Howard Johnson Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 23, 1973

201 N.L.R.B. 376 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Howard Johnson Company and Local 466, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Internation-
al Union , AFL-CIO. Case 3-CA-4575
January 23, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On September 6, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
John P. von Rohr issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Howard Johnson Company, 3300
West Henrietta Road, Rochester, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall
Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
I The Administrative Law Judge found that Alice Landry was a
supervisor because , at the very least, she was held out to Respondent's
employees as having supervisory status We agree with this finding of the
Administrative Law Judge for the reasons stated by him in his Decision
However, we find additionally that Landry responsibly directed the
employees in the performance of their work.
In affirming the findings of the Administrative Law Judge as to
Respondent 's commission of certain 8(a)(1) violations , we do not agree with
his conclusion in fn 30 that Respondent violated that section of the Act by
virtue of the incident in which Linda Uenas , Respondent's supervisor-
housekeeper, during the course of her attempts to resolve differences
between employee Margaret Kaplan and Landry arising out of Kaplan's
allegedly tricking another employee to sign a union card , told Kaplan that
her known union sympathies were "neither here nor there " but that she
could he discharged for two things- "taking company time for union
activities . . . [and I non -performance of work " The record shows that
Respondent had received complaints from other employees about Kaplan's
soliciting during working hours It is also clear that Uenas told Kaplan that
she was not concerned about the Union's coming in before informing her
that she could be discharged for soliciting during working hours and not
peif,,rming her work satisfactorily Therefore , we do not adopt the
Administrative Law Judge' s finding that Respondent engaged in 8(a)(l)
conduct by virtue of these remarks of Uenas
3 In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro forma the
Administrative Law Judge 's finding that Respondent did not violate Sec
8(aX5) of the Act, and his dismissal of the relevant allegations contained in
the complaint
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN P. VON ROHR , Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges filed on August 26, 1971, and January 10, 1972, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
for the Regional Director of Region 3 (Buffalo, New
York), issued a complaint on January 12, 1972, against
Howard Johnson Company , herein called the Respondent
or the Company, alleging that it had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
herein called the Act . The Respondent filed an answer
denying the allegations of unlawful conduct alleged in the
complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Adminis-
trative Law Judge John P. von Rohr in Rochester, New
York , on March 28, 29, and 30, May 18 , and June 5, 1972.
Briefs were received from the General Counsel and
Respondent on July 21, 1972, and they have been carefully
considered.'
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Respondent , a Maryland corporation , is engaged in
the operation of motels and restaurants . The only facility
involved in this proceeding is Respondent 's Motor Lodge
located at 3300 West Henrietta Road , Rochester, New
York, adjacent to which is its restaurant located at 3300
West Henrietta Road , Rochester , New York. Respondent
annually receives gross income from the operation of the
said motel and restaurant in excess of $500,000 . It annually
receives at its restaurant located at 3300 West Henrietta
Road goods shipped directly from points outside the State
of New York valued in excess of $50,000.
I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.2
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 466 , Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders International Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
i Following the hearing the parties submitted a stipulation for correction
of certain errors in the transcript . The document containing this stipulation,
which is hereby approved , will be found in the formal files of this
proceeding
2 I reject Respondent 's contention that it does not meet the Board's
jurisdictional standards because there is no showing that the restaurant and
motor lodge are held out to the public as a single -intergrated enterprise
These facilities, it may be noted , not only bear the Respondent 's name but
are located directly adjacent to each other
201 NLRB No. 52
HOWARD JOHNSON COMPANY 377
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The alleged unfair labor practices herein occurred during
the summer of 1971, at which time the Union was
conducting an organizational campaign among Respon-
dent's employees. In substance the complaint alleges that
during this period the Respondent engaged in a course of
conduct, as exemplified by various alleged independent
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which were
designed to defeat the Union's organizational activities.
The complaint further alleges that during this period the
Union had obtained a majority status in an appropriate
bargaining unit, in consequence of which the General
Counsel seeks the issuance of a bargaining order under the
principle enunciated in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.,
395 U.S. 575.
Denying the commission of any unfair labor practices
violative of Section 8(a)(1), the Respondent contends that
in any event the Union did not represent a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit at any time material
hereto. With respect to the latter contention, both sides
raise subsidiary issues relative to the inclusion or exclusion
of various employees in the unit found to be appropriate.
B. The Appropriate Unit
The General Counsel contends that the appropriate unit
should consist of "all housekeeping employees, including
maids, launderers, maintenance employees, and housemen,
excluding all office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." The
Respondent, on the other hand, would include "desk
clerks, auditors, and bellmen," these being the so-called
office clerical employees.
Preliminarily, it is noted that the Respondent Motor
Lodge consists of four buildings situated close together,
having a total of 100 rooms. The lobby, front desk, and
manager's office are located in the gate lodge. The guest
rooms are in three, two-story buildings adjacent to the gate
lodge.
The maids' primary duty is to clean and make up the
guest rooms. The maintenance man repairs and maintains
motor lodge equipment and also performs various janitori-
al duties. The houseman is a jack of all trades who assists
the maintenance man and helps the maids with heavy
cleaning work. The launderer operates the laundry equip-
ment to wash and dry the linens used by the guest.
The desk clerks, who are on 8-hour schedules to round
out the clock, work at the front desk in the main lodge.
Their principal duties are to check the guests in and out,
book reservations, operate the telephone switchboard, and
see to it that requests of guests are carried out by other
employees. The auditor, the name of which in this instance
is misleading, actually is a desk clerk who works from
midnight until 8 a.m. However, in addition to performing
the desk clerks' functions, he also balances the days
receipts and prepares the daily room status report. He does
not perform any bookkeeping work as such and no special
training is required for this job. In fact, much of the
auditor's time on this shift is idle due to the hours he
works.
All of Respondent's employees, including those at the
desk as well as the housekeeping employees, are subject to
the same employee benefits , such as vacations , insurance,
and employee discounts. Both groups are permitted use of
the swimming pool and an employee lounge. Similarly, all
employees are hourly paid and all punch the same
timeclock.3 All employees attend any employee meetings
called by the manager and all employees attend any such
company gatherings as Christmas parties. All employees
are under supervision of the manager, although the maids
and launderer are immediately supervised by the house-
beeper who reports to the manager.
Although generally engaged in their regular duties, it is
also occasionally incumbent upon the desk clerks to clean
guest rooms, make room checks, and perform other
physical duties, such as shovel snow, vacuum halls, and
clean the pool.
Room check reports are usually made by the housekeep-
er and conveyed to the office by phone. On busy days
when rooms are in demand each maid calls the office as
soon as she has cleaned one or two rooms. Requests or
complaints from guests are usually made to the front desk,
whereupon the desk clerk will contact the housekeeper or a
maid to see that appropriate action is taken. However, this
involves merely a relay of information . . . it does not
involve supervision by the desk clerks of these employees.
The Board has recently summarized the latest cases
which outline its present policy with respect to appropriate
units in the hotel-motel industry in Penn-Keystone Realty
Corp. 191 NLRB No. 105, wherein it stated as follows:
The Board in Holiday Inn [John Hammonds & Roy
Winegardner d/b/a 77 Operating Company, d/b/a
Holiday Inn Restaurant, 160 NLRB 927.] overruled its
prior holding in Arlington Hotel [Arlington, Hotel
Company, Inc., 126 NLRB 400.] that all hotel-motel
operating personnel have such a high degree of
functional integration and mutuality of interests that
they should be grouped together for unit purposes, and
announced that it would consider each case on the
facts peculiar to it in order to determine the true
community of interest among particular employees
since the degree of integration varied considerably at
each hotel or motel . In a later decision , Regency Hyatt
House [ 171 NLRB No. 172 ], the Board held that a unit
of the hotel's manual operating personnel was appro-
priate, notwithstanding the exclusion of clerical em-
ployees. The Board stated that while its new decisional
approach to hotel unit questions, i.e., applying general
unit criteria, did not dispense with its policy of treating
clerical employees as "operating personnel ," it did,
however, treat that as just one of many factors which
the Board will consider in making hotel unit findings.
Additionally , it was stated that , in view of the
differences in the nature of their respective duties and
conditions of employment, the manual operating
employees sought were the employer's "blue collar"
force that the clerical personnel constituted its "white
collar" force. The Board concluded by noting its desire
3 Only the manager and the housekeeper do not punch a timeclock.
378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to remain consistent with its policy in the analgous area
of apartment house units, where it has granted separate
units of "blue collar" employees. [Shannon & Luchs,
etc., T/A Capitol Park Apartments, 162 NLRB 1381.]
While the Board held in Holiday Inn that, although
hotel and motel employees have a basic mutuality of
interest, neither their functions nor their mutual
interests are in all cases integrated to such a high degree
that an overall unit should be found the only
appropriate unit and, in Regency Hyatt House, that a
unit of manual operating personnel was appropriate,
such determinations do not compel a finding that
clerical employees are precluded in all instances from
inclusion in a unit of operating personnel.
The record supports a finding that the clerical
employees herein have a sufficient community of
interest with the previously represented service operat-
ing and maintenance employees to warrant their
inclusion in the unit.
Although the Board excluded desk clerks in the Holiday
Inn case, supra, it included a similar group of office
employees in the Penn-Keystone case, supra. In my view,
the facts in the instant case are more similar to those in
Penn-Keystone than in Holiday Inn. Significantly, unlike the
Holiday Inn case where the desk clerks were paid on a
salaried basis, the desk clerks here are, like the other
employees, paid on an hourly basis. Upon a consideration
of all the factors set forth above, I am persuaded and find
that the desk clerk employees have such a community of
interest with the so-called housekeeping employees, that
they should, as Respondent contends, be included in the
appropriate unit. Indeed, if the desk clerks in the present
case should be deemed to be excluded from the appropri-
ate unit, I find it hard to perceive a situation where they
should ever be included in any broad unit of motel
employees.
C. The Majority Question
It is undisputed that on three different occasions the
Union wrote letters to the Respondent requesting recogni-
tion and bargaining, these bargaining requests having been
received by the Respondent on August 3 and 21 and
September 3, 1971, respectively.'
On the basis of the unit found to be appropriate herein,
the record is indisputably clear that the Union did not have
a majority on August 2 or August 21. However, even
assuming the General Counsel's position concerning the
unit to be correct (i.e., that the desk employees be
included), for the reasons noted below I would still find
that the Union had not achieved a majority status at any of
the times of bargaining requests.
Beginning with August 3, the record reveals that only
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to the year 1971
5 These were Pamela Blaney. Margaret Kaplan, Betty Stewart Sandra
Sharpe , and Candace Kelly
6 Donna Van Dame and Ellen Van Dame , both card signers, were no
longer employed on August 3
7 These were Pamela Blaney, Sandra Sharpe , Margaret Kaplan, and
Janice Harley
s These were Virginia Campbell. Pamela Blaney. Dolores Osborne,
five employees who had signed cards were employed by
Respondent at the time.5 Since the General Counsel
concedes that 11 employees in the unit were employed on
this date, it is clear that the Union lacked a majority on
August 3.6
On August 21, the date of the second request, a total of
four card signing employees were on Respondent's
payroll.T Since even by the General Counsel's standards
there were a minimum of nine unit employees on
Respondent's payroll on this date, it is clear that the Union
also did not represent a majority of Respondent's employ-
ees on August 21, 1971.
The record reflects that on September 3, there were nine
employees on Respondent's payroll who had signed union
authorization cards. s Both sides agree that these employees
properly belong in the unit . Further, it is undisputed that
three employees, whom both sides also agree belong in the
unit but who did not sign cards, were also employed as of
that date. At issue, however, is the unit status of six
additional employees who were employed by Respondent
as of September 3, 1971. The Respondent would include
these employees in the appropriate unit , whereas the
General Counsel contends they should be excluded. My
findings with respect to these employees are as follows:
Inge Scheer and Terezia Thieben were hired as maids in
the early spring of 1971 by Linda Uenas, then the
housekeeper. Uenas testified without contradiction that
these employees, both of whom appear to have immigrated
from Germany, came to her in July and requested that they
would like to take off work for an 8-week period so that
they could take an extended overseas vacation with their
husbands. Testifying that they came to her about 2 weeks
ahead of time, Uenas said that she granted this request and
that she advised them she would expect to see them back
about September 15. Uenas testified that she advised the
manager, Donald Maier, of having granted this request.
Apart from the fact that this testimony was corroborated
by Maier, it is undisputed that the names of these
employees were retained on Respondent's payroll through-
out the period of their absence. They returned to work as
maids on September 16, 1971, at this time retaining their
original payroll starting date. Wesley Martins, who was
manager at the time they returned, testified that he had
been advised by the previous manager, Maier, that Scheer
and Thieben were on leave of absence. He indicated that
hence it was no surprise when Scheer and Thieben came to
him and announced that they had returned from vacation
and were ready to report for work. In view of all the
foregoing, I find that Scheer and Thieben were not severed
from their employment at the times material hereto, that
they had a reasonable expectancy of reemployment, and
that accordingly they belonged in the unit at all times when
the Union made its demands for recognition.9
Margaret Kaplan, Patricia Landry. Janice Harley , Gloria Lighthouse, Calhe
Campbell, and Alice L Landry ( Patricia Landry was no longer a supervisor
at this time Further, since she was no longer a supervisor when she solicited
employees to sign union cards, I reject Respondent 's contention that the
cards obtained by her should not be counted )
9 The General Counsel contends it to be "very likely" that the names of
Scheer and Thieben continued to appear on Respondent 's payroll because
of a "computer input omission " There being no evidence to support this
HOWARD JOHNSON COMPANY 379
The General Counsel contends that Laverne Lightle
should be excluded from the unit because she was a casual
employee. Lightle was employed as a maid from August 10
until September 10, 1971. Uenas testified without contra-
diction that she hired Lightle as a nighttime maid to work 5
hours a day (from 5 p.m. to 10 p.m.) and that she could
count on 3 days a week, or more if business warranted.
Upon being hired, Lightle was placed on the weekly
schedule posted for the following week. While in Respon-
dent's employ, she worked 18, 40, 35.5. 3, and 21.8 hours
per week, respectively. Contrary to the contention of the
General Counsel, I find that Lightle was engaged as, and
held the status of, a regular part-time employee.10
Columbus Plaza Motor Hotel, 148 NLRB 1053; Wisconsin
Bearing Co., 193 NLRB No. 35. Accordingly, I find that
Lightle should be included in the unit as of August 21 and
September 3.
Helen Diciacce was employed as a maid on August 28,]
1971, and worked 3 days a week (21, 22.3, and 18 hours per
week, respectively) for the next 3 weeks until she left
Respondent's employ on September 13, 1971. Martins
testified that Diciacce was employed on a regular basis.
Although there is some testimony that Diciacce mentioned
to one or two other employees that she might return to
work in Florida, there is no evidence that she made this
known to management and/or that Respondent hired her
with any such knowledge. What I have stated in footnote
10, supra, is applicable here also. I conclude and find that
Diciacce was hired by Respondent as a regular part-time
employee and that she remained in this status until she left
Respondent's employ. As such she should be included in
the unit at the time of the September 3 bargaining request.
Little Carter was employed as a maid from August 28
through September 3, 1971, inclusive. Martins testified
without contradiction that he hired Carter as a full-time
maid and told her that she would have a job through the
winter. However, Carter finally was forced to leave
Respondent's employ when, as she notified Martins, she
lost her babysitter and would not be able to continue to
work. I find that Carter was a full-time employee
throughout the period she worked for the Respondent and
should be included in the unit as of September 3, 1971.11
See also footnote 10, supra.
Cynthia Nieligh was employed by Respondent from
August 28 through September 5, inclusive. The General
Counsel contends that she should be excluded as a
management trainee. The record reflects that Manager
Martins met Nieligh at a Howard Johnson Lodge in
Worchester, Massachusetts, where she was a banquet
supervisor and he a manager trainee. Nieligh, together with
Walter Blauvelt (who became a desk clerk at Respondent's
contention, and since I am persuaded that the record does not warrant an
inference that this was the fact. I find no ment to this contention
I also find no basis for comparing the cases of these employees to the
case of another employee who was terminated while absent due to an auto
accident While it may be argued that the injured employee was treated
unfairly, this has no material bearing upon the employment status of Scheer
and Thieben Sandy's Stores, Inc, 163 NLRB 728
iu Hindsight cannot be properly used when considering the employment
status of any individual. Although Lightle remained in Respondent's
employ for only a 5-week period, there is no evidence whatsoever that this
was her intention when she started. Even if it was, this was not made known
to the employer at the time of her hire
lodge) accompanied Martins from Worchester to the
Rochester location. Although Nieligh was not put on
Respondent's payroll immediately, 12 Martins testified that
Nieligh was a friend of his and that she helped perform
laundry work during the transition period when he first
took over as manager. It was on August 28 that Nieligh
was placed on the payroll as a maid. According to Martins,
Nieligh thereafter was engaged in such activity as cleaning
the rooms , cleaning the office, and some room inspection.
Alice Landry (whose special status is discussed hereinafter)
testified that Martins advised her that Nieligh was
"supposed to be the housekeeper" and that he asked her
"to show her everything." Testifying that Nieligh per-
formed maids' work when she first came, Landry testified
that thereafter she [Landry] took Nieligh around to make
room checks , and also that Nieligh made a list of needed
repairs.
Upon consideration of all the testimony, I do not believe
the General Counsel, who has the burden of proof, has
established by a preponderance of the evidence that
Nieligh should be excluded from the unit. The best
evidence here is documentary, i.e., Respondent's payroll
records which show that Nieligh was classified as a maid
and paid at the hourly maids rate of $1.90. Whatever
remark Martins may have made to Landry, there is no
evidence to show that Nieligh, who was not called to
testify, was held out to the other employees to be a
housekeeper trainee. Indeed, it is clear that Martins did not
bring Nieligh with him to Rochester with this purpose in
mind, for he did not even learn that the incumbent
housekeeper would resign until after he arrived in
Rochester and took over as manager at the Rochester
facility.13 In view of all the foregoing, I conclude and find
that Nieligh was employed as a maid and that, accordingly,
she should be included in the unit as of September 3.
In view of the findings above, I find that on September 3,
a total of 18 employees were employed in the unit sought
by the General Counsel. Since only nine of these had
signed union authorization cards , it is clear that Respon-
dent did not represent a majority at the time of the demand
made on this date . Further , on the basis of the unit herein
found to be appropriate (i.e., with the inclusion of the four
desk clerks employed at this time), the Union would only
represent 9 of 22 employees.
In sum, I find that the Union did not represent a
majority of Respondent's employees in the appropriate
unit at any times material hereto.
D. The Supervisory Status of Alice Landry
Alice Landry was employed by Respondent as a maid in
ii It should be noted that September 3 was also the last day of
employment of Janice Harley . who signed a card and who I have included
in the unit as of this date
i2 It appears that Martins. Blauvelt , and Nieligh arrived in Rochester on
or about August 20
iJ Uenas, the incumbent housekeeper , resigned about August 27.
Martins thereupon took over all functions , including that of housekeeper,
until a new housekeeper (Carolyn Almeter) was hired on October 16, 1971
This is clear from the fact that on September 30. Respondent placed a help
wanted ad in a local paper for a housekeeper There is no evidence that any
housekeeper was hired between the period when Uenas left and the placing
of this ad
380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
November 1970. It is undisputed that her status was
changed in the early summer of 1971, the question being
whether this change was sufficient to render her becoming
supervisor within the meaning of the Act. In view of
Landry's involvement in the alleged unfair labor practices,
as discussed later herein, I turn to this issue now.
Linda Uenas, who became Respondent's housekeeper in
October 1970, testified that just before the summer season
she went to Manager Maier and told him that Landry
wanted a raise, that she should be given a salary of $100
per week, and also that Landry should be given "the added
responsibility of checking rooms." She did this, she said,
not only because Landry had requested the raise, but also
because this would be an opportune time to give Landry
this additional responsibility since she (Uenas) also would
have additional duties and responsibilities with the
approach of the summer season . In any event, Landry
testified that at this time Maier called her into his office
and told her that he would like her to be housekeeper for
the summer. Although Maier testified that he did not recall
having any conversation with Landry concerning this
matter, he conceded the undisputed fact that Landry was
placed on a salary at the rate of $100 per week at this time.
Thereafter, Landry worked 8 hours a day for 6 days a
week, in contrast to having worked at the maid's rate of
$1.90 per hour for 8 hours, 5 days a week.
At this point it is relevant to note that Landry remained
in the foregoing salaried position until the advent of
Martins taking over as manager on August 28, 1971. At
this time Landry quit the assignment in question and
returned to her former position as a maid, at her former
hourly rate. However, it is undisputed that at all times
during her salaried status, Landry wore a badge which was
lettered "Lorraine Landry, Housekeeper." 14 Landry credi-
bly testified that she wore the badge at the suggestion of
Manager Maler.15
It is also undisputed that Uenas called a meeting of all
the maids to advise them of Landry's new position.
According to Uenas' own testimony, she at this time
advised them as follows:
I told them that as it was getting to be the summer
season and I was going to be away from the back of
house for some time , you know, interviewing maids,
and making out reports and schedules and different
things, that I was giving one of my functions to [Alice]
Lorraine Landry, and that she would be the inspectress
and that she would inspect their rooms at the end or
near . . . well, during the last half of each working day,
and that they were to listen to what she said, if she told
them something was wrong, that they were to go back and
redo it. And I told them that I still would be available,
even though we were busy, and I still would be
11 Although Maler testified that "offhand" he did not recall any badges,
Respondent witness Uenas conceded that Landry wore this badge during
the period in question.
15 It is clear that no other employees wore badges. Concerning the badge
Landry credibly testified that Maier furnished her with a printed tape
bearing the legend noted above which she affixed to a Hardy badge which
she brought from home.
is Landry's elevation to a salaried employee involved a substantial raise
in pay for her, this notwithstanding that she was required to work 6 days a
week.
17 Although I find Landry to be a supervisor , I do not find that she was
available if they had any problems . [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
Turning to my conclusions , I first note , as the record
establishes , that in her new position Landry did not have
authority to hire , discharge , transfer , reward , or promote
employees , or to effectively recommend such action.
Notwithstanding the foregoing , however , I find that under
all the circumstances of this case the evidence establishes
Landry to have been a supervisor within the meaning of
the Act during the period in question . Thus, it is well
established that any individual endowed with ostensible
supervisory authority , i.e., one who is held out by
management to be a supervisor , is a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act. Wilder Finishing Co., Division of Jervis
Corp., 138 NLRB 1017; Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp., 172
NLRB No. 54. Accordingly, in view of Landry's being
placed on a salaried rather than an hourly basis , 16 the fact
that Respondent suggested and thereafter permitted her to
wear a badge declaring her to be the housekeeper,17 Uenas'
instructions to the maids that they were to "listen to"
Landry and do what she told them to do , and Landry's
authority to direct the maids to do the rooms over if she
deemed it necessary, 18 I conclude and find that Landry, at
the very least, was held out to the employees as having
supervisory status and therefore was a supervisor.19
E. The 8(a)(1) Violations Under Manager Donald
Maier
The Union's campaign started on July 24, 1971, at which
time employees Margaret (Kaplan) Burger and Ellen Van
Dame visited the Union's business manager and indicated
that Respondent's employees were interested in union
representation. Both of these employees signed cards at
this time and the organizational activities thereupon got
underway.
Alice Landry, whom I have found to be a supervisor
during this period, testified that after the beginning of the
union campaign Manager Donald Maier called her in the
office and asked that she find out how many girls had
signed union cards. She testified that subsequently Maier
called her again and this time spoke to her in a motel room
with Linda Uenas present. According to Landry, Maier
began by asking if she knew that Margaret Kaplan was
passing out union cards. Landry, who testified that she first
learned of the union activities upon being apprised by a
maid that Kaplan was so engaged, said she responded by
telling Maier that she did know Kaplan was passing out
union cards but that nobody had signed as far as she knew.
Landry testified that at this point Maier stated he wanted
her to discourage the girls from signing union cards, that
"he did not want the Union in because there were meetings
in fact the housekeeper during this period , for the record is clear that Uenas
remained the top supervisor in this regard . Nevertheless, the fact of
Respondent's permitting Landry to wear the housekeeper badge during all
this period is substantial evidence that Respondent intended to hold out
Landry to the other employees as one having supervisory authority.
is See also the testimony of Uenas, as set forth in In . 20, infra, wherein
Uenas quoted Manager Maier as referring to Landry as a supervisor.
is See also The Bama Company, 145 NLRB 1141, and Pearson
Corporation, 138 NLRB 910. And in view of Respondent 's utilization of
Landry in the commission of certain of the unfair labor practices found
herein . see J M. Machinery Corporation, 155 NLRB 860.
HOWARD JOHNSON COMPANY 381
to go to and that it would cost the girls more than they
could pay." Landry said that somewhat later she had
another conversation with Maier at which time he
instructed her to check Kaplan's work "real, real carefully"
and that if she could not find anything wrong, "to go back
and check again because there must be something."
Finally, Landry testified that Maier broached her on other
occasions during the summer , asking her to discourage the
girls from signing and stating that she had influence over
the girls and could stop them from signing.
Called as a witness for the Respondent, Maier testified,
"I had no conversation with Mrs. Landry involving the
Union." He denied directing Landry to engage in surveil-
lance of other employees' union activity and generally
denied making any statements of a coercive nature. Maier,
who repeatedly stated that he could not recall certain
conversations or events concerning which he was queried,
impressed me as a very poor witness. Indeed, in some
instances his testimony was contradictory to that of Linda
Uenas, also a Respondent witness.20 I credit the testimony
of Landry concerning the conversations which she had
with Maier.
Margaret Kaplan Burger, herein called Kaplan, the
employee who was largely responsible for initiating the
union campaign (she also obtained signed union cards
from approximately nine employees), testified to several
conversations which she had with Uenas and Landry
concerning union activities. She testified that the first such
conversation occurred about August 8, at which time
Uenas asked her, infer alia, if she had seen a union
representative around the premises and if she had obtained
a union card. Uenas gave a different version. She said she
asked Burger if she had seen a union man on the property
handing out cards but that during the conversation Burger
volunteered that she had obtained a union card "on her
own." Burger impressed me as an honest witness. I credit
her testimony.
Kaplan testified that the next such conversation oc-
curred about August 18, at which time Landry came up
and asked what she thought about a girl who had only
been there a few weeks and was going around talking
Union. Landry continued, she said, by stating that the girls
did not want the Union; that they couldn't afford the $5
dues; that if she wanted to go to a union meeting she
should go, but she should not tell the other girls to go; that
20 1 have previously related the testimony of Maier and Uenas
concerning the matter of the badge worn by Landry Although Maier said
that he never spoke to Landry about the Union , Uenas recalled a
conversation with Maier which reflects to the contrary Thus, she testified as
follows
Mr Maier called Lorraine and myself in to speak to him in one of the
rooms the first thing he said , he wanted to make clear to Lorraine
his position and that was that neither he nor I could interrogate or seek
information about the Union because we were supervisors, but
Lorraine was on the level with the girls and if she heard information he
would appreciate her passing it on to me . or to him
If, however , Uenas thereby referred to the same meeting concerning
which Landry testified , I credit the testimony of Landry as hereinbefore set
forth.
2i Uenas testified that earlier Kaplan spoke to her and Maier , stating
that Kaplan had been harassing her and that she couldn 't take it any more
She said that she wanted to get Landry and Kaplan together so that they
could all discuss the matter Presumably this was the same occasion referred
to by Kaplan in the testimony cited above . However, insofar as Uenas'
testimony is concerned , it is significant to note that she testified of having
her two sisters had torn up their union cards; and that
Virginia Campbell, the senior maid, had stated that she did
not want a union.
On August 19 Kaplan became involved in another
conversation with Landry. This occurred in the laundry
room in the presence of four other employees. Following
words between Landry and Kaplan during which Landry
berated Kaplan over a matter involving the distribution of
towels, Landry finally stated, "What do you really want?
We don't want the Union. We can't pay the $5 dues and
we don't want you talking about it all the time." Kaplan
testified that at this point she ran over to the office because
she wanted "to complain about the harassment ." Finding
neither Maier nor Uenas there, she proceeded to voice her
complaint to the desk clerk. Somewhat later in the day
Uenas and Landry came to see her in a room where she
was cleaning.21 As reflected in the testimony of Uenas and
Kaplan, Uenas at this time stated that she wished to get
matters "straightened out as between Kaplan and Landry.
However, insofar as is relevant here, Kaplan credibly
testified that during the conversation Landry stated that
she knew that she (Kaplan) had persuaded employee
Janice Harley to sign a union card, but that she had done
so by trickery because she told Harley that "everyone" had
signed, whereas only she (Kaplan) had signed. Kaplan also
testified that at one point Uenas stated, "We know that
you are passing out union cards, and you could be fired for
that, but that is neither here nor there." Uenas put it
somewhat differently. She testified that after Landry
accused Kaplan of tricking Harley into signing a union
card (her testimony here did not differ from Kaplan's) she
spoke up and stated to Kaplan, "Margaret, I know that
you are involved with the Union, and that is neither here
nor there. But do not take company time to hand out these
Union cards and to solicit for the Union . . . there are two
things for which I can fire you, and the first of these is
taking company time for union activities. The second is for
non-performance of work, and that is if you do not get
these rooms cleaned, if you do not go back when Lorraine
tells you to get these rooms cleaned and if they are not
cleaned to my satisfaction." Concerning the latter aspect of
the conversation, I think Uenas in this instance gave the
more correct version and I credit her testimony.22
Finally, Virginia Campbell, employed with Respondent
as a maid, credibly testified that in the early part of August
been informed by Janice Harley , a maid , on the preceding day that Kaplan
had given her a union card . She said that somewhat later she observed
Kaplan walking down a sidewalk doing nothing, whereupon she took
Kaplan into a room. She testified that at this point, "I told Margaret Kaplan
that I did not care about the Union one way or the other but that I did not
want her to take company time to hand out these cards and to seek
signatures for these cards." As to the latter conversation , it is noteworthy
that Uenas , in relating it, did not claim to have observed Kaplan engaged in
union activities or passing out cards on company time.
22 Uenas appeared a knowledgeable and intelligent witness . While I do
not credit all of her testimony. I do not believe that she would go so far as to
flatly tell Kaplan that she could be fired for passing out union cards. I think
in this instance Kaplan was mistaken
In cases, as here, where there is such a considerable conflict of testimony,
it is well to repeat the oft-quoted observation of Judge Learned Hand in
N LR.B. v Universal Camera Corp, 179 F.2d 749, " It is no reason for
refusing to accept everything that a witness says, because you do not believe
all of it , nothing is more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to
believe some and not all."
382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
she had a conversation with Landry wherein Landry told
her that she had been called in the office and was told by
Mater that Margaret Kaplan was in the Union and they
did not want to fire her but they wanted to push her out.
F. The 8(a)(1) Violations Under Manager Wesley
Martins
Wesley Martins replaced Donald Mater as manager of
Respondent's motor lodge on August 28, 1971. It is
undisputed that Alice Landry advised Mater on August 27
that she wished to return to her job as a maid and that as of
that date she was permitted to do so. It is, therefore,
relevant to note that Landry was engaged by Respondent
as an hourly paid employee at all times when she worked
under Martins.23
Commencing in the latter part of August, one Virginia
Campbell, a maid employed by Respondent, became very
active in the Union. She signed a card on August 25 and
within the next week solicited and obtained signed cards
from about seven other employees. One of these was Alice
Landry, whom Campbell persuaded to sign a card on
August 30.24 Landry testified that shortly after signing the
card she went to Martins and told him that she and a
number of other employees had signed union cards and
sent them in. She said that at this time he responded by
saying that it didn't make any difference to him one way or
another. Martins gave a different version. He said that on
this occasion Landry came to his office and stated that
Margaret Kaplan was "sent in" by the Union, that he
should be careful of her and that he should try to get nd of
her. He responded, he said, by stating he did not care one
way or the other if the Union became the employees'
bargaining representative . I do not credit Martins' version
of this conversation. Documentary evidence (Landry's
card) shows that she signed a union card on August 30. As
noted, it was dust thereafter when this conversation took
place. I hardly think it likely that Landry would speak to
Martins so adversely to Kaplan's and the Union's interest
just at the time when she became a union adherent.25
I turn now to Landry's version of events which
culminated with nine employees signing a petition, on
September 9, to withdraw the authorization which they had
given (via cards) to the Union to represent them. Thus,
within a few days of the above conversation which she had
with Martins, Landry had a second conversation with
Martins at which time Martins stated that the Company
did not want the Union in. Landry responded by stating
that the cards signed by employees had already been
submitted to the Union and that she did not know what
they could do. According to Landry, the following then
ensued:
He told me that he can't tell me what to do, but he
would suggest that I write a letter, a petition, and have
the girls sign it and send it in saying that they did not
23 Landry quit herjob with Respondent in October 1971.
24 Landry testified that she finally signed a card after listening to
Campbell explain various benefits she might receive if the Company became
organized
25 Moreover. Kaplan at this time had ceased her union activities. She
testified that she did not pass out any union cards or solicit any signatures
after the occasion of the conversation when Landry, in the presence of
Uenas, accused her of having obtained the signatures of Janice Harley by
want the Union in, and if it was a legitimate Union
they could back out, knowing nobody wanted the
union in, and I would have to use my own stationary
and typewriter.
He said I couldn't do it on Howard Johnson
stationary or typewriter, so I did it at home.
It was not until 2 days after the above conversation that
Landry in fact prepared the petition at her home. However,
Landry testified that during the interim Martins spoke to
her again , this time stating that Howard Johnson could
close the motel if it wanted to and if anything was said they
could say they closed it for repairs. Landry testified that
she repeated this to the employees, at the same time
advising them that she was writing a petition "to ask the
union not to come in." 26 The petition which Landry finally
prepared was dated September 9 and stated as follows:
We the undersigned employees at Howard Johnsons
Motor Lodge #3350 West Henrietta Road, Rochester
New York no longer wish for the union to represent us.
It is undisputed that, after being solicited by Landry, the
following employees, including Landry, signed the peti-
tion : Alice Landry, Patricia Landry, Dolores Osborn,
Pamela Blaney , Gloria Lighthouse, Everett L. Johnson,
and Virginia Campbell. The petition was ultimately mailed
to the Union postmarked September 13.
Concerning all of the foregoing , Martins testified that it
was Landry who came to him and stated that she and the
other employees had signed union cards . According to
Martins , Landry stated that they had done so because "she
and the other girls were dissatisfied and did not like Mr.
Mater and the way Mr. Mater was . . . and that she
wanted to get even with Mr. Mater." Martins testified that
Landry went on to say that the girls thought that he
(Martins) was a reasonable man, that they did not want to
join the Union, that they regretted their action , and now
that they had signed cards they did not know what to do
about it. Martins said that Landry then asked "if there was
any way she and the girls could get out of their
commitment," whereupon he said , "I told her I could
attempt to find out the proper information in line with her
request, and that when and if I got such an answer I would
let her know."
Martins testified that he went to Landry later that same
day and said he had the advice she requested , namely that
they could draw up and sign a petition stating that they no
longer wished to be represented by a Union. He said that
when she thereupon asked him to write down what to put
in the petition , he advised that he could not do this but that
he could make some suggestions as to how to word the
petition . He said she thereupon obtained a pencil and
paper, at which point he suggested the phrasing of the
petition while she took it down in writing . This phrasing, as
testified to by Martins, in fact was practically identical to
the wording of the petition as set forth above.
trickery
2e Respondent notes in its brief that at one point Landry testified that
she was not sure whether the conversation wherein Martins stated that
Respondent could close the hotel occurred before or after she prepared the
petition However , this was clarified in other portions of her testimony
wherein she recalled repeating Martins ' words to other employees prior to
their signing the petition . The testimony of Virginia Campbell also reflects
that this was conveyed to her by Landry before she signed the petition
HOWARD JOHNSON COMPANY 383
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I credit the testimony of
Landry over that of Martins concerning the conversations
between them which led to Landry's preparing and
soliciting the withdrawal petition. In this connection, I find
it hard to believe, as Martins testified, that Landry told
him that she and the other girls signed the union cards
because they did not like Maier and, more particularly,
that she (Landry) signed a card because "she wanted to get
even with Maier." Thus, aside from there being no
evidence to suggest that the girls did not like Maier, there is
no evidence whatsoever of any animus or hard feelings
between Maier and Landry which might possibly motivate
Landry for wishing to "get even" with Maier. Indeed,
Landry did not even sign a union card until August 30,
which was at least 2 days after Maier left Respondent's
employ. Further, and notwithstanding Mater's denial of
ever having made any threat to any employees, I credit
Landry's testimony concerning his statement to her
concerning Respondent's closing the motor lodge 27
G. Conclusions as to the 8(a)(1) Violations and the
Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(5)
I first turn to the allegation in the complaint which
alleges that Alice Landry, "at the direction or suggestion of
Manager Maier," engaged in unlawful surveillance of the
employees' union activities. As heretofore found, it is true
that Martins requested Landry to ascertain how many of
the employees had signed union cards. However, and
notwithstanding that below, I do find Landry to have
engaged in certain other unlawful conduct, in my view the
record does not establish that Landry in fact carried out
Mater's instructions as aforesaid.28 Accordingly, I recom-
mend that this allegation in the complaint be dismissed.29
On the basis of the findings of fact heretofore made, I
conclude and find that by the following conduct, Respon-
dent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise of employee rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act:
(1) Uenas' interrogation of Kaplan as to whether she had
obtained a union card and if she had seen a union
representative on the premises; (2) Landry's interrogation
of Kaplan as to what she thought about a recently hired
employee going around talking about the Union; (3)
Landry's questioning of Kaplan as to what she "really
wanted" as well as her statement, during the same
27 There is a conflict between the testimony of Landry and three
Respondent witnesses as to whether Maler gave Landry a stamp at the time
she mailed the petition . While I do not deem a resolution of this conflict to
be necessary in determining the issues herein , I have given due considera-
tion to this entire testimony , and to the demeanor of the witnesses in giving
it, in making my credibility resolutions herein
28 It is evident that Landry, called as a General Counsel witness, was not
unwilling to testify against her former employer. It therefore seems
reasonable to assume that if she in fact engaged in conduct demonstrating
that she attempted to execute Maler's instructions , or that she made any
reports to him indicating that she did so, she would have so testified
29 Since I have found Landry to be a supervisor during the period in
question , it would not appear that a finding of surveillance can be
established merely on the basis of a conversation between two supervisors,
particularly where the action requested was not shown to have been
executed or to have been made known to the employees. But see Elder-
Beerman Stores Corp, 173 NLRB 566, where the Board found it
conversation , that she did not want Kaplan talking about
the Union all the time ; (4) Landry's telling Kaplan that she
knew she had persuaded Janice Harley to sign a card and
that she had done so by trickery. Although I have found
that Respondent did not engage in actual surveillance of its
employees ' union activities , I find that in this instance
Respondent created the impression that it was engaging in
surveillance ; (5) Uenas' implied threat to Kaplan that she
could be discharged for soliciting employees to sign union
cards ; 30 (6) Landry's statement to Virginia Campbell that
Mater told her that Kaplan was in the Union and that they
wanted to push her out; and (7) Martins ' statement to
Landry , in context with his conversations with her
concerning the withdrawal petition , that Respondent
would or could close the motel ; and (8) Martins'
suggestion to Landry that she prepare a petition repudiat-
ing the Union and procure the signatures of other
employees therein and his assisting her in the drafting of
the petition by advising her of the language to be used
therein 3i
With respect to the alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act, it having been found that the Union did not
achieve a majority status at the times of its demands for
recognition and bargaining , it is recommended that this
allegation be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above , occurring in connection with the operation of
Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate , and substantial relationship to trade , traffic, and
commerce among the several States intend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative actions
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Howard Johnson Company is an employer engaged
unnecessary to pass on this particular question.
30 It will be recalled that on two occasions Uenas warned Kaplan not to
pass out union cards on company time The second occasion not only
occurred in the presence of two supervisors , with one accusing Kaplan of
having tricked an employee into signing a union card , but was coupled with
Uenas emphasizing to Kaplan that she could be discharged for two reasons,
one of these being for passing out union cards on company time. In the
absence of any showing that Kaplan in fact distributed union cards on
company time, indeed there being no evidence that Uenas even believed this
to have occurred, it is clear that there was absolutely no basis for Uenas to
bring up the subject of discharge in connection with Kaplan 's union
activities Accordingly, in the context of the entire conversation wherein this
unwarranted statement was made , I conclude that Uenas thereby impliedly
threatened Kaplan with reprisal for engaging in lawful union activity
'ii Collins & A,kman Corp., 143 NLRB 15, 17: Hoyt Motor Company, Inc.,
136 NLRB 1042, 1047.
384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Local 466 , Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders International Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The following employees constitute a unit appropri-
ate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act:
All employees employed at the employer 's motor lodge
located at 3350 W. Henrietta Road , Rochester, New
York, including maids, launderers , desk clerks, audi-
tors, housemen , bellmen, and maintenance men,
excluding all professional employees , guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. By interfering with , restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7,
of the Act , Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby make the
following recommended: 32
ORDER
Respondent , Howard Johnson Company , its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Creating the impression that it is keeping under
surveillance the activities of its employees in support of
Local 466, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Barten-
ders International Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union
activities and sympathies in a manner constituting interfer-
ence , restraint , and coercion.
(c) Threatening employees with reprisals because of their
union activities or because of their support of the above-
named labor organization.
(d) Threatening to close its motor inn if the above-named
Union , or any other labor organization, succeeds in
organizing its employees.
(e) Soliciting employees to repudiate the above-named
Union, or any other labor organization, or suggesting that
they draft or sign written repudiations of any Union and
procure the signatures of other employees thereon, or
assisting in the drafting of such repudiation.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization to form , join , or assist the
above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purposes of collective bargaining or any other mutual
aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its motor inn in Rochester, New York, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."33 Copies of
said notices on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 3, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees ire customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to see that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.34
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
§pecifically found herein.
32 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 .46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board the findings,
conclusions , recommendations , and recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the
Board and become its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
33 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
a+ In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are
keeping under surveillance the activities of our
employees in support of Local 466, Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees and Bartenders International Union,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning
their union activities or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close our motor inn if our
employees select the above-named Union , or any other
labor organization , as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals
for engaging in union activities or for signing union
authorization cards.
WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to repudiate any
labor organization , or suggest that they prepare and
sign a written repudiation of any union and procure the
signatures of other employees thereon, or assist them to
draft such a repudiation.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with , restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization , to join or assist Local
466, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through represent-
HOWARD JOHNSON COMPANY
atives of their own choosing , or to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
All our employees have the right to join , or not to join,
Local 466, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Barten-
ders International Union , AFL-CIO, or any other union.
HOWARD JOHNSON
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
385
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must be defaced by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Ninth Floor, Federal
Building, 111 West Huron Street, Buffalo, New York
14202, Telephone 716-842-3100.