Hy-lan Furniture, Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsDec 16, 1969180 N.L.R.B. 308 (N.L.R.B. 1969) Copy Citation 308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc. International Union of North Case I1-CA-3838 and Upholsterers ' 1968. On March 21 the Union filed its charge in America, AFL-CIO. Case I I-CA-3579, and on July 16, 1968, the General December 16, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND ZAGORIA On June 30, 1969, Trial Examiner George Turitz issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, with supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner consistent with the modifications set forth below. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to continue to meet and bargain with the Union and by failing and refusing in accordance with the Union's several requests to furnish information necessary and relevant to the bargaining process. The Trial Examiner recommended that the Respondent be ordered to resume bargaining with the Union for a reasonable period of time without regard to fluctuations in the majority status of the Union. For the reasons related below the Board agrees. The record reveals that the Union was certified on January 2, 1968, and on the following day served on the Respondent a written request for the names of the employees in the bargaining unit, their dates of hire, rates of hourly pay, and job classifications, and data concerning any existing insurance or retirement programs, including information as to costs and contributions. The Respondent failed to reply to this request, and it similarly ignored subsequent requests made by the Union on January 27 and February 23, 'We hereby correct the Trial Examiner ' s inadvertent error that the Union wrote to the Respondent noting its certification and requesting bargaining on January 3, 1969 , rather than on January 3, 1968 Counsel issued a Complaint alleging that the Respondent had refused to bargain. In the interim, on May 3, 1968, the Respondent furnished the Union with a list of the names of the employees in the unit, but the list contained no job classifications and recited hiring dates for only about half the employees. The Union protested that the list was "practically useless" without job classifications, and although the Respondent furnished the Union with an updated list on May 8, 1968, this latter list also failed to recite the employees' job classifications or titles. After a further period of time the Respondent advised the Union, incorrectly as it turned out, that it did not classify jobs or assign job titles. At the opening of the hearing in Case 11-CA-3579 on October 23, 1968, the Respondent indicated its willingness to enter into an informal settlement agreement, post a notice, and resume bargaining. The Union objected to settlement upon an informal basis, but upon the Respondent's assertion of willingness to bargain in good faith, including compliance with its obligation to furnish the Union with data relevant and necessary to the bargaining process, the Trial Examiner in that case granted an adjournment of the hearing to December 17, 1968; this adjournment was later extended to January 20, 1969. The parties resumed bargaining on October 31, 1968, but the Respondent made no pretense of complying with the Union's request for employee job classifications or insurance data until November 25. At a bargaining session on the latter date the Respondent orally advised the Union of pertinent insurance data and also gave the Union a written list of names of 382 employees in the bargaining unit, together with their classifications and assigned departments. However, the list furnished to the Union on this occasion contained neither dates of hire nor wage rates, and inasmuch as the list contained the names of 127 employees who were not included in the list furnished the Union on May 8, 1968, the Union was still without pertinent data for nearly a third of the employees in the bargaining unit . The Respondent made no further attempts to supply the Union with wage rates or hiring dates for the 127 employees. On January 6, 1969, at a bargaining session , Respondent asked the Union to withdraw the charges in Case 11-CA-3579, contending that the withdrawal would promote a spirit of cooperation favorable to reaching agreement. The Union did so, and on January 14, 1969, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, on February 20, 1969, the Respondent discontinued bargaining on the assertion that a majority of its employees had signed a petition to the effect they no longer wished to be represented by the Union. The Board may not find substantive violations of the Act based on events which occurred more than 6 180 NLRB No. 57 HY-LAN FURNITURE, INC. months prior to the filing and service of the charge. We may, however, consider events outside the limitations period to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period, and we may also consider such events for the purpose of enabling us to frame remedial measures necessary to expunge the effect of unfair labor practices found to have occurred within the limitations period. Lundy Manufacturing Corporation. 136 NLRB 1230, enfd. 316 F.2d 921 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 375 U.S. 895. In the instant case, in spite of numerous requests by the Union, the Respondent failed and refused to supply data necessary for meaningful and intelligent bargaining. As the Trial Examiner found, the parties did meet and bargain on four occasions following October 23, 1968, and they made some progress toward a bargaining agreement. However, issues with respect to wages and other economic benefits were not settled prior to the date the Respondent broke off negotiations, and the Union was in no position to engage in meaningful negotiations on these issues without the benefit of the data it had requested. The information in question was fundamental to the bargaining process and Respondent's refusal to supply it derogated not only from the Union's status, but also its ability to function as the bargaining agent. In these circumstances, having refused in an important respect to bargain in good faith, Respondent cannot be heard to question the Union's continued majority status.' True it is that the Respondent's initial refusals occurred outside the period of limitations, but they nevertheless continued within the 6-month period preceding the filing of the instant charge, and also within the period when Respondent was precluded from questioning the Union's majority status because the Union was in its initial year of certification. We also note that the continuing refusals occurred after the Respondent had induced the Union to withdraw the prior charge by agreeing to comply with its statutory duty to bargain. In order to place the parties in the position they would have been but for the Respondent's unfair labor practices, we shall adopt the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner that, upon request, Respondent resume bargaining with the Union. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc., Hickory, North Carolina, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. 'C d C Plywood Corporation and Veneers, Inc., 163 NLRB 1022 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 309 GEORGE TURITZ, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed on February 27, 1969, by Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO ("the Union"), and served on February 27, 1969, upon Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc. ("Respondent," and, at times, "the Company"), the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board"), through the Regional Director for Region 11, on April 23, 1969, issued and served a complaint and notice of hearing against Respondent. Respondent filed its answer in which it denied all allegations of unfair labor practices and alleged, as further defenses, that certain allegations of the complaint were barred by Section 10(b) of the Act and that they had been finally disposed of and terminated by withdrawal of the complaint and charge in Case 11-CA-3579, which involved the same parties. A hearing was held at Hickory, North Carolina, on May 27, 1969, before the Trial Examiner named above. The General Counsel and Respondent were represented by their respective counsel at the hearing; the Charging Party was represented by its district director. At the close of the hearing the General Counsel argued orally; Respondent has filed a brief with the Trial Examiner. Upon the entire record and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc., is a North Carolina corporation having a plant located in Hickory, North Carolina, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of furniture. It is a subsidiary of Unagusta Manufacturing Corporation Respondent annually purchases and causes to be delivered to its Hickory plant directly from points located outside the State of North Carolina raw materials valued at in excess of $50,000; and Respondent annually sells and ships from its Hickory plant directly to customers located outside the State of North Carolina finished products valued at in excess of $50,000. It is found that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act"). II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The principal issues litigated at the hearing were whether Respondent had an adequate basis upon which to withdraw recognition from the Union, which had been certified approximately 13 1/2 months before, and whether Respondent failed reasonably to comply with the Union's requests for information about the employees and their wages. 310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A Sequence of Events 1. Background; bargaining before August 28, 1968' On January 2, 1968, the Union was certified as representative of the following appropriate unit of Respondents' employees at the Hickory plant: All production and maintenance employees employed at the factory of Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc., at Hickory, North Carolina, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. Shortly thereafter the Union presented a list of demands, including demands relating to general and merit wage increases, and wage adjustments and to job classifications and job evaluations. On January 3, 1969, the Union wrote to the Respondent noting its certification and requesting a bargaining conference. The letter requested the names of all employees in the appropriate unit, their hiring dates, job classifications, and hourly rates of pay, and information about any retirement and insurance programs, including information as to cost and contributions. The letter stated that the information was needed "In order for the union representatives to enter into these negotiations and discuss issues intelligently." In a letter dated January 27 the Union noted that Respondent, in a letter dated January 12, had failed to mention the information previously requested which, the Union stated, was ". . . necessary, in order for the union representatives to enter into negotiations and discuss issues intelligently . . . " The Union's letter repeated in full the items of information previously requested. On February 23, 1968, the first negotiating meeting was held. Respondent's chief spokesmen were its attorney, one David Abrams, and Gene Minotto, its executive vice president. The Union again requested the same items of information, this time orally; and it stated that it could not negotiate wages intelligently without knowledge of Respondent's wage structure. Respondent replied that the matter was being worked on, but that it took time. On May 3, 1968, the Union received from Respondent a list of the unit employees with their respective rates of pay. No job classifications or descriptions were listed and the dates of hire were stated for only about half the employees. Respondent promised to send another updated list. On May 6 the Union again wrote to Respondent, calling attention to its prior request for information and stating that the names and hourly rates were "practically useless" without the job classifications. On May 8 Respondent sent the promised "updated" list to the Union, this one complete as to rates of pay and hiring dates, but still omitting job classifications. On May 30 Respondent, in reply to the Union's May 6 letter, stated that it was "unable to furnish each employees' job classification or job title . . . . We have never classified jobs nor assigned job titles to the various operating positions or stations in the Hy-Lan plant." Further meetings with Abrams acting for Respondent were held on April 17, May 30, July 19, and September 1.0, 1968. 'The complaint alleges unfair labor practices on and after August 28, 1968, which was approximately 6 months before the filing and service of the charge in the present case 2. Adjournment of hearing in Case 11-CA-3579 Meanwhile, on March 21, 1968, the Union filed a charge against Respondent in Case 11-CA-3579, and on July 16, 1968, a complaint was issued alleging, inter alia, a refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act based in part on allegedly bad faith in negotiating and on a refusal by Respondent to furnish necessary information. On October 23 the hearing in that case opened before Trial Examiner Sidney J. Barban. Respondent was represented by new counsel, Ellison Smith and William Smith. Before the hearing was opened Respondent proposed to enter into an informal settlement agreement under which it would correct an allegedly invalid no-solicitation rule, post a notice, and resume bargaining . The General Counsel and the Union were agreeable to those terms of settlement except that the Union insisted that it be formal and provide for a court decree, but this was not acceptable to Respondent. Trial Examiner Barban thereupon suggested that the hearing be adjourned for a time during which the parties could engage in further negotiations. He stated: Now, it is my understanding that the Respondent is willing to do this, and has agreed that it would hold an initial bargaining session before November 4 of this year, and would thereafter engage in expeditious bargaining at reasonable times and places .... Counsel for Respondent stated: As far as the Company is concerned, we are in agreement with the Trial Examiner and as I indicated in an off-the-record discussion, we will be prepared to meet and will go forward in negotiations within the framework of our obligation and we will do that which is required of us in connection with collective bargaining , and we think that your proposal is practical and sound, and we will do everything within our power to abide by it, and within the frame of the intention which you have in mind. The union representative stated: . Now, we think that we should go ahead with this; however, we agree with what you have stated in the record. We will bargain and bargain in good faith and do our best to accomplish what you have apparently intended for us to do in your recommendation. Trial Examiner Barban further stated: "The only thing I intend , gentlemen , is that the purposes of the law be met, and I make no inferences that it hasn't been, or that it won't be, or anything of that sort, but only to give you an opportunity which may carry out the purposes of the Act." The hearing was adjourned to December 17; later it was further postponed to January 20, 1969. 3. Bargaining subsequent to August 28, 1968 The September 10 session was the last attended by Abram. As of that time Respondent had not furnished the job classifications requested, nor any insurance information. Following the adjournment of the hearing in Case 11-CA-3579, further bargaining sessions were held on October 31, November 25, and December 13, 1968, and January 6, 1969.2 Respondent's chief spokesman was its attorney, William Smith. Also participating for Respondent were Jack Sherrill, a vice president, Helen B. 'Meetings were scheduled for several other dates but were postponed HY-LAN FURNITURE, INC. Short , an assistant vice president , and Bill White, production manager. Woodall and an employee committee represented the Union. Woodall testified without contradiction: "Substantial progress was made. Mr. Smith began giving us counter - proposals , and we began to bargain, after Mr. Smith came in on the scene on October 31, 1968." He stated that agreement was reached "on a good many of the proposals that the union had made, or some counter-proposal of a like nature." At the meeting on October 31, during discussion of the question of how many shop stewards were to be provided for, the negotiators went out into the plant to ascertain approximately how many employees were in each department. When they returned, Woodall remarked that all that trouble would have been avoided if Respondent had furnished the information the Union had been requesting. Smith asked what information was desired. Woodall told him he needed insurance facts, and the employees' wages, job classifications and hiring dates. Sherrill stated, ". . we really don't have classifications, we have more of the job description, rather than classifications." However Smith promised to get the requested information to the Union with respect to both insurance and wages "right away." The parties met again on November 25. The Union acknowledged receipt of a complete copy of the insurance plan but not the cost information. Information as to insurance costs was immediately furnished orally to the Union's satisfaction. Respondent handed the Union a list of all 382 employees in the unit as of that time. Unlike the May list, it showed the employees' respective departments and classifications, but dates of hire and rates of pay, which were shown on the May list, were omitted. One hundred and twenty-seven of the names did not appear on the May 8 list. The evidence as to the Union's reaction upon receipt of the list is discussed below. 4. Withdrawal of the complaint and charge in Case 11-CA-3579 At the January 6 meeting , when the parties began to discuss a date for their next meeting , Smith pointed out that the hearing in Case II -CA-3579 was scheduled to resume on January 20 . Woodall replied , " Yes, I know that , but we are right down to the top issues , such as the wages , checkoff, and the cost items , really ." Smith suggested that the Union ' s charge be withdrawn , saying that to come to the table as friends would be helpful in working out these "top issues." After consulting the Union 's legal department Woodall, on January 8, 1969 , sent the following telegram to the Regional Director: RE: CASE NO. I1-CA-3579 HY-LAN FURNITURE, INC. . . . CHARGING PARTY RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS WITHDRAW OF CHARGES IN THE ABOVE CASE . PLEASE TAKE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY ACTION ACCORDINGLY. On January 10 counsel for the General Counsel served and filed the following motion to Trial Examiner Barban, attaching the Union 's telegraphed withdrawal request as "Exhibit 1": because of weather or illness, one at the request of the Union, and four at the request of Respondent. MOTION 311 After being informed by the parties that substantial progress has been made towards reaching a contract since the opening of the hearing in above matter, and upon receipt of Exhibit 1, attached hereto, Counsel for the General Counsel respectfully moves to withdraw the Complaint issued herein and recommends that an Order issue approving said motion. On January 11 Respondent notified Trial Examiner Barban by telegram thiit it had no objection to the General Counsel ' s motion to withdraw the complaint. On January 14 Trial Examiner Barban issued the following order in Case I I-CA-3579: ORDER APPROVING WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT The hearing in the above matter opened on October 23, 1968, and adjourned on said date to allow the parties time to continue negotiations. It appearing that the parties have made substantial progress toward reaching an agreement; and the charging party having filed its request to withdraw the charges herein; and Counsel for the General Counsel having filed a motion to withdraw the Complaint; and having duly considered the matter, and good cause shown therefor, it is, HEREBY ORDERED , pursuant to Section 102.25 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, that the foregoing Motion be, and hereby is, granted.' 5. The withdrawal of recognition On February 13, 1969, 215 of the 382 employees then in the appropriate unit signed an informal petition which was used to support a petition to decertify the Union.4 The parties met on February 20. When the Union took up the negotiations where they had left off on January 6, Smith stated that Respondent had information that a majority of the employees no longer wished to be represented by the Union. Asked whether he had checked the authenticity of his information, Smith said that he had not done so himself but that he was sure it was right. Employee-members of the negotiating committee said that several employees had been induced to sign the petition by promises of wage increases or threats of discharge, to which Smith replied that if any such threats had been made they had been unauthorized. He said, "We cannot bargain with you. I suggest you file a new petition." Woodall replied that the Union was still the certified bargaining agent and expected Respondent to continue to bargain until it was decertified. Respondent left the meeting and on February 27 Woodall filed the present charge. 'It is not clear whether Trial Examiner Barban's Order ruled upon the Charging Party 's request to withdraw the Charge , as well as General Counsel ' s Motion to Withdraw the Complaint. However, in the present case the General Counsel treated the Order as an approval of the withdrawal request , and it is so considered for purposes of the present Decision . See National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedures, Series 8, as amended , Section 102.9. 'The formal petition and the informal supporting petition were filed on February 24, 1969, in Case I I -RD-150, which is still pending. 312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Concluding Findings 1. Withdrawal of recognition A striking feature of this case is that the Union withdrew the old Charge in response to Respondent's urging that this would enable the parties to bargain at their next meeting "as friends," but when they next met, Respondent, on the basis of supervening circumstances, withdrew recognition and refused to bargain. On October 23, 1968, Respondent undertook to engage in negotiations with the Union and "do that which is required of us in connection with collective bargaining ...." That undertaking of Respondent's was made in lieu of an informal settlement agreement which Respondent was willing to enter into requiring it to bargain with the Union. Implicit in the undertaking was the understanding that such bargaining would be continued for a reasonable time. Effective bargaining is necessarily impeded if a union is required to bargain under a constant threat of loss of its representative status. The Board stated in Poole Foundry and Machine Company, 95 NLRB 34, 36, enfd. 192 F.2d 740 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 342 U.S. 954: It is well settled that after the Board finds that an employer has failed in his statutory duty to bargain with a union, and orders the employer to bargain, such an order must be carried out for a reasonable time thereafter without regard to whether or not there are fluctuations in the majority status of the Union during that period . . Similarly, a settlement agreement containing a bargaining provision, if it is to achieve its purpose, must be treated as giving the parties thereto a reasonable time in which to conclude a contract ... . See, also, I.M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's of Muskegon, 176 NLRB No. 66. The same policy has been applied with respect to recognition agreements. See N.L.R.B. v. Universal Gear Service Corporation, 394 F.2d 396 (C.A. 6), enfg. 157 NLRB 1169, where the Court quoted with approval the Board's statement that "only if the parties can rely on the continuing representative status of the lawfully recognized union, at least for a reasonable period of time, can bargaining negotiations succeed and the policies of the Act be effectuated." See also Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 NLRB 583, where the Board stated at page 587: With respect to the present dispute which involves a bargaining status established as the result of voluntary recognition of a majority representative, we conclude that , like situations involving certifications, Board orders, and settlement agreements, the parties must be afforded a reasonable time to bargain and to execute the contracts resulting from such bargaining. Such negotiations can succeed , however , and the policies of the Act can thereby be effectuated, only if the parties can normally rely on the continuing representative status of the lawfully recognized union for a reasonable period of time. Whether Respondent's solemn undertaking before Trial Examiner Barban, followed by the Union's withdrawal of the Charge at Respondent's suggestion that it would be in aid of bargaining, be deemed tantamount to a settlement agreement , cf. Gebhard-Vogel Tanning Company, 154 NLRB 913, 915, or tantamount to a recognition agreement , Respondent was required to bargain with the Union for a reasonable time. As stated by the Board in N. J. MacDonald & Sons, Inc., 155 NLRB 67, at page 71: "The determination of what tonstitutes `a reasonable time' depends upon the particular circumstances involved. What is reasonable in one case may not be so in another . . . But, where the parties had not reached an impasse in negotiations, 6 months was held not to be 'a reasonable time.' " After the October 23 hearing the parties met and negotiated on October 31, November 25, December 13, and January 6, and they made considerable progress towards reaching agreement. It is found that the bargaining was not carried on for a reasonable period and that Respondent's withdrawal of recognition on February 20 was therefore violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 2. The Refusal to furnish information (a) From August 28, 1968, until at least October 23, 1968, Respondent continued to refuse to furnish information as to the employees' classifications which the Union had repeatedly requested. Respondent's position in this respect had been set forth in its letter dated May 30, 1968, and at no time prior to October 23' was that position modified. The letter claimed that Respondent could not furnish the classifications for the following reason: "We have never classified jobs or assigned job titles." Short, Respondent's assistant vice president, testified that one or more times each year, in connection with wage surveys, Respondent did classify the employees by job and that when Smith caused Respondent finally to comply with the Union's request, the employee assigned to prepare the list knew from her prior experience just how to go about it and required no instructions. It is found that from August 28, 1968, to at least October 23, 1968, Respondent in bad faith and for the purpose of impeding bargaining refused to furnish to the Union necessary information as to the job classifications of the employees in the unit, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The withdrawal of the Charge and Complaint in Case 11-CA-3579, which included allegations of failure to furnish information, was not based on lack of merit and in no sense represented an adjudication or a disposition of the merits of those allegations As the Regional Director could have reinstated that Charge, see N.L.R.B. v. Lasko Metal Products, Inc., 363 F.2d 529, enfg. 148 NLRB 976, he could entertain the new charge notwithstanding the fact that it covered matter included in the withdrawn case.6 (b) Woodall testified that when the employee list was handed to him on November 25, he protested Respondent's failure to give the then current wage rates and hiring dates, that Sherrill said that this information already had been furnished in the May list, that Woodall replied that the wage information previously furnished was stale, and that two employees on the bargaining committee said that they themselves had received wage increases since May. Short testified that she recalled no such discussion or any indication by Woodall that he was "very unhappy" with the information furnished on November 25. Respondent did not produce Sherrill and General Counsel did not produce either of the two employee members of the committee referred to by Woodall. 'On October 23 Respondent promised to bargain in good faith It did not specifically agree to furnish the information until October 31, and the information was not actually furnished until November 25. 'Such reinstatement or new charge could not operate to permit the finding of unfair labor practices based on activities occurring more than 6 months prior to such reinstatement or new charge See Koppers Company, Inc, Forest Products Division , 163 NLRB No. 64 HY-LAN FURNITURE, INC. It is unnecessary for purposes of this case to resolve the question of credibility as between Short and Woodall. It is undisputed that Respondent failed at all times to furnish to the Union the hiring dates or rates of pay of 127 of the 382 employees in the unit on November 25, information embraced in the Union's October 31 request. It is true that Woodall made no further demand for the information at the bargaining sessions on December 13 and January 6; nor did the Union repeat its request in writing , as it had done before Smith had come into the picture. While these facts may indicate that Woodall did not feel at the time that the lack of fresh wage data impeded the Union at that stage of the bargaining, they do not warrant the inference that he intended to waive the Union's right to the information when the subject of wages would be attacked. Such a waiver, to be found, must be expressed in clear and unequivocal language. See California Portland Cement Company, 101 NLRB 1436, 1439. As Respondent's withdrawal of recognition made its failure to furnish the wage rates and dates of hire of the 127 employees final, it is found that such failure was violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE It is found that the activities of Respondent set forth above in section III , occurring in connection with its operations described in section 1, have a close , intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As it has been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , it recommended that the Board issue the recommended order set forth below requiring Respondent to cease and desist from said unfair labor practices and to take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel has requested that the remedy ordered in this case provide that the certification year be extended to a period of 1 year from such date as Respondent furnishes a list of employees in the unit with their dates of hire, wage rates and classifications. See Amax Aluminum Extrusion Products, Inc, 174 NLRB No. 63; Huttig Sash and Door Company, et al, 173 NLRB No. 118. Basically , the only remedial action which the Board may take is to remedy unfair labor practices which took place during the period of limitation prescribed by Section 10(b) of the Act. While the Board may look to earlier events to determine the appropriate remedy to be prescribed for such unfair labor practices, see N.L.R.B. v. Lundy Manufacturing Corporation, 316 F.2d 921, enforcing 136 NLRB 1230, cert. denied 375 U.S. 895, the Board has specifically held that a certification year cannot be extended on the basis of a failure to bargain occurring before the 10(b) period. Dean Sellers , Inc., 174 NLRB No. 56 . In the present case almost 8 months elapsed from the date of certification to the date of limitation fixed by Section 10(b). In addition, Respondent admittedly bargained in good faith from October 31 on, and did not withdraw recognition until February 20, a period of 3 1/2 months. While Respondent during that period was in default with respect to the furnishing of information , such default did not prevent the 313 parties from making considerable progress in their negotiations. It is unnecessary to decide in this case to what extent it would be appropriate to extend a certification year because of failure to furnish information where bargaining was otherwise in good faith and progressed substantially notwithstanding the absence of the information. The bargaining order recommended below requires Respondent to bargain for a reasonable period of time without regard to whether or not there are fluctuations in the majority status of the Union. See International Association of Machinists v. N.L R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 82-83; N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery Mills, 180 F.2d 701, 706 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 340 U.S. 811. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and of the entire record in this case the Trial Examiner makes the following. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent is, and at all times material has been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 3. Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. All production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent's factory at Hickory, North Carolina, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. At all times material the Union has been, and it still is, the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Respondent, Hy-Lan Furniture , Inc., its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to meet and confer with Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit, and with respect to the negotiation of an agreement and of any question arising thereunder. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent 's factory at Hickory, North Carolina, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. 314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Failing to furnish information requested by the Union with respect to the job classifications, dates of hire, and rates of pay of each employee in the appropriate unit. (c) In any other manner refusing to bargain with the Union as required by Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which,' it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, meet with, and bargain collectively with, the Union as the collective- bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Furnish the Union, on request, within a reasonable time, information with respect to job classifications, rates of pay and dates of hire of all employees in the appropriate unit. (c) Post at its office and place of business located in Hickory, North Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by its representative, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (d) Notify said Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Recommended Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL, upon request, meet with and bargain collectively with Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, with respect to the wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment of our employees in the appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement . The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employees employed at our factory at Hickory, North Carolina, excluding office clerical employees, guards , professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL furnish to the Union on request information with respect to job classifications, rates of pay, and dates of hire of all employees in the appropriate unit. HY-LAN FURNITURE, INC. (Employer) Dated By 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia Building , 301 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 723-9211. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation