Hobson Bearing International, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 11, 2017

365 NLRB No. 73 (N.L.R.B. 2017)

365 NLRB No. 73
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Hobson Bearing International, Inc. and Tera Lopez.
Case 14–CA–156114
May 11, 2017
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On August 19, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Chris-
tine E. Dibble issued the attached decision, and on Au-
gust 24, 2016, she issued an Errata. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified and set forth in full below.2

1 The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s findings (i) that the
Respondent coercively interrogated employee Tera Lopez on July 8,
2015; (ii) that Lopez’ termination was motivated by her contact with
the Board; (iii) that the Respondent’s proffered reasons for terminating
Lopez were pretextual; (iv) that Lopez was not a supervisor under Sec.
2(11) of the Act; (v) that the judge did not properly weigh evidence
regarding Lopez’ alleged supervisory authority; and (vi) that the judge
committed prejudicial error by failing to order production of a cell
phone containing a recording of the alleged interrogation. There are no
exceptions to the judge’s remaining findings.
Chairman Miscimarra recognizes that there were no exceptions to
the judge’s finding that employee Lopez engaged in protected concert-
ed activity on July 8, 2015, during her meeting with the Respondent’s
owner and president, Gene Hobson. Nonetheless, he does not rely on
the judge’s finding that Lopez’ conduct was “inherently concerted,” a
theory he rejects for the reasons set forth in his separate opinions in
Hoodview Vending Co., 362 NLRB No. 81, slip op. at 5–7 (2015)
(Member Miscimarra, dissenting), and Alternative Energy Applications,
Inc., 361 NLRB No. 139, slip op. at 7–8 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). As he explained in Hoodview Vending, the notion
that conversations about certain subjects are “inherently” concerted
cannot be reconciled with Meyers Industries, Inc., 281 NLRB 882
(1986) (Meyers II), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). In Meyers II, the Board
distinguished between conversations that look toward group action,
which are concerted, and mere griping, which is not. To deem a con-
versation “inherently” concerted based solely on its subject matter
erases this distinction and thus contravenes Meyers II. See Hoodview
Vending, 362 NLRB No. 81, slip op. at 5–6 (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting). Instead, he finds that Lopez’ conduct on July 8 was con-
certed under the standard set forth in Meyers II. As relevant here, the
Board in Meyers II held that an individual employee engages in con-
certed activity when he or she brings “truly group complaints to the
attention of management.” 281 NLRB at 887. That is what Lopez did
on July 8 when she brought employees’ concerns about the Respond-
ent’s workplace policies—including its ban on discussing pay—to
Hobson’s attention.

In affirming the judge’s findings, we do not rely on her citations to
several cases decided by a two-member Board: Brighton Retail, Inc.,
354 NLRB 441 (2009); Inn at Fox Hollow, 352 NLRB 1072 (2008);
Bloomfield Health Care Center, 352 NLRB 252 (2008); Bryant Health
Center, Inc., 353 NLRB 739 (2009); and Saigon Gourmet Restaurant,
Inc., 353 NLRB 1063 (2009). See New Process Steel v. NLRB, 560
U.S. 674 (2010) (holding that following a delegation of the Board’s
powers to a three-member group, two members may not continue to
exercise that delegated authority once the group’s—and the Board’s—
membership falls to two). We also do not rely on the judge’s citations
to Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 358 NLRB 537 (2012);
Temecula Mechanical, Inc., 358 NLRB 1225 (2012); and Taylor Made
Transportation Services, Inc., 358 NLRB 427 (2012). These decisions
were issued by panels subsequently found invalid by NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014). The judge also cited Relco Locomo-
tives, Inc., 358 NLRB 298 (2012), and Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358
NLRB 1131 (2012), cases also decided by a panel that included invalid-
ly appointed Board members. See Noel Canning, supra. However,
prior to the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Noel Canning,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and Fifth
Circuit, respectively, enforced the Board’s Orders—see NLRB v. Relco
Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2013); Flex Frac Logistics,
LLC v. NLRB, 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014)—and there is no question
regarding the validity of those courts’ judgments.
In affirming the judge’s finding that the Respondent failed to show
that Lopez was a supervisor under Sec. 2(11) of the Act, we do not rely
on the judge’s characterization of the Board’s decision in Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006), as holding that, in all Sec.
2(11) inquiries, “the evidence must show that a presumed supervisor is
accountable for a subordinate’s work performance.” Accountability is
relevant to determining whether an individual is a statutory supervisor
only where a party contends that the individual possesses authority
responsibly to direct employees. Id. at 691–692. The Respondent
contends that Lopez was a statutory supervisor, but not on the basis that
she responsibly directed employees. Chairman Miscimarra additionally
notes that the judge’s finding that Lopez was not a statutory supervisor
is consistent with the three “common sense” factors set forth in his
dissenting opinion in Buchanan Marine, L.P., 363 NLRB No. 58, slip
op. at 10 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting) (stating that, when
applying the supervisory criteria set forth in Sec. 2(11), the Board
should consider (i) the nature of the employer’s operations; (ii) the
work performed by undisputed statutory employees; and (iii) whether it
is plausible to conclude that all supervisory authority is vested in per-
sons other than those whose supervisory status is in dispute). Here, it is
plausible to conclude that all supervisory authority could be exclusively
vested in Respondent’s president, Hobson, given that the Respondent is
in the business of importing and reselling industrial bearings to com-
mercial customers, the work performed by undisputed statutory em-
ployees does not require much direction, and the Respondent’s work
force is comprised of only five statutory employees.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s discharge of
Lopez was unlawful, we do not rely on the judge’s characterization of
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), as placing a burden of “pro-
duction” on the employer. Rather, as the judge correctly stated else-
where in her decision, once the General Counsel has shown that con-
duct protected by Sec. 7 of the Act was a motivating factor in an ad-
verse employment action, the burden shifts to the employer to show—
i.e., to prove—that it would have taken the same action even in the
absence of the protected conduct. Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 1089. In
finding that the Respondent failed to satisfy its rebuttal burden under
Wright Line, the judge properly considered evidence related to the
Respondent’s intent (i.e., the suspicious timing of the discharge). See
Dish Network, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 141, slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2016).
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, having
found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4) and
(1) by discharging employee Tera Lopez, we shall order
the Respondent to offer her full reinstatement to her for-
mer job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or
any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and to
make her whole for any loss of earnings and other bene-
fits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her.
In accordance with our recent decision in King Soopers,
Inc., 364 NLRB No. 93 (2016), we shall also order the
Respondent to compensate Lopez for her search-for-
work and interim employment expenses regardless of
whether those expenses exceed interim earnings. Search-
for-work and interim employment expenses shall be cal-
culated separately from taxable net backpay, with interest
at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky
River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).3
Within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, the Respond-
ent shall file its report allocating Lopez’ backpay with
the Regional Director, not with the Social Security Ad-
ministration. The Respondent will be required to allo-
cate backpay to the appropriate calendar years. The Re-
gional Director will then assume responsibility for
transmission of the report to the Social Security Admin-
istration at the appropriate time and in the appropriate

Chairman Miscimarra agrees with his colleagues that the Respond-
ent unlawfully discharged Lopez. Unlike the judge, however, he does
not rely on the “suspicious timing” of the discharge in determining that
the Respondent failed to prove that it would have discharged Lopez
even absent her NLRA-protected activity. Suspicious timing is proba-
tive at stage one of a Wright Line analysis, when the Board is determin-
ing whether the General Counsel satisfied his burden to prove that
NLRA-protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s
adverse employment decision. But as Chairman Miscimarra has previ-
ously explained, he is of the view that it is improper to rely yet again on
evidence of unlawful motivation, relevant at stage one of the Wright
Line analysis, to find that the employer failed to satisfy its defense
burden at stage two of the Wright Line analysis. To do so is to double-
count Wright Line stage one and to eliminate Wright Line stage two.
See Dish Network, LLC, supra, slip op. at 4–6 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring).
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended remedy and Order to
reflect the Board’s standard remedies and remedial language for the
violations found, and we shall substitute a new notice to conform to the
language in the Order as modified.
3 For the reasons stated in his separate opinion in King Soopers, su-
pra, slip op. at 12–16, Chairman Miscimarra would adhere to the
Board’s former approach, treating search-for-work and interim em-
ployment expenses as an offset against interim earnings.
manner. AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB No.
143 (2016).
Finally, the Respondent shall be required to remove
from its files any and all references to the unlawful dis-
charge of Lopez, and to notify her in writing that this has
been done and that the discharge will not be used against
her in any way.
ORDER
Hobson Bearing International, Inc., Diamond, Mis-
souri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Promulgating, maintaining, and/or distributing a
“Pay” policy prohibiting employees from discussing their
wages and bonuses with other employees.
(b) Promulgating, maintaining, and/or distributing an
“Agreement of Restriction/Confidentiality” policy pro-
hibiting employees from discussing or sharing “individu-
al proprietary information; vital company information;
and our information.”
(c) Telling employees they are required to sign the un-
lawful policies described above in paragraphs 1(a) and
1(b).
(d) Prohibiting employees from discussing their wages
and other terms and conditions of employment, including
disciplinary issues.
(e) Prohibiting employees from discussing the dis-
charge of an employee.
(f) Coercively interrogating employees about their pro-
tected concerted activities.
(g) Coercively interrogating employees about their
statements to the Board regarding the legality of the Re-
spondent’s policies described above in paragraphs 1(a)
and 1(b).
(h) Threatening to discharge employees for discussing
their wages and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
(i) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees for engaging in protected concerted activities.
(j) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees for seeking access to the Board, filing charg-
es, or giving testimony under the Act.
(k) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the “Pay” and “Agreement of Re-
striction/Confidentiality” policies, or revise them to
make clear they do not prohibit employees from discuss-
ing their wages or other terms and conditions of their
employment.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 3
(b) Notify all employees at its Diamond, Missouri fa-
cility that the “Pay” and “Agreement of Re-
striction/Confidentiality” policies have been rescinded or
revised.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Tera Lopez full reinstatement to her former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed.
(d) Make Tera Lopez whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against her in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the judge’s decision as amended in this deci-
sion.
(e) Compensate Tera Lopez for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award,
and file with the Regional Director for Region 14, within
21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either
by agreement or Board order, a report allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar year(s).
(f) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to Tera Lopez’ discharge, and
within 3 days thereafter, notify Lopez in writing that this
has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against her in any way.
(g) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Diamond, Missouri facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily com-
municates with its employees by such means. Reasona-

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
ble steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. If the Respondent has gone out of busi-
ness or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own ex-
pense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any
time since January 16, 2015.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 14 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 11, 2017
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or distribute a
“Pay” policy prohibiting employees from discussing their
wages and bonuses.
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or distribute an
“Agreement of Restriction/Confidentiality” policy that
prohibits employees from discussing or sharing “individ-
ual proprietary information; vital company information;
and our information.”
WE WILL NOT require you to sign unlawful policies
prohibiting you from discussing your terms and condi-
tions of employment.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from discussing your terms
and conditions of employment, including wages and dis-
ciplinary issues.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from discussing the dis-
charge of an employee.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you about your protected
concerted activities or about statements you make to
agents of the Board.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge or take other ad-
verse actions against you for engaging in protected con-
certed activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against you for engaging in protected concerted activi-
ties, for seeking access to the Board, for filing charges,
or for giving testimony under the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the unlawful “Pay” and “Agreement
of Restriction/Confidentiality” policy provisions or re-
vise them to make clear that they do not prohibit our em-
ployees from discussing their wages or other terms and
conditions of their employment, and WE WILL notify all
employees that the policy provisions have been rescinded
or revised.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Tera Lopez full reinstatement to her former
job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or
any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Tera Lopez whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits resulting from her discharge, less
any net interim earnings, plus interest, and WE WILL also
make Lopez whole for reasonable search-for-work and
interim employment expenses, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Tera Lopez for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and WE WILL file with the Regional Director for
Region 14, within 21 days of the date the amount of
backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a
report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar year(s) for Tera Lopez.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discharge of Tera Lopez, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been done
and that the discharge will not be used against her in any
way.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found
at www.nlrb.gov/case/14–CA–156114 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
William F. LeMaster, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Karl W. Blanchard, Jr., Esq. and David J. Riesenmy, Esq., for
the Respondent.
Eric Crinnian, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Joplin, Missouri, on December 15–16, 2015. Tera
Lopez (Lopez/Charging Party) filed the charge in case number
14–CA–156114 on July 6, 2015.1 The amended charge in this
case was filed by Lopez on September 22. The General Coun-
sel issued the complaint and notice of hearing on September 28.
Hobson Bearing International, Inc. (Respondent/HBI) filed a
timely answer on October 9.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Sections
8(a)(1) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA/the
Act) when:
1. Since about January 16, Respondent has maintained, and
since about July 6, reissued and has maintained an unlawful
rule prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and, or
bonuses with the threat of termination for violating the rule.
2. About July 6, Respondent, by physical distribution to em-
ployees, promulgated and since then has maintained a rule ti-
tled Agreement of Restriction/Confidentiality, restricting em-
ployees from discussing or sharing confidential information,
defined as including, but not limited to, individuals’ proprietary
information; vital company information; and our information.
3. Respondent, by Gene Hobson, at Respondent’s facility:

1 All dates are in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 5
-About mid-June 2015, prohibited employees from discussing
their terms and conditions of employment, including discipli-
nary issues.
-About July 6, 2015, told employees that they were required
to sign agreements to abide by the rules described above in
numbers 1 and 2 of the statement of the case.
-About July 8, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing
their wages and other terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 8, 2015, interrogated employees about their pro-
tected, concerted activities, by asking employees if they had
complained about the rules described above in numbers 1 and
2 of the statement of the case.
-About July 8, 2015, interrogated employees about their pro-
tected, concerted activities, by asking employees about con-
versations they had with agents of the Board regarding Re-
spondent’s rules described above in paragraph 4.
-About July 8, 2015, threatened employees with unspecified
reprisals for engaging in Section 7 activity, including discuss-
ing their wages and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
-About July 8, 2015, threatened employees with unspecified
reprisals for seeking access to the Board.
-About July 9, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing
their wages and other terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 9, 2015, told employees that they were required
to sign agreements to abide by the rules described above in
numbers 1 and 2 of the Statement of the Case.
-About July 13, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing
their wages and other terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 13, 2015, told employees that Respondent termi-
nated an employee because the employee raised concerns
about Respondent’s rules described above in numbers 1 and 2
of the Statement of the Case.
-About July 13, 2015, threatened to terminate employees for
discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
-About July 13, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing
the termination of an employee.
4. About July 13, 2015, Respondent discharged Lopez be-
cause Lopez engaged in concerted conduct, and to discourage
employees from engaging in these or other concerted activities.
Alternatively, in the event that Lopez is found to be a supervi-
sor of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act, or found not to be an employee within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the Act, Respondent engaged in the conduct
described above because Lopez attempted to prevent Respond-
ent from restricting or interfering with employees’ Section 7
rights, pursuant to the rules as described above in paragraph 4,
and to chill employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights; and
because Lopez contacted the Board regarding Respondent’s
rules set out above in paragraph 4.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the importation and
nonretail sale of industrial bearings. Its operations are conduct-
ed from its office and place of business in Diamond, Missouri.
During the 12-month period ending August 31, Respondent
sold and shipped from its Diamond, Missouri facility goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside of the
State of Missouri. In conducting its operations during the 12-
month period ending August 31, Respondent purchased and
received at its facility in Diamond, Missouri goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside of the State of
Missouri. Respondent admits, and I find, that at all material
times it has been an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operation and Managerial Staff
Gene Hobson (Hobson) founded Respondent in 1996 in Di-
amond, Missouri.2 He is Respondent’s founder, owner and
President.3 Respondent’s business mission is the importation
and resell of industrial bearings to commercial customers.
Regal Beloit Corporation (RBC) is Respondent’s largest cus-
tomer, comprising 90 percent of its business. Respondent con-
tracts with various overseas vendors to fill its customers’ sup-
ply needs. During the period at issue, however, MOS was its
primary supplier.
During the relevant time period, Respondent employed at its
Diamond, Missouri facility about six people, including Hobson.
The staff comprised: Hobson, President; Tera Lopez (Lopez),
Project/Operations Manager; Shelly Wishon (Wishon), Front
Office Manager; Halle Hobson (Halle),4 Administrative Spe-
cialist; Michael McBride (McBride), Quality Control; Monty
Greenwood (Greenwood), Warehouse/Shipping Manager.5
Respondent also periodically hires contract (temporary) em-
ployees to assist with special projects. Former employees in-
cluded: Manny Maturino’s (Maturino) employment ended in
late 2014; Rick Halverson’s (Halverson) employment ended in
2013; Tracy Greenwood (Tracy) employment ended in 2014;
Shawn McBride (Shawn) employment ended in 2014; and Scott
Eastman (Eastman) employment ended in 2015. Respondent
also employed for an unknown period of time an unnamed
employee who suffered from a heart condition. Lopez and
McBride tried to persuade Hobson to terminate the employee

2 Respondent’s facility is a building that contains a front office lobby
with a hallway to the left that leads to offices. There is also a testing
laboratory next to the lobby. On the right of the lobby is a staircase that
leads to Hobson’s office and conference room. Straight ahead and
through the lobby is a large warehouse.
3 Hobson also owns a cattle ranch near the HBI facility in Diamond,
Missouri. Hobson is solely responsible for hiring the ranch’s employ-
ees, which currently consists of staff members Cole Frossard (Frossard)
and Shawn Hobson (Shawn).
4 Halle Hobson is Hobson’s daughter.
5 McBride is a part-time employee.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
because of possible liability due to his heart condition, but there
is no evidence of when or whether he was terminated.
B. Company Policies Parts A and B
Since about July 6, Respondent has maintained company
policies that address various terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Company policy part A (part A) addresses pay policies
concerning holiday pay, vacation pay, bereavement pay, and
part-time personnel pay. Company policy part B (part B) sets
out the discipline for personnel infractions. Part B reads in
pertinent part,
Pay: Will be distributed every Thursday, You should not ex-
pect your weekly pay before 4:00 pm. Employees should not
discuss their pay with any other employee, as it is a sensitive
issue. Bonuses will be issued based on merit or performance.
If someone receives a bonus or pay increase and shares their
information with another employee and it is brought to my at-
tention, it will be automatic termination. Pay is set, based on
performance, annual increases, or a management’s decision.
No one is to discuss this issue at any time, other than in my
office during a review. If you want to discuss pay, you must
ask for a private meeting with management.
(GC Exh. 4.) This policy was a revision of prior part B policies
which contained identical language to that set forth above and
addressed the same subjects and infractions. (GC Exh. 3.) The
prior part B policies were revised on November 26, 2012, and
February 5, 2014.
Company policy part B also set forth the procedure employ-
ees had to use if they were late to or absent from work. The
provision addressing “tardies” and absences from work applies
to all employees. In addition, about a year prior to Lopez’ ter-
mination, Hobson informed employees in a meeting that if they
were going to be late or absent from work, Wishon should be
notified by telephone or text message by 9 a.m. on the date.6
The February 5, 2014, revision remained in effect until part
B dated July 6, was distributed to employees at a meeting held
on July 6.7 The evidence also shows that in the past, Respond-
ent’s employees had signed one or more of the revised policies.
C. Confidentiality Agreement
Respondent promulgated and maintained a confidentiality
agreement (CA) that restricted employees from divulging,
among other information, “individual proprietary information;
vital company information; and our information.” (GC Exh. 1-I,
5.) The CA has been in effect since at least May; and on or
about May 28, R distributed it to employees for their review
and signature.
D. Mid-June 2015 Verbal Reprimand of McBride
About the same time that Respondent began revising and dis-
tributing to employees company policies and the CA, an inci-

6 Hobson denied Wishon’s testimony on this point. However, later
in the decision, I detail why I credit Wishon’s testimony instead of
Hobson on this point.
7 The changes made to part B dated July 6 included, among other
changes, reducing paid holiday from 8 days to 7 days; and reducing
bereavement pay for a grandparent from 3 days to 1 day.
dent occurred involving McBride and Hobson. McBride had
been employed with Respondent on several occasions, most
recently from March 2014, to July 22, 2015. In his position as
the quality control manager he served as the point of contact for
customers experiencing quality problems with their orders.
In a meeting about mid-June, Hobson expressed, to McBride,
his concern that McBride had needlessly purchased “grease”
without his authorization. After the meeting, McBride com-
plained to other employees that Hobson “jumped him” and was
“petty” towards him in a meeting. McBride also complained to
other employees about Hobson hiring a contract employee that
he felt was unnecessary. Subsequently, Hobson verbally rep-
rimanded McBride for complaining to other employees about
his managerial decisions, and told him to stop interfering with
business operations by “stirring up drama with employees.”
E. HBI Employee Meeting on July 6
On July 6, Hobson held a meeting with employees in his
conference room. In attendance were Lopez, Wishon, McBride,
Frossard, Halle, and Greenwood. The purpose of the meeting
was for the employees to sign revised parts A and B and the
CA. Hobson explained to the employees that after they re-
viewed and signed the revised policies and CA, he and Wishon
would take their signed forms to have them notarized. He in-
formed the employees that he wanted their forms signed that
day. Wishon questioned whether it was legal to have the forms
notarized without the employees present; and Hobson respond-
ed that his attorney informed him it was permissible.8
After the meeting, Lopez, Wishon, and McBride discussed
the legality of the policies and the CA among themselves.
They also complained about the change to the bereavement
policy, sick pay, mobile phone usage in the office, and dress
code.9 Lopez told them she thought that certain language in the
company policies (parts A and B) and the CA might be illegal.
She also informed them that she was going to research the is-
sues and discuss them with Hobson at her meeting with him on
July 8. Despite their concerns, the employees decided to sign
parts A and B and the CA to avoid upsetting Hobson.10
Subsequently, Lopez researched the issue via the internet and
called the NLRB for guidance.11 She understood the NLRB
representative to say that the provision prohibiting the discus-
sion of their pay and certain portions of the CA were unlawful.
Lopez relayed this information to her coworkers, assuring them
that she would discuss it with Hobson the following day.
F. Meeting between Hobson and Lopez on July 8
On July 8, Hobson met with Lopez in the conference room to
discuss, among other items, business operations and her per-

8 The record is devoid of evidence establishing whether Hobson and
Wishon took those forms to be notarized.
9 Wishon provided undisputed testimony that at some point in their
discussion, Halle also stopped and expressed her displeasure with the
dress code policy change. (Tr. 215.)
10 Wishon had signed past company policies banning the discussion
of employee pay.
11 Lopez also contacted the Department of Labor (DOL) Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) about the same or similar
issues. Ultimately, she filed complaints with those agencies.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 7
formance evaluation. The meeting began with a discussion on
“forecasting”12 that lasted until about 1:30 p.m., when they
broke for lunch. They returned from lunch about 4 p.m. to
continue the meeting. The first 15 minutes of the meeting was
used to finish talking about the company forecasting trends.
Once discussion about business operations ended, Lopez
broached her concerns about the legality of parts A and B and
the CA. She also voiced her objections to the changes to the
bereavement, vacation accrual, dress code, and sick pay poli-
cies and Halle’s chronic tardiness. Some of her complaints
were of a personal nature. For example, she complained about
the effect the revision to the sick leave policy had on her. Hob-
son assured Lopez that it was not personally directed at her; and
it should not be a concern to her because she was a salaried
employee. Nonetheless, the primary focus of their conversation
was on those issues that she spoke about with her coworkers
after the employee meeting on July 6. Lopez told Hobson that
she did not want to sign the policy prohibiting employees from
discussing their pay with each other, but he responded that she
and none of the other employees were supposed to talk about
their pay. Lopez told him the policy violated federal law and
provided him with information she got from the internet cor-
roborating her position. Hobson countered that she could draw
a line through the portion of the policy she found objectionable.
Although he told her it did not matter to him if she wanted to
discuss her pay with other employees, Hobson immediately
repudiated this sentiment by stating,
. . . all it does is stir the pot and create drama, okay? And
cause Obama signed some, some shit into law, ah, this is
something that, that my lawyer would need to, to investigate
and to uh, see what it actually is and the Labor Relations
Board if they have a problem with it can give me a call and
ask and tell me about it because just because it refers to this
section, that section. I don’t know if this is law.
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1 p. 8.) Lopez also informed
Hobson that the CA was unlawful because it imposed a mone-
tary penalty for violating its provisions. Nonetheless, Hobson
told her that she was ignorant of the law, and he was going to
enforce its provisions. In response to her complaint that she
was discouraging him from bringing these concerns to him,
Hobson denied it. He also questioned whether she had talked
about her objections to the parts A and B and the CA with her
coworkers, and instructed her not to discuss her belief that he
was “breaking the law” with other employees. (GC 12; GC
Exh. 13, Part 1 p. 9.) The following exchange ensued:
Hobson: I’m not discouraging you from doing it. I want you
to do it but I don’t want you to be discussing it with other em-
ployees.
Lopez: So, do you want me to go, “hey…”
Hobson: Are you discussing it with other employees?
Lopez: “Hey, he’s violating the law”

12 Forecasting is the term Respondent uses for estimating how much
product a customer might order over several months and, based on that
estimate and its current supply, the amount of product Respondent must
stock at the warehouse to meet its customer’s needs.
Hobson: Did you talk to me only about that or did you bring
it up to other employees…
Id. Hobson continued by telling Lopez that if she objected to
the provision, she could “line through it.” However, he imme-
diately disavowed the statement by emphasizing to her that she
was “going to sign a confidentiality if you work here and that’s,
that’s going to be required” but agreed to have his attorney
review it again to ensure its legality. (GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13,
Part 1, p. 9.)
The next item that Hobson and Lopez debated was her un-
happiness with his daughter’s (Halle) tardiness and her con-
flicts with his wife. Hobson told her that because Halle was a
student, she needed flexibility with her work scheduled, and
Lopez would have to accept it. He also informed her that she
needed to make more of an effort to get along with his wife and
that he had told his wife the same.
Hobson and Lopez revisited the subject of the legality of
parts A and B and the CA. Lopez told him that she called the
“Labor Board” and EEOC.13 Although she had just informed
him that she called the Board and EEOC, he inexplicably asked
if she called the Board on Respondent, what she reported, and
the Board’s response. Lopez again admitted to calling NLRB;
relayed that the NLRB representative informed her that the CA
and parts A and B were unlawful; and the NLRB representative
asked if she wanted to file a complaint. Hobson responded that
filing a claim was her right; and if she did not want to sign the
company policies containing the pay provision, and the CA
with a monetary fine for violating it, she could “scratch off of
there.” Lopez expressed skepticism noting he made employees
feel pressured into signing the documents for fear of losing
their jobs. She explained,
Lopez: Just like the confidentiality, “Sign this.” It’s not, “take
it home and read it over.”
Hobson: mmhmm
Lopez: But I can’t take it home, can I? Because…
Hobson: Why can’t you?
Lopez: Your confidentiality thing says taking crap out I owe
you $75,000.
Hobson: No, I, I, got to put a fee on there. So, you talked to
the Labor Board about that as well?
Lopez: Yes
Hobson: and what did the Labor Board say?
Lopez: The said it’s illegal.
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1, p. 15.) Hobson then asked
her to get a copy of the CA so they could review it; and she
responded with sarcasm which caused him to express frustra-
tion stating,
You’re really, you’re really pushing me. You’re sitting
here telling me, little, looking for little tidbits telling

13 Based on her testimony, it is apparent Lopez was referring to the
NLRB and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
me that you called the EEOC, the Department of La-
bor, all this. Why would you do that? Who does shit
like that?
(GC Exh. 13, p. 16.) They then became locked in a battle over
whether Hobson said Lopez was a “witch stirrer” brewing up
brew or used some variant phrase to denote causing drama. At
some point the discussion deteriorated into an unproductive
argument with Hobson telling Lopez that she appeared intimi-
dated by him, unhappy with her job, and she should find anoth-
er job if she was not happy at the company. He accused her of
being defiant and insubordinate; and he had been warned that
she “would probably try and come against [him] and look for
little things” (GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1, p. 18) Lopez
complained that he awarded employees bonuses unfairly. Hob-
son denied the accusation and told her his award of bonuses to
employees was “not your business.” Id. He reiterated that he
was unhappy with her decision to complain to federal agencies
about the parts A and B and the CA. Hobson told Lopez the he
did not “appreciate you reporting things to me to the govern-
ment.” (GC Exh. 13, p. 17–20.)
The meeting continued with Lopez complaining about Hob-
son being upset with her because she told a RBC employee that
he had instructed her not to send RBC reports on the status of
their orders. Hobson accused her of purposely conveying the
information to RBC in a manner that would cause friction with
RBC. He also reminds her that she was not punished for the
RBC incident, but instead would receive a raise as part of her
annual performance evaluation.
However, Hobson accused her of being insubordinate, which
she denied.14 She circled back to the nonsensical argument
about whether Hobson called her a witch stirring the pot. Frus-
trated Hobson asked, “What is it that you want? What is it you
want, Tera? Do you want to continue your job here or do you
want to leave. What do you want?” (GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13,
Part 2, p. 3.) Lopez responds several times that she is bored
with her job because her duties are taken from her and reas-
signed to other employees, thus leaving her without enough
work to keep her busy.
Hobson and Lopez continue to circle around the same topics
with no apparent resolution. Further into their repetitive dis-
cussion, Hobson again voices his displeasure about her report-
ing the company to the Department of Labor and EEOC; and
notes that he has treated her fairly because she is the highest
paid employee on the payroll. It should also be noted that at
some point in their discussion and in his hearing testimony,
Hobson characterized Lopez as a “stellar employee,” “doing a
good job,” highly intelligent, and had a “wonderful” attitude
with him. Likewise, the only performance appraisal for Lopez
entered into the record lists several of her strong points but lists
one area for improvement as, “[d]o not bring up personal com-
plaints or problems in front of other [e]mployees.” (GC Exh.
14.)
After more squabbling over the hostility between Lopez and
Hobson’s wife, they circle back to a discussion of her contact-

14 It was at this point in the meeting that Lopez informed Hobson she
had been recording their conversations for the past 6 months, including
the current discussion.
ing the Board and the CA. Hobson reiterates that he mark
through the provisions of the parts A and B and the CA that she
found objectionable. Nevertheless, he reminded her that he was
going to review the information he gave her about the CA’s
illegality. Hobson also recalled a mistake she made in sending
an email to Respondent’s supplier in China, MOS, which con-
tained confidential information that could have resulted in seri-
ous damage to Respondent. She acknowledged her mistake;
and he assured her that, although initially upset, he did not be-
lieve she sent the information to MOS with malicious intent.
Towards the end of the meeting, Hobson told Lopez that he
would have terminated her if he felt that she had sent the email
to MOS in an attempt to purposely harm the company. Lopez
accuses him of hypocrisy for discussing the MOS incident with
other workers, but prohibiting her from doing the same. Hobson
rejects her characterization, responding that he does not mind
her talking with other employees when she is upset but not to
talk to them about “business stuff.”15 They proceed to review
the policies together and agree on the sections to delete. Not-
withstanding this action, Hobson repeats that he will be unhap-
py if she discusses work related issues with coworkers; and
again tells her that he is going to take the CA to his attorney to
review it for legal accuracy, and regardless, all employees will
be required to sign it.
Lopez reiterated that she was bored in her job. Hobson in-
formed her that the only challenging position left in the compa-
ny was sales and encouraged her to take on more of those re-
sponsibilities. He promised to support her in this effort. Ex-
plaining to Lopez that he was hiring an employee that she
would train on bearings, he encouraged her to learn from him
because this future employee had a vast knowledge of sales and
the bearing’s market. He also repeats his support of Lopez
stating,
“. . . I wouldn’t keep you around her for a minute if I thought
you were bad business. I didn’t think you were bad business
then and I don’t think you are now and you know you can tell
me stuff you can come against me on and I’ll take it with a
grain of salt cause truthfully and honestly I need, you know,
I’ve been in your corner and I’ve been for you. So there is no
need to worry about me.”
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 3, p. 7.) The meeting finally
ended at about 5 p.m. with Hobson assigning Lopez three sales
calls purportedly in response to her request for more work and
responsibility.
G. Hobson Meeting with Attorney on July 9
On July 9, Hobson called Wishon into his office to ask her if
she felt the ban on employees discussing their pay among
themselves was illegal. When she told him that she felt it pro-
hibited employees from determining if they were being paid
fairly, Hobson retrieved the document and told her he was go-
ing to change it and have employees to sign the revised ver-

15 Although Hobson denied on cross-examination telling Lopez she
could not discuss business matters with other employees, the audio
recorded evidence reveals he explicitly told her this several times dur-
ing the course of their meeting.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 9
sion.16 Hobson informed Wishon that he was taking the docu-
ments to Respondent’s attorney for review. At some unspeci-
fied point, Hobson posted a notice on the employee bulletin
board that the offending provisions had been removed from the
policies because they were inaccurate.17
On July 9, Hobson contacted Respondent’s attorney, David
Riesenmy (Riesenmy), for advice on the legality of the compa-
ny’s policies and the CA. He also consulted with Riesenmy on
his desire to terminate Lopez’ employment. Riesenmy advised
him to rewrite the part B pay provision. There is no evidence
what, if any, advice Riesenmy gave Hobson on his desire to fire
Lopez. Subsequent to his meeting with Riesenmy, Hobson had
the employees sign a revised version of the policies parts A and
B and the CA.18
H. Lopez’ Absence from Work on July 10
On July 10 about 9 a.m., Hobson asked Wishon if Lopez was
in the office. She told him that Lopez was ill and unable to
come to work. Hobson told her that because Lopez did not
personally notify him of her absence he was going to “write her
up” as a no call/no show. He presented the completed “write-
up” to Wishon for her signature, but she refused to sign it.
Consequently, Hobson told her to write whatever she wanted at
the bottom of the form, but regardless, he was going to issue
the “write-up.” Wishon notated on the document that Lopez
notified her the previous evening that she would be absent from
work on July 10. Both testified that ultimately the “write-up”
disappeared before it was issued to Lopez. It was never locat-
ed. Subsequently, Hobson returned to Wishon’s desk about
9:30 a.m. or 10 a.m. and told her that Lopez was fired.
Hobson’s and Wishon’s testimony of their discussion differs
on almost every relevant point. Respondent has a written leave
policy setting forth the disciplinary action that employees are
subject to for violating its provision. (GC Exh. 4.) Hobson in-
sists that since she became operations/project manager, Lopez
has had to notify him if she was going to be absent or late to
work. He insisted, however, that the remaining employees
have the option of notifying him or Wishon if they are going to
be late or absent from work. It is undisputed that employee
notifications of unexpected late arrivals or absences have to be
received by 9 a.m. on that morning. However, Wishon testified
that the practice has been for employees, including Lopez, to
contact her if they are going to be late to or absent from work.

16 The document that Hobson revised in his meeting with Wishon is
GC Exh. 4.
17 Wishon testified that when he returned from meeting with Re-
spondent’s attorney, Hobson told her that he was advised that the provi-
sion banning employees from discussing their pay with each other only
applied to federal employees so he was returning the provision to the
policy. Lopez testified that Hobson also made similar statements to
her. Each of the revised company policies in evidence contains the
provision prohibiting employees from discussing their pay with each
other with the threat of discipline for violations. (GC Exhs. 3, 4, 5, 6.) I
credit her testimony on this point because it was corroborated by other
witnesses and objective evidence.
18 Wishon admitted that she signed another version of the policy that
did not include the ban on discussing employee pay. However, the
revised document that Wishon (and presumably other employees)
signed is not in evidence.
According to her, Hobson communicated this practice to em-
ployees in a meeting about a year ago. She noted that previous-
ly employees were required to notify Lopez if they were going
to be late or absent, but she could not recall when the new pro-
cedure was put in place. Hobson insists that in response to his
inquiry, Wishon first told him she had not heard from Lopez.
According to him, it was not until after he placed a “write-up”
for Lopez on her desk did Wishon tell him that Lopez told her
the previous evening that she might not come to work because
of “female problems.” Wishon contradicts his testimony on
this point, insisting when Hobson first asked she told him that
Lopez informed her the previous evening that she would not be
in to work because she was feeling ill.
I find Wishon more credible than Hobson regarding their
conversation on July 10, about if and who Lopez notified that
she would be absent. Notably, if Lopez was supposed to report
her absences directly to Hobson and not Wishon then why
would he need her to sign off on the “write-up?” Respondent
failed to provide an answer to that question. Moreover, the
“mysterious” disappearance of the write-up that Hobson placed
on Wishon’s desk further casts doubt on the veracity of his
testimony on this point. The Board has consistently declared
that the testimony of current employees is more likely than not
to be reliable because the witness is testifying adverse to her or
his pecuniary interest. Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc., 234
NLRB 618, 619 (1978), enf. denied on other grounds 607 F.2d
1208 (7th Cir. 1979), citing, e.g., Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB
1304, 1305 (1961); Gateway Transportation Co., Inc., 193
NLRB 47, 48 (1971).
I. Respondent’s Efforts to Hire a New Operations Manager
Hobson began reaching out to people about working for him
in March. In April, Hobson contacted an acquaintance, Mi-
chael Norman (Norman), about working for Respondent. Hob-
son told Norman that if he accepted the position his duties
would be “[c]ontrol over the operation, reporting only to [Hob-
son] all the day-to-day operations.” (Tr. 230.) Norman was
informed that someone was currently in the position. On May
21, Norman interviewed with Hobson and toured Respondent’s
facility. During the interview, Hobson told him that the person
currently occupying the position, Lopez, was going to be de-
moted and her duties would be transferred to him. Hobson also
warned him that there might be “friction” when Lopez learned
of her demotion; and he was uncertain if she would want to
remain employed at the company.
After his interview, Hobson contacted Norman by text to ask
whether he was going to accept the position. In the text Hob-
son also wrote,
Going to make some decisions quickly on hiring … May fire
Tera soon … she was suppose (sic) to send my one supplier a
small forecast and production schedule and she sent them a
full inventory schedule of what we have and who are custom-
ers are and how much we get
(GC Exh. 7.) Norman declined the job because he and Re-
spondent could not agree on a compensation package.
In April, Hobson unexpectedly encountered a former em-
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployee, Evan Tanner (Tanner), at the local mall.19 He ex-
plained to Tanner that he wanted to hire someone because he
was having “issues” with an employee. Subsequently, Hobson
and Tanner had several telephone conversations in an attempt
to schedule an in-person meeting. During several of these con-
versations, Hobson told Tanner about problems he was having
with Lopez. The first week in June, Tanner met Hobson at
Respondent’s facility to discuss the position and his expected
duties. During their meeting, Hobson explained that because of
Lopez’ insubordination he wanted her to train Tanner; and
Tanner would then assume some of her responsibilities while
Lopez would be demoted. Hobson also complained to Tanner
that Lopez, McBride, and Wishon would socialize in the ware-
house when they should have been working; and his issues with
Lopez and her causing “drama” with other employees had con-
tinued too long. Tanner was offered the position at the meet-
ing, but his start date was not established because Hobson had
to prepare the paperwork finalizing the job offer; and Tanner
had to give his current employer notice.20 Hobson expressed to
him that he was unsure about Lopez’ role going forward in the
company, but felt that she might voluntarily decide to leave
once Tanner was hired and she was demoted.
On June 30, Tanner met with Hobson to review the job de-
scription and sign the job offer. Hobson also introduced Tanner
to Respondent’s work force. Tanner testified that in this meet-
ing Hobson determined that Tanner would assume Lopez’ posi-
tion of operations manager, and Lopez would be fired. Howev-
er, his Board affidavit contradicts this statement. In his state-
ment to the Board, Tanner notes that there was uncertainty
about what role Lopez would assume after his hire; and he
could not recall if Hobson told him that he had spoken with
Lopez about his plans for her position. (Tr. 105–106) I find
Tanner’s statement to the Board more credible and discount his
testimony at the hearing on this point. His statement at the
hearing was in clear contradiction to his sworn statement; and
the statement to the Board was given closer in time to the act.
Therefore, it is more probable than not that Tanner’s memory
of the event was more accurate at the time he gave his state-
ment to the Board. Moreover, Tanner could not provide a rea-
sonable or any explanation for the change in his testimony.
Except for a text message sent from Hobson to Tanner schedul-
ing a date for him to come into the office, Tanner and Hobson
did not have any further contact until July 10. On July 10,
Tanner received a text message from Hobson informing him
that he was uncertain if Lopez would return to her job because
she did not notify him or anyone else that she would not be at
work that day.21

19 Tanner was briefly employed by Respondent in 1997.
20 Tanner testified that he did not accept the job offer until about a
week after the meeting. However, the affidavit that he gave to the
Board attested that he accepted the job in the interview. Regardless, it
is not necessary for me to reconcile the discrepancy because it is not
important to the merits of the case.
21 On direct-examination, Tanner testified that the first time Hobson
told him that he was going to fire Lopez was June 3. However, his
testimony is in direct contradiction to the affidavit he provided to the
Board on August 17. I do not credit his testimony on this point because
he provides no credible reason for the change in his recollection of the
J. Lopez’ Termination on July 13
On the morning of July 13, Hobson, Tanner, and McBride
were together in the lobby when Lopez arrived for work. Hob-
son informed Lopez immediately when she entered the building
that she was terminated. He told Lopez that Wishon would
gather her personal items and deliver them to her. Lopez left
without incident.
Subsequently, Hobson met with McBride and Tanner in the
conference room to explain why he dismissed Lopez. He told
them that Lopez was fired because she was insubordinate; and
she had mistakenly sent company data to a customer. He testi-
fied to the examples of insubordination that Hobson accused
Lopez of committing in the following exchange with counsel
for the General Counsel:
LeMaster: What was discussed in this meeting?
McBride: He brought us up there and he said, “I had to let her
go. She was being disrespectful.”
LeMaster: Ok. Did he say anything else?
McBride: I asked why?
LeMaster: Did he answer you?
McBride: Yeah, he had an answer. He said it was over the e-
mails sent to the MOS customer about some data and some
cost problems they had.
LeMaster: Okay. Did [Hobson] give any examples of [Lopez]
being disrespectful?
McBride: Yes
LeMaster: What were those?
McBride: He said one of the examples she was – besides the
e-mail problem, and that she was always crossing her arms,
and he said that is disrespectful to him.
LeMaster: Did he give you any other examples?
McBride: Yes. He had – oh, my mind just went blank.
LeMaster: Take your time. Do you recall, was it anything that
she said, that she did?
McBride: Yeah, whenever things was brought up why he let
her go, it was the data that she brought in just showed the le-
gality, that we couldn’t talk about our bonuses and raises, that
was supposed to be legal, and she showed that where she got
the information from, who she talked, to and where she got
the information from.
(Tr. 195–196.) During their discussion, Hobson also explained
to McBride that his lawyer had advised him that company rules
banning employees from discussing their pay was only unlaw-
ful if applied to federal employees; and the information Lopez
gave him on this topic was incorrect.
III. 8(A) (1) VIOLATIONS
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act

conversation he had with Hobson about when Hobson made a definitive
decision to fire Lopez.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 11
(NLRA/the Act) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection.” See Brighton Retail,
Inc., 354 NLRB 441, 441 (2009). An employer violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act if it disciplines or discharges an employ-
ee for engaging in activity that is “concerted” within the mean-
ing of Section 7 of the Act. If it is determined that the activity
is concerted, a violation of Section 8(a)(1) will be found if the
employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee’s activ-
ity, the concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the
adverse employment action was motivated by the employee’s
protected, concerted activity. Relco Locomotives, Inc., 358
NLRB 298 (2012) (citing Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 NLRB
493, 497 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB 755 F.2d
941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985), sup-
plemented 281 NLRB 882 (1986), affd. sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S.
1205 (1988)). Once the General Counsel establishes such an
initial showing of discrimination, the employer may present
evidence, as an affirmative defense, showing it would have
taken the same action even in the absence of the protected ac-
tivity. The General Counsel may offer evidence that the em-
ployer’s articulated reasons are pretext or false. Relco, supra.
In addition, the Act also protects applicants for employment.
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87
(1995).
The Board has held that if a rule specifically restrains Sec-
tion 7 rights, the rule is invalid. Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). See also Waco, Inc., 273
NLRB 746, 748 (1984) (work rule explicitly prohibits employ-
ees from discussing wages with coworkers a restriction on Sec-
tion 7 rights). Even if the rule does not restrict specific Section
7 rights, it may still be unlawful if employees would reasonably
interpret the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity. Longs Drug
Stores California, Inc., 347 NLRB 500, 500–501 (2006); Lu-
theran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra at 647. In Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB at 646, the Board stated,
“. . . in determining whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the
Board must . . . give the rule a reasonable reading. It must re-
frain from reading particular phrases in isolation, and it must
not presume improper interference with employee rights.” See
also Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, at 828 (1998) (cit-
ing Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992)).
The Board has established a framework for assessing wheth-
er an employer’s confidentiality rule violates the Act. If the
rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activities, then the
fact-finder must analyze whether (1) employees would reason-
ably construe the language of the rule to prohibit Section 7
activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union
activity; or (3) the rule has been applied “to restrict the exercise
of Section 7 rights.” Hyundai America Shipping Agency, Inc.,
357 NLRB 860, (2011); Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB
1131, 1146 (2012), enfd. 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014).
A. Respondent’s Confidentiality Agreement is Unlawful
The General Counsel argues that Respondent’s CA violates
the Act because it contains vague and ambiguous provisions
that “any reasonable employee would struggle to interpret the
document or concretely identify what information is permitted
to be discussed.” (GC Br. 18.) The sections read in pertinent
part:
• (Employees)…will not exchange information with the
Chinese manufacturers, new or future employers, bearing
companies, users of such, distributors, users of such, and or
individual’s proprietary information. Regarding company in-
formation, prices, contacts, suppliers, manufacturers, custom-
ers any information to include methods of distribution.
• (Employees)…will not copy vital company information
and or remove or distribute this information or paperwork,
from Hobson Bearing International (HBI), offices under no
circumstance without written authorization (from Respond-
ent)
• (Employees)…will not…give our information to any-
one without the written consent.
• (Employees)…will not…share information obtained
while working or no longer working at HOBSON BEARING
INTERNATIONAL, Inc. With any outside entities whether
related or indirectly related. (sic) (GC 5).
(GC Exh. 5.)
The General Counsel alleges the above provisions are invalid
because the document does not explain or provide definitions to
make clear the context of its prohibitions and restrictions.
Moreover, the General Counsel argues that an employee who
reads the CA would “reasonably interpret the document as en-
compassing protected activities and information, such as dis-
cussing their own wages [and] other terms and conditions of
employment.” (GC Br. 19.)
I find that Respondent’s CA violates the Act because the rel-
evant sections of the CA are so broadly written that it would
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. While
I agree that employers have a legitimate interest in safeguarding
their confidential and proprietary information, read without
context, this CA could also be interpreted to preclude the dis-
closure and discussion of employee wages, disciplinary actions,
performance appraisals, personnel documents, and other terms
and conditions of employment. Battle’s Transportation, Inc.,
362 NLRB No. 17 (2015) (Board held employer’s confidenti-
ality agreement prohibiting employees from divulging “human
resources related information” and “investigations by outside
agencies” violated the Act.). The impromptu discussion Lopez,
McBride, and Wishon held after the meeting on July 6 is evi-
dence of their confusion about what information they were
barred from disclosing under the CA. See Hyundai, supra at 12
fn. 12 (Board explained that in order to keep information confi-
dential employers must “specifically define such information in
a fashion that will clearly not include those matters that em-
ployees are entitled…to discuss among themselves and with
interested third parties.”) Moreover, Respondent “concedes
NLRA violation with regard to portions of its Company Policy
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Confidentiality Agreement.” (R. Br. 19.)22 Respondent
admits that its CA “was overbroad and has been abandoned by
Respondent. Respondent agrees to cooperate with the NLRB in
taking any further steps required.” (R. Br. 12.)
Accordingly, I find the CA violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
B. Ban Prohibiting Employees’ Discussion of Pay Unlawful
The General Counsel argues that Respondent has maintained
and reissued a rule that is facially invalid because it specifically
prohibits employees from discussing their pay with any other
employee and threatens them with termination if the rule is
violated. The sections read in pertinent part:
Pay: Will be distributed every Thursday. You should not ex-
pect your weekly pay check before 4:00 pm. Employees
should not discuss their pay with any other employee, as it is a
sensitive issue. Bonuses will be issued based on merit or per-
formance. If someone receives a bonus or pay increase and
shares their information with another employee and it is
brought to my attention, it will be automatic termination. Pay
is set, based on performance, annual increases, or at manage-
ment’s decision. No one is to discuss this issue at any time,
other than in my office during a review. If you want to discuss
pay, you must ask for a private meeting with management.
(GC Exh. 4.) Hobson acknowledged that since at least Febru-
ary 5, 2014, Respondent has maintained company policies pro-
hibiting employees from discussing their pay with other em-
ployees; and a violation of the policies will result in termina-
tion. (Tr. 25–26; GC Exh. 3, 4.) More importantly, Respondent
admits that its company policies restricting employees’ ability
to discuss their pay with other employees violates the Act.
However, Respondent also argues that it has addressed “those
issues” and “stands ready to take such other reasonable steps as
directed by the NLRB.” (R. Br. 19.)
I find that the provision at issue is unlawful on its face be-
cause it explicitly restricts employees’ Section 7 right to discuss
wage and, or salary information. The Board has consistently
held that nondisclosure rules which ban the disclosure and dis-
cussion of wage and salary information are invalid. The plain
language of the provision at issue explicitly bans employees
from engaging in protected activity. Double Eagle Hotel &
Casino, 341 NLRB 112 (2004); Bettie Page Clothing, 359
NLRB 777 (2013), affd. 361 NLRB No. 79 (2014); Flamingo
Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 288 fn. 3, 291 (1999). Based
on the clear language of the rule, it is apparent that employees
are required to address complaints about wages to the owner
and president of Respondent, Hobson. This requirement, in
combination with the threat of termination for failing to adhere
to the rule, would “reasonably tend to inhibit employees from
bringing wage-related complaints to, and seeking redress from,
entities other than Respondent, and restrains the employees’
Section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities for collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Kinder-Care

22 The pages in Respondent’s posthearing brief are not numbered.
Therefore, I numbered Respondent’s posthearing brief pages with the
cover page number 1 and the signature and certificate of service page
number 20.
Learning Centers, Inc., 299 NLRB 1171, 1172 (1990) Re-
spondent’s rule tends to inhibit employees from banding to-
gether by requiring that the employee discuss pay concerns
with Respondent’s management (Hobson), without the ability
to get assistance from or discuss it with other employees, a
third-party or outside entity. “Faced with such a requirement,
some employees may never invoke the right to act in concert
with other employees or to seek the assistance of a union, be-
cause they are unwilling to first run the risk of confronting the
Respondent on an individual basis.” Kinder-Care, supra at
1172.
I also find unpersuasive Respondent’s implied argument that
it should not be liable for violating the Act because the lan-
guage at issue was subsequently removed. Passavant Memori-
al Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978), sets forth the standard
for effectively repudiating unlawful conduct. The repudiation
must be “timely,” “unambiguous,” “specific in nature to the
coercive conduct,” and “free from other proscribed illegal con-
duct.” Passavant supra at 138; Douglas Division, 228 NLRB
1016 (1977), and cases cited therein at 1024. The Board has
also held that in order to effectively repudiate the unlawful
conduct, the employer must adequately publicize the repudia-
tion to the affected employees, refrain from engaging in the
proscribed conduct post-publication, and assure employees that
in the future the employer will not interfere with the exercise of
their Section 7 rights. Id at 138–139.
While Wishon testified that Hobson posted a notice on the
employee bulletin board that the ban restricting employees’
discussion of their pay was not “right” and therefore rescinded,
she noted that he later told her he was reinstating the ban be-
cause his attorney advised him that it was legal. Moreover, her
testimony was vague regarding the timing of the posting, and
the exact wording of the post. Hobson, however, only admitted
to contacting Respondent’s attorney for advice on the legality
of the pay policy and the CA. I find that the record is devoid of
evidence that there was an effective repudiation as to the pay
policies or the CA. Respondent failed to place into evidence
the notice that Wishon alleged Hobson posted on the bulletin
board. Even assuming such a notice or poster existed, I am
unable to determine if the repudiation was “timely,” “unambig-
uous,” “specific in nature to the coercive conduct,” and “free
from other proscribed illegal conduct.” Passavant supra at 138.
In short, the additional factors necessary for establishing a suc-
cessful repudiation remain unfulfilled.
Accordingly, I find Respondent’s CA violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. July 6 Respondent Mandate that Employees Sign Unlawful
Company Policies and CA
The General Counsel argues that Respondent violated the
Act because at a meeting on July 6, employees were required to
sign the aforementioned unlawful company policies and the
CA. Since Respondent required employees to sign and return
the unlawful documents as a condition of continued employ-
ment, the General Counsel contends this constitutes an inde-
pendent violation of the Act.
Respondent admits that the company policy regarding pay
was distributed to employees on July 6, but denies the CA was
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 13
given to employees on this date. Instead, Respondent insists
the CA was distributed to the employee on May 28.
The evidence is undisputed that in order to retain their jobs,
Respondent required employees to sign the company policies
and the CA, which I previously found were unlawful. It is
irrelevant whether the CA was given to the employees on May
28 or 5 weeks later on July 6 because the action remained un-
lawful. While Respondent may argue the employees’ jobs were
not contingent on them signing the documents, Hobson’s tape-
recorded admissions, addressed in the fact section of this deci-
sion, establish otherwise. (GC Exh. 12, 13.) Notably, Respond-
ent does not address this issue in its posthearing brief, except to
admit that portions of the company policies and the CA violate
the Act and the documents were distributed to employees for
their review and signatures. Consequently, I find that Re-
spondent’s action at the July 6, meeting and its admissions
establish a violation of the Act.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when employees were informed that they were re-
quired to sign the company policies and the CA which con-
tained unlawful provisions.
D. Mid-June 2015, Respondent Unlawfully Banned Employees
from Discussing their Terms and Conditions of Employment
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent unlawfully
reprimanded McBride for complaining to other employees
about being disciplined by Respondent and his opinion that
Respondent unnecessarily hired an additional employee. The
Respondent does not address this allegation in its posthearing
brief.
The Board has consistently held that employee discussions
and complaints about staffing levels are protected by Section 7
of the Act. See, e.g., Bon Harbor Nursing & Rehabilitation
Center, 348 NLRB 1062, 1062 (2006); Bethany Medical Cen-
ter, 328 NLRB 1094, 1094 (1999). Moreover, the Board has
held that employees have a right under Section 7 to discuss
“discipline or disciplinary investigations involving fellow em-
ployees.” Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 358
NLRB 537 (2012); Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271 (2001);
Verizon Wireless, 349 NLRB 640, 658–659 (2007).
I find that Respondent, through Hobson, unlawfully preclud-
ed an employee from discussing his concerns about company
operations and discipline with other employees. The facts es-
tablish that Hobson met with McBride to counsel him for pur-
chasing “grease” without Hobson’s authorization. It is also
undisputed that after their discussion, McBride complained to
other employees that Hobson unfairly criticized him for pur-
chasing the grease. McBride also discussed with other employ-
ees his opinion that Hobson was unnecessarily hiring an addi-
tional contract employee. Hobson admitted on direct examina-
tion that when he learned of McBride’s complaints he told him
to stop “stirring up drama with employees” and interrupting
business operations, and issued McBride a verbal reprimand.
(Tr. 86–89.)
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when Hobson verbally reprimanded McBride for
discussing terms and conditions of employment, including dis-
cipline.
E. July 8, Respondent Unlawfully Interrogated Employees,
Restricted Employees Ability to Engage in Protected Concerted
Activity and Threatened Employees with Reprisal
The General Counsel charges that Respondent engaged in a
series of acts to thwart its employees’ efforts to assert their
rights under Section 7 of the Act. In a meeting on July 8, with
Lopez, Hobson told her several times that: she could not dis-
cuss her pay or workplace concerns with other employees; in-
terrogated Lopez on whether she complained to federal agen-
cies about work place rules; questioned her about her conversa-
tion with the Board’s representatives; issued an implied threat
that Lopez might suffer reprisal if she discussed those topics
prohibited in the company policies and the CA; and implicitly
threatened Lopez with reprisal for contacting the Board to
complain about Respondent.
Respondent failed to address any of the aforementioned alle-
gations in its posthearing brief, except to acknowledge that
several times during their meeting, Hobson expressed to Lopez
his dissatisfaction with her reporting Respondent to the “gov-
ernment.” Respondent also appears to suggest that Lopez’
complaints to Hobson are personal in nature, and therefore, do
not rise to the level of protected concerted activity.
1. Unlawfully prohibited Lopez from discussing pay and other
terms and conditions of employment
The General Counsel argues that Respondent, through Hob-
son, unlawfully sought to restrict Lopez’ exercise of her Sec-
tion 7 rights by explicitly telling her not to discuss her pay or
other work related issues with other employees. Respondent
does not address this allegation in its posthearing brief.
As noted previously in this decision, the Board has consist-
ently held it is unlawful for employers to prohibit employees
from disclosing and discussing wage and salary information.
Hyunadai, supra. Likewise, employers cannot interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed to them in Section 7 of the Act. Yoshi’s Japanese Restau-
rant & Jazz House, 330 NLRB 1339, 1339 fn. 3 (2000).
The evidence is irrefutable that in the meeting with Lopez on
July 8, Hobson explicitly told her that she could not discuss her
pay or “business stuff” with other employees or outside parties.
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13 Part 1, p. 6, 8, 9, 10; GC Exh. 13 Part
2, p. 7, 22.) Hobson also told Lopez to come to him about
work related issues and not to discuss them with other employ-
ees. In the meeting Hobson later reversed himself, and told
Lopez that she could discuss her pay with others or she could
cross out the offending provisions of the pay policy. However,
Hobson would almost immediately repudiate this sentiment by
reiterating that she could not discuss her pay with other em-
ployees, and emphasize that all employees were required to
sign the policy restricting their right to discuss pay with
coworkers. The evidence clearly establishes that Hobson’s
repudiations fail to meet the standard established in Passavant
at 138.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when on July 8, Respondent prohibited employees
from discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of
employment.
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Unlawful interrogation on July 8
The General Counsel argues that Respondent, through Hob-
son, unlawfully interrogated Lopez about her contact with the
Board and her discussions with other employees, thus chilling
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Respondent
does not address this allegation in its posthearing brief.
After instructing Lopez that she could not discuss her pay
and other terms and conditions of employment with her
coworkers, Hobson continued by pressing her to reveal whether
she had spoken about her terms and conditions of employment
with her coworkers. In response to Lopez complaint that Hob-
son does not want her to talk with coworkers about her con-
cerns on the legality of the CA, Hobson said:
Hobson: I’m not discouraging you from doing it. I want you
to do it but I don’t want you to be discussing it with other em-
ployees.
Lopez: So, do you want me to go, “hey…”
Hobson: Are you discussing it with other employees?
Lopez: “Hey, he’s violating the law”
Hobson: Did you talk to me only about that or did you bring
it up to other employees…
(GC Exhs. 12, 13.) After further discussion between them
about the legality of the CA and part A and B, Hobson ques-
tioned Lopez about her contact with agents of the Board:
Lopez: I’ll tell you this. I have called the Labor Board and I
have called the EEOC and I have great grounds.
Hobson: mmhmm.
Lopez: and I have plenty of stuff.
Hobson: mmhmm
Lopez: Do I want to do that to you? No. I’ve worked here for
three years.
Hobson: You called the Labor Board on us?
Lopez: I love everyone I work for.
Hobson: You called the Labor Board on us?
Lopez: Yes I did.
Hobson: Okay, what did you report on, on the Labor Board?
Lopez: I just asked a question. Is this legal?
(GC Exhs. 12, 13.) The Board has adopted the test established
in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964) to determine
if management directly interrogating employees violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Field Family Associates, LP d/b/a
Hampton Inn NY-JFK Airport, 348 NLRB 16 (2006); Smith-
field Foods, Inc., 347 NLRB 1225 (2006). Under the Bourne
test, the factors to consider are: the background; the nature of
the information sought; the identity of the questioner; the place
and method of interrogation; and the truthfulness of the reply.
Westwood Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 935, 939 (2000). In
applying these factors, I must assess whether, based on the facts
of the specific case, the questioning at issue would reasonably
tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of their statutory rights. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB
1176, 1177 (1984); Temecula Mechanical, Inc., 358 NLRB
1225 (2012).
I find the evidence is irrefutable that in response to Lopez’
declaration that she had discussed with other employees the
legality of Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA, and con-
tacted the Board about those issues, Hobson pressed her for
details about those interactions. The record establishes that on
July 8, and after the mandatory employee meeting Hobson held
on July 6, he met with Lopez in his conference room to discuss
forecasting and issue Lopez her performance evaluation. After
they finished reviewing the forecasting information, Lopez
began to tell Hobson about her concerns with the validity of
Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA. The evidence shows
that the primary purpose of the afternoon segment of their
meeting became Hobson’s attempt to determine who Lopez had
contacted about the legality of the Respondent’s parts A and B
and the CA, the substance of those conversations, and why
Lopez felt that she needed to discuss the issue with her cowork-
ers and several federal agencies. Despite one curt statement
from Hobson to Lopez that he did not mind if she talked with
other employees when upset, he immediately followed it with
the admonishment that she was not to discuss “business stuff”
with them. This is no evidence that Hobson gave Lopez any
other assurance that she could speak freely about her protected
concerted activities without reprisal. Based on the evidence, I
must conclude that Hobson questioned Lopez in an attempt to
learn about the strength and depth of her and other employees’
complaints to outside parties.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has established
that Respondent, through Hobson, unlawfully conducted an
interrogation of its employees in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
3. Respondent did not threaten employees with unspecified
reprisal for engaging in protected, concerted activities
According to the General Counsel, the revelation that Lopez
had been discussing her concerns with other employees about
the legality of the Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA
caused Hobson to threaten her with unspecified reprisals. The
General Counsel argues that implied threat was revealed when
Hobson stated,
If it sounded like … I called you a witch it was in reference to
something that, that is just referring to your actions. It wasn’t
referring to how you look or who you are or anything like
that. I have to have, in this, this business her I have to have ul-
timate trust in you and confidentiality and as far as this stuff
goes, hey, if there is a law against discussing that’s fine. I’m
not going to mention it anymore. But I’m also not going to be
happy with people discussing their shit. I’m just not going to
[be] happy about it and whether, you know it’s against the
law…
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13 part 2, p. 22.) Again, Respondent
did not address this issue in its posthearing brief. However,
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 15
Hobson testified that he did not recall much of the conversation
with Lopez on July 8, but acknowledged that he possibly ac-
cused her of “stirring the pot” with other employees and “going
against” him.
The Board has established an objective test for determining
if “the employer engaged in conduct which would reasonably
have a tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act.” Santa Barbara New-Press, 357 NLRB
452, 476 (2011). This objective standard does not depend on
whether the “employee in question was actually intimidated.”
Multi-Ad Services, Inc., 331 NLRB 1226, 1228 (2000), enfd.
255 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, whether the statements
are a threat is viewed from the objective standpoint of the em-
ployee, over whom the employer has a measure of economic
power. See Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB 591, 595 (2011);
Inn at Fox Hollow, 352 NLRB 1072, 1074 (2008); See also
Section 8(c) of the Act (stating that the ‘expressing of any
views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this Act …, if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’). The mere
threat of an unspecified reprisal is sufficient to support a find-
ing that the employer has violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
Metro One Loss Prevention Services Group, 356 NLRB 89, 89
(2010).
I find that the General Counsel has failed to present persua-
sive evidence to establish that the above conversation contained
an unlawful threat of an adverse consequence for Lopez’ inter-
actions with her coworkers about the Respondent’s parts A and
B and the CA.
Hobson’s statement above is nothing more than an employ-
er’s expressing an opinion that although he will abide by the
law, he will not do so happily. There is nothing in the state-
ments to suggest that Lopez or any other employee will suffer
adverse consequences because he has to follow the law. He did
not utter to Lopez “if I have to abide by the law you (Lopez)
will not be happy.” That statement would have been more akin
to an implied threat of reprisal. His statement, particularly if
read within the context of the entire conversation, is simply an
expression of his antipathy for a law. Nothing in the Act sug-
gests that employers have to like the laws governing labor is-
sues, only that they have to follow the laws. Moreover, Hob-
son’s acknowledges this fact as part of the aforementioned
statement.
Consequently, I recommend dismissal of paragraph 5(f) of
the complaint.
4. Respondent did not threaten employees with unspecified
reprisals for seekingaccess to the Board
The General Counsel also alleges that in the same July 8,
meeting Respondent, through Hobson, threatened Lopez with
unspecified reprisals for seeking access to the Board. Re-
spondent does not address this allegation in its posthearing
brief; and Hobson claimed, on direct-examination, to remember
almost nothing from his discussion with Lopez on July 8.
Nonetheless, General Counsel Exhibits 12 and 13 set forth
those portions of the conversation Hobson contends that he
cannot recall. It is evident from listening to and reading the
recording of their conversation, Hobson was frustrated and
annoyed with Lopez’ decision to contact the Board. He made
several statements revealing those emotions:
You know what? You’re really, you’re really pushing me.
You’re sitting here telling me, little, looking for little tidbits
telling me that you called the EEOC, the Department of La-
bor, all this. Why would you do that? Who does shit like that?
* * *
Yeah…you know, I don’t appreciate you reporting things to
me to the government. It’s okay. If I have broken a law I will
be made to pay for that through the Department of Labor.
(GC Exh. 12, 13.) Although Hobson expressed that “[i]t’s
okay” if Lopez reported him to the “Department of Labor,”
later in the conversation he told Lopez,
And here you are, you’re saying that you’re working so hard
for me but yet you’re saying I called the Department of Labor,
I called this and I called the Equal Opportunity Employ-
ment…
* * *
I have to have, in this, this business here I have to have ulti-
mate trust in you and confidentiality and as far as this stuff
goes, hey, if there is a law against discussing that’s fine. I’m
not going to mention it anymore. But I’m also not going to be
happy with people discussing their shit. I’m just not going to
[be] happy about it and whether, you know it’s against the
law…
(GC Exh. 13, part 2 p. 6, 22.) While these comments show
Hobson’s continuing annoyance with Lopez’ actions despite his
protestations to the contrary, I do not find that they are evi-
dence of expressed or implied threats of reprisal.
The General Counsel argues that, taken in context, Hobson’s
statements to Lopez would “reasonably tend to restrain, coerce
or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.” Bloomfield
Health Care Center, 352 NLRB 252 (2008), quoting Rossmore
House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1178 fn. 20 (1984), enfd. sub nom.
HERE Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
While the Respondent admits in its posthearing brief that Hob-
son told Lopez on several occasions that he did not “appreci-
ate” Lopez reporting him “to the government,” it failed to put
forth a counter-argument addressing the statements. Nonethe-
less, I find that the statements do not rise to the level of a threat
of an unspecified (or specified) reprisal.
Although Hobson’s statements could have reasonably led
Lopez to believe that he was unhappy, or even angry, with her
decision to discuss her concerns with the Board, the statements
do not establish a threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The statements cannot be read without placing them in
context with the overall discussion that Hobson and Lopez
engaged in on July 8. The statements, as set forth above, estab-
lish that in a meeting between Hobson and Lopez, he expressed
to Lopez that he was unhappy with her decision to contact the
Board, EEOC, and DOL. Interspersed within Hobson’s state-
ments expressing displeasure that Lopez contacted the Board
16 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about Respondent’s company policies and the CA, Hobson also
praises her work performance, encourages her to assume great-
er responsibility in sales, informs her that she is receiving a
bonus, details his efforts to defend her against other individuals,
and acknowledging her right to file a charge with the Board. I
find nothing in Hobson’s statements to suggest that he implicit-
ly threatened Lopez with an unspecified adverse employment
action because she contacted the Board.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel failed to meet
its burden of proof regarding this allegation and recommend
that paragraph 5(b) of the complaint be dismissed.
F. On July 9, Employees Banned from Discussing Terms and
Conditions of Employment and Required to Sign Unlawful
Company Policies and CA
The General Counsel alleges that Hobson’s action in a meet-
ing with employees on July 9 violated the Act because, despite
their unlawful provisions, he told employees they would have
to sign and return to Respondent the company policies and the
CA. In its posthearing brief, Respondent did not address this
allegation, except to note that Hobson met with the Respond-
ent’s attorney on July 9 to discuss the issues raised by Lopez
“regarding the company policy on discussing pay and the con-
fidentiality agreement.” (R. Br. 11.)
The evidence is undisputed that after his meeting with Lopez
on July 9, Hobson called Wishon into his office to ask her opin-
ion on the legality of the company policy prohibiting employ-
ees from discussing their wages with each other. After she
expressed doubt about its validity, Hobson retrieved the policy
from the computer and told her that he was eliminating the
offending pay provision. He directed her to get the revised
document from the printer, place the reprinted copies on his
desk, and told her he wanted the employees to sign them. Hob-
son also told her that he was meeting with his attorney later that
day to ask for a legal opinion regarding the legality of the doc-
uments. When he returned from meeting with his attorney,
Hobson informed employees that he was reinserting the pay
ban into the policy because his attorney advised him that it was
illegal only if applied to federal employees. Hobson then in-
structed them that all employees were required to review, sign
and return the company policies that included the ban on dis-
cussing their pay with each other and the CA. The company
policies also stated that employees could be terminated for
violating the ban on disclosing and discussing wage and salary
information; and the CA threatened employees with large fines
for violating its provisions.
As previously noted, the Board has consistently held that
nondisclosure rules and policies that ban the disclosure and
discussion of wage and salary information are invalid. Hyundai,
supra at 18; Bryant Health Center, Inc., 353 NLRB 739. I also
found and Respondent admitted that its company policies and
the CA violated the Act. Therefore, it is clear that Hobson
committed an independent violation of the Act when he told
employees on July 9, that they would be required to accept and
sign the unlawful company policies and the CA.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when on July 9, Respondent, through Hobson, pro-
hibited employees from discussing their wages and other terms
and conditions of employment; and required them to sign un-
lawful company policies and CA.
G. Four Separate 8(a)(1) Violations Committed
on July 13, 2015
The General Counsel alleges that on July 13, Respondent,
through Hobson, violated the Act on four separate occasions
when: employees were prohibited from discussing their wages
and other terms and conditions of employment; employees
were told that Respondent terminated an employee for raising
concerns about its company policies and CA; employees were
threatened with termination for discussing their wages and
other terms and conditions of employment; and employees
were prohibited from discussing the termination of an employ-
ee.
1. Unlawful ban on employees discussing their wages and other
employment matters and threat of termination for
violating the ban
The evidence establishes that shortly after Hobson fired
Lopez, he called McBride and Tanner into his office to explain
his reasons for terminating her. During this discussion, Hobson
reiterated that Lopez was incorrect in the information she pro-
vided that cast doubt on the legality of Respondent’s company
policy. He went on to note that the Respondent’s attorney ad-
vised him the prohibition barring employees from discussing
their pay with each other is illegal only when applied to federal
employees; Respondent’s employees would be required to sign
the documents; and employees could be terminated if they dis-
cussed their “bonuses and raises.” Again, these statements are
clear violations of the Act. See Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358
NLRB 1131, 1131 (finding unlawful employer’s rule prohibit-
ing employees from disclosing “personal information and doc-
uments” to nonemployees with the threat of “termination” or
“legal action” for violating the rule); Taylor Made Transporta-
tion Services, Inc., 358 NLRB 427, 434–435 (2012) (finding
unlawful employer’s issuance of a memorandum reminding
employees of its unlawful policy prohibiting discussions about
wages with threat of discipline up to and including termina-
tion).
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when on July 13, Respondent, through Hobson, pro-
hibited employees from discussing their wages and other terms
and conditions of employment; and threatened with termination
for discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of
employment.
2. Hobson did not tell employees Lopez was terminated be-
cause of concerns she raised about the Respondent’s
company policies and CA
The General Counsel contends Hobson told McBride (and
Tanner) that one of the reasons for Lopez’ termination was
because she complained about the CA and the pay provision in
the company policies. However, the record shows McBride
testified that Hobson said he had to fire Lopez because of her
insubordination and disrespectful attitude towards him. He
then engaged in the following exchange with counsel for the
General Counsel:
LeMaster: What was discussed in this meeting?
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 17
McBride: He brought us up there and he said, “I had to let her
go. She was being disrespectful.”
LeMaster: Ok. Did he say anything else?
McBride: I asked why?
LeMaster: Did he answer you?
McBride: Yeah, he had an answer. He said it was over the e-
mails sent to the MOS customer about some data and some
cost problems they had.
LeMaster: Okay. Did [Hobson] give any examples of
[Lopez] being disrespectful?
McBride: Yes
LeMaster: What were those?
McBride: He said one of the examples she was – besides the
e-mail problem, and that she was always crossing her arms,
and he said that is disrespectful to him.
LeMaster: Did he give you any other examples?
McBride: Yes. He had – oh, my mind just went blank.
LeMaster: Take your time. Do you recall, was it anything
that she said, that she did?
McBride: Yeah, whenever things was brought up why he let
her go, it was the data that she brought in just showed the le-
gality, that we couldn’t talk about our bonuses and raises, that
was supposed to be legal, and she showed that where she got
the information from, who she talked, to and where she got
the information from.
(Tr. 195–196.) The above is the only part of McBride’s testi-
mony that addresses Lopez’ protected activity and termination
together. However, the entire exchange was so oddly worded
that I cannot draw conclusions about whether McBride was
responding to the original question from the counsel for the
General Counsel about why Hobson said he fired Lopez. In
fact, it appears that the counsel for the General Counsel might
have been asking McBride what Lopez told him was the reason
for her firing; and she responded that it was because of her
questions and research into the legality of the company policies
and CA. However, I cannot discern from the wording of the
question its exact meaning. Moreover, McBride’s response
was close to gibberish. It consisted of a series of incomplete
sentences strung together as one completely incomprehensible
sentence. The counsel for the General Counsel did not ask
additional questions to clarify McBride’s testimony on this
point so I am left with confusion rather than clarity.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel failed to estab-
lish that Respondent, through Hobson, told McBride and Tan-
ner that Lopez was terminated because she raised concerns
about the company policies and CA in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. On July 13, Respondent prohibited employees from
discussing Lopez’ termination
The General Counsel argues that Respondent, through Hob-
son, unlawfully told employees that they could not disclose or
discuss with anyone the termination of Lopez. Respondent
does not address this allegation in its posthearing brief.
It is undisputed that Hobson told McBride not to disclose or
discuss, with anyone, the conversation that he had with him and
Tanner earlier in the day about his reasons for terminating
Lopez. Hobson’s action was a clear restriction of McBride’s
Section 7 right in violation of the Act. See Kinder-Care Learn-
ing Centers, supra. (employer rule prohibiting employees from
discussing their terms and conditions of employment with par-
ents of children enrolled in the school violates the Act); Verizon
Wireless, 349 NLRB 640 (2007) (banning employees from
discussing workplace concerns about discipline violates the
Act).
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has established
that Respondent, through Hobson, told McBride that he could
not discuss the termination of Lopez with anyone in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
H. Unlawful Termination of Lopez
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act by terminating Lopez for engag-
ing in protected concerted activity. Respondent counters that
Lopez was a supervisor and therefore not entitled to protection
under the Act. Even assuming, however, that Lopez was not a
supervisor, Respondent insists that she was terminated because
of her history of insubordination; and issues related to her job
performance.
As with 8(a)(3) discrimination cases, the Board applies the
Wright Line23 analysis to 8(a) (1) concerted activity cases that
involve an employer’s motivation for taking an adverse em-
ployment action against employees. Hoodview Vending Co.,
359 NLRB 355 (2012), reaffirmed 362 NLRB No. 81 (2015);
Saigon Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 353 NLRB 1063, 1065
(2009). The burden is on the General Counsel to initially estab-
lish that a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s
decision to take adverse employment action against an employ-
ee was the employee’s union or other protected activity. In
order to establish this initial showing of discrimination, the
evidence must prove: (1) the employee engaged in protected
concerted activities; (2) the employer knew of the concerted
nature of the activities; and (3) the adverse action taken against
the employee was motivated by the activity. Once the General
Counsel has met its initial showing that the protected conduct
was a motivating or substantial reason in employer’s decision
to take the adverse action, the employer has the burden of pro-
duction by presenting evidence the action would have occurred
even absent the protected concerted activity. The General
Counsel may offer proof that the employer’s articulated reason
is false or pretextual. Hoodview Vending Co., supra.
The General Counsel retains the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination. Wright Line, id. However, where “the evi-
dence establishes that the reasons given for the Respondent’s
action are pretextual—that is, either false or not in fact relied
upon—the Respondent fails by definition to show that it would
have taken the same action for those reasons, absent the pro-

23 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
18 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tected conduct, and thus there is no need to perform the second
part of the Wright Line analysis.” Golden State Foods Corp.,
340 NLRB 382, 385 (2003) (citing Limestone Apparel Corp.,
255 NLRB 722 (1981), enfd. 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982)).
The Wright Line analysis is not applicable when there is no
dispute that the employer took action against the employee
because the employee engaged in protected concerted activity.
Phoenix Transit System, 337 NLRB 510, 510 (2002), enfd. 63
Fed. Appx. 524 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
A Wright Line analysis is appropriate in this case because
Respondent’s motive is at issue. In order to sustain its initial
burden of proof, the General Counsel must first prove that
Lopez engaged in concerted protected activity and it was the
substantial or motivating factor in Respondent’s decision to
discharge her. Upon such a showing, Respondent then must
present evidence that it would have terminated Lopez even
absent the protected concerted activity. See Correctional Medi-
cal Services, 356 NLRB 277, 278 (2010).
1. Lopez’ protected concerted activity
Clearly, Lopez’ termination is an adverse employment ac-
tion. Therefore, the next question is whether she engaged in
protected concerted activity. The Respondent insists that
Lopez’ complaints to Respondent about issues at the company
were “rife with personal complaints.” Despite Respondent’s
argument to the contrary, I find that the evidence clearly estab-
lishes that Lopez engaged in protected concerted activity. (R.
Br. 17)
The evidence is undisputed that after the employee meeting
on July 6, Lopez expressed her concerns to coworkers about the
requirement that they had to sign Respondent’s company poli-
cies and CA or risk termination. They agreed that Lopez would
research the legality of the company policies and CA, and dis-
cuss those concerns and findings with Hobson. When Lopez
met with Hobson on July 8, she raised issues of a personal na-
ture, but a larger portion of their conversation involved Lopez’
objections to and questions about the company policies and
CA; and her contacting the Board and other federal agencies to
complain about those documents. Lopez’ actions are the epito-
me of protected concerted activity. The personal nature of
some of Lopez’ complaints does not negate the fact that her
objections about the ban on discussing pay with other employ-
ees and specific provisions in the CA are protected concerted
activity because the acts were taken for the mutual aid or pro-
tection of all the employees (getting the provisions in the com-
pany policies and CA rescinded for all employees). See, Fresh
& Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 12, slip op.
at 3 (2014) (explaining the “mutual aid or protection” analysis
focuses on whether there is a connection between the activity
“and matters concerning the workplace or employees’ interests
as employees.”); Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271 (2001);
Verizon Wireless, 349 NLRB 640, 658–659 (2007).
Lopez engaged in protected concerted activity when she
voiced to Hobson, the Board and, or her coworkers concerns
about the unfairness of the Respondent’s company policies and
CA; the disparate manner in which the Respondent issued bo-
nuses; and the change to the dress code and bereavement poli-
cies. While her complaints about the vacation accrual, dress
code, and bereavement policies may have contained an element
of selfish motivation, it is undisputed that she discussed those
subjects with her coworkers and any changes to the dress code
and bereavement policies would have affected the entire work
force. See Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 358
NLRB 537 (2012); Caesar’s Palace, supra.; Verizon Wireless,
supra. Moreover, Lopez’ discussion with her coworkers about
the CA and the company’s policy restrictions on employees’
discussion of their wages is considered “inherently concerted”
activity. See Automatic Screw Products Co., Inc., 306 NLRB
1072, 1072 (1992) (employee discussions of wages are inher-
ently concerted);
Accordingly, I find that Lopez engaged in protected concert-
ed activity.
2. Respondent’s knowledge of Lopez’ protected
concerted activity
I have already determined that Lopez engaged in protected
concerted activity in the meeting with Hobson on July 8. The
evidence is uncontroverted that Lopez engaged in a discussion
with Hobson for about 1-½ hours on July 8, questioning and
objecting to the Respondent’s company policies prohibiting
employees from talking about their pay with other people and
the discipline and, or fines levied for violating their provisions
and those of the CA. There was also discussion about Lopez’
contact with the Board; and Hobson’s questions to her regard-
ing that contact. It is impossible for Hobson to deny being
aware of Lopez’ actions since he was obviously a participant in
the conversation. Moreover, the evidence supports a finding
that Respondent, through Hobson, was aware that Lopez’ ac-
tions were protected concerted activity. In his meeting with
Lopez, Hobson interrogated her about whether she had dis-
cussed with other employees her concerns with Respondent’s
part A and B and the CA. His interrogation of her supports a
finding that Hobson recognized the protected concerted nature
of Lopez’ activities. Further, his questioning of Wishon the
following day about her opinion on the legality of the docu-
ments; and a subsequent announcement to several employees
that Lopez’ information about the company policies and CA
were incorrect and all employees were required to sign them,
also bolster my finding that Respondent, through Hobson, was
aware that Lopez was engaged in protected concerted activity.
Consequently, I find that Respondent had knowledge of
Lopez’ protected concerted activity prior to her termination.
3. Adverse employment action based on discriminatory animus
The remaining step is for the General Counsel to establish
whether the Respondent terminated Lopez because of discrimi-
natory animus. If the General Counsel establishes an initial
showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the Respondent
to show, as an affirmative defense, that it would have terminat-
ed Lopez even in the absence of her concerted protected activi-
ties.
In its brief, the General Counsel contends that the evidence is
replete with examples of Hobson’s personal animus towards
Lopez as a result of her protected conduct. Moreover, the Gen-
eral Counsel argues that Hobson committed independent viola-
tions of the Act that constitute evidence of animus when he
unlawfully: “(1) interrogated Lopez about her protected conver-
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 19
sations with her co-workers and Board agents and threatened
Lopez with unspecified reprisals for doing so; (2) prohibited
Lopez from discussing her terms and conditions of employment
with others; (3) interrogated Lopez about her protected com-
munications with Board agents; and (4) threatened Lopez with
unspecified reprisal as a result of her contacting the Board.” (R
Br. 53.) The General Counsel also contends that the timing of
Lopez’ termination (5 days after her meeting with Hobson to
complain about the company policies and CA and inform him
of her contact with the Board) is evidence of Hobson’s discrim-
inatory animus towards her. Finally, the General Counsel insist
that several other factors support a finding of discriminatory
animus: (1) Hobson informing McBride that Lopez protected
activity was a reason for her termination; and (2) Hobson’s
insistence on disciplining Lopez for being a “no call/no show”
despite Wishon assuring him that Lopez had provided the ap-
propriate notification.
Respondent counters that Lopez was terminated because she
was insubordinate and disrespectful towards the owner and
president of the company; and experienced a decline in her job
performance, exhibited by the RBC incident. The Respondent
also insists that the decision to terminate Lopez was made be-
fore she engaged in the protected concerted activity; and there
is no evidence of discriminatory animus by Hobson towards
Lopez.
Discriminatory animus can be inferred from both circum-
stantial and direct evidence. The Board considers several fac-
tors in determining whether an inference of discriminatory
animus can be sustained. The factors to consider are proffering
false reasons in defense of taking the adverse action, disparate
treatment of certain employees with similar work records or
offenses, deviation from past practice, and the proximity in
time of the discipline to the protected activity. Embassy Vaca-
tion Resorts, 340 NLRB 846, 847 (2003); Austal USA, LLC,
356 NLRB 363, 363 (2010); Lucky Club Co, 360 NLRB 271
(2014).
I find that the Respondent’s actions evinced discriminatory
animus when: Hobson unlawfully interrogated Lopez about her
protected concerted activity; unlawfully prohibited her from
discussing terms and conditions of employment with other
employees; and unlawfully interrogated her about her protected
contact with the Board.24 Hobson’s and Lopez’ conversation
on July 8, contained several instances of Hobson assuring
Lopez that she had the right to file a claim with the Board; and
he would remove the offending provisions from the company
policies and CA. However, he would almost immediately disa-
vow those statements and accuse Lopez of acting against his
best interest. Likewise, the illegal provisions remained in the
company policies and CA, which he later reissued to employees
to sign and return to him. The offending provisions were not
removed until after Lopez’ termination. See, e.g., Sunrise
Health Care Corp., 334 NLRB 903, 2001 (independent 8(a)(1)
violations constitute evidence of animus);
Further, the record supports a finding that Hobson was

24 As noted earlier in the decision, I did not find that Hobson unlaw-
fully threatened Lopez with unspecified reprisal for contacting the
Board or coworkers.
pleased with Lopez’ job performance until she began to com-
plain about the company’s policies and the CA. Although Hob-
son testified that he had been displeased with Lopez’ job per-
formance since early to middle 2014, there is no evidence that
over the next year he documented this alleged decline. On the
contrary, the evidence contains one performance appraisal for
Lopez; and it lists as the only area for improvement a caution
for her not to discuss personal complaints “in front of other
Employees.” (GC Exh. 14.) There is nothing else in the record
that shows written documentation of a decline in the quality of
Lopez’ work performance during her tenure with Respondent.
Moreover, in their meeting on July 8, Hobson characterized
Lopez as a “stellar employee.” (GC Exh. 13, Part 2 p. 9.) In the
same meeting he repeatedly reminded her that: she was his
highest paid employee; he supported her in the face of opposi-
tion from other people, including his wife; he did not believe
her actions regarding the MOS and RBC incidents were inten-
tional; and she was doing a good job. Despite Hobson’s failure
to document Lopez’ alleged decline in job performance, and
contradictory statements that she was a “stellar” employee; a
mere 5 days after her discussion with Hobson about the illegali-
ty of Respondent’s company policies and CA; the revisions to
the dress code and bereavement policies; and notice of her con-
tact with the Board’s representatives, Respondent terminated
Lopez.
Based on the evidence of record, I find that Respondent’s ac-
tions establishes discriminatory animus towards Lopez because
she engaged in protected concerted activity. Consequently, I
find that the General Counsel has met its initial burden of
proof.
Since the General Counsel has met his initial burden, the Re-
spondent must show that Lopez would have been terminated
even absent her protected concerted activity. While acknowl-
edging that Hobson expressed displeasure with Lopez for talk-
ing with coworkers and the Board about Respondent’s compa-
ny policies and CA, Respondent notes that he told her she had a
right to file a claim; and Respondent also contends that the
decision to fire Lopez had been made “days before she contact-
ed the NLRB.” (R. Br. 16.) Further, Respondent insists that
Lopez was terminated because she was insubordinate and disre-
spectful to Hobson.
I find that the Respondent has failed to establish its burden of
production; and that the proffered reasons for terminating
Lopez are pretextual.
Listening to the recording of the meeting on the July 8, be-
tween Hobson and Lopez, it was obviously contentious at
times. Both of them were guilty of poor behavior. While it
appears that at certain points Lopez goaded Hobson into mak-
ing incriminating statements, the evidence is clear that he vol-
untarily took the bait. During the meeting, she frequently inter-
rupted him and was often argumentative. Moreover, Lopez
made clear to Hobson that she disliked his wife and was angry
with him for seemingly taking his wife’s side against her in
their disputes. Lopez also told Hobson that she was frustrated
with the attendance and work habits of his daughter, Halle. She
complained several times that she was bored with her job be-
cause Hobson had not provided her with enough meaningful
duties. The conversation was peppered with profanity, accusa-
20 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions, and, or sarcasm by both of them. Nevertheless, Lopez’
behavior does not negate the evidence which supports a finding
that but for her protected concerted activities she would not
have been terminated. Although it is evident to me from the
tenor of the conversation that Lopez was not intimidated by
Hobson in the meeting, it is also obvious to me that Hobson
was frustrated and angry by her actions involving the company
policies, CA, and contact with the Board and other employees
about the unlawfulness of those documents.
The Respondent argues that the evidence is devoid of ani-
mus; and Hobson’s actions towards Lopez were supportive,
rather than hostile. It is undisputed that in a meeting with
Lopez on July 8, Hobson acknowledged to Lopez her right to
file a claim. He made several comments that he was not “both-
ered” by her contact with the Board because he had not pur-
posely tried to break the law. Moreover, Hobson told Lopez
that he was confident in her advice about the documents’ un-
lawfulness; and repeatedly told her that he would delete the
offending language from the company policies and CA. During
their meeting, he also made numerous statements supportive of
Lopez. Significantly, Hobson told Lopez that he had always
been supportive of her; and would not have retained her if he
felt that she were “bad business.” (GC Exh. Part 3 p. 7.) He
noted that she was a stellar employee, highly intelligent, and
had a wonderful attitude with him. Towards the end of their
meeting, Hobson encouraged Lopez to take on responsibility
for sales because it is the “highest paid position in any compa-
ny.” Id. He explained to her that she would train Tanner on
bearings; and could learn from him because Tanner has a vast
knowledge of sales and the bearing’s market.
I do not find Respondent’s argument persuasive for a several
reasons: (1) Respondent’s shifting rationale for terminating
Lopez; (2) Hobson’s repeated disavowals of his statements
supporting Lopez exercising her Section 7 rights and his overall
lack of credibility; and (3) the suspicious timing of Lopez’
termination.
During the hearing and in its posthearing brief, Respondent
argued Lopez was terminated because she was insubordinate,
erroneously sent company information to its customer (RBC),
failed to follow instructions regarding MOS, suffered a decline
in her job performance, and was a “no call/no show” on July
10. I find, however, that Respondent’s argument is not sup-
ported by the evidence. In response to questioning by the
counsel for the General Counsel, Hobson testified that exam-
ples of Lopez’ insubordination were: her occasionally crossing
her arms when talking with him, snatching papers from his
hands, rolling her eyes and turning her back to him, and walk-
ing away from him while he was talking to her. As previously
found, however, the record is devoid of evidence that Respond-
ent disciplined Lopez for or documented those or any other
instances of her alleged insubordination. Likewise, there is no
evidence that Hobson mentioned to Lopez that he felt some of
her actions towards him were disrespectful and insubordinate
until their meeting on July 8, when she began to complain
about the company policies and the CA.
Equally as weak as the charge of insubordination, is Re-
spondent’s argument that an alleged decline in Lopez’ job per-
formance was a factor in the decision to terminate her. Again,
there is no evidence documenting a decline in her performance.
Moreover, in his meeting with her on July 8, Hobson reminded
Lopez that he had “not once written her up.” (GC Exh. 13, Part
3, p. 3.) The lone performance appraisal of record makes men-
tion of only one area that needed improvement, the admonish-
ment that Lopez “not bring up personal complaints or problems
in front of other Employees.” (Tr. 159–160; GC Exh. 14.)
Hobson also testified that Lopez was terminated because she
sent “damning” confidential company information to one of
Respondent’s China suppliers. I do not find his testimony cred-
ible on this point. During his meeting with Lopez on July 8, he
clearly told her that he believed she sent MOS the information
without malicious intent. Significantly, their discussion about
this incident was rather detailed with Hobson spending several
minutes assuring her that he believed her motives were inno-
cent. Therefore, it strains credulity to believe that Lopez’ ac-
tion was a legitimate factor in Respondent’s decision to termi-
nate her. Similarly, Hobson testified that the catalyst for his
decision to fire her was Lopez informing a RBC representative
that she was told by Hobson not to send them weekly status
reports. (Tr. 260.) I do not credit his testimony on this point
because Respondent never counseled or otherwise disciplined
Lopez for this incident, making it unlikely that it was a credible
factor in Respondent’s decision to terminate her.
Hobson testified that Lopez’ “no call/no show” was the final
act, in a series of acts, that resulted in her termination. Howev-
er, Respondent’s posthearing brief contradicts his testimony
noting that Hobson made the decision to terminate Lopez after
the RBC incident. (R. Br. 16.) Regardless, I do not find either
contention is credible. McBride credibly testified to the rea-
sons Hobson gave him for firing Lopez and none included her
“no call/no show.” Another strike against Hobson’s credibility
on this point is his response to Lopez’ complaint about the revi-
sion to the Respondent’s sick leave policy. Hobson told her
because she was a salaried employee she did not have to be
concerned with sick pay, implying that she did not have to wor-
ry about taking a reasonable amount of sick leave. The Re-
spondent attempted to show that Lopez was required to person-
ally notify Hobson if she was going to be absent, and her failure
to do so resulted in her termination. However, I previously
found Wishon’s testimony credible that about a year prior to
Lopez’ termination, Hobson had informed employees that
Wishon should be notified if they would be late to or absent
from work. Except for his self-serving testimony, there is no
substantive or credible evidence to establish that Lopez was
exempted from this procedure and instead had to personally
notify Hobson. Last, Hobson acknowledged that, during her
tenure with Respondent, Lopez had to sign the company polic-
es, including the document addressing attendance. (Tr. 67–68;
GC Exh. 3, 4.) The document that Lopez and other employees
signed does not specify a particular person to notify if they are
absent or late to work. Hobson admitted that in a “normal situ-
ation” the company policies addressing the procedure for re-
porting “tardies” or absences and the discipline employees are
subject to for infractions also applied to Lopez an “in a normal
situation.” However, he provides no credible reason why the
situation at issue was not “normal” other than to testify that “I
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 21
was upset.” The fact remains that Lopez provided advanced
notice of her absence.
In response to the General Counsel’s argument that the tim-
ing of Lopez’ termination is evidence of discriminatory animus,
Respondent contends that the decision to fire Lopez had been
made “days before she contacted the NLRB.” I do not find
Respondent’s arguments credible for several reasons. Hobson
argued that in April he started contemplating firing Lopez but
because of the RBC incident, he made the decision to terminate
Lopez after Tanner started working for Respondent and had
been fully trained. In his sworn affidavit for the OSHA com-
plaint, Hobson attested “I [then] began discussions with Evan
Tanner in early June of 2015 to hire him, to absorb most of Ms.
Lopez’ responsibilities, with the intent of firing her or demoting
her with a reduction in pay. Those discussions led to his hiring
on June 24 with a start-date of July 10th” (Tr. 80). His state-
ment reveals Hobson was still uncertain about Lopez’ status in
the company. Tanner reaffirmed the uncertainty of Respond-
ent’s decision to either fire or demote Lopez stating that the
“discussions at that time, were more of uncertainty about Tera
and what would take place now that I was coming into HBI. I
can’t recall fully if Gene discussed whether he had talked to
Tera about me coming in, or what her role would be subse-
quently.” (Tr. 105.) It has been established that Hobson initial-
ly contacted Tanner in April about working for Respondent.
Tanner testified that about 2 weeks after that contact he spoke
with Hobson on the telephone who told him that Hobson’s plan
was to hire Tanner; and Lopez would train him to take over her
position. Hobson also told him that Hobson was uncertain of
his plans for Lopez but noted he might move her to a lesser
position. Even Hobson’s text message to Norman revealed he
had not decided whether to demote or fire Lopez. (GC Exh. 7.)
Again, it must be noted that Hobson told Lopez on July 8,
that he would not have kept her as an employee if he felt she
had malicious intent regarding her actions in the MOS and
RBC incidents. He also complimented her on being highly
intelligent, a stellar employee, and performing well in her posi-
tion. It was not until after their July 8, conversation that Hob-
son contacted Respondent’s attorney for advice of terminating
Lopez. I find that the timing of Lopez’ termination also sup-
ports a finding of discriminatory animus.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s action to terminate
Lopez violates Section the Act.
I. Supervisory of Tera Lopez
Respondent argues that Lopez is a supervisor, and therefore
not entitled to protection under the Act. The General Counsel
disagrees with this designation, asserting Lopez was merely a
worker. However, assuming that Lopez is found not to be an
employee under the Act, the General Counsel contends that her
termination remains a violation of the Act because “unimpeded
access to the Board’s processes is essential and available to
supervisors and managers. In support of his position, the Gen-
eral Counsel cites Hi-Craft Clothing Co., 251 NLRB 1310
(1980). See also General Services, Inc., 229 NLRB 940
(1977); SNE Enterprises, 347 NLRB 472, 497 (2006) citing Hi-
Craft Clothing Co., 251 NLRB 1310 (1980).
The burden of establishing supervisory status is with the par-
ty alleging that status. The party asserting supervisory status
must set forth specific facts which prove the existence of su-
pervisory authority. Commercial Movers, Inc., 240 NLRB 288,
290 (1979); Under Section 2(11) of the Act, the status of super-
visor is determined by the duties performed and not the title or
job classification. Section 2(11) defines a supervisor as any
person
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, trans-
fer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recom-
mend such action, if … such authority is not of a merely rou-
tine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.
Based on the statutory language, an individual is a supervisor
if: the individual has authority to take one of the actions listed
in Section 2(11) or to effectively recommend such action; the
individual exercises this authority in the interest of the employ-
er; and the exercise of this authority is not merely routine or
clerical in nature, but instead requires the individual to use
independent judgment. NLRB v. Kentucky River Community
Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861, 1864 (2001); NLRB v. Health Care
& Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 573–574 (1994). Moreover,
the Board has consistently held that the evidence must show
that a presumed supervisor is accountable for a subordinate’s
work performance. In re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB
686, 691–692 (2006).
Respondent argues that Lopez was a supervisor because she
had authority to: hire and fire employees, perform employee
evaluations, access QuickBooks, approve employees’ sick
leave requests, and organize work parties. Further, according
to Respondent, Lopez assumed control of the work force when
Hobson was away from the facility. Respondent admits that
Hobson removed some of those duties from Lopez, but insists it
was done because she was insubordinate, and had committed
mistakes involving MOS and RBC. Lopez counters that in late-
December 2014, Hobson removed from her control: authority
to hire and fire employees, perform employee evaluations, ac-
cess QuickBooks, approve employees’ sick leave requests, and
organize work parties.
I find the evidence does not establish that Lopez meets the
statutory definition of a supervisor. Hobson admitted that he
retained sole authority to hire permanent employees. Occa-
sionally, Lopez was allowed to work parties and hire temporary
employees or reassign permanent employees to assist with spe-
cial projects. Moreover, Hobson’s testimony that he could not
recall the last employee Lopez hired is not credible. Respond-
ent employed fewer than 10 employees, so I find it highly un-
likely that he is unable to recall the last employee Lopez alleg-
edly hired. Hobson’s failure to truthfully testify on this point
cause me to discount his testimony about Lopez’ hiring authori-
ty.
Lopez, according to Respondent, had authority to inde-
pendently evaluate, discipline, and discharge employees. Hob-
son testified that Lopez terminated several employees: Ma-
turino, Halverson, Tracy, Shawn, and Eastman. He provided
limited information about the circumstances surrounding their
22 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
departures, except for estimates on their lengths of employment
with Respondent. Hobson did, however, admit that Lopez
sought his approval to terminate Eastman. In contrast, Lopez
testified that Hobson instructed her to fire Maturino and Hal-
verson; and Hobson, without her input, made the decision to
terminate Tracy and Eastman. She noted that Shawn voluntari-
ly quit for a position with another employer. I am finding that
Lopez’ testimony about her ability to terminate and evaluate
employees more credible than Hobson’s contradictory state-
ments on this point. Unlike Respondent, the General Counsel
produced objective evidence establishing that Lopez’ only role
in the performance appraisals was to write whatever Hobson
told her to include in an employee’s evaluation. (GC Exh. 20.)
There was also objective evidence that Hobson made decisions
on disciplinary actions and work assignments. (GC Exh. 21.)
Moreover, Hobson contradicted his own testimony that Lopez
had authority to independently fire employees. An example of
Hobson’s contradictory statements is his retelling of Lopez’
attempt to get him to terminate an unnamed warehouse worker
with a heart condition. According to Hobson, Lopez told him
that he should terminate the worker because he was a “liability”
due to his heart condition. A few days later, McBride also tried
to persuade him to fire the worker; and Hobson felt it was part
of a coordinated plan by Lopez and McBride to get the worker
fired. This reveals possibly a coordinated effort by two em-
ployees to get their boss to fire a coworker; but it clearly does
not establish that Lopez had independent authority to fire em-
ployees. The entire incident points to the contrary conclusion.
As previously noted, one of Lopez’ job responsibilities was
to conduct forecasting. Hobson attempted to show that it was a
supervisory function that Lopez performed independently be-
cause he rarely reviewed her forecasting reports. This argu-
ment fails for two reasons. There is objective evidence that
Hobson reviewed and had final approval of her forecasting
reports. (GC Exhs. 24, 28.) More importantly, Respondent
failed to provide a legal argument or case cites for the proposi-
tion that “forecasting” is a uniquely supervisory function.
Finally, Respondent attempted to show, through the testimo-
nies of Greenwood and Halle, that Lopez exercised supervisory
authority over them. Greenwood testified that Lopez gave him
general help in the warehouse, and assisted with “my days off
for my sick days, and just overseeing the pulling and shipping
of the orders.” (Tr. 300–301.) Likewise, Halle testified that
Lopez reviewed her duty drawback25 paperwork before it was
processed, and “if I needed to leave early, I would ask her.”
(Tr. 297) The General Counsel aptly notes in its posthearing
brief that the Board has consistently held that inferences, sup-
positions or conclusory statements without detailed, specific
evidence fails to prove supervisory authority. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 304 NLRB 193 (1991); Securitas Critical Infrastructure
Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 817 F.3d 1074 (2016).
Accordingly, I find that the evidence does not establish that
Lopez meets the definition of a supervisor as set forth in Sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act. I do find, however, that Respondent vio-

25 Halle defined duty drawback as processing a claim to receive re-
imbursement for the duty paid on an imported product.
lated the Act when Respondent terminated Lopez because she
engaged in protected concerted activity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Hobson Bearing International, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By, on or about July 13, terminating Tera Lopez because
she engaged in protected concerted activities, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act.
3. By, on or about January 16, maintaining, and since about
July 6, reissuing and maintaining an unlawful rule prohibiting
employees from discussing their pay and, or bonuses, Respond-
ent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By, on or about January 16, physically distributing to em-
ployees, promulgating and since then maintaining a rule titled
Agreement of Restriction/Confidentiality, restricting employees
from discussing or sharing confidential information, defined as
including but not limited to, individuals’ proprietary infor-
mation; vital company information; and our information, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By, on or about mid-June, Respondent, through Gene
Hobson, prohibiting employees from discussing their terms and
conditions of employment, including disciplinary issues, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By, on or about July 6, telling employees that they were
required to sign agreements to abide by unlawful policies pro-
hibiting employees from discussing their wages and threatening
employees with termination if they violated them; and an over-
broad confidentiality agreement prohibiting employees from
discussing their terms and conditions of employment, Respond-
ent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By, on or about July 8, prohibiting employees from dis-
cussing their wages and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By, on or about July 8, interrogating employees about
their protected concerted activities by asking employees if they
had complained about the company policies and the confidenti-
ality agreement, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
9. By, on or about July 8, interrogating employees about
their protected concerted activities, by asking employees about
conversations they had with agents of the Board regarding Re-
spondent’s company policies and confidentiality agreement,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
10. By, on or about July 9, prohibiting employees from dis-
cussing their wages and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
11. By, on or about July 9, telling employees that they were
required to sign agreements to abide by the company policies
and confidentiality agreement, Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
12. By, on or about July 13, prohibiting employees from
discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
13. By, on or about July 13, threatening to terminate em-
ployees for discussing their wages and other terms and condi-
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC. 23
tions of employment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
14. By, on or about July 13, prohibiting employees from
discussing the termination of an employee, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
15. The above violations are unfair labor practices that af-
fects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
16. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set
forth above.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Respondent having discriminatorily terminated Tera Lopez
must offer her reinstatement and make her whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits she suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against her from the date of the discrimination to
the date of her reinstatement. Backpay shall be computed in
accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest as provided in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Ad-
ministration allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar
quarters. Respondent shall also compensate Tera Lopez for the
adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more
lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer than 1 year,
Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No.
10 (2014).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended26
ORDER
The Respondent, Hobson Bearing International, Inc., Dia-
mond, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Terminating or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for engaging in protected concerted activities.
(b) Interrogating employees about their protected concerted
activities; and interrogating them about their contact with the
Board.
(c) Maintaining and reissuing and maintain an unlawful rule
prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and, or bonus-
es.
(d) Distributing to employees, promulgating and maintain-
ing an overbroad confidentiality agreement restricting employ-
ees from discussing or sharing confidential information, de-
fined as including but not limited to, individuals’ proprietary
information; vital company information; and our information.

26 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
(e) Prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and
other terms and conditions of employment, including discipli-
nary issues.
(f) Telling employees that they are required to sign agree-
ments to abide by unlawful policies prohibiting employees
from discussing their wages and threatening employees with
termination if they violated them; and an overbroad confidenti-
ality agreement prohibiting employees from discussing their
terms and conditions of employment.
(g) Threatening to terminate employees for discussing their
wages and other terms and conditions of employment.
(h) Prohibiting employees from discussing the termination
of an employee.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer
Tera Lopez reinstatement to her former position or, if that posi-
tion no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Tera Lopez whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
her, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful termination of
Tera Lopez, and within 3 days thereafter notify Tera Lopez in
writing that this has been completed and that the discharge will
not be used against her in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Diamond, Missouri, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”27 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 14 Sub-region 17, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees and members are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall
be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. In the event that, during the pen-

27 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
24 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 16,
2015.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT terminate any employee for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity, including contacting the Board
agents.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from discussing their terms
and conditions of employment, including wages and discipli-
nary issues.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their protected
concerted activities of contact with agents of the Board.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from discussing the termi-
nation of other employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain and reissue and maintain unlawful
rules prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and, or
bonuses.
WE WILL NOT maintain and distribute to employees over-
broad and unlawful confidentiality agreements.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the rights guaranteed to them
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Tera Lopez the position at issue or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges pre-
viously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Tera Lopez whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against her, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the
decision.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful termination
of Tera Lopez, and within 3 days thereafter notify Tera Lopez
in writing that this has been completed and that she will not be
retaliated against in any way.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration
allocating backpay to the appropriate quarters.
WE WILL compensate Tera Lopez for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay
awards covering periods longer than 1 year.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/14–CA–156114 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–
1940.