Hygrade Food Products Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 1949

85 N.L.R.B. 841 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of IIYGRADE FOOD PRODUCTS CORPORATION, EMPLOYER
and BuTCHERs ' UNION LOCAL 174, AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND
BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA , AFL, PETITIONER
Case No. 2-RC-610.-Decided August 25,1949
DECISION
AND
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed, a hearing was held before Lloyd S.
Greenidge, hearing officer of the National Labor Relations Board.
The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudi-
cial error and are hereby affirmed.,'
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act.
2. The Petitioner, Butchers' Union Local 174, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL, is a labor
organization claiming to represent employees of the Employer.
The Intervenors, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO,,
herein called the International, and its Local 231, are labor organiza-
tions claiming a contractual interest to represent employees of the
Employer.
3. The Intervenors contend that their collective bargaining agree-
ment executed on January 13, 1947, for the period ending August 11,
1948, constitutes a bar to a present election, because it was auto-
matically renewed upon failure to serve a 30-day notice in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract. The petition was filed on August
6, 1948.
The agreement contains a union-security provision. The Inter-
venors have not been certified by the Board under Section 9 (e) (1)
of the Act as being authorized to execute such a provision. On at
i The Petitioner opposed the intervention of the United Packinghouse Workers of
America , CIO, Local 231, on the ground that Local 231 has failed to comply with Section
9 (f), (g), and ( h) of the Act . Whether a union has complied with the affidavit and filing
requirements of the Act is a matter to be determined administratively by the Board.
Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works, 76 N. L. R. B. 922 . Regardless of compliance, Local
231 was entitled to intervene on the strength of its contractual interest . Matter of New
Indiana Chair Company, Inc ., 80 N. L . R. B. 1686 . However , we are satisfied that the
compliance . requirements of the Act have in fact been met by Local 231.
85 N. L . R. B., No. 145.
841
842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
least one occasion in 1948, when the president of Local 231 requested
the discharge of an employee, the Company refused to comply. We
have previously held that the mere existence of such a contractual
provision acts as a restraint upon employees desiring to exercise
their right to refrain from union activities guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act.2 Under these circumstances, and without regard to any other
considerations, we find that the contract cannot serve as a bar to a
present determination of representatives.3
A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation
of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c)
(1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Employer, Hygrade Food Products Corporation, a New
York corporation engaged in the meatpacking business, maintains and
operates in various parts of the country about 60 plants, either directly
or through subsidiaries. This case involves one of the Employer's
plants in Newark, New Jersey,4 which is operated through a division
known as A. Fink & Sons Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation.
The Petitioner seeks a unit confined to the Newark plant. It wishes
to represent all production and maintenance employees including
shipping workers, but excluding office clerks, drivers, salesmen, and
supervisors as defined in the Act. Although the Intervenors, the CIO
International and its Local 231, do not object to the composition of
the unit proposed by the Petitioner, they contend that only a multi-
plant unit, consisting of the Newark plant and 12 other plants of the
Employer which are covered by the Intervenors' master agreement,
is appropriate. The Employer took no position as to the scope of
the unit.
In 1943 the Employer and the International negotiated the first
of a series of master contracts, covering at that time a small group
of the Employer's plants.5 During the next 4 years the total cover-
age of the International's contracts rose to the present 13 plants,
as various locals of the International achieved recognition after card
checks or Board elections on a single-plant basis . In an earlier case
where the Employer, the present Petitioner, and the United Work-
men's Mutual Aid Association stipulated to the single-plant unit,"
2 Matter of C. Hager & Sons Hinge Manufacturing Company, 80 N. L. R. B. 163.
8 Matter of Merchants Fire Dispatch, 83 N. L. It. B . 788; Matter of Laurel Textiles,
Inc., 80 N. L . It. B. 262 ; Matter of General Electric Corporation , 80 N. L . It. B. 169.
4 The plant is located at 810 Freylinghuysen Avenue, Newark , New Jersey.
5 The record in Matter of Hygrade Food Products Corporation ( Supro Meat Products
Company ), 85 N. L . It. B. 853, a case decided this day, reveals that there were 5 plants
in the group.
9 Matter of Hygrade Food Products Corporation, 51 N . L. It. B. 878. The Packinghouse
Workers Organizing Committee , which asserted and was found to have an interest in the
employees involved , made no appearance at the hearing and hence did not join in the
stipulation.
EYGRADE FOOD PRODUCTS CORPORATION 843
the Board found appropriate a unit confined to the Newark plant with
which we are now concerned. Following certification of the Inter-
national's predecessor 7 on September 18, 1943, the Newark plant
was added to the master agreement.
The 13 plants covered by the contract of January 13, 1947, are
located as follows : 1 in Newark, New Jersey ; 1 in Perth Amboy, New
Jersey; 1 in New York, New York; 1 in Buffalo, New York; 1 in
Syracuse, New York ; 1 in Boston, Massachusetts ; 1 in Mishawaka,
Indiana; 4 in Detroit, Michigan; 1 in Fostoria, Ohio; 1 in Vernon,
Texas. The remaining 47 plants of the Company are apparently simi-
lar in function. Six of those located in or near New York City have
been organized by the Petitioner itself, which has contracted with the
Employer on a single-plant basis.s Additional locals affiliated with
the same international union as the Petitioner have also negotiated in-
dividual contracts covering other plants in various parts of the country.
Still other plants are unorganized.
The single-plant unit sought by the Petitioner is appropriate for
bargaining purposes unless, as the Intervenors contend, this 1 plant in
Newark has been effectively merged with 12 others in the same and
other localities to form a single multi-plant unit which is appropriate
under Section 9 (b) of the statute.9 We turn, therefore, to a consider-
ation of the factors bearing on the question whether or not the 13 plants
covered by the Intervenors' contract constitute an appropriate bargain-
ing unit.
The master contracts: The Intervenors' contracts, since 1943, have
been negotiated in New York City between the Employer's top offi-
cials and representatives of the International Intervenor and of all the
locals involved. The contracting union is identified in the current
agreement 11 as the International "on behalf of the local unions under
its jurisdiction" at each of the plants. Officers of each local, as well
as International officers, signed this agreement. The recognition
clause provides that the International is the exclusive bargaining agent
"for those employees in the bargaining units of such of the Company's
'The Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, CIO, which became the United
Packinghouse workers of America, CIO, in October 1943.
8 They are located at 153 Broadway, Brooklyn, New York City ; 151 East Fourth Street,
Manhattan, New York City ; 74 East Fourth Street, Manhattan, New York City ; 112 East
Fourth Street, Manhattan, New York City ; 217 Broome Street, Newark, New Jersey ;
Second Street, Hoboken, New Jersey.
6 See Matter of Standard Brands, Incorporated, 75 N. L. R. B. 394 at 399. Section 9 (b)
of the Act, insofar as here pertinent, provides : "The Board shall decide in each case
whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guar-
anteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be
11the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . .
io Presumably, the current agreement is similar to those which preceded it in respect of
the features here described.
844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plants as have been or in the future may be certified by the * * *
Board, or by stipulation or consent are recognized as being repre-
sented by locals of the U. P. W. A." Under this series of contracts,
there has been substantial uniformity among all plants covered by
the master agreement with respect to seniority rights, hours and other
working conditions, and the procedure for adjustment of grievances.',-
Two general wage increases negotiated by the International have been
uniformly applied to all 13 plants since January 1947; and the last
two contracts made provision for the elimination of inequalities in
wage rates among these plants.
It does not appear, however, that the master agreements have ac-
tually established identical wage rates in all the 13 plants ; and the
current contract specifically permits certain wage rate inequalities to
be adjusted by local negotiation. Changes in starting and quitting
time, determination of certain working conditions for night and over-
time workers, and substitution of local holidays for those listed in the
contract, too, are left to negotiation at the local plant level. Griev-
ances, under the six-step procedure set forth in the contract, are
handled at the plant level until the fifth step, at which point a grievance
is negotiated between representatives of the International and the
General Manager of the Employer." A grievance not settled at that
stage goes to arbitration.
We find in the Intervenors' contracts no clear indication as to
whether or not the parties to this course of collective bargaining ac-
tually intended to effect a consolidation of the original plant units,
thereby destroying the separate identity of each one. The agreements
contain many features which were present in other cases where the
Board found that an appropriate multi-plant unit had been estab-
lished by collective bargaining between a single employer and a union
representing employees in many of that employer's plants 13 On the
other hand, these same master agreements are also compatible with
the preservation of the basic plant groups as separate and distinct,
albeit similar, bargaining units." For all that appears in this case,
the Employer and the International adopted the practice of negotiat-
ing "master" agreements simply because it was convenient to bargain
"However, the record in Matter of Hygrade Food Products Corporation (Supro Meat
Products Company ), supra. shows that general * working conditions , such as vacations and
holidays, are uniform in all the Employer's plants.
'a However , at the fourth step a grievance is handled by the International representative
and the plant manager.
13 Matter of West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 814; Matter of Bethlehem-
Fairfield Shipyard, Incorporated, 58 N. L. R. B. 579; Matter of P. Lorillard Company,
Louisville Plant, 58 N. L. R. B. 1112; Matter of Standard Brands, Incorporated , 75 N. L.
It. B. 394 ; Matter of Robert Gair Company, Inc. (Natick Bon and Board Division ), 77 N. L.
R. B: 649.
S4 Matter of Aluminum Company of America and Carolina Aluminum Company, 61
N. L. R. B. 245; Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 61 N. L. R. B. 251.
HYGRADE FOOD PRODUCTS CORPORATION 845
at one time and place concerning the wages, hours, and working con-
ditions of employees in all the similar (but separate) units that were
represented, for the time being, by the International. There is no
unmistakable indication that these parties mutually intended to ex-
tinguish the right of the employees in each of the original plant units
to select and change their bargaining representatives, at appropriate
intervals, by the vote of their separate majority. In these circum-
stances, we need not determine whether the intent of the contracting
parties as to the scope of the bargaining unit would be controlling if
it were clearly expressed. We find that the history of collective bar-
gaining alone is not decisive of the unit issue in this case.
Other tests of appropriateness: Apart from the fact that they have
.a common employer and a common bargaining representative, the em-
ployees in the 13 plants covered by the International's contract appear
to have no special community of interest that sets them apart from all
other employees of the Employer in its other 47 plants. There is
virtually no interchange of employees among any of the Employer's
plants. Employees' seniority rights, under the Intervenors' contract,
depend upon length of service in the department and plant, not in any
other plant of the Employer. The 13 plants under this contract do
not comprise any functional, administrative, or geographical sector
of the Employer's business organization. On the contrary, they are
located in 10 cities or towns in 7 States as widely separated as Massa-
chusetts and Texas.
Three of these plants, moreover, including the one involved in this
case, are in the same metropolitan area, New York City, where there
is a cluster of 6 plants represented by the Petitioner. We note, too,
that collective bargaining units confined to individual plants have
been approved for the employees of other meatpacking companies
which, like the Employer here, have engaged in the practice of negoti-
ating "master" collective bargaining contracts with this International
and its locals.- It is evident that there is no firmly established pat-
tern of multiple-plant bargaining units for the employees of this
Employer, or those in the industry generally. Considering all these
factors, we hold that the 13-plant unit advocated by the Intervenors
is a fortuitous aggregation of distinct groups of employees, not a
single appropriate bargaining unit.
Our dissenting colleague declares that this conclusion is contrary
to Board precedent-and hence, presumably, wrong in two respects.
First, he would find that the historical inclusion of several plants
' Matter of Swift & Company, d/b/a New England Dressed Meat and Wool Company,
81 N. L . R. B. 1197 ; Matter of Swift & Company , d/b/a H. L. Handy Company, 81 N. L.
It. B. 425; Matter of New York Butchers Dressed Meat Company, Division of Armour and
Company, 81 N. L. It. B . 855; Matter of Wilson & Co ., Inc., 81 N. L. R. B. 504.
846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
under the coverage of a single "master" contract, itself, is sufficient
proof of the contracting parties' mutual desire and agreement upon a
single unit; 16 and he apparently interprets the Bethlehem-Fairfteld-
decision, and the line of cases following it, as standing for the rule
of construction. Second (assuming his own interpretation of the
bargaining history in this case), Mr. Reynolds objects to our testing
the appropriateness of the proposed 13-plant unit by criteria other
than the history of collective bargaining; and, again, he complains
that we ignore precedent in giving consideration to these "other tests."
We do not concede that our decision in this case runs counter to any
established rule of unit determination, for we accept the principle
enunciated in Bethlehem-Fairfield and similar decisions. Our only
difference with our dissenting colleague concerns the question
whether that principle properly applies to the facts before us. Ap-
praising all those facts in their necessary interrelationships,17 we
think it does not.
For the reasons that we have indicated, we are unable to find in this
case, as the Board found in the Bethlehem-Fairfield case, that in fact
the employees in the single-plant unit sought by the petitioner "have-
been effectively consolidated [through collective bargaining] with
other similar groups in a broader unit, also appropriate for bargaining
purposes." 18 (Emphasis supplied.) There is no Board doctrine that.
16 This proposition is difficult to defend , a priori. The master agreements in this case-
merely list the plants intended to be covered, but contain no provision defining the unit-
except, indeed , a reference in the recognition clause to " the bargaining units of such . . .
plants," etc. Moreover , as pointed out above , both the substantive provisions of the con-
tracts , and the practice of the parties in negotiating and administering them, are no less
consistent with the hypothesis that it was the parties' intention simply to cover many
units by one uniform agreement , than with the alternative hypothesis that a single.
amalgamated unit was intended . Considering , too, the fact that master contracts covering
many separate plant units are often made by large companies dealing with international'
unions ( witness the International ' s arrangements with other employers in this same
industry ) we would not be justified in assuming that the mere inclusion of many plants
under a single master agreement necessarily signifies that only one amalgamated unit,
coextensive with the contract 's coverage , was what the parties intended.
17 For example , in construing the master agreement in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, as we must , and in drawing inferences as to what the contracting parties
intended by what they left unsaid , we think the "other tests of appropriateness" are
relevant. So, in this case, we decline to presume that the parties intended to establish
the unit which , by those "other tests" is the less reasonable of the two possible units which
they may have in mind.
Mr. Reynolds does not explain his objection to our virtually requiring that "the parties
expressly state . . . that they are bargaining on a multi-plant basis ." We do not under -
stand what objection there can be to a requirement that the parties should clearly express,
in their agreements or otherwise , and at some time before a petition for a single-plant unit
is filed, a mutual desire to take a step having the grave consequence of extinguishing the
right of self-determination of employees in manifestly appropriate plant units.
is See 58 N. L . R. B. at 582 . The master agreements in the Bethlehem -Fairfield case
were preceded by a "Memorandum of Understandings " which quite clearly contemplated
the establishment of a functional unit in which certain existing units , plus others in which
elections were about to be conducted , would be merged. The resulting unit , which was
"stabilized" from the time of the very first master agreement , covered all but one of the
Atlantic Coast shipyards of three subsidiaries of Bethlehem Steel Corporation . A Pacific
IIYGRADE FOOD PRODUCTS CORPORATION 847
constrains us to find effective consolidation of employees in many sep-
arate and widely scattered plant groups where, as here, the record does
not even show that the historical collective bargaining was designed
to achieve such consolidation.19 Much less is it a rule of this Board to
find appropriate any unit that may have been desired and agreed upon
by the employer and a bargaining representative in the past where,
as here, that unit does not conform reasonably well to other standards
of appropriateness.20 Section 9 (b) of the Act provides that "The
Board shall decide," and "in each case," what unit is appropriate for
collective bargaining purposes. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, we find that all production and maintenance employees
including shipping workers at the Employer's Newark, New Jersey,
plant, but excluding office clerks, drivers, salesmen, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
As part of the investigation to ascertain representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining with the Employer, an election by
secret ballot shall be conducted as early as possible, but not later than
30 days from the date of this Direction, under the direction and super-
vision of the Regional Director for the Region in which this case was
heard, and subject to Sections 203.61 and 203.62 of National Labor
Relations Board Rules and Regulations, among the employees de-
scribed in paragraph numbered 4, above, who were employed during
Coast yard owned by one of these same subsidiaries was excluded "because of practical
difficulties in administration ." These facts distinguish the Bethlehem -Fairfield case from
the present one.
19 On the contrary , the Aluminum cases , supra, footnote 14, which were decided 6 months
after Bethlehem-Fairfield, demonstrate that there are no such implications in the doctrine
of the leading Bethlehem-Fairfield case.
It is the Aluminum cases, incidentally, which in our opinion bear the closest resemblance
to the present one . In rejecting an allegedly preestablished multi-plant unit there, the
Board noted among other things that the plants covered by a master agreement were
"widely scattered throughout the country."
20 The cases cited in footnote 13, above, and in footnotes 24 and 29 of the dissenting
opinion, do not stand for any such rule . The Board 's failure , in many of those cases, to
discuss in its opinions any problem except the collective bargaining history and what it
signified as to the intended unit certainly does not mean that other pertinent tests of
appropriateness were not considered , and not satisfied . In none of those cases was the
multi -plant unit , approved by the Board , so lacking in geographical or functional coherence
as the 13 -plant unit advocated here ; and in a majority of them the multi -plant unit was
obviously appropriate when judged by criteria other than bargaining history. In Standard
Brands (footnotes 13 and 29 ), for example , the unit contained all the employer 's plants
in one of its functional subdivisions ; in American Viscose Corporation ( footnote 24) the
unit was employer -wide; in Poultry Producers of Central California ( footnote 24) the
unit was confined to a single geographical area and was virtually employer -wide ; this was
also true in the Bethlehem-Fairfield case , as we indicated above (footnote 18) ; and in
Brunswick Drug Company ( footnote 24) the unit was a multiple -employer unit covering
all the functionally similar establishments of three employers in two neighboring California
cities.
848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the pay-roll period immediately preceding the date of this Direction,
including employees who did not work during said pay-roll period
because they were ill or on vacation or temporarily laid off, but ex-
cluding those employees who have since quit or been discharged for
cause and have not been rehired or reinstated prior to the election,
and also excluding employees on strike who are not entitled to re-
instatement, to determine whether they desire to be represented, for
purposes of collective bargaining, by Local 231, United Packilighouse
Workers of America, CIO, or by Butchers Union Local 174, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher WTorkmeii of North America, AFL,
or by neither.
MEMBER MURDOCK, concurring :
I agree with the majority's finding that the single-plant unit is the
appropriate unit in this case. But in reaching this conclusion, I am
persuaded by an additional and more cogent reason, to which the
majority apparently ascribes no weight. Of the two alternative units
between which the Board must choose here, the single-plant unit pro-
posed by the Petitioner is one of the types of units listed in the statute
itself as appropriate for bargaining purposes, whereas the Intervenor's
proposed 13-plant unit is not. Section 9 (b) of the Act provides that
"The Board shall decide . . . whether ... the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." [Emphasis supplied.] As
the 13-plant unit does not correspond to any geographical, administra-
tive, or functional grouping of plants within this Employer's organiza-
tion, nor to any true class of employees having a special community of
interest based on other factors, it seems clear to lne that the 13-plant
combination is not a "subdivision" of the employer unit within the
meaning of the statutory phraseology.21
Whether or not the listing of the categories, "employer," "craft,"
"plant," and "subdivision thereof," in Section 9 (b) actually limits the
Board's power to establish a unit not conforming to one of the specified
types-and I doubt that the statutory language does have that re-
strictive import-I believe that Congress intended to indicate that
units of the types listed are at least presumptively appropriate. It
follows, in my opinion, that in a case like this one, where we must
decide between a unit to which that presumption of appropriateness
attaches, and another which is not among the types designated in the
statute, other things being equal, the former should prevail.
n Although the Board is not in the habit of finding any "subdivision " of a craft group
to be an appropriate unit , it seems apparent that the words " subdivision thereof" in
Section 9 ( b) refer to the phrases "employer unit" and "craft unit" as well as the imme-
diately preceding phrase , "plant unit,"
HYGRADE FOOD PRODUCTS CORPORATION 849
MEMBER REYNOLDS, dissenting in part :
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion in this case
insofar as it holds that a separate unit of employees at the Employer's
Newark, New Jersey, plant is appropriate.- My colleagues apparently
rely on the following premises : (1) that the master contracts involved
herein do not clearly indicate that the parties intended to establish
a Irnilti plant unit; and (2) that the factors present in the instant
case fail to meet "other tests of appropriateness" utilized by the Board
as basis for making multi-plant unit determinations.
(1) The master contracts: While the majority concedes that the mas-
ter agreements with which we are here concerned contain many signifi-
cant features which were present in cases such as Bethlehem-Fairf eld'22
where the Board found multi-plant units had been established, it
considers that these same agreements include many features present
in cases such as the Aluminum decision'23 where the Board found
separate plant units appropriate. The implication is that the factors
involved herein are about equally balanced between the two types
of cases. In the Bethlehemn-Fairfield case the Board reiterated and
expanded upon the principle previously followed that where there
has been actual bargaining upon a multi-plant basis, stabilized by
agreement or tradition, the mechanics of the plan are unimportant and
a separate unit limited to one of the plants involved is inappropriate.
This principle has been consistently followed in a long line of Board
decisions 24 both before and after the Bethlehem decision. In order
to ascertain the intent of the parties, as to whether or not bargaining
has actually been on a multi-plant basis, the Board has looked to the
terms of the agreement and their conduct with respect to the agree-
ment. In the Aluminum case, although a separate plant unit was held
to. be appropriate, this same criterion was utilized to determine the
intent of the parties. However, the Board found that certain pro-
visions of the master agreement illustrated an intent by the parties
to treat the employees at the plants where the agreement was applied
on the basis of separate bargaining units 25 and their conduct with re-
12 See footnote 13, supra.
23 Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 61 N. L. R. B. 251.
21 See footnote 13, supra ; Matter of Brunswick Drug Company , 71 N. L . R. B. 309;
Matter of Poultry Producers of Central California, 78 N. L . R. B. 1067; Matter of Shell
Chemical Corporation, 79 N. L. R . B. 697; Matter of American Viscose Corporation, 79
N. L. R. B. 953.
26 In the Aluminum case , the master contract itself permitted the local to dominate
the grievance procedure and to protect the interest of the employees on a single-plant
level . Although a grievance might ultimately reach a high executive of the employer,
it was processed at all points by the employee himself or his local representative. The
local union could be divorced from the representative function at a certain stage, but the
aggrieved employee or his representative still had an option as to whether or not to accept
the international ' s aid. In the instant case the grievance procedure specified in the
master agreement provides for referral of grievances arising in any plant , which are not
850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spect to the agreement negatived a conclusion that they considered
the employees at the plant in question as part of a multi-plant unit
governed by the contract.26 In my opinion, the instant case is in all
substantial respects similar to the Bethlehem-Fairfield type of case
and is clearly distinguishable from the Aluminum type of case. Both
the terms of the master agreement and the conduct of the parties
indicate an intent to establish a multi-plant unit in much the same
manner as in the long line of past Board cases wherein such units
were found to have been created.
However, the majority is apparently introducing another element
which we have not heretofore deemed necessary in order to deter-
mine that the parties intended to create a multi-plant unit, to wit,
that there be an unmistakable indication that the parties mutually in-
tended to extinguish the right of employees to be represented in sep-
arate plant units. This would seem tantamount to a requirement
that the parties expressly state in their agreement, or otherwise affirma-
tively express the fact, that they are bargaining on a multi-plant
basis. The majority asks why I believe this new requirement is ob-
jectionable. My answer is that my colleagues appear to be overlook-
ing the fact that the Board in representation cases is faced with the
necessity of reconciling two important concepts, namely, granting
freedom of choice to employees and maintaining stability in bargain-
ing relationships. In order to preserve an equitable balance between
these factors, we have been careful not to place too much emphasis on
one and too little on the other. Thus, in the interest of industrial sta-
bility the Board has always held that a multi-plant unit was estab-
lished where, as here, the parties have had a long history of bargaining
based upon a series of master contracts covering specifically named
plants and where their conduct has been consistent with a conclusion
that they intended to create such a unit. We have found these facts
to constitute clear evidence as to the parties' intent without demand-
settled at the lower levels , to an international representative of the Intervenor and the
general manager of the Employer . The District Director of the Intervenor 's international
and the parent Company's vice president in charge of operations travel to the various
plants, one of the reasons for so doing being to settle grievances which are not resolved
locally.
211 In the Aluminum case, the employees at the plant in question negotiated with the
local manager at that plant for 3 days before withdrawing demands for terms and condi-
tions not appearing in the master agreement and agreeing to execute a contract identical
therewith. The Board stated that the fact that the union attempted to obtain at that
plant a contract different in terms from the master agreement foreclosed an interpretation
that the union , at the time it conducted the negotiations , considered the employees at the
plant as part of a multi-plant unit governed by the master agreement. The Board further
stated that as the employees at the plant in question apparently had the alternative of
accepting the terms of the master agreement or some other contract , it might be inferred
that joint representation was an expedient of the company and that individual locals
might accept or reject the results of negotiations at the central office. No such facts are
present in the instant case.
HYGRADE' FOOD PRODUCTS CORPORATION 851
ing an express statement from them. On the other hand, where there
has been little or no bargaining history involved and the Board is
determining for the first time the propriety of a multi-plant unit, we
have given paramount consideration to the protection of the right
of employees to separate plant representation, so that in the absence
of facts tending to indicate that the employees would be most effectively
represented in the broader unit,'' we have found separate plant units
appropriate. Since the traditional test which we have applied for
many years in balancing the factors of freedom of choice against
stability in bargaining relationships has achieved salutary results,
there is no cogent reason now, in my opinion, to give greater weight
to the former at the expense of the latter, as my colleagues propose to
do merely because the parties have not more explicitly stated what
type of unit they intended to establish.
(2) Other tests of appropriateness: The majority refers to certain
other factors, such as lack of interchange among employees of the
various plants, seniority rights being determined on a departmental
or plant basis rather than a multi-plant basis and geographical sepa-
ration of the plants involved, as indicating that the employees in the
13 plants covered by the Intervenors' contract do not have any special
community of interest setting them apart from all of the Employer's
other employees. However, although the Board gives some weight
to these factors when it is considering whether a multi-plant unit may
be appropriate in the first instance, 28 it has not found it necessary to
consider such factors where, as here, there has been an uninterrupted
history of collective bargaining for many years on a multi-plant
basis."' In the latter situation, because bargaining relations pre-
sumably would have continued for such a period of time only if they
were satisfactory, the Board has considered the history of bargaining
per se as evidence that a sufficient community of interest existed
among the employees in the several plants involved.
As a final argument, the majority cites a number of cases 30 as indic-
ative of the fact that bargaining units limited to individual plants
have been approved for employees of other meat packing companies,
which like the Employer have negotiated contracts with the Inter-
national herein and its locals. The majority concludes that there is
no firmly established pattern of multi-plant bargaining units for this
24 Such factors could be integration of the plants involved, community of interest of all
employees, etc.
28 Matter of Century -American Corporation , Woodstock Typewriter Division , 79 N. L.
R. B. 43 ; Matter of Sandler Moccasin Company , Inc., 80 N . L. R. B. 1079.
20 See footnote 13, supra, and, particularly , Matter of West Virginia Pulp and Paper
Company, 53 N. L. R. B. 814; Matter of Standard Brands , Incorporated, 75 N. L. R. B. 394.
90 See footnote 15, supra.
857829-50-vol. 8 5--5 5
852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employer's employees or those in the industry. An examination of
the cases reveals, however, that the only factor in common with the
instant case is that such cases involved "master" agreements with the
same International which is an intervenor herein together with some
of its locals. In none of these cases was the Board asked to decide
whether the historical unit was multi-plant or single-plant in scope.
This question was never brought in issue as none of the parties con-
1tended that they had been bargaining on a multi-plant basis or that
their contracts were intended to cover multi-plant rather than single-
plant units. In fact, in each of these cases it was inferentially or
affirmatively conceded by the parties that they had been bargaining on
a single-plant basis. Furthermore, assuming that there is no firmly
established pattern of multi-plant bargaining for employees in other
plants of this Employer or those in the industry generally, as indi-
cated by prior Board decisions these negative factors are not im-
portant where there is affirmative evidence that there has been a firmly
established pattern of multi-plant bargaining for the particular
employees in the plants in question. Contrary to the majority opin-
ion, it is only where there has been no past collective bargaining his-
tory on a multi-plant basis for the employees in the plant or plants
under consideration that the presence or absence of multi-plant bar-
gaining units for other employees of the employer may become rele-
vant.31 Moreover, the Board in the past has not deemed the existence
or nonexistence of a pattern. of multi-plant bargaining in an industry
as persuasive in determining the propriety of single- or multi-plant
units for the employees of a particular employer. 32
In view of all the circumstances in this case, I believe that only a
multi-plant unit is appropriate and accordingly would dismiss the
petition.
31 Cf . Matter of Joseph E. Seagram t Sons , Inc., 83 N. L. R. 13. 167.
32 The majority also adverts to the fact that Section 9 (b) provides that the Board shall
determine the appropriate unit "in each case," apparently implying that the Board is not
bound by its past decisions . If this be true , the obvious answer is that without some
more or less consistent adherence to precedent, the Board would be lending itself to the
creation of uncertainty in labor relations rather than to the stability contemplated by
the Act.