Hutzler Bros. Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 17, 1979

241 N.L.R.B. 914 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DE(CISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hutzler Brothers Company and Retail Store Employ-
ees Union, Local 692, affiliated with Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-
8165
April 17, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND TRUESDAI.E
On September 16, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed a
brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefst
and has decided to affirm the rulings,2 findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Hutzler Brothers
Company, Towson, Maryland, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
i Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby denied
as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and
positions of the parties.
2 Respondent excepts to the Administrative Law Judge's ruling precluding
certain testimony concerning the effectiveness of advertisements in our local
newspapers and local radio and television stations which serve the area in
which most of Respondent's employees live. The witness did testify to the
existence of such means of communication, but was barred only from pre-
senting his opinion as to their effectiveness in reaching Hutzler employees.
Respondent made an offer of proof to the effect that the witness would testify
that the means of communication would be effective. However, no showing
was made or offered to establish the witness's competence in determining the
effectivness of local advertising on union matters in reaching Hutzler em-
ploees. Consequently. the excluded testimony would have been essentially
unsupported opinion, and, therefore, the Administrative Law Judge's ruling
precluding it was. we find, proper. Respondent also excepts to the exclusion
of certain testimony and exhibits concerning the availability of facilities near
Respondent's store for the holding of union organizational meetings. How-
ever, the issue before us concerns the availability of effective means of com-
municating with employees so that the Union, inter alia. could attempt to
induce them to attend a union meeting. It does not directly involve the
availability of facilities for holding such a meeting. C'onsequently, the prolf
fered evidence was not relevant and. thus, we affirm the Administrative l.aw
Judge's ruling excluding it.
DECISION
STATEMENt' OF TIlE CASE
HENRY L. JAI.ETTE. Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding involves the right of a labor organization to solicit
employees and to distribute handbills on the property of the
above-named Respondent. The proceeding was initiated by
a charge filed by the above-named Union on September 13.
1976.1 On October 19, the charge was amended, and on
February 16, 1977, a complaint was issued alleging that
Respondent had violated Section 8(a)( ) of the Act by re-
fusing to permit representatives from the Union to distrib-
ute literature on its premises and threatening them with
arrest if they did so. On May 2 4, 1977, a hearing was held
in Baltimore, Maryland.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and upon consideration of the briefs of the par-
ties, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FA('I
1. THE AIi..EGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTIC(ES
Respondent is a Maryland corporation engaged in the
operation of retail department stores in the Baltimore,
Maryland, area including a store in Towson, Maryland, the
only location involved herein.2 The store is freestanding and
is bordered at street level by Delaware Avenue, Shealey
Avenue, Dulaney Valley Road, and Joppa Road. There are
three store entrances at this level (referred to in the record
as entrances 1,. 2, and 3), but only entrance I at the corner
of Shealey Avenue and Dulaney Valley Road is in use,
entrances 2 and 3 are restricted to emergency use only.
Below the street level are entrances 4 and 5. These en-
trances are on Respondent's property, and adjacent thereto
is a large parking area which is also owned by Respondent.
(A portion of this parking area has a deck to accommodate
additional cars). Before 10 a.m., when the store opens and
at 9:30 p.m.. when the store closes, all employees are re-
quired to use entrance 5.
To the north of Respondent's store is the Towson Plaza
Shopping Center which contains 30 to 40 stores. This shop-
ping center is separated from Respondent's store by Re-
spondent's parking area and the shopping center's own
parking area which is contiguous to Respondent's parking
area. Access to either of these parking areas may be had
from an entrance on Joppa Road designated A in the rec-
ord, and two entrances on Dulaney Valley Road designated
B and C in the record. Access could also be had from Fair-
mont Avenue which fronts the Towson Shopping ('enter,
but such access would not appear to be sufficiently close or
convenient to be deemed significant in terms of access to
Respondent's store.
The Towson store employed about 550 employees in Au-
gust 1976, the time herein relevant. On August 30, at about
5 p.m.. three nonemployee union representatives distributed
handbills at entrances 4 and 5. The procedure followed by
U inless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 1976
2 Jurisdiction is not in issue. Respondent admits that it meets the Board's
standard for the assertion of jurisdiction over retail stores.
241 NLRB No. 141
914
HUTZLER BROTHERS COMPANY
the organizers was to ask persons exiting from these en-
trances whether or not they were employees of Respondent
and. if they indicated they were, to hand them a handbill.
After a few minutes of doing this, the union representatives
were confronted by security guards of Respondent. were
told that they were on private property, and told that unless
they left they would be arrested. The union representatives
refused to leave, and the police were called. After they had
arrived and engaged in discussions with the security guards
and union representatives, and after the union representa-
tives had called the Union's attorney for advice, the union
representatives left the premises.
On September 1, the Union sent a letter to Respondent
requesting the names and addresses of the Towson store
employees. On September 7, Respondent denied the re-
quest.
11. ANAl YSIS AND) (O()N(I.SI()NS
The issue presented by Respondent's prohibition against
the distribution of literature on its property by union orga-
nizers is not novel and no extended discussion of legal prin-
ciples governing decision is required. Section 7 of the Act,
guarantees to employees the right "to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations" This includes the
right of union representatives to inform employees of the
advantages of union representation. Where union organiz-
ers seek to exercise this right on private property, a conflict
arises between the owner's right to dictate the use that can
be made of his property and the Section 7 rights of employ-
ees. The guiding principle for adjusting this conflict was
enunciated more than 20 years ago in N.L.R.B. v. Babcock
& Wilcox Conmpal', wherein the Court stated:
It is our judgment, however, that an employer may
validly post his property against nonemployee distribu-
tion of union literature ift' reasonable efforts by the
union through other available channels of communica-
tion will enable it to reach employees with its message
and if the employer's notice or order does not discrimi-
nate against the union by allowing other distribution.)
There is no contention here that Respondent has dis-
criminated against the Union by allowing other distribu-
tion.' The only issue presented is whether Respondent's em-
ployees are beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts
through other available means of communication.
The record indicates that the Union made little effort to
communicate with employees by any means before station-
ing its agents on Respondent's property. Thus, the Union
did not advertise on radio or television, in any of the local
newspapers of general circulation, or in neighborhood pub-
lications. The Union's agents did not try to distribute litera-
ture at store entrance 1,. which is on a public street. nor did
they try to distribute literature at automobile entrances A,
B. or C. The Union's agents took a view of the surrounding
area of the store on two occasions and assertedly checked
3351 U.S. 105. 112 (1956).
' The parties stipulated that Respondent has maintained a rule prohibiting
solicitation on its property for many years and the store and parking lot bear
notices to the public prohibiting the distribution of literature
bus stops and made inquiries in nearby restaurants relative
to the lunch or shopping habits of Respondent's employees.
Respondent contends that in order to sustain his burden
of proof the General Counsel had the burden of showing
that before entering Respondent's property the Union at-
tempted to use other channels of communication which
were available. I reject this contention. I find no support for
it in Babcock & Wilcox, supra, nor in any of the cases cited
by Respondent. The test of Babcock, & I'Wilco, supra, is one
of the existence of reasonable alternative means of commu-
nication, not whether such means were in fact used. In the
absence of attempts by the Union to use other means of
communication, there may be insufficient evidentiary sup-
port for the assertion that other means were not reasonable.
but this is a matter of proof, not a matter of essence to the
cause of action.
The alternative means of communication assertedIv rea-
sonable and available to the Union are: Newspapers. radio
and television stations, billboards, sound trucks. posters and
banners, office space rentals, handbill distribution at park-
ing lot entrances, street contacts, telephone contacts, and
home visits.
Newspapers and radio and television stations: The rec-
ord indicates that in addition to two newspapers of general
circulation, there are various community newspapers which
serve the greater Towson area, in which the vast majority of
the employees live, as well as several radio and television
stations. The Union did not attempt to use any of these
means of communication.' In my judgment, in a metropol-
itan area such as is described in the record herein, it is not
reasonable to require that a union use newspapers or radio
and television stations to reach employees with its message.
The record contains estimates only of the cost of advertising
through such media, but it appears to me a reasonable as-
sumption that the cost of any advertising campaign which
would have any reasonable prospect of reaching a signifi-
cant number of Respondent's employees would be prohibi-
tive. In order to assure that a significant number of employ-
ees saw the newspaper ads or heard radio or television
announcements, the Union would be required to use several
of these media over a sustained period of time. In Solo Cup
Compan'L Ctlalumelt and Industrial District Compan.v, 172
NLRB 1110 (1968). the Board rejected such media as effec-
tive means for a union to reach employees with its message.
In so holding, the Board assumed that cost was no object. It
seems to me, however, that the element of cost cannot he
ignored. If cost were no object, a union could resort to all
the newspapers and radio and television stations over a sus-
tained period of time. When cost is an object, however, the
number of newspapers and radio and television stations
poses a problem of selection, and one can only guess at the
frequency and duration of any advertising that would be
required to be effective.' It seems evident that only at pro-
'Union Representative Douglas Ammlung gave testimony suggesting that
ads were not placed in newspapers of general circulation or radio and televi-
sion stations because such media wosuld not accept ads of the itpe necessary
to reach employees of Respondent. I deem his testimony is of no value. The
fact of the matter is that the Union never submitted ads to an, newspapers
or radio or television stations
t, ommunity newspapers are published weekly and distributed only oser
a limited geographical area
915
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hibitive cost could the Union have effectively reached em-
ployees with its message through the use of such media.
In Scott Hudgens, 230 NLRB 414 (1977), the Board
agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the mass
media appropriately used by merchants were not reason-
able means of communication for employee pickets seeking
to publicize a dispute with a single store. Likewise here, it
defies commonsense to suggest the use of mass media to
convey a message to 550 individuals.
Finally, such means of communication suffer from being
wholly impersonal. They offer no opportunity to exchange
ideas with employees, nor to present the Union's message
with any degree of persuasiveness.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that newspapers and
radio and television stations are not reasonable means of
communicating the Union's message to Respondent's em-
ployees. Billboards, assuming one was available for rental,'
suffer from the impersonal nature of its appeal. The sugges-
tion that sound trucks could have been used must be re-
jected if only for the noise pollution it would create. Re-
spondent suggests that the Union could have rented space
to conduct organizational meetings. The suggestion cannot
be given serious thought. A union must first contact the
employees before it has need of a meeting place. Respon-
dent suggests that the Union could have used banners and
posters outside the store or parking lot. Whether or not this
was feasible is a question so interrelated to the feasibility of
any union efforts outside the store or parking lot that it
requires no independent analysis.
The real question in this case is whether the Union could
reach Respondent's employees with its message by mail,
telephone, home visits, or other personal contacts without
encroaching on Respondent's property. As to the use of
mail, telephone solicitation, or home visits, I do not under-
stand either the General Counsel or the Union to contend
that such means of communication would not constitute
reasonable alternative channels of communication if the
Union were in possession of the names and addresses of
Respondent's employees. In my judgment, such channels of
communication are reasonable alternatives to encroach-
ments on Respondent's property rights. However, the
Union did not know the names, even less the addresses, of
Respondent's employees. As noted earlier, Respondent re-
fused the Union's request for the names and addresses of its
employees. In the circumstances, mail, telephone solicita-
tion, and home visits were channels of communication not
available to the Union.
Respondent contends that mail, telephone solicitation,
and home visits were available as channels of communica-
tion because the Union could have obtained the names and
addresses of its employees through reasonable efforts. Thus,
all employees wear name tags while working. Assertedly,
the Union could have jotted these names down and ob-
tained the addresses of most of them by telephone direc-
tory. This assertion by Respondent presupposes that Re-
spondent would consent to the union representatives' use of
its store for the purpose of recording employee names. As
the General Counsel points out, a willingness on Respon-
dent's part to permit such nonbusiness use of its store is
7 According to Respondent's advertising director, one was available for
rental in the vicinity of the Towson store during the period here in question.
inconsistent with its position on handbilling on the parking
lot. While union representatives could record employee
names surreptitiously, statutory rights cannot be made to
depend on their ability to do so. In addition, obtaining tele-
phone numbers and addresses on the basis of name tags,
some of which bear only a first initial, is not as simple to do
as Respondent suggests. Over 50 percent of Respondent's
employees are female and it is reasonable to assume that
those who are married have telephones listed in their hus-
band's names, while some of the unmarried live with their
parents and likewise have no telephone listings.
A second way which Respondent contends the Union
could have used to obtain the names and addresses of em-
ployees was by copying the license plate numbers of em-
ployees' automobiles and obtaining the names and ad-
dresses of the registered owner from the Department of
Motor Vehicles. Respondent's vice president, Conrad
McClung, gave testimony, which I credit, that Respondent
has designated an area in its parking lot for employee park-
ing which contains 235 parking places. While that area con-
tains no signs or markings to advise the public that it is
reserved for employees, a security guard is stationed at the
area from 7:30 a.m. to 9:45 p.m. daily to ensure that
nonemployees do not park in the area. I am persuaded that
with minimal effort the Union could have determined
where Respondent's employees park when they come to
work.
While the Union could have determined where employ-
ees park, as Respondent contends, Respondent offers no
suggestion on how the Union could record the license plate
numbers without being trespassers on its property. As the
area is not under guard after 9:45 p.m. and is distant from
the store, the union representatives could clearly trespass
with impunity, and enter the parking lot to record license
tags. Again, statutory rights cannot be made to depend on
the availability of such methods.
The record indicates that an individual who has a license
plate number can obtain the name and address of the regis-
tered automobile owner upon request to the Department of
Motor Vehicles. Requests made in person are filled without
charge, but one individual can obtain information on only
three plate numbers on any one day; however, unlimited
requests can be made by mail at a cost of $1 for each name
and address requested. In my judgment, the payment of $1
for each name and address requested is not a prohibitive
cost, and were the Union able to obtain the license plate
numbers through reasonable efforts without trespassing on
private property, I would conclude that the names and ad-
dresses of employees procurable from such license plate
numbers would afford the Union a reasonable alternative
channel of communication wiih slightly in excess of 50 per-
cent' of Respondent's employees either by mail, home vis-
its, or telephone solicitation (the telephone numbers could
readily be obtained once the Union had names and ad-
dresses).
Without names and addresses, the Union was unable to
make personal contacts with Respondent's employees un-
less it could have done so at the place of their employment.
Respondent contends that, assuming such to be the case, it
did not have to permit the Union to have access to its prop-
' This figure is based on a survey of employees by Respondent showing
that 280 used the employee parking area.
916
HUTZLER BROTHERS COMPANY
erty because the Union could have reached the employees
on public sidewalks, at bus stops, in nearby business places,
and at the points of ingress and egress to the parking lot.
As noted earlier, there are three principal avenues of in-
gress and egress to the parking lot described in the record as
entrances A. B, and C. All three entrances are at four lane
roadways divided by a median at the point of exit to the
public streets. At points B and C, traffic is apparently suffi-
ciently heavy to be controlled by traffic lights: at point A,
there are stop signs. Respondent contends that the union
representatives could distribute handbills to employees at
these entrances by standing on the medians separating the
in and out traffic lanes.
Joint Exhibit 2 depicts very well the size of Respondent's
parking lot and that of Towson Plaza Shopping Center. It is
clear that thousands of cars must go in and out of entrances
A, B, and C during the course of a workday. It is inconceiv-
able to me that anyone could seriously consider it reason-
able for a union to reach employees with its message by
distributing handbills at points A, B, and C. In order to
reach the 250 or so employees, who might park in the em-
ployee parking area on a single day, the Union would be
required to distribute thousands of handbills to the motor-
ists entering or leaving the parking lot. Respondent mini-
mizes this problem, contending that the Union could dis-
tribute handbills in the morning before most of the stores
and the Shopping Plaza are open for business and at the
very time when its employees are reporting for work. Con-
cededly the problem would be less severe at such times than
during the hours the stores are open, and the liklihood of
reaching employees would be greater, but it seems clear to
me that in order to reach a substantial number of Respon-
dent's employees who begin arriving at 7 a.m. until about
10 a.m., the Union would be required to hand out handbills
to several hundred motorists. Accordingly, prescinding
from any question of safety or traffic hazard arising out of
the distribution of handbills from the median strips, I find
that such points of distribution were not reasonable chan-
nels of communications.
The matter of safety and traffic haza d is one which can-
not be ignored. The volume of traffic which entrances A, B,
and C are designed to handle both entering and leaving the
parking lot supports an inference that the distribution of
handbills on median strips, if effective in stopping motor-
ists, would create traffic tieups and the necessity to reach so
many motorists wih handbills could easily cause momen-
tary lapses in caution and lead to personal injury.9 For this
additional reason, I find that distribution of handbills at the
median strips is not a reasonable alternative means of com-
municating with employees.
The only remaining means for the Union to reach em-
ployees is either at entrance I or nearby walkways and pub-
lic places. Since entrance I may not be used to enter the
store before 10 a.m., the Union would be unable to reach
employees there until later in the day when employees
might exit from that entrance for lunch or to go on a variety
of personal errands. According to McClung, employees on
lunch break use entrance 1; however, as starting times for
I am not persuaded that the conditions under which McClung simulated
distribution of handbills were comparable to actual conditions and accord
no weight to the evidence of his experience in connection therewith.
work are staggered, presumably lunch breaks are staggered.
There is no showing how many employees leave the store
for lunch and how many in fact use entrance , but again it
may reasonably be presumed that over a period of time (6
months, perhaps) most of the employees would have occa-
sion to use the entrance and if handbill distribution was
conducted for a period of hours daily for a period of time,
the Union might well reach a substantial number of em-
ployees. In my judgment, the accommodation of rights re-
quired by Babcock & Wilcox, supra, was not intended to
create so severe an obstacle to communication with em-
ployees.
Respondent contends that the Union could contact em-
ployees either at bus stops or walking to the store from a
bus stop. Respondent's survey of employees indicates a to-
tal of 53 employees who travel to work by bus. The sugges-
tion that organizers stand at bus stops seeking to identify 53
riders as employees of Respondent does not deserve any
serious consideration. Employees arriving before 10 a.m.
would likely cross point 6 on Joint Exhibit 2, where they
could be approached by an organizer. In view of the stag-
gered hours of work, and the fact that only one-half of the
work force works each day, it would again require a pro-
longed vigil at point 6 to reach a significant number of
employees.
Respondent contends that the Union has access to its
employees in restaurants or other public places near the
store. Between 105 and 116 employees wear uniforms (wait-
resses, food preparation employees, and merchandise han-
dlers), and all employees wear name tags. In view of these
facts, Respondent contends that union representatives
could readily recognize employees on the streets or public
places near the store. As to name tags, the record does not
permit a finding either that employees who leave the store
wear their name tags or remove them. As to those in uni-
form, their number is less than 20 percent of the work force
and their accessibility to union representatives is highly
problematic as it depends on the frequency of their use of
entrance I or on the Union's ability to canvas the many
food places and other facilities in the area surrounding Re-
spondent's store. Again, in my judgment, the accommoda-
tion of rights dictated by Babcock & Wilcox, supra, does not
require that the Union resort to such hit or miss techniques
of organizing to assure that employees learn of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
It should be carefully noted that in concluding that the
channels of communication described herein are inad-
equate to afford the Union the opportunity to reach Re-
spondent employees, I am not finding that through a long
painstaking campaign of daily canvassing of public areas
near the store the Union could not reach a number of Re-
spondent's employees. I am persuaded that given enough
time and money, and using sufficient personnel, the Union
could reach a number of Respondent's employees. But I
believe that this could be said in every case and if this were
the touchstone for access to an employer's property there
would never be that accommodation of property rights con-
templated by Babcock & Wilcox, supra. In reaching this
conclusion, I am aware that the test of access is not one of
relative convenience, and I do not base my conclusion on
the ground that it may be more convenient and less expen-
917
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sive for the Union to have access to Respondent's property
to reach Respondent's employees. Cf. Monogram Models,
Inc., 192 NLRB 705 (1971). Rather, I base my conclusion
on the ground that the means of access herein described are
so difficult to use, and present so little likelihood of the
Union's reaching employees that only by access to Respon-
dent's property can meaning be given to the Section 7 rights
of Respondent's employees.
An additional reason for concluding that Respondent's
property right should yield to the Section 7 rights of its
employees is the fact that Respondent has opened its prop-
erty to the public. I am mindful of the Court's decision in
Central Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B., 407 U.S. 539 (1972),
rejecting an argument that the Union had a right to access
to an owner's property because the owner had diluted his
property interest by opening it to the general public; how-
ever, I do not understand the Court to have intended by its
holding to preclude reliance on the public nature of the
property as a factor to be weighed in the accommodation of
rights dictated by Babcock & Wilcox, supra. In my judg-
ment, when one considers how many people make use of
Respondent's property, the limited intrusion required to
give meaning to the Section 7 rights of the employees can-
not be regarded as a significant encroachment on Respon-
dent's property right.'0
Finally, in reaching my conclusion, I have carefully con-
sidered the cases cited by Respondent. They are all factu-
ally distinguishable. As can readily be seen, each case must
turn on its own facts. Central Hardware Company, 181
NLRB 491 (1970), on which the General Counsel relies, is
factually very similar to the instant case and is noteworthy
for the fact that the Union had a list of the names and
addresses of 80 percent of the employees and the Board
nevertheless held that under the Babcock & Wilcox, supra,
principle the Union had no reasonable means of access
other than Respondent's property. Such a conclusion has
even greater support when, as here, the Union has no
names and addresses and no in-store employee organizers.
While the Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the
Board's Decision," I am bound by the Board's view of the
case.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section , above,
occurring in connection with its operations described
therein, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship
to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct-
ing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Hutzler Brothers Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
l0 In Central Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that where the need for access has been shown, access is limited to (i)
union organizers, (ii) prescribed nonworking areas of the employer's prem-
ises, and (iii) the duration of organization activity.
Il Central Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B. , 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972).
2. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 692, affiliated
with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL CIO, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By prohibiting union representatives from distributing
union literature to employees on its premises and threaten-
ing them with arrest for attempting to do so, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 2
The Respondent, Hutzler Brothers Company, Towson,
Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Prohibiting union representatives from distributing
union literature to its employees on its property and threat-
ening them with arrest for attempting to do so.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Towson, Maryland, store copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5,
after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps it
has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
'3 In the event that this Order is enforced by ajudgment ofa United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
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HUTZLER BROTHERS COMPANY
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL. NOT prohibit representatives of Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 692, affiliated with Re-
tail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, from
distributing union literature to our employees on our
property, nor will we threaten them with arrest for at-
tempting to do so.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
HUTZLER BROTHERS COMPANY
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