Hortencia R.,1 Complainant,v.Alex M. Azar II, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (Indian Health Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 6, 20180120172550 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 6, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Hortencia R.,1 Complainant, v. Alex M. Azar II, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (Indian Health Service), Agency. Appeal No. 0120172550 Hearing No. 443-207-00023X Agency No. HHS-HIS-00302016 DECISION The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) accepts Complainant’s appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Administrative Judge’s Order, dated April 19, 2017, and the Agency’s subsequent final decision dated, June 24, 2017, concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. BACKGROUND During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Licensed Practical Nurse, GS 6, at the Agency’s Acute-Care Department at the Pine Ridge Hospital in Pine Ridge, South Dakota. On November 6, 2015, Complainant initiated EEO Counselor contact. Informal efforts at resolution were not successful. On February 5, 2016, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her based on age (born 1961) when: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120172550 2 1. Complainant was directed to complete the Advanced Cardiac Life Support (“ACLS”) and the Pediatric Advanced Life Support (“PALS”) training, which had not been required previously. Complainant completed the training as directed on August 27, 2014, February 8, 2015,2 respectively. 2. On or about November 5, 2015, Complainant was not given a raise after duties had been added to her position description, on May 1, 2015, without her notification. As a preliminary matter, we find it necessary to address the extensive procedural history of this case, which was compounded by considerable confusion, discussed further below. The Agency initially dismissed Complainant’s formal complaint on March 8, 2016 on the ground that it was untimely filed. Complainant’s appeal to the Commission followed. On June 24, 2016, the Commission reversed the Agency’s dismissal and remanded the case to the Agency for further processing. Complainant v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal No. 0120161496 (June 24, 2016). After the investigation of the claims, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or a final decision within thirty days of receipt of the correspondence. On November 4, 2016, Complainant requested a hearing before an AJ. On March 24, 2017, the Agency issued a Combined Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Decision Without a Hearing. The Agency asserted that the formal complaint should be dismissed for untimely EEO Counselor contact. The Agency further argued that the undisputed evidence did not support a finding of discrimination and a decision could be issued on the record. On April 19, 2017, the AJ issued a Final Order. In the body of the Order, the AJ determined that EEO Counselor contact was untimely. The AJ also dismissed Complainant’s hearing request as untimely and remanded the case to the Agency for an Agency final decision. The AJ, however, also instructed the Agency to “issue a final order notifying the Complainant whether [the Agency] will fully implement [the AJ’s order] (emphasis added)” in the Notice to the Parties attached to the AJ’s Order. On April 19, 2017, the Agency contacted the AJ, by email, for guidance regarding its perception of conflicting instructions stated in the AJ’s Order, as noted above. The AJ responded by email on April 19, 2017 that “[t]he Order should be interpreted as a final order under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a).” 2 The PALS certification certificate indicates that Complainant completed this training on April 3, 2015. 0120172550 3 Nevertheless, on June 24, 2017, the Agency issued the instant final decision on the merits,3 finding no discrimination. On August 18, 2017,4 the Agency notified Complainant by letter that it had rescinded its June 24, 2017 final agency decision. The Agency explained in the letter that “the AJ’s Order Entering Judgment has become final as a matter of law.” The instant appeal from Complainant followed. In response, the Agency requests, on appeal, that the Commission uphold the AJ’s finding and dismiss Complainant’s complaint for untimely EEO Counselor contact. The Agency further requests that in the event the Commission addresses the merits of the complaint; the Commission should find that the Agency did not subject Complainant to age discrimination. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS EEO Counselor Contact The AJ properly dismissed Complainant’s complaint for untimely EEO Counselor contact. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action. The Commission has adopted a “reasonable suspicion” standard (as opposed to a “supportive facts” standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (Feb. 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until a Complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become apparent. Here, Complainant stated in her affidavit that she was allegedly “threatened” in March 2015 “with the charge of insubordination if [she] failed to take a skills-check-off on the PALS certification.” The record indicates that Complainant’s supervisor reminded Complainant on February 25, 2015 and March 26, 2015 to complete PALS training and Complainant completed both trainings on August 27, 2014 and April 3, 2015. The record also indicates that Complainant’s supervisor emailed Complainant a copy of the revised Practical Nurse position description on May 1, 2015. 3 The Agency explained that “claims 1 and 2 should have been dismissed for untimely EEO Counselor contact prior to acceptance pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107. However, in order to provide Complainant with an opportunity to make her case, the decision proceeds under the assumption that these claims are, in fact, timely.” 4 The letter is incorrectly dated “April” 18, 2017. However, the certification of service for this letter indicates that it was mailed on August 18, 2017. 0120172550 4 The email explained that the Practical Nurse position description underwent classification in October 2015, without any changes reflected in the grade level. The revised Practical Nurse position description included new requirements for Complainant to complete ACLS and PALS training. Complainant stated in her affidavit that she became aware of the changes reflected in her position description in May 2015. Therefore, Complainant had constructive knowledge of changes to her position description as early as May 1, 2015. Complainant, however, waited six months to initiate EEO Counselor contact on November 6, 2015. Thus, Complainant initiated EEO contact well beyond the 45-day limitation period. We note that Complainant emailed her supervisor on November 4, 2015 to inquire whether Complainant would receive a grade increase considering the new training requirements. However, Complainant’s supervisor had already explained, in the May 1, 2015 email, that there were no grade changes reflected in the revised Practical Nurse position description. Therefore, the information Complainant would have received in response to her November 4, 2015 inquiry would not have differed from the information she received initially on May 1, 2015. Complainant has not presented any persuasive arguments or evidence warranting an extension of the time limit for initiating EEO Counselor contact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2). Therefore, the AJ properly dismissed Complainant’s formal complaint for untimely EEO Counselor contact. Disparate Treatment To the extent that we were to entertain the merits of this case, we find that Complainant would not have prevailed on the merits even if she had timely initiated EEO Counselor contact. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. 0120172550 5 See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). Agency management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Acute Care Supervisor (“S1”) (YOB: 1954) stated, regarding claim 1, that the Director of Nursing (“Director”) (YOB: 1975) issued a memorandum requiring all nursing personnel to become ACLS and PALS certified. S1 further stated that and email was sent to “all nursing staff,” and no registered nurses were excluded from this requirement. S1 further explained that the required skills from the ACLS and PALS training were within the scope of Complainant’s practice and the trainings ensured that Complainant had knowledge of the procedures. The Director stated that she issued the email regarding the new training requirement to staff on September 2, 2014. The Director further stated that the trainings were issued to all nursing staff regardless of age and the trainings were required for “any nurse proving direct patient care.” The Director explained that Complainant provided direct patient care because her position involved monitoring patients. The Director further explained that Complainant is “the only LPN who meets the direct-patient-service criterion for these requirements.” The record contains a copy of Complainant’s revised Practical Nurse position description which states, in pertinent part, that LPNs “[p]rovide direct care as a licensed practical nurse in assessing, planning, implementing, and evaluating care for patients in the Acute Care department.” The record also contains a copy of the Director’s September 2, 2014 email informing the supervisors that “[a]ll [registered nurse] and LPN position descriptions need to state that BLS, ACLS, [and] PALS [training certifications] are required.” The record includes a copy of the Agency’s nursing staff personnel list for fiscal year 2015 as well as the Agency’s organizational chart indicating that Complainant was the only the Practical Nurse at the Agency. Copies of Complainant’s ACLS and PALS certificates indicate that Complainant completed these trainings on August 27, 2014 and April 3, 2015. Regarding claim 2, S1 explained that she forwarded Complainant’s pay increase request to the Director. S1 stated that the Director explained that “fulfilling new educational requirements did not warrant an increase in pay.” S1 stated that no other employee received an increase for completing the training courses at issue. S1 further explained that Complainant is at her highest paygrade for an LPN, and Complainant cannot receive a pay increase while hired in this position. S1 stated that Complainant would have to become a registered nurse to earn more money. 0120172550 6 The Director explained that Complainant’s position description was reclassified in October 2014 and the additional certification requirements did not warrant a pay increase. The Director further explained that the Office of Personnel Management sets the wages for career series/grade/step, and she does not have the authority to alter Complainant’s payment. The Director further stated that Complainant “is at the maximum grade and step compensation levels for an LPN.” The record contains a copy of Practical Nurse position descriptions classified in March 2010 and October 2014. Both position descriptions classify the Practical Nurse position at a GS 6 even though the October 2014 position description includes the requirement that all LPNs “maintain BLS, ACLS, PALS, and other certifications.” After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that neither during the investigation, nor on appeal, has Complainant proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered reasons for the disputed actions were a pretext for unlawful discrimination based on her age. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Administrative Judge’s Order Entering Judgement dismissing the complaint for untimely EEO Counselor contact. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. 0120172550 7 The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 6, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation