Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local 4Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 26, 1971189 N.L.R.B. 366 (N.L.R.B. 1971) Copy Citation 366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and Its Branches Of The International Union Of Operat- ing Engineers (The Carlson Corporation) and Robert E. Messenger Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and its Branches Of The International Union Of Operat- ing Engineers (Manzi Electrical Corporation) and Robert E . Messenger . Cases 1-CB-1471 and 1-CB-1486 March 26, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND 'MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On November 19, 1969, Trial Examiner William F. Scharnikow issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrori and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and briefs in support of their exceptions. The General Counsel filed an answering brief to the exceptions and brief of the Respondent. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner as herein modified. The Respondent's basic policy is to encourage its members to seek out their own jobs. Accordingly, most of Respondent's members locate their own jobs. However, the Respondent operates a job referral system to assist its members in locating jobs. An estimated 5 percent of all hirings of Respondent's members occur through this service. Normally, contractors make the request for Respondent's members by either telephoning the Respondent's office or by contacting a business agent on the construction site or at his home. Members, on the other hand, who are seeking employment will either go to the "loading room" located at Respondent's office and wait for job openings to be reported or the members inform one of the business agents that they are looking for employment. In accordance with the Respondent's policy of encouraging members to locate their own jobs it has become accepted procedure to give to the member who first calls the attention of the business agent to a possible job opening the first right to that job. In the present case the Trial Examiner found that Messenger was the first to inform Business Agent DeRosa of a possible job opening at the construction site of Carlson Corporation. However, when Carlson subsequently informed DeRosa that it needed to employ two members of the Respondent Union, DeRosa refused to refer Messenger. The Trial Examiner found that Messenger was not referred for employment, as was standard procedure, because he had politically opposed the then elected union officers. This conclusion was supported by statements Business Agent DeRosa made at the time of his refusal to refer Messenger. The Trial Examiner found that Section 8(b)(1)(A) was violated. He dismissed, however, the 8(b)(2) allegation in the complaint because Carlson, the employer, knew nothing of Messenger's claim to the job nor of the Respondent's refusing him a referral and therefore, in this nonexclusive hiring arrange- ment, it could not be said that Respondent's actions "caused or attempted to cause" Carlson to discrimi- nate against Messenger. We agree with the Trial Examiner that factually the alleged violation of Section 8(b)(2) has not been substantiated.' The Board held in Chauffeur's Union Local 9232 that a respondent union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it, acting as the statutory exclusive bargaining representative, discriminatorily refused assistance through its nonexclusive hiring hall ar- range- ment to certain employees in the represented bargaining unit because they had opposed reelection of the Union's officers. The Board reasoned: It does not follow, however, that a union's discriminatory refusal to assist certain represented employees in their effort to find new jobs lacks coercive impact merely because the employees might have obtained jobs without the union's assistance. An employee who knows that he is reducing his chance for future employment by supporting a particular condidate is being re- strained and coerced in the exercise of his Section 7 rights, notwithstanding the fact that the coercion would be even greater if the discriminating union were party to an exclusive hiring arrangement. That case is dispositive of the present proceeding. The critical circumstances in both cases are parallel. In each, employees who engaged in Section 7 protected activity of opposing the reelection of i We need not consider the Trial Examiner's conclusion that a violation 2 Chauffeur's Union Local 923, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, of Sec 8(b)(2) could be found where there is disparate treatment for discriminatory reasons in the administration of a nonexclusive hiring hall arrangement Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Yellow Cab Co), NLRB No 248 172 189 NLRB No. 52 HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS , LOCAL 4 incumbent union officials were denied the use of the union operated nonexclusive hiring hall because of their protected activities.3 We believe the Union is obligated to offer to all of its members the same access to and use of those services which it provides members to faciliate their acquisition of employment, as for example, a hiring hall, and may not treat certain members disparately because they have engaged in activities which are protected by the Act.4 Accordingly, as the Respondent in this case has undertaken to provide the service to all its members of assisting them in finding employment through a nonexclusive referral service, to deny Messenger access to this service because of his intraunion political activities, and thereby reduce his chance for future employment, acts as a restraint upon his exercise of Section 7 rights. The Respondent's obligation not to discriminate against Messenger because of his protected activities extends to its voluntary continuance of this referral service. Once the Respondent has undertaken the task of helping to find jobs for its members it has accepted the correlative duty that it must act in an "even-handed" manner toward all its members without discrimina- tion based on the exercise of Section 7 rights. We therefore affirm the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and its Branches of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Boston, Massachu- sets, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom- mended Order.5 3 It is well established that active opposition to the reelection of an incumbent union official is protected activity within the meaning of Sec 7 of the Act Falstaff Brewing Corporation 128 NLRB 294 4 Respondent Union argues that without evidence of a contract, understanding , or commitment with Carlson which obligates the statutory bargaining representative to refer prospective employees , the refusal to do so, no matter the reason , is not a violation of the Act It relies on several Board decisions to support its contentions including United Construction Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No 171, 169 NLRB 1, and Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local 302 (West Coast Steel Works), 144 NLRB 1449 These cases are not applicable to the present case In Chauffeur's Union Local 923 at In 3, the Board stated that in the cases cited by the respondent union the General Counsel had only alleged a violation of Sec 8 (b)(I)(A) as the derivative of conduct alleged to be an 8(b)(2) violation These cases do not consider the question of whether disparate treatment for discriminatory reasons is independently violative of Sec 8(b)(1)(A) The Board in Chauffeur's Union Local 923 found, as we find here , that disparate treatment of job referrals from a nonexclusive hiring hall because of discriminatory reasons is an independent violation of Sec 8 (b)(1)(A) 5 In fn 9 of the Trial Examiner ' s Decision , substitute "20" for "10" days TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 367 WILLIAM F. SCHARNIKOW, Trial Examiner: The com- plaint issued and served by the Regional Director on June 9, 19,¢9, in the above-consolidated cases alleges , but the answer of the Respondent (Hoisting and Portable Engi- neers, Local No. 4 and its Branches of the International Union of Operating Engineers) denies, that the Respondent committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq., herein called the Act. The basic charges were filed by Robert E. Messenger , an individual claiming to be affected by the alleged unfair labor practices, in Case 1-CB-1471 'on February 6, 1969, and in Case I-CB-1486 on April 23, 1969. In each instance the charges were duly served by the Regional Director on the Respondent the following day. Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1969, before me, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent appeared by their respective counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on -the issues. Since the close of the hearing , I have received and considered briefs from the General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS I. THE ISSUES The complaint, alleges, the Respondent 's answer admits, and I find , that the Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and that the various employers with whom the Respondent has dealt, including The Carlson Corporation and Manzi Electrical Corpora- tion are employers engaged in the building and construc- tion industry and in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The issued presented and litigated at the hearing is whether , as the complaint alleges but the Respondent's answer denies: 1. The Respondent "has created and maintained a hiring hall or referral system as a method of supplying member-applicants for employment," as a result of which certain employers have "relied upon , utilized , and other- wise subjected themselves to Respondent 's hiring hall as the exclusive source of [securing ] applicants for employment ... [as] operators . . . within the territorial jurisdiction of Respondent." 2. Respondent, because of Robert E. Messenger's "history and continuing nature of his intra-union activi- ties" as a member of Respondent and "contrary to [its] usual [established ] practice procedures and preferences" in connection with the operation of its "hiring hall or referral system," failed and refused to refer Messenger for A 368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employment by Carlson Corporation on January 19, 1969, and for employment by Manzi Electrical Corporation on February 25 and March 10, 1969. 3. Respondent, by thus failing and refusing to provide Messenger with such referrals because of his "intra-union activities" in spite of their protection by Section 7 of the Act, "has caused or attempted to cause" the two aforesaid employers "to fail to hire Messenger through its inherently discriminatory administration, method of selection and operation of the hiring hall or referral system" and has thereby: (a) restrained and coerced Messenger in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A); and (b) caused or attempted to cause the two employers to discriminate against Messenger in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, thus itself committing unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Respondent and its Membership, Officers, Agents, and Operations, Including its "Referrals" of Members for Employment The Respondent (including its "Branches") is an approximately 4000-member local union with its office in Roslindale (a section of Boston) and claims craft jurisdic- tion over operating engineers engaged in building and construction work in the eastern portion of New England from the Canadian border to the southern boundary of Massachusetts. Approximately 2000 of its members are "straight Local 4 members," i.e., full members licensed as "engineers" by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and thus accredited as fully qualified to operate all types of construction equipment "Branch" members are those with lesser-demonstrated or restricted competency. About 500 of them are apprentices or "oilers" in Branch 4A, who after 4 years, the attainment of an engineer's license, and the satisfactory service of a probationary period on 2-man equipment, are eligible for election by the general membership to "straight 4 membership." The remaining members (approximately 1,500 in number) are classified in separate Branches for hoisting engineers on heavy or highway construction, for operators of specific types of certain one-man equipment, for house engineers, for mechanics, and for field engineers. The Respondent's president and other general officers are elected by the full membership, as is also its business manager who is its chief executive officer in charge of its overall, day-to-day operations and all its personnel including the business agents. The business manager's term had been 1 year until an amendment of the International's constitution in 1965 increased it to 3 years. Walter Ryan, a former business agent since 1950, was the Respondent's elected business manager in 1961 and 1962, and following a defeat in the 1963 election has again been the Respondent's elected business manager since 1964. His current 3-year term will expire in 1971. In accordance with the amendments of the Internation- al's constitution in 1965, Ryan, as business manager, has appointed the Respondent's six business agents, each of whom is in direct charge of the Respondent's affairs under the supervision of the business manager , in a separate "territory" of the Respondent, although before 1965 they had also been elected by the membership. Despite the spread and area of the business agents' respective territories (e.g., one embraces almost the entire State of Maine and another the State of New Hampshire and northern Massachusetts), all the business agents are based in the Respondent's office in Roslindale. Except for the Maine business agent who appears infrequently, each of the business agents picks up his paycheck on Wednesdays and spends only a few hours a week on a different morning at the Roslindale office where, in addition to the space used by the clerical force, there is a day room or "loafing room" provided for members who are seeking work. In the absence of a business agent in his territory, telephone calls received in the Roslindale office for him from employers or from members are noted in a telephone log book and the business agent is informed of them when he telephones in to the office. Otherwise, the business agent's contacts with employers and members are made directly in the field either personally on the business agent's rounds of construction sites or by telephone, including telephone calls to and from the business agent at his home. According to the complaint and the General Counsel's evidence, only two of the Respondent's business agents (Charles DeRosa and Joseph Grande) and Business Manager Ryan were directly involved in the Respondent's unfair labor practices in allegedly failing and refusing to give member Robert Messenger a "referral" to jobs at construction sites in Bedford, Massachusetts, and North Andover, Massachusetts. Business Agent DeRosa's territo- ry in southern Massachusetts included the Bedford construction site and Business Agent Grande's territory of New Hampshire and northern Massachusetts included the North Andover construction site. The Respondent, its business manager , and its business agents deal with approximately 500 employers about matters affecting operating engineers . With only about 350 of these employers does the Respondent have a contract or agreement of any sort. With some of them, it has limited agreements covering only the employers' payment of fringe benefits such as payments to a health, welfare, and pension fund administered by the Old Colony Trust Company of Boston. With the remaining 350 employers (whose number is not disclosed), the Respondent does have full contracts generally covering the terms and conditions of their employment of operating engineers . But it should be noted that this category of fully contracting employers does not include, and did not include, either the Carlson Corpora- tion or Manzi Electrical Corporation, the employers whom the complaint alleges were involved by the Respondent in the few specified incidents of unfair labor practices based upon their hire of engineers other than Robert Messenger, the charging part, at the Bedford site on January 19, 1969, or the North Andover site in February and March 1969. For this reason, I rejected the General Counsel's repeated offers in evidence of the Respondent' s general contract with other employers. Furthermore, it became apparent during the hearing that this type of general contract had no such broad significance with respect to the Respondent's HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS , LOCAL 4 369 practice of referring its members for employment on an employer's request, as would otherwise warrant its admission in evidence . For, as the General Counsel conceded throughout the hearing , neither under the proffered contract nor under any agreement with any employer has the employer agreed to secure its engineers through the Respondent nor has the Respondent agreed to refer its members to the employer . Indeed, as the allegations of the complaint also make clear ,' the General Counsel 's unfair labor practice theory is based , not on any formal contractual obligation , but solely on an actual "hiring hall or referral system " which the Respondent has created and which employers voluntarily rely upon, use, and "subject themselves to" in securing their operating engineers. The Respondent 's business agents spend most of their time in their respective territories , visiting and observing conditions on jobsites and dealing with employers, stewards , and their members. As Business Manager Ryan testified , their broad responsibility is "to protect our jurisdiction ." Obviously , in view of the extent of their territories and the Respondent 's large membership , they are busy men. Their principal duties are to see to it that contracting employers comply With the terms of their contracts with the Respondent , and to persuade noncon- tracting employers of members of the Respondent to meet acceptable "area standards" with respect to wage rates and fringe benefits including health and welfare fund payments as set forth in the Respondent 's contract with other employers . Passing references in the testimony also indicate the business agents' involvement in the usual variety of other activities of a union representative in such matters as grievances , organizational activities , picket lines , strikes, and complaints by employers against the Respondent's membersin their employ . Finally, in addition to all this, the business agents when asked by employers-whether under contract with the Respondent or not-"refer" members of the Respondent for employment. This is the Respondent's "referral" practice which the General Counsel would have the Board find to be a "hiring hall or referral system" which in a discriminatory application to member Robert Messenger deprived Mes- senger of fobs with the Carlson Corporation on the Bedford site on January 19, 1969 , and with the Manzi Electrical Corporation on the North Andover site in February and March 1969 . To provide an understanding and permit an evaluation of this contention, the parties presented evidence concerning the hire and employment of operating engineers in the Respondent's claimed territorial jurisdic- tion and the nature , manner, and extent of the business agents' "referral" practice . As to these matters, the evidence is consistent and therefore there is no dispute. By its nature , the work of an operating engineer in the construction industry is transient and intermittent . In order to secure maximum and reasonably continuous employ- ment, he must get a succession of jobs with different employers at different construction sites as the work done by operating engineers at each site is completed. The continuous period for which an engineer may be employed by a contractor varies in length from "broken time", i.e., a day or two days (in which case the contractor often requires a man on short notice), to a period of months. So far as the Respondent is concerned , the contractors exercise complete freedom in hiring whomever they want and, although for their own reasons they may ask the Respondent to refer applicants , they are not required by any agreement with the Respondent either to ask for referrals or, if they do so, to accept applicants referred by the Respondent Furthermore , in an estimated 95 percent of all hirings of operating engineers , the Respondent's members find and secure their own jobs directly from the contractors without any referral by the Respondent. They do this usually by riding around and locating construction sites, by watching the progress of work on these sites, by securing information as to job possibilities from other members of the Respondent who may already be working on particular projects, and then by visiting the sites and applying to the contractors for jobs when they see that equipment requiring engineers is being used or when, from their experience , they know that in normal course, such equipment is about to be used . In some instances while working for one contractor on a site , they arrange for a transfer to a job with another contractor using equipment on the same site and thus prolong their employment there. Finally, some operating engineers are fortunate in that, as "regulars", they have been able to establish a personal relationship with particular contractors whereby they are employed by these contractors for the longerjobs at various sites and are later repeatedly recalled by these contractors on subsequent building projects . But even these "regulars," like operating engineers generally, have substantial inter- vening periods of unemployment which they must attempt to fill in by seeking employment from other contractors at other sites. When , in the estimated 5 percent of all hirings of Respondent 's members , the contractors ask the Respon- dent to send them men , the requests are made by the contractors ordinarily by telephone calls to the Respon- dent's office , whether to the business agent for the territory or to anyone else in the office . But in some instances, the requests are made to the business agent outside the office either by telephoning him at his home or by speaking to him at the construction sites. If a request for an immediate referral for "broken time" is telephoned to the office, the business manager , any business agent who happens to be in the office , or even the office girl , may refer a member from the "loafing room" if any are there at the time and are willing to take the job. In other cases when the business agent covering the territory is not in the office, the message is taken for him , entered in a telephone log book (which contains other types of messages as well), and given to him when he makes one of his frequent calls to the office. Unless the contractor has specified the member it wants and he is available, the business agent then decides which member he will refer to each job according to the qualifications required for the job (straight 4 members are presumably qualified and given preference over Branch members) from members who are either in the " loafing room" at the time or who have recently informed the business agent (ordinarily by telephone calls to him at his 1 See sec 1, above 370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD home) that they are out of work and looking for a job. General factors which play a role in his selection from known available and qualified members are the distances of their homes from the jobsite , their current periods of unemployment , and their ages. But, in keeping with the Respondent 's policy of encouraging its members to find their own jobs and thus in effect (as Business Manager Ryan testified) to act as additional individual "business agents" for the Respondent in obtaining the maximum employment of its members, the business agents give preference in their referrals first to any member who has found equipment in operation , appeared at the site (or as the witnesses put it, "was on the job") and has notified the territorial business agent that he had in fact been "on the job"; and then secondly to a member who, although he has not been "on the job ," has notified the business agent that he believes there is or will be a job open and that he claims it in the event there should be a referral . In determining priorities in such possibly competing claims, Business Agent DeRosa testified that it is his practice to visit the jobsite, check the existence of the job, and ask any member of the Respondent working on another job at the site (preferably one who is serving as his steward) whether any of their fellow members have been "on the job" and, if so, when they had been there. According to DeRosa , he relies upon this information , although he is not certain what he would do if , for example , two members had already informed him that they had been "on the job" although the steward tells him that he had seen only one of them there. A master list of members is kept at the office and is available to the business agents. When there is occasion, the Respondent may secure from the trustee of the health and welfare fund the names of members who are currently employed and on whose behalf employers are making payments to the fund . But neither the Respondent at its office nor the business agents in the field keep any records of the employment of its members, the names of those currently unemployed , the dates their last employment terminated , any out-of-work registry , or any record of the referrals actually made by it and its business agents. As a result, when requested for a referral, a business agent makes his choice of the member to be referred solely on the basis of information which he has secured on his rounds of the construction sites or in telephone calls from members telling him they are out of work and perhaps asking him to keep them in mind for specific jobs they have visited or believe will open up . This information upon which he bases his referrals is for the most part simply kept "in his head" although he sometimes makes notes which he keeps only so long as he thinks he may have use for them . Although the business agents are responsible to, and discuss their work with , the business manager, they file no written reports nor do they discuss the referrals made by them, except possibly in particular situations when problems arise . According to the substance of Business Manager Ryan's testimony, the Respondent 's justification for this informal manner of handling referrals rather than through a formularized, centralized , or dispersed hiring hall system with detailed records and possibly an out-of -work registry , is to be found in the comparatively few referrals handled , the fact that they must be handled expeditiously , the efficiency and fairness of their being handled for points remote from the Respondent's office in which only local segments of the Respondent's membership would be interested , and the consequent impracticability as well as the physical impossibility of setting up a more formal , elaborate system of referrals in the Respondent 's Roshndale office and perhaps even at other points as well. B. Robert Messenger 's Intraunron Activities Robert Messenger , the charging party who claims that he has been refused job referrals by the Respondent because of his intraunion activities , has been a member of the Respondent for 28 years and is a straight Local 4 member. In every year since 1958 , he has run for umon office (often for several offices on a single ballot ), has supported only two candidates who were successful (Connie Ryan as president and Bob Delaney as business manager), has been elected only to two offices (auditor from 1962 to 1965 and trustee in 1962 ) and in other years has been defeated in his candidacies for president (in 1961 , 1962 and 1965), for vice president (in 1959) and for treasurer (in 1963 and 1968). In several of these elections , Messenger was defeated by the Respondent's current president , Rocco Alberto, for that office, i.e., in 1962 and 1965. His unsuccessful candidacies have had some, but not nearly sufficient support, from other members some of whom (including Warren Smith) also ran for office and distributed common campaign material among the membership as a "Committee To Promote a Better Local 4" and as a "Bob Messenger for President Committee." Throughout his campaigns for office , and in other related activities , Messenger has been persistently and sharply critical of the conduct of the Respondent 's affairs by the incumbent officers . In appearances at membership meet- ings, and in his mimeographed campaign material distribut- ed among the Respondent 's 4,000 members, especially in connection with the 1963 and 1965 elections, he accused the officers of such improprieties as excessive spending , failing to protect the Respondent's jurisdiction against encroach- ment by other unions, improperly refusing him access as auditor to the Respondent's records in 1963 , irregularities in election procedures in 1963, and failing to provide a fair distribution of jobs among the members . Some of these accusations he brought to the attention of the International and the United States Department of Labor, but his appeals to them for correction of what he asserted were improper practices were rejected. In 1963, he accused President Rocco Alberto of a conflict in interest in acting as the Respondent 's president and at the same time receiving a salary of $5600 from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as its Labor Commissioner . Alberto thereupon filed charges against him for engaging "in a malicious campaign to wrong fellow members and officers," and denied that he had received any compensation from the Commonwealth except a fee of $ 25 for council meetings which occurred less frequently than once a week . Messenger answered these charges with an accusation that Alberto was "lying." The union charges against Messenger were not actually processed , however, and in 1967 Messenger and five other members (including Warren Smith ) filed a petition with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts asking for a declaratory judgment against Alberto for a HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS, LOCAL 4 "conflict in interest" in holding both his office as Respondent's president and his office as the Common- wealth's Labor Commissioner, but the Court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the petition. In 1966 and again in 1968 Messenger turned to the Board and filed charges against the Respondent in Cases 1-CB-1125 and 1-CB-1424, asserting the Respondent's commission of unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A). But in each case the Regional Director after investigation refused to issue a complaint and dismissed the charges. About the time of the Regional Director's dismissal of the second of these unfair labor practice charges which Messenger had filed, Messenger also handled an unsuccessful appeal to the General Counsel from the Regional Director's dismissal of unfair labor practice charges filed against the Respondent by another of the Respondent's members (Charles Samara) in Case 1-CB-1436. Despite these persistent attacks on the Respondent's officers since 1958, it does not appear from the present record that prior to 1969 there was any background of reprisal or discrimination against Messenger by the Respondent's agents in referrals or in any other respect. The record does not disclose the nature or the substance of Messenger's unfair labor practice charges in 1966 and 1968, but in any event they were deemed by the Regional Director to be insufficient for the issuance of any complaint against the Respondent. Furthermore, although Messenger testified at one point that he had "many times" unsuccess- fully asked Business Agent DeRosa for referrals, he also testified that "My usual practice is to inform him [merely] that I am unemployed," that in only a few instances had he spoken to DeRosa about specific jobs (and even then it did not appear from his testimony that they were jobs he had "found" and claimed), and that although at times he had appeared at the "loafing room" looking for work, he had not done so since February 1968. Finally, in summarizing his general experience in the 3 years preceding 1969, he testified, "I have been pretty fortunate the last couple of years. The jobs I have been getting have been running longer durations but start out as short-term jobs. In other words, the jobs were jobs that I got on my own. When I took the job I wasn't aware that they would last, certainly, more than a month." Certainly, this testimony of Messen- ger is much too vague and general to provide the basis for a conclusion that there was any discrimination against him in withholding referrals before 1969. On the contrary, according to both Messenger's testimo- ny and that of Business Agents Grande and DeRosa, in the few instances before 1969 in which the Respondent's business agents dealt with Messenger, it appears that the business agents treated him fairly and supported him in his attempts to get and keep jobs. Thus in 1966, Business Agent Grande supported Messenger's and fellow member Smith's claims to, and got them pay from Carlson Construction Company for, the operation of heaters which they had found running unattended at night on a Carlson job in Malden. In the fall of 1966, Business Agent DeRosa persuaded Score, a subcontractor on a Peabody job, to reinstate Messenger after he had been fired as incompetent on that job, although when DeRosa referred Messenger to 371 Score on a later job in East Boston, Score refused the hire Messenger again and DeRosa was then unable to do anything about it. In another instance at or about the same time, when Messenger was laid off on a generator job for Preload Construction Co. in Woburn and claimed a job operating a small electric pump on the same site, DeRosa asked the contractor to give Messenger the pump job and, when the contractor refused to put an engineer on such a small pump, DeRosa protested his refusal through the International but without success. Finally, in one other instance, when the superintendent of Jefferson Construc- tion Company told DeRosa that he wanted Messenger for a generator job on the same East Boston site where he had worked for Score, but that he had been unable to reach Messenger, DeRosa held off on the referral of another member from the "loafing room" so that the contractor had more time to reach Messenger and give him the job the next day. The present cases, however, are based on incidents which occurred in 1969 and thus subsequent to the Regional Director's refusal to issue complaints on Messenger's 1966 and 1968 unfair labor practice charges. For, in the present cases, Messenger has based his unfair labor practice charges, and the Regional Director issued the instant complaint, on allegations that in three instances in January, February, and March 1969, the Respondent through its business manager and business agents has discriminatorily failed and refused to issue job referrals to Messenger because of his long continuing "intraunion activities" against the Respondent's officers, and that, by thus depraving him of the jobs to which he should have been referred in 1969, Respondent has committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. C. Messenger's Unsuccessful Attempt to Secure Employment by Carlson Conntruction Company on or about January 19, 1969 The first incident in which the complaint alleges that the Respondent improperly withheld a referral from Messenger occurred on January 19, 1969 in connection with the filling of a second or third shift job operating a portable heater for the Carlson Construction Company at its Sunbeam Vacuum plant construction site in Bedford, Massachusetts. Such heaters are operated by engineers in cold weather to prevent freezing during concrete pouring operations, sometimes only on the first or day shift from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., but also, when thought necessary, on a second shift from 4 p.m. to midnight and a third shift from midmght to 8 a.m. as well. James Oldford, Carlson's superintendent, started operating the heaters on the Bedford job on the day shift on Wednesday, January 15 and then, on a decision reached by him only on the following Wednesday, January 22, also on the second and third shifts beginning Friday, January 24. George Houston, a member of the Respondent, had been working continuously for Carlson on the Bedford job as a forklift operator since September 1968, having been originally referred to Carlson by Business Agent Charles DeRosa from the Respondent's "loafing room." The 372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD forklift operation ended on January 15, 1969, and, at Houston's request, Houston was immediately assigned by Superintendent Oldford to operating the heater on the first shift. Thereafter, on a request made by Superintendent Oldford for additional referrals on Thursday, January 23, Business Agent DeRosa referred members Warren Smith and Joseph Mara, who had appeared on the job and spoken with Houston on Monday, January 20. On Friday, January 24, Smith and Mara began operating the heaters for Carlson on the second and third shifts, respectively. Messenger 's claim to either the second or third shift Bedford heater job and a right to a referral thereto from Business Agent DeRosa is based on the fact that in a joint search for jobs, as they told DeRosa on Sunday, January 19, he and Smith (who had had to a somewhat lesser extent also openly opposed the Respondent's "administration") had together previously visited the Bedford site about 8 p.m. on Friday (January 17), had found a heater operating without an attendant, but had not been able to locate either an operator, the superintendent, a watchman, or other representative of Carlson. They thereupon agreed to make separate telephone calls to Business Agent DeRosa in which each would request a referral not only for himself but for the other as well. But neither was able to reach DeRosa that night or on Saturday. On Sunday night, January 19, however, first Messenger and then Smith spoke separately by telephone to DeRosa who answered their calls at his home. Each of them told DeRosa that there were heaters running on the Bedford job and DeRosa said that he did not know that they were in operation on the second or third shifts. From the testimony of the three men, it is clear that Messenger claimed one of the jobs for himself that Smith claimed one of the jobs too, and that Smith told DeRosa he had been at the site on Friday night and had seen the heaters in operation. As to other elements of these telephone conversations, Messen- ger's and Smith's testimony is in conflict with that of DeRosa. Messenger and Smith each testified that in his separate conversation with DeRosa he told DeRosa that the two of them had visited the site together that Friday night, that they had both seen the heaters operating, and that on this basis he was making a claim to one of the night jobs for himself and to the other job for his friend. Messenger further testified that in the conversation with him, DeRosa thereupon said that if there was a job and Smith wanted it, he could have it, but that DeRosa would "give [Messenger] nothing." Smith, too, testified that in his conversation, DeRosa had said, "If there is a job there, I will take care of you. [But] I wouldn't give that bastard [Messenger] a job if he was the last one on the face of the earth." DeRosa testified that only Smith told him he had been on the job on Friday night and had seen the heaters operating, that Messenger merely said he thought that the heaters on the Bedford job were about to open up and was vague as to the location of the site, that neither Messenger nor Smith said that they had been on the site together or for that matter even referred at all to the other, that he told Messenger that so far as he knew there was only a day shift operation of the heaters on the Bedford job, but that he would check it and Messenger could also see the superintendent about other shifts and have a job on another shift if it were available, and that he told Smith (who had said he had actually been on the job) that if an extra shift were available he could have the job. Finally, DeRosa denied that he told either Messenger or Smith that, although he would refer Smith, he would "never put Messenger on that job." There is no dispute as to what happened after these telephone conversations on the 19th. Messenger did not visit the site again until Friday, January 24 after Smith and Mara had begun operating the heaters on the second and third shifts, respectively. But, in the meantime , on Monday, January 20 Smith and Mara had gone to the Bedford job and asked Steward Houston about operating the heaters on the extra shifts. Houston did not then know that the heaters would later be operated on the second and third shifts. Smith told Houston that Messenger had been on the job with him the previous Friday. Houston, however, had not seen Messenger. On Tuesday or Wednesday, January 21 or 22, Superin- tendent Oldford told Houston he intended to operate the heaters on the second and third shift beginning on Friday January 24 and that Houston should make arrangements to get men through Business Agent DeRosa. On Thursday, January 23, on Houston's call, DeRosa came to the job and saw both Houston and Superintendent Oldford who told DeRosa that Carlson would need men on the second and third shifts on Friday, January 24. Houston told DeRosa that Mara and Smith had been on the jobsite but did not tell DeRosa that Smith had said Messenger had also been there with him On the same day, Thursday, January 23, DeRosa telephoned referrals to Mara, who had been on a one-day job, and also to Smith. On Friday, January 24, Houston worked the first shift as usual, and Smith and Mara started work on the second and third shifts respectively. Messenger appeared at the end of the second shift, helped Smith, and then left the job with Smith when Mara relieved Smith at the beginning of the third shift The critical, disputed element with respect to DeRosa's failure or refusal to refer Messenger for one of the Carlson heater jobs is, of course, presented in the conflict of the testimony concerning DeRosa's telephone conversations with Messenger and Smith on the evening of January 19 which has already been set forth In appraising this conflict, I have considered not only the direct testimony of the three witnesses as to the substance of these conversations but also the absence in the present record of any indication of a previous disposition by the Respondent's business agents to discriminate against Messenger in referrals because of his "intraunion activities." I have also considered DeRosa's protestations during his testimony that although he knew of these activities he had no feelings against Messenger, and the evidence that DeRosa had in fact helped Messenger in a number of previous incidents which have already been noted. But none of this background (consistent though it is with DeRosa's version of the conversations) rules out the possibility that in the January 1969 conversations, DeRosa then rejected Messenger's bid for a Carlson referral (to which he was apparently entitled in accordance with the HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS , LOCAL 4 Respondent's practice) because of his activity against the Respondent and its officers, as both Messenger's and particularly Smith's versions of their conversations would clearly indicate. Moreover, we have been given not only Messenger's but also Smith's consistent contradiction of DeRosa's testimony and, on a weighing of the testimony of the three witnesses in this particular conflict, I credit the combined effect of the testimony of Messenger and Smith rather than the testimony of DeRosa. Accordingly, I find that in their January 19 conversations with DeRosa, both Messenger and Smith told DeRosa that they had visited the Bedford site together that Friday night and found heaters in operation; that each claimed one of the extra shift jobs for himself and the other for his friend; and that DeRosa told each of them that although he would refer Smith, he would not refer Messenger, stating in his conversation with Smith that "I wouldn't give that bastard [Messenger] ajob if he was the last one on the face of the earth." D. Messenger's Unsuccessful Attempts to Secure Employment by Manzi Electrical Corporation on or about February 25 and March 10, 1969 The remaining two incidents in which the complaint alleges that the Respondent improperly withheld referrals from Messenger occurred in connection with the filling of two forklift operator jobs on or about February 25 and March 10, 1969, by Manzi Electrical Corporation on equipment which Manzi rented without an operator from Logan Equipment Company and began using for the first time as an electrical subcontractor on a Western Electric Company job at North Andover, Massachusetts. Davidson Construction Company was the general contractor on this job and Davidson and a number of the subcontractors also working there had been employing various members of the Respondent operating other equipment on the jobsite. Among these members of the Respondent were Raymond Paul (who had worked for Davidson on the site for 7 or 8 months but had been laid off 3 weeks earlier) and another engineer named O'Brien and Joseph Ginuisz (both of whom had been working on bucket lifts on the site for a subcontractor named Marrone). At first, Logan Equipment Company delivered only one forklift to Manzi at the jobsite on or about February 25. Manzi had never before used such equipment in its electrical work, had therefore never previously employed operating engineers, and had no contract with the Respondent. Before the arrival of this first forklift and at the suggestion of Davison (the general contractor), Peter Maciariello, Manzi's superintendent, telephoned the Res- pondent and, speaking with Business Agent Joseph Grande, asked him to supply an operator. Member Raymond Paul had already notified Grande he had been laid off and Grande, knowing that Paul had already worked on the North Andover site, referred him to the Manzi job. As a result, Paul was hired by Manzi to operate the first forklift supplied by Logan Equipment Company. After Superintendent Maciariello of Manzi had called Business Agent Grande but before Paul reported for work, 373 Messenger visited Macianello at the North Andover site on or about February 25 and asked for work. Maciariello said he expected a "spot" to open up and when Messenger asked Maciariello to "put his name down," Maciariello asked Messenger was he a member of the Respondent. Messenger said he was, but when Macianello asked if it were all right to check with the Union, Messenger said, "If I rely on the Union I won't get the job." Messenger had not previously gotten in touch with the Respondent about the Manzi job and did not do so at this time . Nor does it appear from the record that the Respondent (and particularly Business Agent Grande) ever knew from Messenger or Maciariello that Messenger had sought work from Manzi on or about February 25. Raymond Paul continued to operate the first forklift obtained by Manzi and Manzi, through Macianello, ordered another forklift from Logan Equipment Company which was delivered on or about March 10. In the meantime Macianello put in a telephone call to the Respondent for another operator. Messenger appeared again at the site on March 10 and was there when the second forklift arrived on that day, but was told by Maciariello that he had already called the Union for an operator.2 Messenger then put through a telephone call from the jobsite to Business Manager Walter Ryan at the Respondent's office, and being told that Ryan was in conference, left his name and telephone number for Ryan to call him. In the meantime, it appears from a composite of the credible evidence of members Paul and Ginuisz, as well as of Business Agent Grande, (and I therefore find) that there had been a shift in the jobs of operating engineers employed by other subcontractors on the site ; that, as a result of these shifts, Supervisor Dean, who was in charge of the outside work for Manzi on the site, had been asked and had agreed to Ginuisz' taking the job on the second Manzi forklift; and that this information was given to Business Agent Grande by O'Brien who was acting as the Respondent's steward on the jobsite. In brief, although the details of the testimony became quite complicated before it was finally made clear, Ginuisz' work on a bucket lift for another subcontractor (Marrone) was "phasing out" and he had asked for and secured Dean's commitment to put him on the second Manzi forklift. Business Manager Ryan did not return Messenger's telephone call from the jobsite but Business Agent Grande not only received Messenger's inquiry about the Manzi forklift job but, in a routine call from steward O'Brien on another matter, was told by O'Brien that Ginuisz had been transferred to Manzi. Accordingly, Grande then tele- phoned Messenger and told Messenger that the Manzi forkliftjob had already been filled by Ginuisz. E. Conclusions The questions to be decided in the present case are (1) whether Messenger's "intraunion activities" were "concerted activities" protected by Section 7 of the Act; and (2) whether the Respondent withheld "referrals" from 2 I credit Macianello's testimony to this effect Messenger testified that Maciariello did not tell him he had already put in a call to the Union 374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Messenger to the Carlson and Manzi jobs in January, February, and March 1969 because of these "intraunion activities" and thereby committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) or (2) of the Act. Since 1958, as I have found, Messenger repeatedly ran for union office against the incumbent officers in each election, criticized the conduct of the incumbents in mimeographed material which he distributed among the Respondent's members, accused the officers of improprieties in election procedures and in their general conduct of the union's affairs, filed suit against the president of the Respondent in an apparent attempt to oust him from office, filed charges against the officers with the International and the United States Department of Labor, and filed unfair labor practice charges against the Respondent with the Board. Regardless of their justification or basis, these "intraunion activities" in opposition to the Respondent's officers, constituted attempts by Messenger acting in concert with other dissident members, to control by legal means and procedures the conduct of the union which they had chosen to be their bargaining representative in dealing with their current and prospective employers. In agreement with the General Counsel and contrary to the Respondent's contention, I hold that Messenger's activities were "concerted activities" within the meaning and protection of Section 7 of the Act.3 A more complicated problem is presented by the question of whether the Respondent committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) or (2) of the Act by withholding referrals from Messenger to the Carlson and Manzi jobs because of his "intraunion activities." For, even assuming for the moment the suggested discrimination against Messenger in withholding these job referrals, it would not have been a violation of the Act unless, on some basis or other, the Respondent was obligated to refer known, available job applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis.4 But the Respondent had no express "exclusive hiring hall" contract with any employer, i.e. a contract in which the Respondent undertook to refer all operating engineers needed by the employer and the employer, in turn, agreed to hire only those engineers referred to it by the Respondent. And the Board has repeatedly held that, in the absence of any such express contract or an equivalent oral agreement or an apparent understanding between a union and an employer implied from an existing continuous complementary practice of referral and exclusive hire, a union is ordinarily not obligated to refer job applicants on an employer's requests, and its refusal to do so in particular instances-whatever its reasons-is therefore not an unfair labor practice.5 3 As to the protection of a dissident union member's right to oppose union officers generally, including participation in Congressional and Board proceedings, see Local 138, Operating Engineers v N LR B, 321 F 2d 130, 136 (C A 2), enfg in material part 139 NLRB 633 As to the protection of a union member 's opposition to the reelection of incumbent officers, see Chauffeur's Union Local 923, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 172 NLRB No 248 As to the protection under Section 7 of a union member's filing unfair labor practice charges against his union , see N L R B v Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U. S 418, reversing 379 F 2d 702 (C A 3), and enfg 159 NLRB 1065, N L R B v Cannery Workers etc, 396 F 2d 955 (C.A 9), enfg 159 NLRB 843, cert denied 393 U S 1025, N L R B v Millwrights and Machinery Erectors, Local Union No 1510, etc, 379 F.2d To avoid the possible adverse impact of these decisions in the present case, the General Counsel makes two general arguments, each advancing a somewhat different ground for holding that the Respondent was obliged under its established referral practice to refer its members for jobs whenever requested by an employer and to make these referrals without discrimination against any member like Messenger because of activity protected by the Act. The General Counsel's first argument is that, in view of a general reliance and acceptance by the construction employers of the Respondent's "referrals" as their only practical source of operating engineers, the Respondent's referral practice, although not the subject of any agreement or contract with any employer, constituted an "exclusive hiring hall" arrangement with construction employers in the area, under which any discrimination against its members for activity protected by the Act is an unfair labor practice. The General Counsel's second argument is, in substance, that although voluntarily attempting to secure jobs for its members on employers' requests, the Respon- dent is obligated, when such a request is made and it therefore reasonably expects that a "referral" will be accepted, to refer its known available members without discrimination. From the General Counsel 's presentation of the first of these two arguments (the general substance of which I have just stated), it appears that the General Counsel is contending that the Respondent's referral practice and its use by employers have resulted in such an "exclusive hiring hall arrangement" between the Respondent and the employers as to obligate the Respondent to make referrals of its members upon request, either because the existing practice implies an agreement to that effect or because the Respondent's referrals constitute the employers' only source of qualified engineers as well as the only channel through which the engineers may at times hope to secure employment. But neither of these branches of the General Counsel's argument is supported by the evidence. For, as I have found, the Respondent's existing referral practice is used in filling only 5 percent of the job openings for operating engineers; the other 95 percent of these jobs are filled by the employers themselves on direct applications without union referral, and, even in the small percentage of cases in which "referrals" are hired, it does not appear from the evidence that the employers or the engineers themselves are compelled by circumstance to use the referral system either to fill or to secure jobs. There is therefore no basis in the record for holding that, either by implication or by compelling necessity, the Respondent's referral practice and its use by employers have resulted in such a virtual 679 (C A. 5), enfg. 152 NLRB 1374 4 Carpenters Local #40, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 143 NLRB 142, 143 5 Hoisting & Portable Engineers, Local 302, 144 NLRB 1449. 152, United Construction Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc, Local No 171, 169 NLRB No I (TXD), Frank Pauley, Agent 152 NLRB 1409, 1414-15, Millwrights Local Union 1421, 156 NLRB 94, 103 (and see other earlier decisions cited in fn . 10) The Board will infer an exclusive referral and hiring arrangement giving rise to the Union's obligation to refer or clear, only from a continuing mutual practice in which the Union has in fact been the sole source of an employer's workers See N L R B v Local 568, Hotel Employees, 334 F.2d 723, 727-728 (C A 3 ), enfg 141 NLRB 310 HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS, LOCAL 4 375 "exclusive hiring arrangement" that the Respondent has been obligated either to employers or to its own members to make referrals whenever requested. The General Counsel is sound, however, in his second argument that, although the Respondent's referral practice has been purely voluntary, the Respondent is nevertheless under an obligation to its members, so long as it pursues its practice of supplying even a limited employment service, to continue to furnish this service without discrimination whenever an employer makes a request for an engineer. This obligation to its members is imposed by the prohibitions in Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act and is not dependent on the existence of any contractual or other obligation arising under an "exclusive hiring hall arrange- ment." For, the withholding by a union in the Respondent's position of a job referral of one of its eligible members, under an existing nonexclusive referral practice in reprisal for the member's activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, discriminatorily narrows the job opportunities of the member, thereby restrains him and other members in the exercise of their right to engage in the protected activity, and is certainly such restraint and coercion of the members as to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Similarly, such a discriminatory withholding of referral is also a violation of Section 8(b)(2) when it appears that the employer knew of the union's refusal to refer and it can therefore be said that by the refusal the union caused or attempted to cause the employer to refuse to hire the disfavored member .6 Returning to a consideration of the first of the three instances of alleged discrimination by the Respondent in refusing job referrals to Robert Messenger, it will be recalled that both Messenger and Smith told Business Agent DeRosa in their telephone conversations on January 19, 1969, the Messenger had found unattended heaters operating on the Carlson job in Bedford the preceding Friday night and claimed one of the night shift jobs; that DeRosa told Messenger as well as Smith that he would do nothing to help Messenger get the job; and that when Carlson asked DeRosa to refer two men for the night shifts within the next few days, DeRosa referred Smith and Mara who thereupon got the jobs on January 24, 1969, instead of Messenger . Not only did Business Agent DeRosa thereby depart from his usual practice in handling referrals by summarily rejecting the priority claimed by Messenger to the Carlson jobs by reason of his having "found" them, but his brusque rejection of Messenger' s claim (particularly in his hostile remark to Smith that he "wouldn't give that bastard [Messenger] a job if he was the last one on earth") appears to have no explanation in the circumstances shown by the evidence, other than that DeRosa's refusal to refer Messenger to the Carlson jobs was based on Messenger's disagreeable but protected "intraunion activities" against the Respondent's officers. Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent, acting through Business Agent DeRosa, refused to refer Messenger to the Carlson Company's Bedford job on January 19, 1969, because of Messenger's protected "intraunion activities," and that the refusal in this instance deprived Messenger of one of the heater jobs with Carlson on January 24, 1969, and constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. But, since Carlson, the employer, knew nothing of Messenger's claim to the job nor of the Respondent's refusing him a referral, I cannot find that the Respondent's action "caused or attempted to cause" Carlson to discriminate against Messenger in violation of Service 8(a)(3) of the Actor therefore that the Respondent's refusal of the referral was a violation of Section 8(b)(2). Consequently I shall dismiss the 8(b)(2) allegation of the complaint based upon this incident. Nor do I find that the evidence (which I have already discussed in - detail) supports the allegations of the complaint that the Respondent discriminatorily refused or failed to refer Messenger to either of the two Manzi jobs on the North Andover site in February and March 1969. As to the first of these jobs in February, it does not appear from the evidence that Messenger ever made any request to the Respondent to be referred to the job or that the Respondent had any reason to believe that Messenger was available when Business Agent Grande assigned engineer Paul to the job because he knew that Paul had already been working on the site. And as to the second Manzi job on the same site in March, it appears that the job was filled not by any union referral but by the independently arranged transfer of engineer Ginuisz from a job with another contractor on the site to Manzi, and that this was explained to` Messenger by Business Agent Grande when the latter finally spoke to Messenger about the matter. Accordingly, I find that the evidence does not aupoort, and I will therefore dismiss, the allegations of the complaint that the Respon- dent in violation of Section 8(b)(1) or (2) of the Act discriminated against Messenger by refusing or failing to refer him to either of the Manzi jobs on February 25 or March 10, 1969. III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent, Hoisting & Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and its Branches of the Internation- al Union of Operating Engineers, which have been set forth in section II, above, have a close relation to trade, traffic, 6 In his development of this argument in his brief , the General Counsel relies on the Board's recent decision in Chauffeurs Union Local 923 (172 NLRB No 248) in which the Board applied the "fair representation" principle of the Miranda case ( 140 NLRB 181) to hold that, even absent an exclusive hiring hall arrangement , the respondent union as a statutory exclusive bargaining representative violated sec 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by discriminatorily refusing assistance to secure employment elsewhere for certain employees in the represented bargaining unit because they had opposed reelection of the Union's officers While the "fair representation" principle is not strictly applicable in the present case since the Respondent was not in most instances the statutory exclusive bargaining representative of employees of the employers with whom it dealt, the analogy and the Board's reasoning in the Chauffeurs case are serviceable and instructive In the "fair representation" cases, the unions ' obligation of fair dealing in assisting the employees they represent without discrimination is based on their undertaking the fair performance of the bargaining and incidental obligations imposed by, and voluntarily assumed by them, under Sec 8(d), 8(b)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and, also where applicable 8(b)(2) In the present case, the Respondent 's obligation to its members not to discriminate in referrals is imposed by its voluntary continuance of its referral practice and the application of Sec 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act 376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY It has been found that on January 19, 1969, the Respondent, Hoisting & Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and its Branches of the International Union of Operating Engineers, a labor organization, committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by refusing to issue a job referral to Robert E. Messenger because he had engaged in protected concerted activities in opposition to the Respondent's officers. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and take such affirmative action as is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has also been found that by its aforesaid discriminato- ry, illegal refusal to issue a job referral to Messenger, the Respondent deprived Messenger of a job with the Carlson Corporation on January 24, 1969. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Respondent make Robert E. Messenger whole for any loss of earnings suffered by him as a result of the Respondent's discrimination by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned as wages in the employ of Carlson Corporation on and after January 24, 1969, less his net earnings elsewhere during the same period. Loss of earnings and interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be computed in the manner set forth in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In his brief, the General Counsel requests that the remedial order direct the Respondent to "establish lawful nondiscriminatory standards for the operation of its referral service," distribute copies of these standards to its members, and "maintain records to reflect accurately and fairly the operation of the referral service." I deny this request. The evidence, as I have found, does not support the General Counsel's contention that the Respondent's referral practice created a compulsory, exclusive hiring hall arrangement. On the contrary, it shows simply a voluntary nonexclusive employment service rendered by the Respon- dent for its members which is used in only about 5 percent of the hirings of operating engineers in the area served by the Respondent. Furthermore, the Respondent's avowed standards, though loose in their application, are fair and nondiscriminatory; it is impracticable under the circum- stances shown by the evidence for the Respondent to establish an elaborate, formulaic hiring hall especially for the large geographical area and the small percentage of hirings it would serve; and, in any event, only one instance of illegal discrimination has been proved. In such a limited situation, it would seem unwise, if not improper, for the Board to require the establishment of a referral system or hiring hall according to any prescribed procedures or rigid standards which the Board might or might not believe to be 7 See Local 138, Operating Engineers v N L R B, 321 F 2d 130, 137-138 (C A 2) But see also and compare the orders and notices prescribed by the Board to remedy discrimination under an exclusive hiring hall arrangement or practice in International Union of United Brewery etc, Workers of fair orl give reasonable assurance of nondiscriminatory operation.7 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Hoisting & Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and its Branches of the International Union of Operating Engineers, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. Carlson Corporation and Manzi Electrical Corp. are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 3. By refusing on January 19, 1969, to issue a job referral to Robert E. Messenger, one of its members, for a job with Carlson Corp. because Messenger had engaged in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has committed an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Except as found herein, the Respondent has not committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) or (2) of the Act as are alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Respondent Hoisting & Portable Engineers, Local No. 4 and its Branches of the Internation- al Union of Operating Engineers, and its officers, agents, and successors, shall: 1. Cease and desist from discriminating against Robert E. Messenger or any of its members in the issuance of, or by its refusal to issue, ajob referral to the Carlson Corp. or any other employer because Messenger or any other member has engaged in such concerted activities in opposition to, or in criticism of, the Respondent or its officers as are protected by Section 7 of the Act, including but not limited to opposing the reelection of incumbent officers, running for election to union office, criticizing the Respondent or its officers in communications to governmental agencies, filing suits against the Respondent or its officers in the courts, and filing charges of unfair labor practice with the Board. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make whole Robert E. Messenger for any loss of earnings suffered by him as a result of the Respondent's refusal to issue him a referral to a job with the Carlson Corporation on January 19, 1969, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned as wages in the employ of Carlson Corp. on and after January 24, 1969, less his net earnings elsewhere during the same period. Loss of earnings and interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be computed in the manner set America, AFL-CIO, 166 NLRB No 97, and International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751, AFL-CIO, 175 NLRB No 2 HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS, LOCAL 4 377 forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,138 NLRB 716. (b) Post at its business offices, meeting halls, and all other places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.9 It is further recommended that the Board dismiss the allegations of the complaint asserting Respondent's commission of unfair labor practices other than those I have herein specifically found 8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region I , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discriminate against Robert E. Messenger or any of our members in the issuance of, or by a refusal to issue , a job referral to the Carlson Corp. or any other employer because Messenger or any other member has engaged in concerted activities in opposi- tion to, or in criticism of, this Union or its officers, including opposition to the reelection of officers, running for election to union office, criticizing the Union or its officers in communications to governmen- tal agencies, filing suits against the Union or its officers in the Courts, and filing charges of unfair labor practice with the Board WE WILL make whole Robert E. Messenger for any loss of earnings suffered by him as a result of our failure and refusal to issue him a referral to a job with the Carlson Corp. on January 19, 1969. Dated By HOISTING & PORTABLE ENGINEERS , LOCAL No 4 AND ITS BRANCHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 20th Floor, John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge & New Sudbury Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02203, Telephone 617-223-3353. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation