Huntington Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 25, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 253 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL
The Huntington Hospital, Inc. and National Union of
Hospital and Health Care Employees, 1199 W.
Va., Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO and Margaret E. Brinegar.
Cases 9-CA-9411 and 9-CA-9431
April 25, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND MURPHY
On December 16, 1976, the National Labor
Relations Board issued the attached Proposed
Decision and Order (227 NLRB 316) in this
proceeding in which it proposed finding that the
Respondent, The Huntington Hospital, Inc., violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, by discharging employee
Margaret E. Brinegar and independently violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating Brinegar.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Proposed Decision and Order in light of the
exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the
proposed rulings, findings, and conclusions and to
adopt the Proposed Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Proposed
Order set forth in the attached Proposed Decision,
and hereby orders that the Respondent, The Hunt-
ington Hospital, Inc., Huntington, West Virginia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said Proposed Order.
December 16, 1976
PROPOSED DECISION AND ORDER'
The charge in Case 9-CA-9411 was filed on June 10,
1975, by National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees, 1199 W. Va., Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, and
the charge and amended charge in Case 9-CA-9431 were
229 NLRB No. 44
filed on June 18 and July 19, 1975, respectively, by
Margaret E. Brinegar, an individual, alleging that The
Huntington Hospital, Inc., hereinafter called Respondent
or the Hospital, unlawfully discharged Brinegar. On July
31, 1975, an order consolidating cases, consolidated
complaint, and notice of hearing issued, alleging that the
Respondent interrogated employees on or about May 25
and June 12, 1975, in violation of Section 8(aX)() of the Act,
and discharged Margaret E. Brinegar on or about June 5,
1975, in violation of Section 8(a)() and (3) of the Act.
Thereafter, on August 8, 1975, Respondent filed its answer
to the complaint in which it admitted the discharge of
Brinegar, but denied that it had committed any unfair
labor practices as alleged in the complaint.
On October 21 and December 11, 1975, a hearing was
held before Administrative Law Judge Milton Janus in
Huntington, West Virginia. Following the close of the
hearing, the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs
with the Administrative Law Judge.
By letter of February 13, 1976, Chief Administrative Law
Judge Thomas N. Kessel notified the parties that Adminis-
trative Law Judge Janus had died on January 31, 1976, and
that various alternatives were available for disposition of
the case,2 including settlement of the case, transfer to the
Board for issuance of a Proposed Decision and Order on
the record as made, designation of another Administrative
Law Judge to prepare a Decision on the record as made, or
a hearing de novo before another Administrative Law
Judge. By letters dated March 2, 1976, the General Counsel
and the Respondent notified the Chief Administrative Law
Judge of their willingness to transfer the instant matter
directly to the Board. By letter dated March 12, 1976, the
Union advised the Chief Administrative Law Judge of its
consent to a transfer of the case. 3 Accordingly, on March
22, 1976, the Chief Administrative Law Judge advised all
parties that pursuant to their agreement the instant matter
was being transferred to the Board, and, on March 24,
1976, the Board ordered that the proceeding be transferred
to, and continued before, it.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
IAny party may, within 20 days from the date hereof, file with the Board
in Washington, D.C., eight copies of a statement setting forth exceptions to
this Proposed Decision and Order, together with seven copies of a bref in
support of said exceptions and, immediately upon such filing, serve copies
thereof on each of the other parties.
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 8, as
amended, the findings, conclusions, and proposed Order shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
2 See sec. 554(d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. See also
Sec. 102.36 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended:
In the event the administrative law judge designated to conduct the
hearing becomes unavailable to the Board after the hearing has been
opened, the chief administrative law judge, or the presiding judge, San
Francisco, California. as the case may be, may designate another
administrative law judge for the purpose of further hearing or other
appropriate action.
3 Although Brinegar was the Charging Party in Case 9-CA-943 1, she did
not, other than as a witness for the General Counsel, participate at the
heanng. Apparently. her interests have been represented by the General
Counsel.
253
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Board has delegated its authority in this
proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board, having received and considered the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, and the
entire record in this case, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and we find
that Respondent is, and at all times material herein has
been, a nonprofit West Virginia corporation engaged in the
operation of a hospital in Huntington, West Virginia; that
during the representative 12-month period preceding
issuance of the complaint the Respondent had a direct
inflow, in interstate commerce, of goods and products
valued in excess of $50,000 which it purchased and caused
to be shipped to its Huntington, West Virginia, location
directly from points located outside the State of West
Virginia; and that, during the same representative period,
the Respondent received gross revenues in excess of
$250,000. Accordingly, we find, as alleged in the complaint,
that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert
jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and we find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Brinegar was hired on March 31, 1967, as a salad girl and
worked in the kitchen. Sometime thereafter, according to
Brinegar's uncontradicted testimony, John Guy, the owner
of Guy Food Service, leased the food service facilities of
the Hospital. On August 19, 1974, the Union commenced
an organizing campaign among Respondent's employees.
In the course of this campaign, Respondent discharged
Kermit Chapman, a housekeeper, because of his activities
on behalf of the Union. The Board, in a prior proceeding,
found that Chapman was unlawfully discharged and
ordered him reinstated with backpay.4 In April or May
1975, 5 the Union began another organizing campaign at
the Hospital. On May 24, Brinegar, according to her
uncontradicted testimony, learned that several of the
dishwashers had signed union authorization cards and
asked one of them to get a card for her. After signing the
card, Brinegar asked for more cards so that she could
distribute them to other employees. On the same day she
distributed cards to five employees, four of whom signed
them. Brinegar also talked with other employees that day
about the Union.
218 NLRB 51 (1975).
5 All dates hereinafter are 1975 unless otherwise specified.
6 Since the record is unclear as to the correct spelling of Kees' name, we
B. Interrogation of Brinegar
According to Brinegar's uncontradicted testimony, she
worked on May 25, the day after distributing the union
cards, and then went on vacation until June 4. When she
returned, Brinegar was called by Guy into the office of
Dietary Manager Irene Kees. 6 Guy then asked her, "Mrs.
Brinegar, what do you know about the Union?" To which
Brinegar responded, "Not much, only what I read in the
paper. I saw that they have people in St. Mary's and in the
hospital here." Guy also informed her that he served 28
hospitals, only one of which had a union, and that he had
more trouble from that hospital than all the rest. He also
stated that usually a union did more harm than good.
As previously stated, Guy owned Guy Food Service
which operated the kitchen for Respondent. The only
direct testimony as to this arrangement was Brinegar's
statement that the kitchen was leased to Guy. Although
Respondent's attorney stated at the hearing that Guy was
merely a consultant to the Hospital, there is no record
testimony as to his status.
Respondent asserts in defense to these allegations that
Guy was not its agent at any time material herein.
Respondent contends that, even if Guy is found to be an
agent of Respondent, Brinegar was a supervisor and
therefore not entitled to the protection of the Act, and that,
consequently, neither Guy's interrogation of her nor her
subsequent discharge was unlawful. Respondent further
contends that, even if Brinegar is found to be an employee,
Respondent was not aware of her union activity, and
therefore such activity cannot be the motive for any actions
which Respondent took against her.
C. Discharge of Brinegar
Brinegar testified that on June 5, the day after she was
questioned by Guy, he again called her into Kees' office
when Brinegar reported for work. In the presence of
Personnel Manager Robert Adkins, Guy stated, "Mrs.
Brinegar, the Huntington Hospital no longer needs your
service. We find your work as a supervisor unsatisfactory."
When Brinegar asked what was wrong with her work, there
was no reply. When Brinegar persisted in demanding the
"real reason" she was fired, Adkins told her, "You was [sic]
told the reason you was [sic] fired." An argument among
Brinegar, Guy, and Adkins ensued regarding the quality of
Brinegar's work and when she should leave the hospital.
When Brinegar stated that she would not leave until they
told her the "real reason" she was fired, Adkins threatened
to call a security guard. After more argument, Brinegar
turned in her keys to the dietary department and left the
hospital, returning only to pick up her check the next day.
Brinegar's testimony as to the foregoing was uncontradict-
ed, and neither Guy nor Adkins testified at the hearing.
have adopted the spelling utilized by Respondent in its brief, inasmuch as
Kees is an employee of Respondent.
254
THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL
IV. FINDINGS
A. Agency Status of Guy
Brinegar testified without contradiction that Guy ran the
kitchen and thus was her supervisor. Additionally, Respon-
dent's personnel director was present when Guy discharged
Brinegar, and explicitly supported Guy's action. Therefore,
"whether or not [Guy] was technically a 'supervisor' under
the Act, his responsibilities put him in a position to be
identified with management in the eyes of the employees
and to translate to them the policies and desires of
management." Accordingly, we conclude that, at all times
material herein, Guy was held out to the employees by
Respondent as its agents and we therefore find that Guy
was the agent of Respondent.
B. Brinegar's Discharge
Brinegar worked the shift from 5:30 a.m. until 2 p.m. and
had the following job duties: setting up patient trays,
preparing salads and desserts for lunch for patients and
patrons of the cafeteria, putting dishes away after meals,
setting up the cafeteria for lunch, receiving telephone
messages from nurses regarding patients' meals, and
operating the cash register during lunch in the cafeteria.
She further testified, as did other dietary department
personnel called as witnesses by Respondent, including
Assistant Manager and Dietitian Patricia Toler, that the
job performed by dietary department employees was a
routine one. Brinegar also helped to train new employees,
as did other employees in the department. Several of the
department employees also stated that Brinegar performed
the same job as everyone else in the department. However,
Brinegar apparently was the only employee who operated
the cash register. When Kees was not at work, Brinegar
allegedly was in charge of the department to the extent of
calling a replacement if an employee did not come to work,
correcting mistakes on timecards, and ordering food. As we
note infra, however, Kees was seldom absent from work.
Additionally, the evidence indicates that Brinegar autho-
rized overtime on one date and only occasionally initialed
timecards. Thus, the only record evidence in this regard is
that in Kees' absence, Brinegar, on March 12, signed a pay
advance for an employee, and on March 15 signed three
overtime authorizations for other employees. All of these
actions, however, were approved and countersigned by
Personnel Manager Adkins.
Although several of the employees testified that they
referred to Brinegar as their supervisor, she testified that
only once was she so informed by any official of
Respondent. That one incident occurred in June 1974
when Supervisor Virginia Adkins left Respondent's employ
due to illness. When Brinegar asked Kees who was to
7 Pittsburgh Metal Lithographing Co., Inc., 158 NLRB 1126, 1133 (1966).
8 Sterling Faucet Company, Texas Division, a Subsidiary of Rockwell
Manufacturing Company, 203 NLRB 1031, 1032 (1973).
9 Indeed, Brinegar, who stated without contradiction that she was the
most senior employee in the department, was paid $2.51 per hour as of the
date of her discharge. Two other employees in the department, one of whom
had I I years of seniority, were paid $2.50 per hour and a part-time employee
was paid $2.10 per hour.
'o In 1971 or 1972, Bnnegar was made an "assistant supervisor" under a
replace Mrs. Adkins, Kees told Brinegar that she was, but
Brinegar's job duties did not change and she did not
receive a raise.9 It is undisputed that Brinegar never hired,
fired, suspended, laid off, promoted, disciplined, or
adjusted grievances of employees, or recommended any of
these actions, nor was she ever told that she had authority
to do so. Brinegar unlike Kees wore a uniform like the
other employees in the department and had a locker like
the other employees. Furthermore, unlike Kees, Brinegar
did not have her own office and was never told that she
had access to personnel files. Brinegar never received any
notice that she was a supervisor from Respondent's
personnel manager10 or any management official other
than Kees.
Respondent's chief basis for its assertion that Brinegar
was a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act is the testimony of three employees that they
considered her to be their supervisor. Respondent also
relies on the fact that for approximately 5 hours during the
day there was no other alleged supervisor in the kitchen
aside from Brinegar, and that Brinegar approved timecard
entries, authorized overtime, authorized pay advances, and
called for replacements. We find no merit to Respondent's
contention that the absence for several hours a day of any
other supervisor establishes Brinegar's supervisory status,
in view of the uncontradicted testimony of several
witnesses that the kitchen work was rather routine. In our
view, this evidence indicates that a supervisor was not
necessary at all times."
Furthermore, although it appears that Brinegar assumed
additional responsibilities when Kees was absent, we note
that in the 2 years preceding the hearing herein Kees was
absent only once for a 2-week vacation and twice for
unspecified lengths of time when she was injured. Also, the
functions which Brinegar performed in Kees' absence were
routine, such as calling replacement employees or ordering
food, or they were approved by higher authorities, such as
when Brinegar authorized overtime and pay advances.
Furthermore, when the performance evaluations of two
employees in the department came due during a period
when Kees was absent, Respondent chose to wait for Kees'
return rather than have Brinegar prepare the evaluations.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we conclude
that Brinegar was not a supervisor but was, at most, a lead
person.1 2
Respondent contends that it had no knowledge of
Brinegar's union activities, and thus such activities could
not have been the basis for her discharge. We find no merit
to this contention. As set forth above, on May 24, Brinegar
signed a union card and then solicited five other employees
to do likewise. Brinegar worked the next day but then
commenced a l-week vacation. On June 4, her first day
back at work, Guy called her into Kees' office before 10
previous operator of Respondent's food service. Bnnegar testified that the
only change in her terms of employment following the alleged promotion
was that she worked the 5:30 a.m. to 2 p.m. shift instead of the 10 a.m. to 7
p.m. shift. There was no change in her duties, she did not receive a wage
increase, and she was not told that she had any authority over any kitchen
employees.
I Spector Freight System, Inc., 216 NLRB 551, 554 (1975).
12 Pinecrest Convalescent Home, Inc., 222 NLRB 13 (1976); Highland
Telephone Cooperative, Inc., 192 NLRB 1057 (1971).
255
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a.m. and questioned her, as found above, as to what she
knew about the Union. The next morning when Brinegar
reported for work, Guy again called her into Kees' office
and, in the presence of Personnel Director Adkins, told her
that she was being discharged because her work as a
"supervisor" was unsatisfactory. When Brinegar asked
what was wrong with her work she received no answer, nor
did Respondent adduce any evidence at the hearing that
she was performing below expectation. We credit Brine-
gar's uncontradicted testimony as to her conversations on
June 4 and 5 with Guy, and Guy and Adkins, respectively,
in view of Respondent's failure to adduce any contradicto-
ry evidence and particularly inasmuch as Respondent
neither called Guy nor Adkins to testify nor explained its
failure to do so.
Additionally, Brinegar testified without contradiction
that she had never received a warning for poor job
performance, that she had received a merit increase every
year,13 and that she had been told many times by both Guy
and Adkins that she was a good employee. Brinegar also
testified, again without contradiction, that aside from being
absent because she had the measles in 1967, she has been
absent from work only 2 days, and had been late to work
only once since she began to work for Respondent.
Considering the timing of Brinegar's interrogation and
discharge herein, and the smallness of the dietary depart-
ment, we can reach no conclusion other than that
Respondent had knowledge of Brinegar's union activi-
ties,14 and that she was discharged because of this activity
in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act.
C. Interrogation of Brinegar
Inasmuch as we have already found that Guy was an
agent of Respondent, that Brinegar was not a supervisor,
and that Guy asked Brinegar on June 4 what she knew
about the Union, we conclude that he thereby interrogated
her in violation of Section 8(aX)(1) of the Act.15
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action intended to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Affirmatively, we shall order Respondent to offer
Margaret E. Brinegar immediate and full reinstatement to
her former position or, if such position no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges, and to make her
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
because of Respondent's discrimination against her. Her
loss of earnings shall be computed as prescribed in F. W.
'3 Brinegar also testified without contradiction that all employees
received a merit increase annually but of differing amounts (ranging from I
to 5 cents per hour) and that her latest increase had been approved for the
maximum amount on March 31.
14 Cf. Tayko Industries, Inc.. 214 NLRB 84, 88 (1974). Brinegar testified
that there were 17 employees in the dietary department, who worked in the
kitchen. In Tayko, in a plant of 30-35 employees, the employer was found to
have knowledge of the union activities of 3 employees because of the timing
of their discharges. just 3 days after the start of the union campaign, and
because of the small size of the plant.
15 In addition to Brinegar's interrogation, General Counsel contends that
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum as required by Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Furthermore, as Respondent's violation of Section
8(a)(3) goes to the very heart of the Act, we shall order
Respondent to cease and desist from infringing in any
other manner upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act. 16
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating an employee concerning
her union sympathies and activities, Respondent thereby
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
thus engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(aX)() of the Act.
4. By discharging Margaret E. Brinegar because of her
activities on behalf of the Union, Respondent has discrimi-
nated against her in regard to her hire and tenure of
employment, thereby discouraging membership in a labor
organization in violation of Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, we hereby issue the following proposed:
ORDER
Respondent, The Huntington Hospital, Inc., Hunting-
ton, West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union sentiments and activities.
(b) Discouraging membership in National Union of
Hospital and Health Care Employees, 1199 W. Va., Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, by discharging or otherwise
discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment or any other term or condition of employment
of any of its employees in order to discourage union
membership or activities.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
Supervisor Hubbard interrogated employee Chapman about his union
sympathies. Thus, Chapman testified that Supervisor Hubbard asked him
what he thought about the Union. Hubbard, however, denied doing so.
Under the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we conclude that we
cannot make a credibility resolution in view of the conflicting testimony of
Chapman and Hubbard and the fact that we did not observe the demeanor
of these witnesses at the hearing. We note, however, that were we to find
that Chapman was unlawfully interrogated, this finding would not affect the
remedy proposed herein. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to pass upon
this issue.
i6 See N.LRB. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941).
256
THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL
the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employ-
ees, 1199 W. Va., Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, and to refrain from any and all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Margaret E. Brinegar full and immediate
reinstatement to her former position or, in the event that
said position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority and other rights
and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered by her because of the discrimi-
nation against her, in the manner set forth above in the
section entitled "Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its Huntington, West Virginia, facility, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'7 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
17 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all sides had an opportunity to
give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
refrain from any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in, or activities
on behalf of, any labor organization by discharging
employees or otherwise discriminating against them in
any manner, with regard to their hire and tenure of
employment, or any term and condition of employ-
ment, because of their activities on behalf of the
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employ-
ees, 1199 W. Va., Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their
membership in, activities on behalf of, or support for a
union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Margaret E. Brinegar immediate and
full reinstatement to her former job or, if it no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and wE WILL make her whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered because of the discrimina-
tion against her, at the rate of 6-percent interest per
annum.
THE HUNTINGTON
HOSPITAL, INC.
257