in good faith 1190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD treatment of [employees in the plant by] Mr. Beaverson . It was mentioned about the train- ing. Well , almost from the very start... the company started training route supervisors on jobs.'" I know at that particular meeting , Bill Wilkes said ... he knew Mr . Cochran as well as any- one and that he felt Mr . Cochran had said he would never sign a contract and that his at- titude ... toward this and the position on holidays and things, he just felt like they would never be able to obtain a contract . And he said that was his own personal opinion . And several employees kicked this around. * * * * * Well, I told the employees I felt they should wait until the January 11 meeting rather than go on strike, but it was to no avail .... I be- lieve that it was about three hours that I was talking to these people . I don't believe there was too much missed in this three hour meet- ing, the things that went on in the plant, negotiations and things. The following day, December 20, 15 employees of Respondent went on strike , which strike con- tinues to be current . That same day, Respondent sent each of these strikers a telegram advising that unless he reported for work no later than 10:15 a.m., Thursday, December 21, the Respondent would begin hiring a replacement for his job. The record does not show that any of these employees has returned to work . Cochran testified that they have been replaced. During the strike , publicity put out by the strikers and others in their behalf was to the effect that they were on strike for improvement in their wages and working conditions. 2. Conclusions as to the strike The Respondent argues, vigorously and ably, that under generally accepted principles , a strike to ob- tain a contract or better working conditions-such as that which occurred in this case-is normally an economic strike, especially in the absence of a find- ing that the employer was engaged in bad-faith bar- gaining . But this is not universally the case. See, i.e., The Rangaire Corporation, 157 NLRB 682. In- deed , if any unfair labor practice on the Respon- dent's part is shown to be a causative factor in the work stoppage, the strike must be found to be an unfair labor practice strike, notwithstanding the ex- istence of other , additional motives . West Side " According to Goade's uncontradicted testimony, during a conversa- tion with Cochran immediately after the election , the latter said he was going to train route supervisors to do the work During this conversation Plymouth , Inc., 170 NLRB 686; Stafford Trucking, Inc., 166 NLRB 894. In the present case, while it would be difficult to exclude any of Respondent's actions from the total motivation for the work stoppage- for men nor- mally act in serious matters on the basis of their whole experience-the record leaves no doubt that Respondent 's persistent and pervasive statements of resistence to a collective -bargaining contract was the causative factor which unleashed the strike in this case . Respondent sought to convince the em- ployees of the futility of representation under the Act in the face of Respondent 's resolute opposition to a collective-bargaining contract . In this, it vio- lated the Act, as has been found . Respondent, further , misjudging the temper of its employees, by such conduct impelled them to engage in the very strike which Respondent sought to avoid, which work stoppage was, and it is found to be , an unfair labor strike. CONCLUSION OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has engaged in and is engag- ing in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which unfair labor practices af- fect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The strike of Respondent's employees which began on December 20, 1967, was caused by unfair labor practices of Respondent and is an unfair labor practice strike. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent en- gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act, which conduct caused or contributed to the unfair labor practice strike which began on December 20, 1967, it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from such unfair labor practices, or otherwise in- fringing upon the exercise of employee rights under Section 7 of the Act. In accordance with the normal practice of the Board, it will be recommended that Respondent, upon application , offer to all its employees who en- gaged in the strike beginning December 20, 1967, reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges , dismissing, if necessary, any employee hired to replace the striking employees, and that the Respondent make Cochran also told Goade that he "would never sign a contract unless it benefits his company ," which Goade asserted that Cochran repeated at every meeting with the Union IDEAL BAKING COMPANY, INC. 1 191 whole those strikers who are entitled to reinstate- ment for any loss of pay they may suffer by reason of the Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them, upon request, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during the period beginning 5 days after the date on which he applies for reinstatement and terminating on the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement, such loss to be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. As previously noted, Respondent claims that cer- tain strikers by misconduct during the strike have disqualified themselves for reinstatement. Because that issue may become ripe for decision only when and if strikers request reinstatement and are refused, the Trial Examiner declined to permit the issues to be litigated in this proceeding. However, the order recommended herein shall not preclude the Respondent, in appropriate circumstances, from raising the issue of disqualification, which may properly be resolved in subsequent proceedings, if not otherwise adjusted. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, it is recommended that Respondent, Ideal Baking Company, Inc., Batesville, Arkansas, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening or warning its employees that Respondent will not sign a contract with a labor or- ganization which may become or is the duly designated bargaining representative of the em- ployees, or otherwise threatening or warning that Respondent will make the selection of a collective- bargaining representative by the employees a futile and vain act. (b) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals if they become or remain union members or give assistance or support to a union, or if they engage in concerted activities protected by the Act. (c) Interrogating employees concerning union membership or activities or concerning protected concerted activities, in a manner violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. (d) Promising employee benefits in order to discourage union membership, or union activities, or other protected concerted activities. (e) Questioning applicants for employment con- cerning union membership, union activities, or at- titudes toward a union. (f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. 1 ake the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Upon application, offer to the Respondent's striking employees reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant at Batesville, Arkansas, cop- ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." is' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 26, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. i6 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that except to the extent found herein, the allegations of the com- plaint be dismissed. 15 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" *6 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge you or to close the plant or to refuse to employ you in the future, or threaten that you will suffer any other kind of harm from the company because you join or help Bakers Tri-State Local 363 of American Bakery and Confectionary Worker's International Union, AFL-CIO. or any other labor union, or because you lawfully decide to strike or go on strike. 1192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL WE WILL NOT attempt to discourage em- ployees from joining or helping a labor union, or from lawfully deciding to strike , or from striking-by promising employee benefits, or by threatening not to sign a contract with a union of the employees ' choice, or by warning or threatening employees in any way that the company will see to it that they get no benefit from union representation. WE WILL NOT ask you concerning your feelings about , or activities , for a labor union, or about the feelings or activities of other em- ployees for a labor union. WE WILL NOT in any other way interfere with your right to: Organize yourselves , or form , join or help unions. Bargain for your working conditions through a representative freely chosen by a majority of workers in the plant. Act together for mutual aid or protection of your working conditions. Refuse to do any or all of these things. It has been found that the company 's employees, on December 20, 1967 , began a lawful unfair labor practice strike . Therefore- WE WILL , upon their application , offer to our employees who continue lawfully on strike, LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing , if necessary , any employees hired to replace striking employees , and we will make each employee whole for any loss of pay suffered by him as a result of our failure to reinstate him within 5 days after his application to return to work. IDEAL BAKING COMPANY, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting , and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 746 Federal Office Building , 167 North Main St ., Memphis, Tennessee , Telephone 534-3161. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation