Hooker Chemical Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 30, 1960

128 N.L.R.B. 1394 (N.L.R.B. 1960)

1394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
payroll period immediately preceding the date of issuance of the
notice of election. See Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 107 NLRB 1137;
see also Gail N. Glass d,/b/a Richard A. Glass Company, 120 NLRB
914, 917; Musgrave Manufacturing Company, et al., 124 NLRB 258.
[Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication.]
Hooker Chemical Corporation successor to Shea Chemical Cor-
poration and District 50, United Mine Workers of America
and Local Union No. 13871, District 50, United Mine Workers
of America , Parties to the Contract and David Gardner and
Charles D. Peyton
District 50, United Mine Workers of America and Local Union
No. 13871, District 50, United Mine Workers of America and
Hooker Chemical Corporation successor to Shea Chemical
Corporation, Party to the Contract and David Gardner and
Charles D. Peyton. Cases Nos. 9-CA-1f96, 9-CA-1298, and
9-CB-368. August 30, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 22, 1959, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached thereto. Thereafter, the Respondents
and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner except to the extent inconsistent
herewith.
1. The Trial Examiner concluded that the Respondent Company
and Unions had violated Section 8(a) (1) (2) and (3) and Section
8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act, respectively,'by requiring employees
to join the Respondent Local Union and execute checkoff authori-
zations pursuant to an oral agreement, understanding, or practice
although the Union was not in compliance with Section 9(f), (g),
1 At one point in the Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner inadvertently stated
that "the Respondent Unions violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (2 ) of the Act." This
is corrected to read "8 (b) (1) (A) and ( 2) of the Act."
128 NLRB No. 133.
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1395
and (h) of the Act?. To remedy such violations, the Trial Examiner
recommended the application of the Brown-Olds remedy whereby the
Respondents, jointly and severally, were to reimburse all present and
former employees for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys un-
lawfully exacted from them as a condition of employment. The Trial
Examiner noted that no unfair labor practices could be found against
the Respondent Employer prior to August 19, 1957, because of the 6-
month statutory limitation contained in Section 10(b) of the Act, and
that no employees had been hired and no checkoff authorizations exe-
cuted after July 1, 1957. The Trial Examiner concluded, neverthe-
less, that although a finding of violation based on the execution prior
to August 19, 1957, of the written checkoff authorizations was barred
by Section 10(b), the continued enforcement (i.e., the continued de-
ductions) of the illegally obtained authorizations constituted an unfair
labor practice occurring within the 10 (b) period. In doing so, the
Trial Examiner relied on the Board's decision in Bryan Manufactur-
ing Company, 119 NLRB 502, at 504, enfd. 264 F. 2d 575 (C.A.D.C.).
Since the Intermediate Report herein issued, the Supreme Court,
in reviewing the 10 (b) question in Bryan,3 concluded that "a finding
of violation which is inescapably grounded on events predating the
limitations period" is barred by Section 10(b). As the Respondent
Employer's alleged violations herein are necessarily grounded on
events which predated the 10(b) period, we conclude, in accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in Bryan, that the complaint,
insofar as it alleges that the Respondent Employer violated Section
8(a) (1) (2) and (3), must be dismissed. This does not, however, pre-
clude a finding of violation against the Respondent Union. The
charge against the Respondent Union was served on August 25, 1957,4
and the unfair labor practices found occurred within the 6-month
period preceding that date. In contrast, the earliest charge against
the Respondent Employer was served on February 19, 1958, which,
as set forth above, was more than 6 months after such violations.
2. Unlike the Trial Examiner, we conclude that the application of
a Brown-Olds or any other reimbursement order is not warranted
here. In the present case, there is no question that the Union repre-
sented a majority and employees could have been lawfully required
to join the union but for the fact that the Unions were not in com-
pliance. Our dissenting colleague does not dispute that such non-
compliance has been deemed a technical violation which does not
2 Prior to its amendment in September 1959, Section 8(a) (3) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act permitted an employer to make an agreement with a labor organiza-
tion requiring membership in such labor organization as a condition of employment only
if, inter also, such labor organization was in compliance with Section 9,(f), (g), and (h)
of the Act
3 Locai Lodge No. 14 2 4, etc., et al v N L R.B, 362 U.S. 411.
'The Trial Examiner erroneously gave this date as September 17, 1959.
1396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
warrant the application of a Brown-Olds remedy.5 Instead, he seem-
ingly seeks to justify a different result because the agreement here was
not in writing. In our opinion, however, the mere fact that the agree-
ment here was oral rather than written does not warrant a reimburse-
ment remedy, even assuming, arguendo, that compliance with the
Section 8(a) (3) proviso requires a written agreement." For contrary
to the apparent assumption of our dissenting colleague, the Board
does not hold that every invalid union-security agreement warrants
application of such a remedy. Rather the Board has held that a
Brown-Olds reimbursement remedy is warranted where the agreement
or practice makes union membership or union clearance a condition of
obtaining employment 7 and that such remedy is not warranted where,
as here, the agreement or practice is unlawful for some reason not in-
volving a limitation on the right to obtain employment"
We also conclude that a reimbursement remedy is not warranted by
the additional fact that employees were coerced as to the form or
method of paying their dues and initiation fees by being required,
after a grace period conforming to the Act, to execute a combined
membership application and checkoff authorization. It cannot be
questioned that an employee covered by a union-security agreement
which is unlawful for reasons not involving a limitation on the right
to obtain employment is, if the agreement is enforced, subject to
unlawful coercion to pay union dues and initiation fees, either directly
or through a checkoff. Yet, as pointed out previously, the Board does
not require reimbursement in such cases. The only difference between
this case and the cited cases not ordering reimbursement is that,
because the membership application here included a checkoff author-
ization, the employees affected were required to pay dues and initia-
tion fees through payroll deductions rather than by some other
method .9 Contrary to the apparent opinion of our dissenting col-
league, we believe this distinction is too insubstantial to warrant the
result he urges.l"
b See Philadelphia Woodworking Company 121 NLRB 1642 at 1645.
6 In view of the basis for our conclusion regarding the appropriate remedy, discussion
of our colleague ' s opinion regarding the legality of an oral arrangement is unnecessary.
7 E g. Dtimeo Construction Company, 122 NLRB 980 at 981 ; Argo Steel Construction
Company, 122 NLRB 1077 at 1084
8 Orfeo Kostrencich , et al., 127 NLRB 96; Chun King Sales, Inc., 126 NLRB 761; Nord-
berg-Selah Fruit, Inc., et al., 126 NLRB 714 ; Local 569 , United Packinghouse Workers, etc.
(Frank Jaworski Sausage Company), 126 NLRB 870.
0 Cf Chun King Sales, Inc., supra ; Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., et al., 122 NLRB 1552
at 1555.
10 Member Jenkins joins his colleagues of the majority in finding that the Brown-Olds
reimbursement remedy is inapplicable in this case for the reason that there was no
evidence of coercion directed specifically toward the securing of checkoff authorizations
or that the individuals were required to join the Union before 30 days or as a condition
of employment at the time of hiring ( See his separate dissenting opinion in Shear's
Pharmacy, 128 NLRB 1417 .) However, like his dissenting colleague , he is of the
opinion that an oral union-security arrangement or understanding is not lawful.
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION
ORDER
1397
Upon the entire record in these cases and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Unions, Local
13871, District 50, United Mine Workers of America and District 50,
United Mine Workers of America, their officers, agents, representa-
tives, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Maintaining, or otherwise giving effect to any understanding,
arrangement or practice with Hooker Chemical Corporation, whereby
employees must become members of the Respondent Union as a con-
dition of employment except in accordance with Section 8(a) (3) of
the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
(b) Coercing employees of Hooker Chemical Corporation to ex-
ecute checkoff authorizations or giving effect to any checkoff author-
ization forms previously executed by employees of Hooker Chemical
Corporation, authorizing the deduction of union dues and/or initia-
tion fees from wages and their remission to the Respondent Unions.
(c) Causing or attempting to cause Hooker Chemical Corporation
to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of
the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing the
employees of Hooker Chemical in the exercise of their rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized by Section
8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its offices in Jeffersonville, Indiana, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix." 11 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region shall, after
being duly signed by their authorized representative, be posted by
Respondent Unions immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members are customarily
u In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order"
the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an
Order."
577684-61-vol 128-89
1398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices
are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail to the Regional Director for the Ninth Region signed
copies of the notice for posting at the Jeffersonville, Indiana, plant of
Hooker Chemical Corporation, if said Corporation be willing. Copies
of said notice, to be furnished to the Respondent Unions by the
Regional Director shall, after being signed by Representatives of the
Respondent Union, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director
for such posting.
(c) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing, within 10
days from the date of this Order as to what steps they have taken to
comply herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint against the
Respondent Company be, and it hereby is, dismissed, and, except as
otherwise found herein that the complaint against the Respondent
Unions be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBER RODGERS , dissenting :
I do not agree with my colleagues' failure to order a reimbursement
remedy in this case.
As found by my colleagues, the Union and the Employer had an
understanding or arrangement under which employees were required,
as a condition of continued employment after 60 days, to join the
Union and to execute checkoff authorizations. My colleagues cor-
rectly find that it was unlawful to require employees to join the Union
because the Union was not in compliance with the then operative
Section 9(f),(g), and (h) of the Act. They also find correctly that
the checkoff authorizations executed in these circumstances were ob-
tained through unlawful coercion. My colleagues are nevertheless
withholding the application of a reimbursement remedy, on the basis
of their assertion that but for the Union' s noncompliance with the
filing requirements of the former Section 9(f), (g), and (h), "em-
ployees could have been lawfully required to join the Union."
This oblique reasoning ignores the fact that, regardless of the
Union's noncompliance, there was in this case no lawfully operative
requirement that employees join the Union. There was no written
union-security clause of any kind in the contract between the Union
and the Employer. There is considerable doubt that any oral or im-
plicit union-security arrangement is lawful, even if it otherwise ap-
parently conforms to the proviso to Section 8(a) (3). In my opinion
such an arrangement or understanding is not lawful."
12 Under the Wagner Act, the Board refused to accept alleged oral closed -shop agree-
ments as a defense to violations involving discharges for nonmembership in a union,
where the parties' written contract contained no closed -shop provision . The Iron Fire-
men Manufacturing Company, 69 NLRB 19; G. W. Hume Company, et al., 71 NLRB 533,
535. The Board has also found that a discharge for nonmembership in a union violates
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1399
But clearly any arrangement, whether it be written or unwritten,
which conditions continued employment on both signing a checkoff
authorization card and joining the Union is without doubt an unlaw-
ful arrangement; such an arrangement goes well beyond what is au-
thorized by the proviso to Section 8 (a) (3). The facts in this case
do not warrant considering separately the membership and checkoff
requirements here at issue-as my colleagues are doing. Here it is
clear that the Union, with the approval of the Employer, handed to
the employees a combination membership application and checkoff
authorization, and told them to sign it if they wished to continue
working. Thus the illegality that is inherent in the parties' arrange-
ment stems no more from the one facet than from the other.
As the arrangement between the Respondents thus unlawfully co-
erced employees to join the Union, and to pay dues and initiation
fees through payroll deductions, the appropriate remedy should re-
quire reimbursement of the moneys coercively collected. The attempt
of my colleagues to justify their failure to order reimbursement of
moneys collected on the ground that the unlawful defect in the Re-
spondent's union-security arrangement was merely technical is ob-
viously fallacious.
Section 8 ( a) (3) as amended , where the written union -security clause involved contains
no requirement that the dischargee acquire membership as a condition of continued em-
ployment Nordberg-Selah Fruit, Inc, et at, 126 NLRB 714.
I also note that Congress was sufficiently concerned with the same problem to require,
in Section 104 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, that
labor organizations furnish a written copy of any collective -bargaining agreement made
with any employer , to any employee whose rights are affected by such agreement.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL UNION No. 13871, DISTRICT 50,
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA AND DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE
WORKERS OF AMERICA, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF HOOKER CHEMICAL
CORPORATION
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT maintain or otherwise give effect to any under-
standing, agreement, or practice with Hooker Chemical Corpora-
tion whereby employees must become union members as a condi-
tion of employment except in accordance with Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL NOT coerce employees of Hooker Chemical Corpora-
tion to execute checkoff authorizations or give effect to any check-
1400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
off authorization forms previously executed by employees of
Hooker Chemical Corporation.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Hooker Chemical Cor-
poration to discriminate against employees in violation of Section
8(a) (3) of the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
the employees of Hooker Chemical Corporation in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the
extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized by Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
LOCAL UNION No. 13871, DISTRICT 50,
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE
WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated-- -------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before W. Gerard Ryan,
the duly designated Trial Examiner , in Louisville , Kentucky, on March 17, April
13-17, and April 20-24, 1959, in which the issues litigated were alleged violations
of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2 ) of the Act. The
General Counsel and the Respondents participated in oral argument and have filed
briefs.
In Case No . 9-CA-1296 the charge was filed by David E . Gardner on February
18, 1958 , against Shea Chemical Corporation and was served on February 19, 1958.
Gardner filed and served an amended charge on September 17, 1958, upon Hooker
Chemical Corporation, the Respondent Employer.
In Case No. 9-CA-1298 Charles D. Peyton filed a charge against Shea Chemical
Corporation on February 26, 1958 , which was served on February 26, 1958 . Peyton
filed an amended charge on September 17, 1858 , which was served upon Respond-
ent Employer on September 17, 1958.
In Case No. 9-CB-368 Gardner and Peyton filed a charge on August 27, 1957,
against Respondents District 50, United Mine Workers of America and Local
Union No. 13871, District 50, United Mine Workers of America , which charge was
served on September 17, 1959.
The complaint alleged that Hooker Electrochemical Corporation , a New York
corporation , on or about May 29, 1958 , consolidated with Shea Chemical Cor-
poration to form a new corporation known as Hooker Chemical Corporation which
latter firm , a New York corporation, assumed all of the assets and liabilities of Shea
Chemical Corporation, including the obligations of all labor contracts to which
Shea Chemical Corporation had been a party.
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1401
The original answer filed by Hooker Chemical Corporation admitted the fore-
going allegation , except the allegation as to the State of incorporation as set forth
in subparagraph 1(a) thereof.
At the hearing Respondent Employer Hooker Chemical Corporation moved to
amend its answer and the motion was granted over objections of the General Counsel.
The Respondent Employer Hooker Chemical Corporation then in its amended
answer admitted the allegations contained in subparagraph 1(a) of the complaint
except the allegation , previously stated, as to the State of incorporation of Shea
Chemical Corporation and the additional exception (heretofore admitted in the
original answer ) as to the assumption by Hooker Chemical Corporation of the obli-
gations of all labor contracts to which Shea Chemical Corporation had been a party.
During the hearing the General Counsel moved to strike such additional exception
and decision on the motion was reserved . I now deny the motion.
During the hearing the Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on various
grounds, including Section 10(b) and (c) of the Act, upon which decision was
reserved . Those motions are disposed of in accordance with the findings and con-
clusions hereinafter set forth.
Upon the entire record and my observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION , SUCCESSOR
TO SHEA CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Hooker Chemical Corporation , a New York corporation , has been and still is the
surviving corporation resulting from the consolidation and merger on May 29, 1958,
of Shea Chemical Corporation ( a Tennessee corporation ) and Hooker Electro-
chemical Company ( a New York corporation).
During the calendar year 1957, Shea Chemical Corporation sold, shipped, and
delivered from its plant in Jeffersonville , Indiana, chemicals and related products
manufactured by it valued in excess of $50,000, directly to points outside the State
of Indiana. From on and after May 29, 1958, Hooker Chemical Corporation sold,
shipped , and delivered from the Jeffersonville , Indiana, plant products valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Indiana . The record
shows that when Hooker Chemical Corporation was formed on May 29, 1958,
as a result of the above merger and consolidation , there was a collective -bargaining
agreement in existence between Shea Chemical Corporation and the Respondent
Unions which had been entered into on August 1, 1956, and which was to terminate
on July 31, 1958. Hooker Chemical Corporation assumed that labor agreement
and observed it until it terminated on July 31 , 1958, during which time Hooker
Chemical Corporation continued the checkoff of dues and transmitted such amounts
to District 50. Hooker Chemical Corporation has now in effect a written collective-
bargaining agreement with Respondent Unions effective since August 1, 1958,
which will continue in effect until July 31, 1960. Further evidence that the Re-
spondent Employer is the successor to Shea Chemical Corporation for all purposes,
including the obligations of all labor contracts to which Shea Chemical Corporation
had been a party, is contained in the Agreement of Consolidation and Merger,
paragraph 10(c) which provided:
All rights of creditors and all liens upon the property of either of the Con-
stituent Corporations shall be preserved unimpaired , limited in lien to the
property affected by such liens at the time of the Consolidation , and all debts,
liabilities and duties of the respective Constituent Corporations shall thence-
forth attach to the Consolidated Corporation and may be enforced against it
to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or
contracted by it.
Section 90 of article 8 of the New York Stock Corporation Law provides inter
alia that ". . . such consolidated corporation shall be deemed to have assumed and
shall be liable for all liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations con-
solidated in the same manner as if such consolidated corporation had itself incurred
such liabilities or obligations."
Joseph M. Weigman was director of industrial relations for Shea Chemical Cor-
poration prior to the consolidation and merger and continued in that capacity for
several months thereafter. He testified there was no interruption in production or
change in conditions of employment as a result of the consolidation at the four
plants owned and operated by Shea Chemical Corporation prior to the consolidation,
nor were there any changes in supervision at said plants as an immediate result of
1402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the consolidation and merger. He testified further that there was no change in the
operation of said plants and that Hooker Chemical Corporation continued to fulfill
the contracts made by Shea Chemical Corporation for the shipment of Shea's products
to its various customers pursuant to the production schedules made up by Shea with
the same employees who had worked for Shea Chemical Corporation. The only
change which took place immediately after the consolidation and merger was a
change of officers without any change in ownership operations or labor relations
policy in respect to the plants previously operated by Shea Chemical Corporation.
By reason of the foregoing it is clear and I find that Hooker Chemical Cor-
poration is the alter ego of Shea Chemical Corporation and has assumed all of the
assets and liabilities of Shea Chemical Corporation including the obligations of all
labor contracts to which Shea Chemical Corporation had been a party. I further
find that at all times herein material Shea Chemical Corporation was, and Hooker
Chemical Corporation, its successor, still is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act and that assertion of jurisdiction is warranted.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
District 50, United Mine Workers of America and Local Union No. 13871 are
labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. Neither labor organization had
complied with the then provisions of Section 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act.'
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleged that for the purpose of encouraging membership in and
activities on behalf of Respondent Unions, the Respondents on or about August 25,
1957, compiled and published a seniority list on which, at the demand of Respond-
ent Unions, the Respondent Employer falsely assigned the seniority of April. 1, 1957,
to Charles D. Peyton and April 8, 1957, to David Gardner, although both had been
continuously employed by Respondent Employer since November 14, 1955; and
that the assignment of such false dates and the failure to restore them to their
correct seniority status caused Peyton and Gardner to be discharged on August 25,
1957, in violation of the Act.
David Gardner was hired at the Jeffersonville plant as a maintenance laborer by
Stanley Hanen, maintenance superintendent for Shea Chemical Corporation at $1.40
per hour on November 14, 1955. At the time he was hired Hanen told him, "We
have a union here and after 60 days probationary state you'll have to join and
you'll get a quarter an hour more." On January 13, 1956, which was the end of
his 60-day probation period, Gardner received the increase provided for in the
collective-bargaining agreement of 25 cents per hour. On February 2, 1956, he
joined the Union by signing a membership application and authorization for dues
checkoff. On that day, Pete Costa, the president of the Local Union told him,
"Gardner, your 60 days is up. Here is a checkoff slip for you to sign." Gardner
replied that he did not want to sign it and did not want to belong to the Union.
Costa answered, "Everybody else here belongs. If you don't want to work here
it's all right with me." Gardner retorted, "Well, I don't work here then" to which
'Costa replied, "Well, that's okay with me." When Gardner turned away, Huffman
who was an employee and also on the grievance committee inquired , "Aren't you
going to join?" and Gardner answered , "I can 't write." (Gardner, however, was
able to write. ) Huffman then said , "If you 'll put your X down there I'll sign it
for you." Gardner then testified "things was getting confused" so he went back
and signed after an argument . Gardner continued as a member of the Union and
his dues were checked off monthly by Shea Chemical Corporation during his con-
tinuous employment thereafter until he was laid off on August 25, 1957.
On or about June 6, 1956, Gardner left the Jeffersonville plant and went to Dallas,
Texas, to work for Shea Chemical Corporation where the Company was constructing
a new plant and where Gardner worked under the supervision of Superintendent
Hanen. Gardner did not obtain a leave of absence to go to Dallas nor at any time
for any time he was away from Jeffersonville. Gardner worked at Dallas until
about November 4, 1956, when he was transferred from Dallas to the plant of
Shea Chemical Corporation in Adams, Massachusetts. While Gardner was working
at Dallas, his union dues were checked off monthly by the Company but were not
remitted to Respondent Unions. They were allowed to accumulate because as the
1 Since the hearing closed , Congress has repealed the filing requirements of Section
9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, Section 201(d). The repeal does rot operate retroactively to excuse violations
previously committed.
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1403
record shows, the payroll clerk did not know what to do with them. There is
nothing in the record to show that the Respondent Unions had any knowledge of
such checkoff while Gardner was in Dallas. There was no Union Local in Dallas
at that time. Such accumulated dues were later returned to him by the Company.
About 2 weeks before leaving Dallas for Adams, Gardner asked Superintendent
Hanen if he still had any seniority with Shea Chemical Corporation stating that if
he did not have it, he did not intend to go to Adams; that if he had lost his semority
he did not intend to go further but wanted to establish it somewhere else. Hanen
replied, "Definitely you will have your seniority: you won't have to worry a thing
about it."
Gardner continued to work at the Adams plant until he was returned to the
Jeffersonville plant where he began working on April 8, 1957. While at Adams he
was a member of the Union Local there and his dues were checked off monthly and
remitted to the Adams Local.
Charles D. Peyton was hired on November 14, 1955 (the same day that Gardner
was hired) by Superintendent Stanley Hanen, to work at the Jeffersonville plant as
a laborer at $1.40 per hour. At the same time, Hanen told him he would have to
join the Union after 60 days and would get an increase of 25 cents per hour.
Peyton replied that would be fine and accepted the job. He joined the Union at the
same time Gardner did on February 2, 1956. He continued to work thereafter
continuously for the Company until he was laid off on August 25, 1957. He always
remained a member of the Union and his dues were checked off monthly.
About the middle of July 1956, Peyton went from the Jeffersonville plant to work
at the Dallas construction project under the supervision of Superintendent Hanen.
Peyton applied for and obtained a 30-day leave of absence from the Jeffersonville
plant before he left for Dallas. While he was at Dallas and before the 30-day leave
had expired. Peyton inquired from Hanen about getting his leave of absence extended
and Hanen told him to forget about it because it was not worth the paper it was
written on.
Three or four weeks after Gardner had left Dallas, Peyton too (about the end
of November 1956) was transferred to Adams. While at Adams his monthly dues
were checked off by the Company. Peyton worked at Adams until the end of March
1957, at which time he was told by Superintendent Hanen to return to Jeffersonville.
He resumed work in Jeffersonville on April 1, 1957, and, as already shown above,
worked until August 25, 1957.
After Gardner and Peyton returned to the Jeffersonville plant, they were aware
in April 1957 that their seniority had been forfeited. During the month of April
1957 meetings were held between representatives of Shea Chemical Corporation and
the Respondent Unions and the rates of pay, seniority , and work assignments for
Gardner, Peyton, and another employee (Gilbert Tyler) were discussed. As a
result of these meetings, it was agreed by representatives of Shea Chemical Cor-
poration and the Respondent Unions that Gardner and Peyton would continue at
the rates of pay and job classifications which they had when they returned to the
Jeffersonville plant ; and they were assigned as construction employees and were
able to work in the plant when not engaged in construction work but when working
in the plant could not displace any regular employees . There is disputed evidence
that an agreement was also reached that their seniority would be the dates on which
they returned to work at the Jeffersonville plant . Gardner testified that Stanley
Hanen and A . H. Newbanks , production superintendent , notified him of the results
of the meeting sometime during April 1957. Peyton testified that Gardner told
him, in April 1957, that their seniority was "dropped down to the bottom." 2
On May 28, 1957, Peyton was present with Gardner when Joe Wilkins, then
president of the Local Union, gave Peyton and Gardner new membership applica-
tions and authorizations for checkoff of dues to be signed. Also present was Arthur
Newbanks , production superintendent for Shea Chemical Corporation at that time.
Wilkins brought the slips out and said, "Your 30 days is up. In fact, it went over
30 days. I want you to sign this ." Gardner said he did not want to sign and asked
Wilkins to wait for a couple of days because he was waiting for his transfer card
from the Adams Local. At that point Newbanks wanted to know what was the matter
and Gardner replied that he did not want to sign because his transfer slip (from
Adams ) was coming in. Newbanks then stated that Mr. Shea (president of Shea
2 Louis Martin was transferred from the Jeffersonville plant to the Dallas plant to
the Adams plant and when he returned to the Jeffersonville plant his seniority was the
date when he was hired originally at the Jeffersonville plant because he requested and
obtained a leave of absence covering the period of time that he was away from the
Jeffersonville plant.
1404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Chemical Corporation) said if anybody worked there, they would join the union.
After that was said, Gardner signed. Peyton signed "while they were arguing." At
the time Wilkins also told Gardner and Peyton that he would return their money
if their transfers came through from the Local in Adams, Massachusetts. Peyton
testified that he heard later that his transfer later did arrive.
The question of Gardner's and Peyton's seniority was again considered and
reconsidered at further meetings between representatives of Shea Chemical Cor-
poration and the Respondent Unions in May, June, and August 1957. The Respond-
ent Unions maintained throughout that Gardner's seniority should date from April
8, 1957, nand Peyton's seniority should date from April 1, 1957, the dates when they
returned to the Jeffersonville plant, because of their failure to obtain leaves of
absence while they were away from the plant.
On August 23, 1957,3 Shea Chemical Corporation posted a list of employees to
be laid off on August 25, 1957. Gardner's seniority dated from April 8, 1957, and
Peyton's seniority dated from April 1, 1957. Gardner and Peyton were included
among the 13 employees who were to be laid off and they were laid off on August
25, 1957. The layoff was an economic layoff. All these employees were laid off
in accordance with the Jeffersonville plant seniority list dated August 21, 1957
(posted August 23). In addition to the layoff, other employees in the bargaining unit
were reassigned to lower paid jobs. The layoff was not discussed with the Re-
spondent Unions, except that Plant Manager Hogan called Hoover, the field repre-
sentative of District 50, and told Hoover the names of the employees who were
to be laid off.
In September 1957 Peyton and Gardner were two of six employees recalled for
temporary work at the Jeffersonville plant which was completed in early October
1957, and the six employees were laid off. In January 1958 Gardner and Peyton
were among employees recalled for temporary work and on January 10, 1958,
Gardner and Peyton were two of the three employees who were laid off. All the
employees recalled and laid off were selected for recall or layoff by the plant
manager in accordance with the Jeffersonville plant seniority list dated August 21,
1957 (posted August 23).
Conclusions With Respect to Gardner and Peyton
The basic and ultimate question presented is whether their layoffs on August
25, 1957, were discriminatorily motivated by the Respondents in violation of the
Act, viz, whether in order to encourage membership in the Respondent Unions
their seniority dates were falsely established so that they would be included in the
economic layoff on August 25, 1957.
The entire question arose because Gardner failed to apply for any leave of absence
from the plant and Peyton failed to renew his 30-day original leave of absence.
When they returned to the Jeffersonville plant in April 1957, after working at the
Dallas and Adams plants, the question of their seniority status affecting themselves
and the other employees in the plant became the subject of meetings and discussions
between the Respondent Unions and Shea Chemical Corporation. These meetings
and discussions were held in April, May, June, and August 1957, at which the
Respondent Unions steadfastly maintained that because they failed to have leaves
of absence they had forfeited their plant seniority. The Company maintained that
their seniority should be counted on the basis of continuous employment at the
Jeffersonville, Dallas, and Adams plants.
I find that the General Counsel has failed to prove by any preponderance of
evidence that the discharges alleged in the complaint were discriminatorily motivated
in violation of the Act.
With respect to Peyton there is no evidence of any discriminatory motivation
and the complaint with respect to Peyton's alleged discharge on August 25, 1957,
should be dismissed. An added reason for such dismissal is that the complaint
with respect to Peyton's alleged discharge on August 25, 1957, is based on untimely
charges. Peyton's original charge in which he stated that on or about August 23,
1957. Shea Chemical Corporation discriminatorily caused his layoff in violation of
the Act was filed and served on February 26, 1958. The 6-month period within
which to file the charge expired on February 25, 1958.
With respect to Gardner there is no evidence of any discriminatory motives vio-
lative of the Act, unless an inference is to be drawn from the fact that on February
2, 1956, when he joined the Union he had objected and said he did not want to
sign the card for membership and deduction authorization. I consider such an event
"The record contains other dates as to when the layoff list was posted. I fix August
23, 1957, since that date is given by Gardner in his affidavit dated August 27, 1957.
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1405
too remote in time upon which to base an inference of discriminatory motive, over
14 months later, when the question of his seniority first arose in April 1957. There
is no evidence that Gardner ever took part in any antiunion activities; in fact, in his
affidavit dated August 27, 1957, he stated that he had not engaged in any such
activities. He at all times remained a member of the Union and his dues were
deducted monthly during his entire employment. Nor does the fact that on May
28, 1957, Gardner requested the Local Union to wait for a few days more for
receipt of his transfer slip from the Adams, Massachusetts, Local before executing
another application for membership supply a reason why the Unions would seek
to discriminate against him. The question of his seniority had been raised early
in April 1957. The record also shows that as early as June 1956 Gardner's name
was missing from the seniority list posted at the plant. I, therefore, find that the
Respondents were not discriminatorily motivated in violation of the Act in assigning
to him the seniority date of April 8, 1957, which resulted in his discharge or layoff
on August 25, 1957. The complaint with respect to Gardner's alleged discriminatory
discharge on August 25, 1957, should be dismissed.
The General Counsel further contends that the provision in the leave-of-absence
clause in the pertinent collective-bargaining agreements whereby leaves of absence
will be granted by the Company in conjunction with the Union thereby gives to the
Union final control over the seniority status, thereby delegating to a union complete
control over seniority in violation of the Act because it tends to encourage mem-
bership in a union.
The pertinent seniority clauses in the 1956 and 1958 contracts provided:
Article VII: Seniority
Section 1. The seniority or length of service of any employee subject to the
Agreement shall be calculated from the oldest date on which the employee
came upon the payroll of the Company with no break in employment for a
cause attributable to the employee.
Section 11. Seniority lists shall be prepared by the COMPANY and made
available to the UNION at least twice yearly. The UNION shall have the
right to object to any such seniority list within two weeks after delivery to the
UNION of a copy thereof. In the absence of any objection by the UNION,
said seniority list shall be considered the official list to be binding upon the
parties thereto and all employees subject to the Agreement.
Section 12. It is understood and agreed that the COMPANY, in conjunction
with the UNION may grant leaves of absence for specified purposes and for
specified period of time without loss of seniority. Any such leave of absence
shall be limited to a period not to exceed six months but may be subject to
renewal for further periods not exceeding a total of twelve months upon
agreement of the parties hereto. Should for health reasons only, an extension
beyond twelve months be necessary, medical advice shall be sought and
decision of the COMPANY medical advisor shall be binding upon both parties.
Request for a leave of absence must be submitted in writing to the COMPANY.
Section 14. Seniority shall continue to accumulate during leave of absence.
In my opinion it cannot be said here that the Employer by contract has
granted to the Respondent Unions unfettered power unilaterally to determine
all seniority questions which would be unlawful as violative of Section 8(a)(1),
(2), and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act as was held in Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Co.4
When Gardner and Peyton returned to the Jeffersonville plant in April 1957, a
genuine question arose subject to conflicting interpretations as to their rightful place
on the seniority list of the employees at the Jeffersonville plant. Was their seniority
to be calculated from the oldest date they came on the payroll as contended by the
Company, or had they lost their seniority at the Jeffersonville plant because of
failure to comply with the leave-of-absence provisions as contended by the Re-
spondent Unions? The contract provisions as to seniority and leave of absence be-
came at least ambiguous as applied to the situation herein, viz, did the provision
that seniority or length of service be calculated from the oldest date the employee
came upon the payroll of the company mean that it was plantwide seniority at the
Jeffersonville plant or was it meant to include work done at other plants of the com-
pany each of which had its own separate contract with plant seniority; or was the
seniority clause to be read with the leave-of-absence clause in determining whether
4107 NLRB 837, enfd. as mod sub nom , N L.R B, v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, etc, et al, 225 F. 2d 343 (C A 8).
1406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
an employee accumulated or lost his seniority? As far as the Respondent Unions
knew, Gardner had quit his employment in June 1956.5
These various interpretations properly became a subject for collective bargaining.
Whether or not one agrees with the position advocated by the Respondent Unions
that Gardner's seniority began on April 8, 1957, and Peyton's seniority began on
April 1, 1957, it is clear that the Respondent Unions had a reasonable basis for the
interpretation they advanced. It is of no significance that the employer would have
resolved the seniority question differently had it not been for the position taken by
the Respondent Unions for the statutory duty to bargain presupposes that there will
be a yielding on occasions by one side of the demands of the other side.
This case is similar in many respects to the situation presented in Armour and
Company,6 where the Board held that an employer had not delegated "complete
control over seniority" to the union within the meaning of Pacific Intermountain Ex-
press, supra. There the employer had adopted a neutral position on possible inter-
pretations of a seniority clause and after consulting with the union adopted the
resolution of the seniority question advocated by the union.
On the basis of the entire record, 11 find that the provisions in the leave-of-absence
clause whereby leaves would be granted by the company in conjunction with the Re-
spondent Unions did not thereby give to the Respondent Unions final control over
the seniority status so as to delegate to them complete control over seniority in vio-
lation of the Act.
The complaint further alleged that at all times since February 27, 1957, the Re-
spondents in violation of the Act have maintained and enforced an agreement,
understanding, and practice which requires, as a condition of employment, con-
tinuous membership in good standing in Respondent Unions on or after the 30th day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agree-
ment, understanding, or practice, whichever is later; that at all times since said date
the Respondent Employer has collected dues and initiation fees pursuant to the
agreement, understanding, and practice from its employees; and that the Respond-
ent Employer and the Respondent Unions have at all times since said date forced
and required employees to authorize the checkoff of monthly dues and initiation fees.
The events of May 28, 1957, have been related, supra, where Joe Wilkins, presi-
dent of the Local, insisted upon obtaining from Gardner and Peyton (after he had
been directed by Arthur Newbanks, production superintendent, to "sign them up")
new membership applications and authorizations for checkoff of initiation fees
and monthly dues. Newbanks' contribution to the discussion between Wilkins,
Gardner, and Peyton that Shea (president of Shea Chemical Corporation) had said
in substance that all who worked there would join the Union, conclusively estab-
lishes in my opinion that there was an oral agreement, understanding, and practice
by which employees, after completion of their probationary periods were required
as a condition of employment to join the Respondent Unions and to execute written
authorizations for deduction of initiation fees and dues. I so find. They were
thereby inevitably coerced into the payment of initiation fees and dues. Joe Wilkins
testified that while he was president of the Local (having succeeded Pete Costa in
that office) from November 13, 1956, until July 16, 1957, he explained the benefits
of the Union to those employees who had completed their probationary periods and
pointed out to them that they would have to join the Respondent Unions if they
wanted to work for Shea Chemical Corporation. He further testified that he did
approach employees until Newbanks gave him the slips authorizing such action.
During the period, March-June 1957, approximately 11 employees joined the Re-
spondent Unions after their probationary periods had been completed. On the
basis of the foregoing, I find that the Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b) (4) (A)
and (2) of the Act. No finding is made that the Respondent Employer committed
any unfair labor practices prior to August 19, 1957, in view of the statutory bar
contained in Section 10(b) of the Act.
The Respondent Unions and the Company have had successive collective-bar-
gaining agreements since 1954. In 1954, Shea Chemical Corporation and the Re-
spondent Unions entered into a collective-bargaining agreement for a term of 2
years. In 1956, another contract was entered into for a 2-year term which would
' Gardner had told employees in the plant in June 1956, that he was quitting following
instructions from his supervisor, to keep the fact quiet, that he was going to work for
the company in Dallas The evidence is conflicting as to whether he had actually quit.
On the whole, however, I find that he did not quit his employment in June 1956, when
he left for Dallas and his employment was continuous from November 14, 1955, to
August 25, 1957.
6123 NLRB 1157.
HOOKER CHEMICAL CORPORATION 1407
terminate in July 1958. During the term of that contract, namely on May 29,
1958, Hooker Chemical Corporation became the successor corporation to Shea
Chemical Corporation through consolidation and merger proceedings already referred
to above. Hooker Chemical Corporation continued with the 1956 agreement
and when it terminated in July 1958, entered into a 2-year contract with the Re-
spondent Unions which contract will terminate in July 1960.
None of the foregoing contracts contained a union-security clause. It is un-
disputed that the Respondent Unions had not complied with the then Section 9(f),
(g), and (h) of the Act.
It is also undisputed that since 1954 to the date of the hearing, Shea Chemical
Corporation and later Hooker Chemical Corporation have continued to deduct
union dues pursuant to signed authorizations from the employees. Gordon Hoover,
field representative for District 50, testified that at the time the 1958 contract be-
came effective (August 1), all the employees in the bargaining unit of Hooker
Chemical Corporation were members of the Respondent Unions. It is also a fact
which is not disputed that up to the date of the hearing, there has been no hiring of
employees either by Shea Chemical Corporation or Hooker Chemical Corporation
since July 1, 1957. Consequently, there have been no new written authorizations
executed since July 1, 1957. It should be further noted that no unfair labor practices
may be found against the Respondent Employer prior to August 19, 1957, because
of the limitations contained in Section 10(b) of the Act.
The remaining question to be decided is whether or not the continued deduc-
tion of dues on and after August 19, 1957, by the Respondent Employer violated
the Act.
Since standing alone, there is no evidence after August 19, 1957, with respect
to the Employer that the continued deduction of dues is legal or illegal, it is
necessary to examine the background evidence prior to August 19, 1957, in
order to explain or throw light upon the monthly deductions. The General
Counsel has introduced evidence through the testimony of Stanley Hanen, former
maintenance superintendent for Shea Chemical Corporation and later for Hooker
Chemical Corporation, that he told employees when he hired them that they would
have to join the Respondent Unions after their probationary periods of employment
had been completed. I credit Hanen's testimony and in so doing I have considered
his possible bias arising from the fact that he was discharged by Hooker Chemical
Corporation and also because of the friendship between Hanen and Gardner. I
believe he testified truthfully with respect to the material matters at issue. The
testimony of Joe Wilkins, president of the Local, has already been discussed above.
I believe Wilkins testified truthfully although he, too, was discharged by the employer
and the Respondent Unions refused to process his grievance. Several witnesses
corroborated the testimony of Hanen, Wilkins, Gardner, Peyton, and others, in-
cluding Trimble, Wilson, and Saunders. Thus it appears and I find that employees
were coerced into joining the Respondent Unions and inevitably coerced into pay-
ment of dues. While the Respondent Employer introduced the testimony of
officers and other supervisors to the effect that they did not know of any such
understanding, arrangement or practice that employees were required to join the
Respondent Unions, such testimony does not negate the affirmative testimony of
what actually did occur according to the testimony of Hanen, Wilkins, and other
witnesses.
The execution of the written authorizations for deductions of dues was thus
obtained by interference, restraint, and coercion which would be found to be unfair
labor practices by the Employer were it not for the statute of limitations contained
in Section 10(b) of the Act. Such written authorizations, however, continued to
be enforced during the 6-month period prior to the charge and thereafter. The
Board has held that where an illegal contract has been executed prior to 6 months
before a charge is filed, the execution of the instrument may not be found to consti-
tute an unfair labor practice in view of the bar of Section 10(b); but that the
,bnforcement of such illegal contract during the lawful period of 6 months prior to
the charge and thereafter, does constitute an unfair labor practice. (Local Lodge
No. 1424, etc. (Bryan Manufacturing Company), 119 NLRB 502, 264 F. 2d 575
(C.A.D.C.), cert. granted June 22, 1959.)
I find that the continued enforcement of the written authorizations in this case
is similar to the continued enforcement of the illegal contract in the Bryan case,
supra; that such enforcement thereby encouraged membership in the Respondent
Unions and that accordingly the Respondent Employer has violated Section 8(a) (1),
(2), and (3) of the Act.
1408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent Employer described in section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action which will effectuate the policies of the Act.
By the aforesaid unlawful understanding, arrangement, and practice, the Respond-
ent Unions have unlawfully coerced employees to join the Respondent Unions in
order to continue in employment, thereby inevitably coercing them into the pay-
ment of initiation fees, dues, and/or other sums; and by continuing to enforce the
written authorizations for deduction of dues, thereby encouraging membership in
the Respondent Unions, the Respondent Employer has coerced them into the pay-
ment of such sums, thereby enforcing and implementing the aforesaid unlawful
understanding, arrangement, and practice.
In order adequately to remedy the unfair labor practices found, the Respondents
should be required, jointly and severally, to reimburse all present and former
employees by refunding to them all initiation fees, dues, and/or other moneys
which have been unlawfully exacted from them and paid to the Respondent Unions
as the price of their employment. I believe that these remedial provisions are
appropriate and necessary in order to expunge the coercive effect of the Respondents'
unfair labor practices. The liability of each Respondent for reimbursement shall
lbegin 6 months prior to the date of the filing and service of the charge against it
and shall extend to all such moneys thereafter collected.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, I shall also recom-
mend that the Respondents cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Employer is engaged in commerce and the Respondent
Unions are labor organizations all within the meaning of the Act.
2. Hooker Chemical Corporation, the Respondent Employer, became and is the
successor to Shea Chemical Corporation.
3. By contributing support and assistance to the Respondent Unions, the Re-
spondent Employer has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (2) of the Act.
4. By discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of employment thereby
encouraging membership in the Unions, the Respondent Employer has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Employer has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By continuing to enforce deductions for dues, thereby enforcing an understand-
ing, arrangement, or practice which required as a condition of employment member-
ship in Respondent Unions, thereby encouraging membership in the Unions, the
Respondent Employer has violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act and the Respondent
Unions, by causing the Respondent Employer to discriminate with respect to the
hire and tenure of employment in violation of Section 8(a) (3), have engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (2) of the Act.
7. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Unions have engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]