Hobson Bearing International, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Aug 19, 2016

14-CA-156114 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 19, 2016)

JD–78–16
Diamond, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
WASHINGTON, DC
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Respondent
and Case No.: 14–CA–156114
TERA LOPEZ, an Individual
Charging Party
William F. LeMaster, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Karl W. Blanchard, Jr., Esq. and David J. Riesenmy, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
Eric Crinnian, Esq.,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Joplin, Missouri
on December 15–16, 2015. Tera Lopez (Lopez/Charging Party) filed the charge in case number
14–CA–156114 on July 6, 2015.1 The amended charge in this case was filed by Lopez on
September 22. The General Counsel issued the complaint and notice of hearing on September
28. Hobson Bearing International, Inc. (Respondent/HBI) filed a timely answer on October 9.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA/the Act) when:
1. Since about January 16, Respondent has maintained, and since about July 6, reissued
and has maintained an unlawful rule prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and, or
bonuses with the threat of termination for violating the rule.
2. About July 6, Respondent, by physical distribution to employees, promulgated and
since then has maintained a rule titled Agreement of Restriction/Confidentiality, restricting
employees from discussing or sharing confidential information, defined as including, but not
limited to, individuals’ proprietary information; vital company information; and our information.

1 All dates are in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
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2
3. Respondent, by Gene Hobson, at Respondent’s facility:
-About mid-June 2015, prohibited employees from discussing their terms
and conditions of employment, including disciplinary issues.
5
-About July 6, 2015, told employees that they were required to sign
agreements to abide by the rules described above in numbers 1 and 2 of the
statement of the case.
-About July 8, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing their wages and 10
other terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 8, 2015, interrogated employees about their protected, concerted
activities, by asking employees if they had complained about the rules
described above in numbers 1 and 2 of the statement of the case.15
-About July 8, 2015, interrogated employees about their protected, concerted
activities, by asking employees about conversations they had with agents of
the Board regarding Respondent’s rules described above in paragraph 4.
20
-About July 8, 2015, threatened employees with unspecified reprisals for
engaging in Section 7 activity, including discussing their wages and other
terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 8, 2015, threatened employees with unspecified reprisals for 25
seeking access to the Board.
-About July 9, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing their wages and
other terms and conditions of employment.
30
-About July 9, 2015, told employees that they were required to sign
agreements to abide by the rules described above in numbers 1 and 2 of the
Statement of the Case.
-About July 13, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing their wages and 35
other terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 13, 2015, told employees that Respondent terminated an
employee because the employee raised concerns about Respondent’s rules
described above in numbers 1 and 2 of the Statement of the Case.40
-About July 13, 2015, threatened to terminate employees for discussing their
wages and other terms and conditions of employment.
-About July 13, 2015, prohibited employees from discussing the termination 45
of an employee.
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3
4. About July 13, 2015, Respondent discharged Lopez because Lopez engaged in
concerted conduct, and to discourage employees from engaging in these or other concerted
activities. Alternatively, in the event that Lopez is found to be a supervisor of Respondent within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, or found not to be an employee within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the Act, Respondent engaged in the conduct described above because Lopez 5
attempted to prevent Respondent from restricting or interfering with employees’ Section 7 rights,
pursuant to the rules as described above in paragraph 4, and to chill employees’ exercise of their
Section 7 rights; and because Lopez contacted the Board regarding Respondent’s rules set out
above in paragraph 4.
10
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
15
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the importation and nonretail sale of industrial
bearings. Its operations are conducted from its office and place of business in Diamond,
Missouri. During the 12-month period ending August 31, Respondent sold and shipped from its20
Diamond, Missouri facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside of the
State of Missouri. In conducting its operations during the 12-month period ending August 31,
Respondent purchased and received at its facility in Diamond, Missouri goods valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from points outside of the State of Missouri. Respondent admits, and I find,
that at all material times it has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of 25
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operation and Managerial Staff30
Gene Hobson (Hobson) founded Respondent in 1996 in Diamond, Missouri.2 He is
Respondent’s founder, owner and President.3 Respondent’s business mission is the importation
and resell of industrial bearings to commercial customers. Regal Beloit Corporation (RBC) is
Respondent’s largest customer, comprising 90 percent of its business. Respondent contracts with 35
various overseas vendors to fill its customers’ supply needs. During the period at issue,
however, MOS was its primary supplier.
During the relevant time period, Respondent employed at its Diamond, Missouri facility
about six people, including Hobson. The staff comprised: Hobson, President; Tera Lopez 40

2 Respondent’s facility is a building that contains a front office lobby with a hallway to the left that
leads to offices. There is also a testing laboratory next to the lobby. On the right of the lobby is a
staircase that leads to Hobson’s office and conference room. Straight ahead and through the lobby is a
large warehouse.
3 Hobson also owns a cattle ranch near the HBI facility in Diamond, Missouri. Hobson is solely
responsible for hiring the ranch’s employees, which currently consists of staff members Cole Frossard
(Frossard) and Shawn Hobson (Shawn).
JD–78–16
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(Lopez), Project/Operations Manager; Shelly Wishon (Wishon), Front Office Manager; Halle
Hobson (Halle),4 Administrative Specialist; Michael McBride (McBride), Quality Control;
Monty Greenwood (Greenwood), Warehouse/Shipping Manager.5 Respondent also periodically
hires contract (temporary) employees to assist with special projects. Former employees
included: Manny Maturino’s (Maturino) employment ended in late 2014; Rick Halverson’s 5
(Halverson) employment ended in 2013; Tracy Greenwood (Tracy) employment ended in 2014;
Shawn McBride (Shawn) employment ended in 2014; and Scott Eastman (Eastman) employment
ended in 2015. Respondent also employed for an unknown period of time an unnamed employee
who suffered from a heart condition. Lopez and McBride tried to persuade Hobson to terminate
the employee because of possible liability due to his heart condition, but there is no evidence of 10
when or whether he was terminated.
B. Company Policies Parts A and B
Since about July 6, Respondent has maintained company policies that address various 15
terms and conditions of employment. Company policy part A (part A) addresses pay policies
concerning holiday pay, vacation pay, bereavement pay, and part-time personnel pay. Company
policy part B (part B) sets out the discipline for personnel infractions. Part B reads in pertinent
part,
20
Pay: Will be distributed every Thursday, You should not expect your weekly pay
before 4:00 pm. Employees should not discuss their pay with any other
employee, as it is a sensitive issue. Bonuses will be issued based on merit or
performance. If someone receives a bonus or pay increase and shares their
information with another employee and it is brought to my attention, it will be 25
automatic termination. Pay is set, based on performance, annual increases, or a
management’s decision. No one is to discuss this issue at any time, other than in
my office during a review. If you want to discuss pay, you must ask for a private
meeting with management.
30
(GC Ex. 4) This policy was a revision of prior part B policies which contained identical
language to that set forth above and addressed the same subjects and infractions. (GC Exh. 3.)
The prior part B policies were revised on November 26, 2012, and February 5, 2014.
Company policy part B also set forth the procedure employees had to use if they were 35
late to or absent from work. The provision addressing “tardies” and absences from work applies
to all employees. In addition, about a year prior to Lopez’s termination, Hobson informed
employees in a meeting that if they were going to be late or absent from work, Wishon should be
notified by telephone or text message by 9 a.m. on the date.6
40

4 Halle Hobson is Hobson’s daughter.
5 McBride is a part-time employee.
6 Hobson denied Wishon’s testimony on this point. However, later in the decision, I detail why I
credit Wishon’s testimony instead of Hobson on this point.
JD–78–16
5
The February 5, 2014, revision remained in effect until part B dated July 6, was
distributed to employees at a meeting held on July 6.7 The evidence also shows that in the past,
Respondent’s employees had signed one or more of the revised policies.
C. Confidentiality Agreement 5
Respondent promulgated and maintained a confidentiality agreement (CA) that restricted
employees from divulging, among other information, “individual proprietary information; vital
company information; and our information.” (GC Ex. 1-I, 5.) The CA has been in effect since at
least May; and on or about May 28, R distributed it to employees for their review and signature.10
D. Mid-June 2015 Verbal Reprimand of McBride
About the same time that Respondent began revising and distributing to employees
company policies and the CA, an incident occurred involving McBride and Hobson. McBride 15
had been employed with Respondent on several occasions, most recently from March 2014, to
July 22, 2015. In his position as the quality control manager he served as the point of contact for
customers experiencing quality problems with their orders.
In a meeting about mid-June, Hobson expressed, to McBride, his concern that McBride 20
had needlessly purchased “grease” without his authorization. After the meeting, McBride
complained to other employees that Hobson “jumped him” and was “petty” towards him in a
meeting. McBride also complained to other employees about Hobson hiring a contract employee
that he felt was unnecessary. Subsequently, Hobson verbally reprimanded McBride for
complaining to other employees about his managerial decisions, and told him to stop interfering 25
with business operations by “stirring up drama with employees.”
E. HBI Employee Meeting on July 6
On July 6, Hobson held a meeting with employees in his conference room. In attendance 30
were Lopez, Wishon, McBride, Frossard, Halle, and Greenwood. The purpose of the meeting
was for the employees to sign revised parts A and B and the CA. Hobson explained to the
employees that after they reviewed and signed the revised policies and CA, he and Wishon
would take their signed forms to have them notarized. He informed the employees that he
wanted their forms signed that day. Wishon questioned whether it was legal to have the forms 35
notarized without the employees present; and Hobson responded that his attorney informed him
it was permissible.8
After the meeting, Lopez, Wishon, and McBride discussed the legality of the policies and
the CA among themselves. They also complained about the change to the bereavement policy, 40
sick pay, mobile phone usage in the office, and dress code.9 Lopez told them she thought that

7 The changes made to part B dated July 6 included, among other changes, reducing paid holiday
from 8 days to 7 days; and reducing bereavement pay for a grandparent from 3 days to 1 day.
8 The record is devoid of evidence establishing whether Hobson and Wishon took those forms to be
notarized.
9 Wishon provided undisputed testimony that at some point in their discussion, Halle also stopped and
expressed her displeasure with the dress code policy change. (Tr. 215.)
JD–78–16
6
certain language in the company policies (parts A and B) and the CA might be illegal. She also
informed them that she was going to research the issues and discuss them with Hobson at her
meeting with him on July 8. Despite their concerns, the employees decided to sign parts A and B
and the CA to avoid upsetting Hobson.10
5
Subsequently, Lopez researched the issue via the internet and called the NLRB for
guidance.11 She understood the NLRB representative to say that the provision prohibiting the
discussion of their pay and certain portions of the CA were unlawful. Lopez relayed this
information to her coworkers, assuring them that she would discuss it with Hobson the following
day.10
F. Meeting between Hobson and Lopez on July 8
On July 8, Hobson met with Lopez in the conference room to discuss, among other items,
business operations and her performance evaluation. The meeting began with a discussion on 15
“forecasting”12 that lasted until about 1:30 p.m., when they broke for lunch. They returned from
lunch about 4 p.m. to continue the meeting. The first 15 minutes of the meeting was used to
finish talking about the company forecasting trends. Once discussion about business operations
ended, Lopez broached her concerns about the legality of parts A and B and the CA. She also
voiced her objections to the changes to the bereavement, vacation accrual, dress code, and sick 20
pay policies and Halle’s chronic tardiness. Some of her complaints were of a personal nature.
For example, she complained about the effect the revision to the sick leave policy had on her.
Hobson assured Lopez that it was not personally directed at her; and it should not be a concern to
her because she was a salaried employee. Nonetheless, the primary focus of their conversation
was on those issues that she spoke about with her coworkers after the employee meeting on July 25
6. Lopez told Hobson that she did not want to sign the policy prohibiting employees from
discussing their pay with each other, but he responded that she and none of the other employees
were supposed to talk about their pay. Lopez told him the policy violated federal law and
provided him with information she got from the internet corroborating her position. Hobson
countered that she could draw a line through the portion of the policy she found objectionable.30
Although he told her it did not matter to him if she wanted to discuss her pay with other
employees, Hobson immediately repudiated this sentiment by stating,
…all it does is stir the pot and create drama, okay? And cause Obama signed
some, some shit into law, ah, this is something that, that my lawyer would need 35
to, to investigate and to uh, see what it actually is and the Labor Relations Board
if they have a problem with it can give me a call and ask and tell me about it
because just because it refers to this section, that section. I don’t know if this is
law.
40

10 Wishon had signed past company policies banning the discussion of employee pay.
11 Lopez also contacted the Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) about the same or
similar issues. Ultimately, she filed complaints with those agencies.
12 Forecasting is the term Respondent uses for estimating how much product a customer might order
over several months and, based on that estimate and its current supply, the amount of product Respondent
must stock at the warehouse to meet its customer’s needs.
JD–78–16
7
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1 p. 8.) Lopez also informed Hobson that the CA was unlawful
because it imposed a monetary penalty for violating its provisions. Nonetheless, Hobson told her
that she was ignorant of the law, and he was going to enforce its provisions. In response to her
complaint that she was discouraging him from bringing these concerns to him, Hobson denied it.
He also questioned whether she had talked about her objections to the parts A and B and the CA 5
with her coworkers, and instructed her not to discuss her belief that he was “breaking the law”
with other employees. (GC 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1 p. 9.) The following exchange ensued:
Hobson: I’m not discouraging you from doing it. I want you to do it but I don’t
want you to be discussing it with other employees.10
Lopez: So, do you want me to go, “hey…”
Hobson: Are you discussing it with other employees?
15
Lopez: “Hey, he’s violating the law”
Hobson: Did you talk to me only about that or did you bring it up to other
employees…
20
Id. Hobson continued by telling Lopez that if she objected to the provision, she could “line
through it.” However, he immediately disavowed the statement by emphasizing to her that she
was “going to sign a confidentiality if you work here and that’s, that’s going to be required” but
agreed to have his attorney review it again to ensure its legality. (GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part
1, p. 9)25
The next item that Hobson and Lopez debated was her unhappiness with his daughter’s
(Halle) tardiness and her conflicts with his wife. Hobson told her that because Halle was a
student, she needed flexibility with her work scheduled, and Lopez would have to accept it. He
also informed her that she needed to make more of an effort to get along with his wife and that 30
he had told his wife the same.
Hobson and Lopez revisited the subject of the legality of parts A and B and the CA.
Lopez told him that she called the “Labor Board” and EEOC.13 Although she had just informed
him that she called the Board and EEOC, he inexplicably asked if she called the Board on 35
Respondent, what she reported, and the Board’s response. Lopez again admitted to calling
NLRB; relayed that the NLRB representative informed her that the CA and parts A and B were
unlawful; and the NLRB representative asked if she wanted to file a complaint. Hobson
responded that filing a claim was her right; and if she did not want to sign the company policies
containing the pay provision, and the CA with a monetary fine for violating it, she could “scratch 40
off of there.” Lopez expressed skepticism noting he made employees feel pressured into signing
the documents for fear of losing their jobs. She explained,

13 Based on her testimony, it is apparent Lopez was referring to the NLRB and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
JD–78–16
8
Lopez: Just like the confidentiality, “Sign this.” It’s not, “take it home and read it
over.”
Hobson: mmhmm
5
Lopez: But I can’t take it home, can I? Because…
Hobson: Why can’t you?
Lopez: Your confidentiality thing says taking crap out I owe you $75,000.10
Hobson: No, I, I, got to put a fee on there. So, you talked to the Labor Board about
that as well?
Lopez: Yes15
Hobson: and what did the Labor Board say?
Lopez: The said it’s illegal.
20
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1, p. 15) Hobson then asked her to get a copy of the CA so they
could review it; and she responded with sarcasm which caused him to express frustration stating,
You’re really, you’re really pushing me. You’re sitting here telling me, little,
looking for little tidbits telling me that you called the EEOC, the Department of 25
Labor, all this. Why would you do that? Who does shit like that?
(GC Exh. 13, p. 16.) They then became locked in a battle over whether Hobson said Lopez was
a “witch stirrer” brewing up brew or used some variant phrase to denote causing drama. At some
point the discussion deteriorated into an unproductive argument with Hobson telling Lopez that 30
she appeared intimidated by him, unhappy with her job, and she should find another job if she
was not happy at the company. He accused her of being defiant and insubordinate; and he had
been warned that she “would probably try and come against [him] and look for little things” (GC
Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 1, p. 18) Lopez complained that he awarded employees bonuses
unfairly. Hobson denied the accusation and told her his award of bonuses to employees was “not 35
your business.” Id. He reiterated that he was unhappy with her decision to complain to federal
agencies about the parts A and B and the CA. Hobson told Lopez the he did not “appreciate you
reporting things to me to the government.” (GC Exh. 13, p. 17–20.)
The meeting continued with Lopez complaining about Hobson being upset with her 40
because she told a RBC employee that he had instructed her not to send RBC reports on the
status of their orders. Hobson accused her of purposely conveying the information to RBC in a
manner that would cause friction with RBC. He also reminds her that she was not punished for
the RBC incident, but instead would receive a raise as part of her annual performance evaluation.
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However, Hobson accused her of being insubordinate, which she denied.14 She circled back to
the nonsensical argument about whether Hobson called her a witch stirring the pot. Frustrated
Hobson asked, “What is it that you want? What is it you want, Tera? Do you want to continue
your job here or do you want to leave. What do you want?” (GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 2, p.
3) Lopez responds several times that she is bored with her job because her duties are taken from 5
her and reassigned to other employees, thus leaving her without enough work to keep her busy.
Hobson and Lopez continue to circle around the same topics with no apparent resolution.
Further into their repetitive discussion, Hobson again voices his displeasure about her reporting
the company to the Department of Labor and EEOC; and notes that he has treated her fairly 10
because she is the highest paid employee on the payroll. It should also be noted that at some
point in their discussion and in his hearing testimony, Hobson characterized Lopez as a “stellar
employee,” “doing a good job,” highly intelligent, and had a “wonderful” attitude with him.
Likewise, the only performance appraisal for Lopez entered into the record lists several of her
strong points but lists one area for improvement as, “[d]o not bring up personal complaints or 15
problems in front of other [e]mployees.” (GC Exh. 14)
After more squabbling over the hostility between Lopez and Hobson’s wife, they circle
back to a discussion of her contacting the Board and the CA. Hobson reiterates that he mark
through the provisions of the parts A and B and the CA that she found objectionable. 20
Nevertheless, he reminded her that he was going review the information he gave her about the
CA’s illegality. Hobson also recalled a mistake she made in sending an email to Respondent’s
supplier in China, MOS, which contained confidential information that could have resulted in
serious damage to Respondent. She acknowledged her mistake; and he assured her that,
although initially upset, he did not believe she sent the information to MOS with malicious 25
intent. Towards the end of the meeting, Hobson told Lopez that he would have terminated her if
he felt that she had sent the email to MOS in an attempt to purposely harm the company. Lopez
accuses him of hypocrisy for discussing the MOS incident with other workers, but prohibiting
her from doing the same. Hobson rejects her characterization, responding that he does not mind
her talking with other employees when she is upset but not to talk to them about “business 30
stuff.”15 They proceed to review the policies together and agree on the sections to delete.
Notwithstanding this action, Hobson repeats that he will be unhappy if she discusses work
related issues with coworkers; and again tells her that he is going to take the CA to his attorney
to review it for legal accuracy, and regardless, all employees will be required to sign it.
35
Lopez reiterated that she was bored in her job. Hobson informed her that the only
challenging position left in the company was sales and encouraged her to take on more of those
responsibilities. He promised to support her in this effort. Explaining to Lopez that he was
hiring an employee that she would train on bearings, he encouraged her to learn from him
because this future employee had a vast knowledge of sales and the bearing’s market. He also 40
repeats his support of Lopez stating,

14 It was at this point in the meeting that Lopez informed Hobson she had been recording their
conversations for the past 6 months, including the current discussion.
15 Although Hobson denied on cross-examination telling Lopez she could not discuss business matters
with other employees, the audio recorded evidence reveals he explicitly told her this several times during
the course of their meeting.
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10
“…I wouldn’t keep you around her for a minute if I thought you were bad
business. I didn’t think you were bad business then and I don’t think you are now
and you know you can tell me stuff you can come against me on and I’ll take it
with a grain of salt cause truthfully and honestly I need, you know, I’ve been in
your corner and I’ve been for you. So there is no need to worry about me.” 5
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13, Part 3, p. 7) The meeting finally ended at about 5 p.m. with Hobson
assigning Lopez three sales calls purportedly in response to her request for more work and
responsibility.
10
G. Hobson Meeting with Attorney on July 9
On July 9, Hobson called Wishon into his office to ask her if she felt the ban on
employees discussing their pay among themselves was illegal. When she told him that she felt it
prohibited employees from determining if they were being paid fairly, Hobson retrieved the 15
document and told her he was going to change it and have employees to sign the revised
version.16 Hobson informed Wishon that he was taking the documents to Respondent’s attorney
for review. At some unspecified point, Hobson posted a notice on the employee bulletin board
that the offending provisions had been removed from the policies because they were inaccurate.17
20
On July 9, Hobson contacted Respondent’s attorney, David Riesenmy (Riesenmy), for
advice on the legality of the company’s policies and the CA. He also consulted with Riesenmy
on his desire to terminate Lopez’s employment. Riesenmy advised him to rewrite the part B pay
provision. There is no evidence what, if any, advice Riesenmy gave Hobson on his desire to fire
Lopez. Subsequent to his meeting with Riesenmy, Hobson had the employees sign a revised 25
version of the policies parts A and B and the CA.18
H. Lopez’s Absence from Work on July 10
On July 10 about 9 a.m., Hobson asked Wishon if Lopez was in the office. She told him 30
that Lopez was ill and unable to come to work. Hobson told her that because Lopez did not
personally notify him of her absence he was going to “write her up” as a no call/no show. He
presented the completed “write-up” to Wishon for her signature, but she refused to sign it.
Consequently, Hobson told her to write whatever she wanted at the bottom of the form, but
regardless, he was going to issue the “write-up.” Wishon notated on the document that Lopez 35
notified her the previous evening that she would be absent from work on July 10. Both testified

16 The document that Hobson revised in his meeting with Wishon is GC Exh. 4.
17 Wishon testified that when he returned from meeting with Respondent’s attorney, Hobson told her
that he was advised that the provision banning employees from discussing their pay with each other only
applied to federal employees so he was returning the provision to the policy. Lopez testified that Hobson
also made similar statements to her. Each of the revised company policies in evidence contains the
provision prohibiting employees from discussing their pay with each other with the threat of discipline for
violations. (GC Exhs. 3, 4, 5, 6) I credit her testimony on this point because it was corroborated by other
witnesses and objective evidence.
18 Wishon admitted that she signed another version of the policy that did not include the ban on
discussing employee pay. However, the revised document that Wishon (and presumably other
employees) signed is not in evidence.
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11
that ultimately the “write-up” disappeared before it was issued to Lopez. It was never located.
Subsequently, Hobson returned to Wishon’s desk about 9:30 a.m. or 10 a.m. and told her that
Lopez was fired.
Hobson’s and Wishon’s testimony of their discussion differs on almost every relevant 5
point. Respondent has a written leave policy setting forth the disciplinary action that employees
are subject to for violating its provision. (GC Exh. 4) Hobson insists that since she became
operations/project manager, Lopez has had to notify him if she was going to be absent or late to
work. He insisted, however, that the remaining employees have the option of notifying him or
Wishon if they are going to be late or absent from work. It is undisputed that employee10
notifications of unexpected late arrivals or absences have to be received by 9 a.m. on that
morning. However, Wishon testified that the practice has been for employees, including Lopez,
to contact her if they are going to be late to or absent from work. According to her, Hobson
communicated this practice to employees in a meeting about a year ago. She noted that
previously employees were required to notify Lopez if they were going to be late or absent, but 15
she could not recall when the new procedure was put in place. Hobson insists that in response to
his inquiry, Wishon first told him she had not heard from Lopez. According to him, it was not
until after he placed a “write-up” for Lopez on her desk did Wishon tell him that Lopez told her
the previous evening that she might not come to work because of “female problems.” Wishon
contradicts his testimony on this point, insisting when Hobson first asked she told him that Lopez 20
informed her the previous evening that she would not be in to work because she was feeling ill.
I find Wishon’s more credible than Hobson regarding their conversation on July 10,
about if and who Lopez notified that she would be absent. Notably, if Lopez was supposed to
report her absences directly to Hobson and not Wishon then why would he need her to sign off 25
on the “write-up?” Respondent failed to provide an answer to that question. Moreover, the
“mysterious” disappearance of the write-up that Hobson placed on Wishon’s desk further casts
doubt on the veracity of his testimony on this point. The Board has consistently declared that the
testimony of current employees is more likely than not to be reliable because the witness is
testifying adverse to her or his pecuniary interest. Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc., 234 NLRB 30
618, 619 (1978), enf. denied on other grounds 607 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1979), citing, e.g.,
Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305 (1961); Gateway Transportation Co., Inc., 193 NLRB
47, 48 (1971).
I. Respondent’s Efforts to Hire a New Operations Manager35
Hobson began reaching out to people about working for him in March. In April, Hobson
contacted an acquaintance, Michael Norman (Norman), about working for Respondent. Hobson
told Norman that if he accepted the position his duties would be “[c]ontrol over the operation,
reporting only to [Hobson] all the day-to-day operations.” (Tr. 230.) Norman was informed that 40
someone was currently in the position. On May 21, Norman interviewed with Hobson and
toured Respondent’s facility. During the interview, Hobson told him that the person currently
occupying the position, Lopez, was going to be demoted and her duties would be transferred to
him. Hobson also warned him that there might be “friction” when Lopez learned of her
demotion; and he was uncertain if she would want to remain employed at the company.45
JD–78–16
12
After his interview, Hobson contacted Norman by text to ask whether he was going to
accept the position. In the text Hobson also wrote,
Going to make some decisions quickly on hiring … May fire Tera soon … she
was suppose (sic) to send my one supplier a small forecast and production 5
schedule and she sent them a full inventory schedule of what we have and who
are customers are and how much we get
(GC Exh. 7.) Norman declined the job because he and Respondent could not agree on a
compensation package.10
In April, Hobson unexpectedly encountered a former employee, Evan Tanner (Tanner), at
the local mall.19 He explained to Tanner that he wanted to hire someone because he was having
“issues” with an employee. Subsequently, Hobson and Tanner had several telephone
conversations in an attempt to schedule an in-person meeting. During several of these 15
conversations, Hobson told Tanner about problems he was having with Lopez. The first week in
June, Tanner met Hobson at Respondent’s facility to discuss the position and his expected duties.
During their meeting, Hobson explained that because of Lopez’s insubordination he wanted her
to train Tanner; and Tanner would then assume some of her responsibilities while Lopez would
be demoted. Hobson also complained to Tanner that Lopez, McBride, and Wishon would 20
socialize in the warehouse when they should have been working; and his issues with Lopez and
her causing “drama” with other employees had continued too long. Tanner was offered the
position at the meeting, but his start date was not established because Hobson had to prepare the
paperwork finalizing the job offer; and Tanner had to give his current employer notice.20 Hobson
expressed to him that he was unsure about Lopez’s role going forward in the company, but felt 25
that she might voluntarily decide to leave once Tanner was hired and she was demoted.
On June 30, Tanner met with Hobson to review the job description and sign the job offer.
Hobson also introduced Tanner to Respondent’s work force. Tanner testified that in this meeting
Hobson determined that Tanner would assume Lopez’s position of operations manager, and 30
Lopez would be fired. However, his Board affidavit contradicts this statement. In his statement
to the Board, Tanner notes that there was uncertainty about what role Lopez would assume after
his hire; and he could not recall if Hobson told him that he had spoken with Lopez about his
plans for her position. (Tr. 105–106) I find Tanner’s statement to the Board more credible and
discount his testimony at the hearing on this point. His statement at the hearing was in clear 35
contradiction to his sworn statement; and the statement to the Board was given closer in time to
the act. Therefore, it is more probable than not that Tanner’s memory of the event was more
accurate at the time he gave his statement to the Board. Moreover, Tanner could not provide a
reasonable or any explanation for the change in his testimony. Except for a text message sent
from Hobson to Tanner scheduling a date for him to come into the office, Tanner and Hobson 40
did not have any further contact until July 10. On July 10, Tanner received a text message from

19 Tanner was briefly employed by Respondent in 1997.
20 Tanner testified that he did not accept the job offer until about a week after the meeting. However,
the affidavit that he gave to the Board attested that he accepted the job in the interview. Regardless, it is
not necessary for me to reconcile the discrepancy because it is not important to the merits of the case.
JD–78–16
13
Hobson informing him that he was uncertain if Lopez would return to her job because she did
not notify him or anyone else that she would not be at work that day.21
J. Lopez’ Termination on July 13
5
On the morning of July 13, Hobson, Tanner, and McBride were together in the lobby
when Lopez arrived for work. Hobson informed Lopez immediately when she entered the
building that she was terminated. He told Lopez that Wishon would gather her personal items
and deliver them to her. Lopez left without incident.
10
Subsequently, Hobson met with McBride and Tanner in the conference room to explain
why he dismissed Lopez. He told them that Lopez was fired because she was insubordinate; and
she had mistakenly sent company data to a customer. He testified to the examples of
insubordination that Hobson accused Lopez of committing in the following exchange with
counsel for the General Counsel:15
LeMaster: What was discussed in this meeting?
McBride: He brought us up there and he said, “I had to let her go. She was being
disrespectful.”20
LeMaster: Ok. Did he say anything else?
McBride: I asked why?
25
LeMaster: Did he answer you?
McBride: Yeah, he had an answer. He said it was over the e-mails sent to the MOS
customer about some data and some cost problems they had.
30
LeMaster: Okay. Did [Hobson] give any examples of [Lopez] being disrespectful?
McBride: Yes
LeMaster: What were those?35
McBride: He said one of the examples she was – besides the e-mail problem, and that she
was always crossing her arms, and he said that is disrespectful to him.
LeMaster: Did he give you any other examples?40

21 On direct-examination, Tanner testified that the first time Hobson told him that he was going to fire
Lopez was June 3. However, his testimony is in direct contradiction to the affidavit he provided to the
Board on August 17. I do not credit his testimony on this point because he provides no credible reason
for the change in his recollection of the conversation he had with Hobson about when Hobson made a
definitive decision to fire Lopez.
JD–78–16
14
McBride: Yes. He had – oh, my mind just went blank.
LeMaster: Take your time. Do you recall, was it anything that she said, that she did?
McBride: Yeah, whenever things was brought up why he let her go, it was the data that 5
she brought in just showed the legality, that we couldn’t talk about our bonuses and
raises, that was supposed to be legal, and she showed that where she got the information
from, who she talked, to and where she got the information from.
(Tr. 195–196) During their discussion, Hobson also explained to McBride that his lawyer had 10
advised him that company rules banning employees from discussing their pay was only unlawful
if applied to federal employees; and the information Lopez gave him on this topic was incorrect.
III. 8(A) (1) VIOLATIONS
15
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA/the Act) provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The rights guaranteed in Section 7
include the right “to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 20
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” See Brighton Retail, Inc., 354 NLRB
441, 441 (2009). An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if it disciplines or discharges
an employee for engaging in activity that is “concerted” within the meaning of Section 7 of the
Act. If it is determined that the activity is concerted, a violation of Section 8(a)(1) will be found
if the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee’s activity, the concerted activity 25
was protected by the Act, and the adverse employment action was motivated by the employee’s
protected, concerted activity. Relco Locomotives Inc., 358 NLRB 37 (2012) (citing Meyers
Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB 755 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985), supplemented 281 NLRB 882 (1986), affd. sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)). Once 30
the General Counsel establishes such an initial showing of discrimination, the employer may
present evidence, as an affirmative defense, showing it would have taken the same action even in
the absence of the protected activity. The General Counsel may offer evidence that the
employer’s articulated reasons are pretext or false. Relco, supra. In addition, the Act also
protects applicants for employment. NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87 35
(1995).
The Board has held that if a rule specifically restrains Section 7 rights, the rule is invalid.
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). See also Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB
746, 748 (1984) (work rule explicitly prohibits employees from discussing wages with 40
coworkers a restriction on Section 7 rights). Even if the rule does not restrict specific Section 7
rights, it may still be unlawful if employees would reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit
Section 7 activity. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 347 NLRB 500, 500–501 (2006);
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra at 647. In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343
NLRB at 646, the Board stated, “. . . in determining whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the 45
Board must . . . give the rule a reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular phrases
in isolation, and it must not presume improper interference with employee rights.” See also
JD–78–16
15
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, at 828 (1998) (citing Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236,
1245 (1992)).
The Board has established a framework for assessing whether an employer’s
confidentiality rule violates the Act. If the rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activities, 5
then the fact-finder must analyze whether (1) employees would reasonably construe the language
of the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union
activity; or (3) the rule has been applied “to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.” Hyundai
America Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB 860, (2011); Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB 1131,
1146 (2012), enfd. 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014).10
A. Respondent’s Confidentiality Agreement is Unlawful
The General Counsel argues that Respondent’s CA violates the Act because it contains
vague and ambiguous provisions that “any reasonable employee would struggle to interpret the 15
document or concretely identify what information is permitted to be discussed.” (GC Br. 18.)
The sections read in pertinent part:
・ (Employees)…will not exchange information with the Chinese manufacturers,
new or future employers, bearing companies, users of such, distributors, users of 20
such, and or individual’s proprietary information. Regarding company
information, prices, contacts, suppliers, manufacturers, customers any information
to include methods of distribution.
・ (Employees)…will not copy vital company information and or remove or
distribute this information or paperwork, from Hobson Bearing International25
(HBI), offices under no circumstance without written authorization (from
Respondent)
・ (Employees)…will not…give our information to anyone without the written
consent.
・ (Employees)…will not…share information obtained while working or no30
longer working at HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, Inc. With any
outside entities whether related or indirectly related. (sic) (GC 5).
(GC Exh. 5.)
35
The General Counsel alleges the above provisions are invalid because the document does
not explain or provide definitions to make clear the context of its prohibitions and restrictions.
Moreover, the General Counsel argues that an employee who reads the CA would “reasonably
interpret the document as encompassing protected activities and information, such as discussing
their own wages [and] other terms and conditions of employment.” (GC Br. 19.)40
I find that Respondent’s CA violates the Act because the relevant sections of the CA are
so broadly written that it would chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. While I
agree that employers have a legitimate interest in safeguarding their confidential and proprietary
information, read without context, this CA could also be interpreted to preclude the disclosure 45
JD–78–16
16
and discussion of employee wages, disciplinary actions, performance appraisals, personnel
documents, and other terms and conditions of employment. Battle’s Transportation, Inc., 362
NLRB No. 17 (2015) (Board held employer’s confidentiality agreement prohibiting employees
from divulging “human resources related information” and “investigations by outside agencies”
violated the Act.). The impromptu discussion Lopez, McBride, and Wishon held after the 5
meeting on July 6 is evidence of their confusion about what information they were barred from
disclosing under the CA. See Hyundai, supra at 12 fn. 12 (Board explained that in order to keep
information confidential employers must “specifically define such information in a fashion that
will clearly not include those matters that employees are entitled…to discuss among themselves
and with interested third parties.”) Moreover, Respondent “concedes NLRA violation with 10
regard to portions of its Company Policy and Confidentiality Agreement.” (R. Br. 19)22
Respondent admits that its CA “was overbroad and has been abandoned by Respondent.
Respondent agrees to cooperate with the NLRB in taking any further steps required.” (R. Br. 12.)
Accordingly, I find the CA violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.15
B. Ban prohibiting employees’ discussion of pay unlawful
The General Counsel argues that Respondent has maintained and reissued a rule that is
facially invalid because it specifically prohibits employees from discussing their pay with any 20
other employee and threatens them with termination if the rule is violated. The sections read in
pertinent part:
Pay: Will be distributed every Thursday. You should not expect your weekly pay
check before 4:00 pm. Employees should not discuss their pay with any other 25
employee, as it is a sensitive issue. Bonuses will be issued based on merit or
performance. If someone receives a bonus or pay increase and shares their
information with another employee and it is brought to my attention, it will be
automatic termination. Pay is set, based on performance, annual increases, or at
management’s decision. No one is to discuss this issue at any time, other than in 30
my office during a review. If you want to discuss pay, you must ask for a private
meeting with management.
(GC Exh. 4.) Hobson acknowledged that since at least February 5, 2014, Respondent has
maintained company policies prohibiting employees from discussing their pay with other 35
employees; and a violation of the policies will result in termination. (Tr. 25–26; GC Exh. 3, 4.)
More importantly, Respondent admits that its company policies restricting employees’ ability to
discuss their pay with other employees violates the Act. However, Respondent also argues that it
has addressed “those issues” and “stands ready to take such other reasonable steps as directed by
the NLRB.” (R. Br. 19.)40
I find that the provision at issue is unlawful on its face because it explicitly restricts
employees’ Section 7 right to discuss wage and, or salary information. The Board has

22 The pages in Respondent’s post hearing brief are not numbered. Therefore, I numbered
Respondent’s post hearing brief pages with the cover page number 1 and the signature and certificate of
service page number 20.
JD–78–16
17
consistently held that nondisclosure rules which ban the disclosure and discussion of wage and
salary information are invalid. The plain language of the provision at issue explicitly bans
employees from engaging in protected activity. Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112
(2004); Bettie Page Clothing, 359 NLRB 777 (2013), affd. 361 NLRB No. 79 (2014); Flamingo
Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 288 fn. 3, 291 (1999). Based on the clear language of the rule, 5
it is apparent that employees are required to address complaints about wages to the owner and
president of Respondent, Hobson. This requirement, in combination with the threat of
termination for failing to adhere to the rule, would “reasonably tend to inhibit employees from
bringing wage-related complaints to, and seeking redress from, entities other than Respondent,
and restrains the employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities for collective 10
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171,
1172 (1990) Respondent’s rule tends to inhibit employees from banding together by requiring
that the employee discuss pay concerns with Respondent’s management (Hobson), without the
ability to get assistance from or discuss it with other employees, a third-party or outside entity.
“Faced with such a requirement, some employees may never invoke the right to act in concert 15
with other employees or to seek the assistance of a union, because they are unwilling to first run
the risk of confronting the Respondent on an individual basis.” Kinder-Care, supra at 1172.
I also find unpersuasive Respondent’s implied argument that it should not be liable for
violating the Act because the language at issue was subsequently removed. Passavant Memorial 20
Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978), sets forth the standard for effectively repudiating
unlawful conduct. The repudiation must be “timely,” “unambiguous,” “specific in nature to the
coercive conduct,” and “free from other proscribed illegal conduct.” Passavant supra at 138;
Douglas Division, 228 NLRB 1016 (1977), and cases cited therein at 1024. The Board has also
held that in order to effectively repudiate the unlawful conduct, the employer must adequately 25
publicize the repudiation to the affected employees, refrain from engaging in the proscribed
conduct post-publication, and assure employees that in the future the employer will not interfere
with the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Id at 138–139.
While Wishon testified that Hobson posted a notice on the employee bulletin board that 30
the ban restricting employees’ discussion of their pay was not “right” and therefore rescinded,
she noted that he later told her he was reinstating the ban because his attorney advised him that it
was legal. Moreover, her testimony was vague regarding the timing of the posting, and the exact
wording of the post. Hobson, however, only admitted to contacting Respondent’s attorney for
advice on the legality of the pay policy and the CA. I find that the record is devoid of evidence 35
that there was an effective repudiation as to the pay policies or the CA. Respondent failed to
place into evidence the notice that Wishon alleged Hobson posted on the bulletin board. Even
assuming such a notice or poster existed, I am unable to determine if the repudiation was
“timely,” “unambiguous,” “specific in nature to the coercive conduct,” and “free from other
proscribed illegal conduct.” Passavant supra at 138. In short, the additional factors necessary for 40
establishing a successful repudiation remain unfulfilled.
Accordingly, I find Respondent’s CA violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
JD–78–16
18
C. July 6 Respondent Mandate that Employees Sign Unlawful Company Policies and CA
The General Counsel argues that Respondent violated the Act because at a meeting on
July 6, employees were required to sign the aforementioned unlawful company policies and the
CA. Since Respondent required employees to sign and return the unlawful documents as a 5
condition of continued employment, the General Counsel contends this constitutes an
independent violation of the Act.
Respondent admits that the company policy regarding pay was distributed to employees
on July 6, but denies the CA was given to employees on this date. Instead, Respondent insists 10
the CA was distributed to the employee on May 28.
The evidence is undisputed that in order to retain their jobs, Respondent required
employees to sign the company policies and the CA, which I previously found were unlawful. It
is irrelevant whether the CA was given to the employees on May 28 or 5 weeks later on July 6 15
because the action remained unlawful. While Respondent may argue the employees’ jobs were
not contingent on them signing the documents, Hobson’s tape-recorded admissions, addressed in
the fact section of this decision, establish otherwise. (GC Exh. 12, 13.) Notably, Respondent
does not address this issue in its post hearing brief, except to admit that portions of the company
policies and the CA violate the Act and the documents were distributed to employees for their 20
review and signatures. Consequently, I find that Respondent’s action at the July 6, meeting and
its admissions establish a violation of the Act.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when employees
were informed that they were required to sign the company policies and the CA which contained 25
unlawful provisions.
D. Mid-June 2015, Respondent Unlawfully Banned Employees from Discussing their Terms and
Conditions of Employment
30
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent unlawfully reprimanded McBride for
complaining to other employees about being disciplined by Respondent and his opinion that
Respondent unnecessarily hired an additional employee. The Respondent does not address this
allegation in its post hearing brief.
35
The Board has consistently held that employee discussions and complaints about staffing
levels are protected by Section 7 of the Act. See, e.g., Bon Harbor Nursing & Rehabilitation
Center, 348 NLRB 1062, 1062 (2006); Bethany Medical Center, 328 NLRB 1094, 1094 (1999).
Moreover, the Board has held that employees have a right under Section 7 to discuss “discipline
or disciplinary investigations involving fellow employees.” Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 40
358 NLRB 537 (2013); Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271 (2001); Verizon Wireless, 349 NLRB
640, 658–659 (2007).
I find that Respondent, through Hobson, unlawfully precluded an employee from
discussing his concerns about company operations and discipline with other employees. The 45
facts establish that Hobson met with McBride to counsel him for purchasing “grease” without
Hobson’s authorization. It is also undisputed that after their discussion, McBride complained to
JD–78–16
19
other employees that Hobson unfairly criticized him for purchasing the grease. McBride also
discussed with other employees his opinion that Hobson was unnecessarily hiring an additional
contract employee. Hobson admitted on direct examination that when he learned of McBride’s
complaints he told him to stop “stirring up drama with employees” and interrupting business
operations, and issued McBride a verbal reprimand. (Tr. 86–89.)5
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Hobson
verbally reprimanded McBride for discussing terms and conditions of employment, including
discipline.
10
E. July 8, Respondent Unlawfully Interrogated Employees, Restricted Employees Ability to
Engage in Protected Concerted Activity and Threatened Employees with Reprisal
The General Counsel charges that Respondent engaged in a series of acts to thwart its
employees’ efforts to assert their rights under Section 7 of the Act. In a meeting on July 8, with 15
Lopez, Hobson told her several times that: she could not discuss her pay or workplace concerns
with other employees; interrogated Lopez on whether she complained to federal agencies about
work place rules; questioned her about her conversation with the Board’s representatives; issued
an implied threat that Lopez might suffer reprisal if she discussed those topics prohibited in the
company policies and the CA; and implicitly threatened Lopez with reprisal for contacting the 20
Board to complain about Respondent.
Respondent failed to address any of the aforementioned allegations in its post hearing
brief, except to acknowledge that several times during their meeting, Hobson expressed to Lopez
his dissatisfaction with her reporting Respondent to the “government.” Respondent also appears 25
to suggest that Lopez’ complaints to Hobson are personal in nature, and therefore, do not rise to
the level of protected concerted activity.
1. Unlawfully prohibited Lopez from discussing pay and other terms and
conditions of employment30
The General Counsel argues that Respondent, through Hobson, unlawfully sought to
restrict Lopez’ exercise of her Section 7 rights by explicitly telling her not to discuss her pay or
other work related issues with other employees. Respondent does not address this allegation in
its post hearing brief.35
As noted previously in this decision, the Board has consistently held it is unlawful for
employers to prohibit employees from disclosing and discussing wage and salary information.
Hyunadai, supra. Likewise, employers cannot interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act. Yoshi’s Japanese Restaurant & 40
Jazz House, 330 NLRB 1339, 1339 fn. 3 (2000).
The evidence is irrefutable that in the meeting with Lopez on July 8, Hobson explicitly
told her that she could not discuss her pay or “business stuff” with other employees or outside
parties. (GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13 Part 1, p. 6, 8, 9, 10; GC Exh. 13 Part 2, p. 7, 22) Hobson45
also told Lopez to come to him about work related issues and not to discuss them with other
employees. In the meeting Hobson later reversed himself, and told Lopez that she could discuss
JD–78–16
20
her pay with others or she could cross out the offending provisions of the pay policy. However,
Hobson would almost immediately repudiate this sentiment by reiterating that she could not
discuss her pay with other employees, and emphasize that all employees were required to sign
the policy restricting their right to discuss pay with coworkers. The evidence clearly establishes
that Hobson’s repudiations fail to meet the standard established in Passavant at 138.5
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when on July 8,
Respondent prohibited employees from discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of
employment.
10
2. Unlawful interrogation on July 8
The General Counsel argues that Respondent, through Hobson, unlawfully interrogated
Lopez about her contact with the Board and her discussions with other employees, thus chilling
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Respondent does not address this allegation 15
in its post hearing brief.
After instructing Lopez that she could not discuss her pay and other terms and conditions
of employment with her coworkers, Hobson continued by pressing her to reveal whether she had
spoken about her terms and conditions of employment with her coworkers. In response to Lopez 20
complaint that Hobson does not want her to talk with coworkers about her concerns on the
legality of the CA, Hobson said:
Hobson: I’m not discouraging you from doing it. I want you to do it but I don’t
want you to be discussing it with other employees.25
Lopez: So, do you want me to go, “hey…”
Hobson: Are you discussing it with other employees?
30
Lopez: “Hey, he’s violating the law”
Hobson: Did you talk to me only about that or did you bring it up to other
employees…
35
(GC Exhs. 12, 13.) After further discussion between them about the legality of the CA and part
A and B, Hobson questioned Lopez about her contact with agents of the Board:
Lopez: I’ll tell you this. I have called the Labor Board and I have called the EEOC
and I have great grounds.40
Hobson: mmhmm.
Lopez: and I have plenty of stuff.
45
Hobson: mmhmm
JD–78–16
21
Lopez: Do I want to do that to you? No. I’ve worked here for three years.
Hobson: You called the Labor Board on us?
Lopez: I love everyone I work for.5
Hobson: You called the Labor Board on us?
Lopez: Yes I did.
10
Hobson: Okay, what did you report on, on the Labor Board?
Lopez: I just asked a question. Is this legal?
(GC Exhs. 12, 13.) The Board has adopted the test established in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 15
48 (2d Cir. 1964) to determine if management directly interrogating employees violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Field Family Associates, LP d/b/a Holiday Inn-JFK Airport, 348 NLRB 16
(2006); Smithfield Foods, 347 NLRB 1225 (2006). Under the Bourne test, the factors to consider
are: the background; the nature of the information sought; the identity of the questioner; the
place and method of interrogation; and the truthfulness of the reply. Westwood Health Care 20
Center, 330 NLRB 935, 939 (2000). In applying these factors, I must assess whether, based on
the facts of the specific case, the questioning at issue would reasonably tend to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. Rossmore House, 269
NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984); Temecula Mechanical, Inc., 358 NLRB 1225 (2012).
25
I find the evidence is irrefutable that in response to Lopez’ declaration that she had
discussed with other employees the legality of Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA, and
contacted the Board about those issues, Hobson pressed her for details about those interactions.
The record establishes that on July 8, and after the mandatory employee meeting Hobson held on
July 6, he met with Lopez in his conference room to discuss forecasting and issue Lopez her 30
performance evaluation. After they finished reviewing the forecasting information, Lopez began
to tell Hobson about her concerns with the validity of Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA.
The evidence shows that the primary purpose of the afternoon segment of their meeting became
Hobson’s attempt to determine who Lopez had contacted about the legality of the Respondent’s
parts A and B and the CA, the substance of those conversations, and why Lopez felt that she 35
needed to discuss the issue with her coworkers and several federal agencies. Despite one curt
statement from Hobson to Lopez that he did not mind if she talked with other employees when
upset, he immediately followed it with the admonishment that she was not to discuss “business
stuff” with them. This is no evidence that Hobson gave Lopez any other assurance that she could
speak freely about her protected concerted activities without reprisal. Based on the evidence, I 40
must conclude that Hobson questioned Lopez in an attempt to learn about the strength and depth
of her and other employees’ complaints to outside parties.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has established that Respondent, through
Hobson, unlawfully conducted an interrogation of its employees in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) 45
of the Act.
JD–78–16
22
3. Respondent did not threaten employees with unspecified reprisal for engaging in protected,
concerted activities
According to the General Counsel, the revelation that Lopez had been discussing her 5
concerns with other employees about the legality of the Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA
caused Hobson to threaten her with unspecified reprisals. The General Counsel argues that
implied threat was revealed when Hobson stated,
If it sounded like … I called you a witch it was in reference to something that, that 10
is just referring to your actions. It wasn’t referring to how you look or who you
are or anything like that. I have to have, in this, this business her I have to have
ultimate trust in you and confidentiality and as far as this stuff goes, hey, if there
is a law against discussing that’s fine. I’m not going to mention it anymore. But
I’m also not going to be happy with people discussing their shit. I’m just not 15
going to [be] happy about it and whether, you know it’s against the law…
(GC Exh. 12; GC Exh. 13 part 2, p. 22.) Again, Respondent did not address this issue in its post
hearing brief. However, Hobson testified that he did not recall much of the conversation with
Lopez on July 8, but acknowledged that he possibly accused her of “stirring the pot” with other 20
employees and “going against” him.
The Board has established an objective test for determining if “the employer engaged in
conduct which would reasonably have a tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act.” Santa Barbara New-Press, 357 NLRB 452, 476 (2011). This objective 25
standard does not depend on whether the “employee in question was actually intimidated.”
Multi-Ad Services, 331 NLRB 1226, 1228 (2000), enfd. 255 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather,
whether the statements are a threat is viewed from the objective standpoint of the employee, over
whom the employer has a measure of economic power. See Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB 591,
595 (2011); Inn at Fox Hollow, 352 NLRB 1072, 1074 (2008); See also Section 8(c) of the Act 30
(stating that the ‘expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act …, if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’). The mere threat of an unspecified reprisal is
sufficient to support a finding that the employer has violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. Metro 35
One Loss Prevention Services Group, 356 NLRB 89, 89 (2010).
I find that the General Counsel has failed to present persuasive evidence to establish that
the above conversation contained an unlawful threat of an adverse consequence for Lopez’
interactions with her coworkers about the Respondent’s parts A and B and the CA.40
Hobson’s statement above is nothing more than an employer’s expressing an opinion that
although he will abide by the law, he will not do so happily. There is nothing in the statements
to suggest that Lopez or any other employee will suffer adverse consequences because he has to
follow the law. He did not utter to Lopez “if I have to abide by the law you (Lopez) will not be 45
happy.” That statement would have been more akin to an implied threat of reprisal. His
statement, particularly if read within the context of the entire conversation, is simply an
JD–78–16
23
expression of his antipathy for a law. Nothing in the Act suggests that employers have to like the
laws governing labor issues, only that they have to follow the laws. Moreover, Hobson’s
acknowledges this fact as part of the aforementioned statement.
Consequently, I recommend dismissal of paragraph 5(f) of the complaint.5
4. Respondent did not threaten employees with unspecified reprisals for seeking
access to the Board
The General Counsel also alleges that in the same July 8, meeting Respondent, through 10
Hobson, threatened Lopez with unspecified reprisals for seeking access to the Board.
Respondent does not address this allegation in its post hearing brief; and Hobson claimed, on
direct-examination, to remember almost nothing from his discussion with Lopez on July 8.
Nonetheless, GC Exhs. 12 and 13 set forth those portions of the conversation Hobson contends
that he cannot recall. It is evident from listening to and reading the recording of their 15
conversation, Hobson was frustrated and annoyed with Lopez’ decision to contact the Board. He
made several statements revealing those emotions:
You know what? You’re really, you’re really pushing me. You’re sitting here
telling me, little, looking for little tidbits telling me that you called the EEOC, the 20
Department of Labor, all this. Why would you do that? Who does shit like that?
* * *
Yeah…you know, I don’t appreciate you reporting things to me to the 25
government. It’s okay. If I have broken a law I will be made to pay for that
through the Department of Labor.
(GC Exh. 12, 13.) Although Hobson expressed that “[i]t’s okay” if Lopez reported him to the
“Department of Labor,” later in the conversation he told Lopez,30
And here you are, you’re saying that you’re working so hard for me but yet you’re
saying I called the Department of Labor, I called this and I called the Equal
Opportunity Employment…
35
* * *
I have to have, in this, this business here I have to have ultimate trust in you and
confidentiality and as far as this stuff goes, hey, if there is a law against
discussing that’s fine. I’m not going to mention it anymore. But I’m also not 40
going to be happy with people discussing their shit. I’m just not going to [be]
happy about it and whether, you know it’s against the law…
(GC Exh. 13, part 2 p. 6, 22.) While these comments show Hobson’s continuing annoyance with
Lopez’ actions despite his protestations to the contrary, I do not find that they are evidence of 45
expressed or implied threats of reprisal.
JD–78–16
24
The General Counsel argues that, taken in context, Hobson’s statements to Lopez would
“reasonably tend to restrain, coerce or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.” Bloomfield
Health Care Center, 352 NLRB 252 (2008), quoting Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1178
fn. 20 (1984), enfd. sub nom. HERE Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). While
the Respondent admits in its post hearing brief that Hobson told Lopez on several occasions that 5
he did not “appreciate” Lopez reporting him “to the government,” it failed to put forth a counter-
argument addressing the statements. Nonetheless, I find that the statements do not rise to the
level of a threat of an unspecified (or specified) reprisal.
Although Hobson’s statements could have reasonably led Lopez to believe that he was 10
unhappy, or even angry, with her decision to discuss her concerns with the Board, the statements
do not establish a threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The statements cannot be read
without placing them in context with the overall discussion that Hobson and Lopez engaged in
on July 8. The statements, as set forth above, establish that in a meeting between Hobson and
Lopez, he expressed to Lopez that he was unhappy with her decision to contact the Board, 15
EEOC, and DOL. Interspersed within Hobson’s statements expressing displeasure that Lopez
contacted the Board about Respondent’s company policies and the CA, Hobson also praises her
work performance, encourages her to assume greater responsibility in sales, informs her that she
is receiving a bonus, details his efforts to defend her against other individuals, and
acknowledging her right to file a charge with the Board. I find nothing in Hobson’s statements 20
to suggest that he implicitly threatened Lopez with an unspecified adverse employment action
because she contacted the Board.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel failed to meet its burden of proof regarding
this allegation and recommend that paragraph 5(b) of the complaint be dismissed. 25
F. On July 9, Employees Banned from Discussing Terms and Conditions of Employment and
Required to Sign Unlawful Company Policies and CA
The General Counsel alleges that Hobson’s action in a meeting with employees on July 9 30
violated the Act because, despite their unlawful provisions, he told employees they would have
to sign and return to Respondent the company policies and the CA. In its post hearing brief,
Respondent did not address this allegation, except to note that Hobson met with the
Respondent’s attorney on July 9 to discuss the issues raised by Lopez “regarding the company
policy on discussing pay and the confidentiality agreement.” (R. Br. 11.)35
The evidence is undisputed that after his meeting with Lopez on July 9, Hobson called
Wishon into his office to ask her opinion on the legality of the company policy prohibiting
employees from discussing their wages with each other. After she expressed doubt about its
validity, Hobson retrieved the policy from the computer and told her that he was eliminating the 40
offending pay provision. He directed her to get the revised document from the printer, place the
reprinted copies on his desk, and told her he wanted the employees to sign them. Hobson also
told her that he was meeting with his attorney later that day to ask for a legal opinion regarding
the legality of the documents. When he returned from meeting with his attorney, Hobson
informed employees that he was reinserting the pay ban into the policy because his attorney 45
advised him that it was illegal only if applied to federal employees. Hobson then instructed them
that all employees were required to review, sign and return the company policies that included
JD–78–16
25
the ban on discussing their pay with each other and the CA. The company policies also stated
that employees could be terminated for violating the ban on disclosing and discussing wage and
salary information; and the CA threatened employees with large fines for violating its provisions.
As previously noted, the Board has consistently held that nondisclosure rules and policies 5
that ban the disclosure and discussion of wage and salary information are invalid. Hyundai, supra
at 18; Bryant Health Center, Inc., 353 NLRB 739. I also found and Respondent admitted that its
company policies and the CA violated the Act. Therefore, it is clear that Hobson committed an
independent violation of the Act when he told employees on July 9, that they would be required
to accept and sign the unlawful company policies and the CA.10
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when on July 9,
Respondent, through Hobson, prohibited employees from discussing their wages and other terms
and conditions of employment; and required them to sign unlawful company policies and CA.
15
G. Four Separate 8(a)(1) Violations Committed on July 13, 2015
The General Counsel alleges that on July 13, Respondent, through Hobson, violated the
Act on four separate occasions when: employees were prohibited from discussing their wages
and other terms and conditions of employment; employees were told that Respondent terminated 20
an employee for raising concerns about its company policies and CA; employees were threatened
with termination for discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of employment; and
employees were prohibited from discussing the termination of an employee.
1. Unlawful ban on employees discussing their wages and other employment matters and threat 25
of termination for violating the ban
The evidence establishes that shortly after Hobson fired Lopez, he called McBride and
Tanner into his office to explain his reasons for terminating her. During this discussion, Hobson
reiterated that Lopez was incorrect in the information she provided that cast doubt on the legality 30
of Respondent’s company policy. He went on to note that the Respondent’s attorney advised
him the prohibition barring employees from discussing their pay with each other is illegal only
when applied to federal employees; Respondent’s employees would be required to sign the
documents; and employees could be terminated if they discussed their “bonuses and raises.”
Again, these statements are clear violations of the Act. See Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 NLRB35
1131, 1131 (finding unlawful employer’s rule prohibiting employees from disclosing “personal
information and documents” to nonemployees with the threat of “termination” or “legal action”
for violating the rule); Taylor Made Transportation Services, Inc., 358 NLRB 427, 434–435
(2012) (finding unlawful employer’s issuance of a memorandum reminding employees of its
unlawful policy prohibiting discussions about wages with threat of discipline up to and including 40
termination).
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when on July 13,
Respondent, through Hobson, prohibited employees from discussing their wages and other terms
and conditions of employment; and threatened with termination for discussing their wages and 45
other terms and conditions of employment.
JD–78–16
26
2. Hobson did not tell employees Lopez was terminated because of concerns she raised about the
Respondent’s company policies and CA
The General Counsel contends Hobson told McBride (and Tanner) that one of the reasons
for Lopez’ termination was because she complained about the CA and the pay provision in the 5
company policies. However, the record shows McBride testified that Hobson said he had to fire
Lopez because of her insubordination and disrespectful attitude towards him. He then engaged
in the following exchange with counsel for the General Counsel:
LeMaster: What was discussed in this meeting?10
McBride: He brought us up there and he said, “I had to let her go. She was being
disrespectful.”
LeMaster: Ok. Did he say anything else?15
McBride: I asked why?
LeMaster: Did he answer you?
20
McBride: Yeah, he had an answer. He said it was over the e-mails sent to the MOS
customer about some data and some cost problems they had.
LeMaster: Okay. Did [Hobson] give any examples of [Lopez] being disrespectful?
25
McBride: Yes
LeMaster: What were those?
McBride: He said one of the examples she was – besides the e-mail problem, and that she 30
was always crossing her arms, and he said that is disrespectful to him.
LeMaster: Did he give you any other examples?
McBride: Yes. He had – oh, my mind just went blank.35
LeMaster: Take your time. Do you recall, was it anything that she said, that she did?
McBride: Yeah, whenever things was brought up why he let her go, it was the data that
she brought in just showed the legality, that we couldn’t talk about our bonuses and 40
raises, that was supposed to be legal, and she showed that where she got the information
from, who she talked, to and where she got the information from.
(Tr. 195–196.) The above is the only part of McBride’s testimony that addresses Lopez’
protected activity and termination together. However, the entire exchange was so oddly worded 45
that I cannot draw conclusions about whether McBride was responding to the original question
from the counsel for the General Counsel about why Hobson said he fired Lopez. In fact, it
JD–78–16
27
appears that the counsel for the General Counsel might have been asking McBride what Lopez
told him was the reason for her firing; and she responded that it was because of her questions and
research into the legality of the company policies and CA. However, I cannot discern from the
wording of the question its exact meaning. Moreover, McBride’s response was close to
gibberish. It consisted of a series of incomplete sentences strung together as one completely 5
incomprehensible sentence. The counsel for the General Counsel did not ask additional
questions to clarify McBride’s testimony on this point so I am left with confusion rather than
clarity.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel failed to establish that Respondent, through 10
Hobson, told McBride and Tanner that Lopez was terminated because she raised concerns about
the company policies and CA in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. On July 13, Respondent prohibited employees from discussing Lopez’ termination
15
The General Counsel argues that Respondent, through Hobson, unlawfully told
employees that they could not disclose or discuss with anyone the termination of Lopez.
Respondent does not address this allegation in its post hearing brief.
It is undisputed that Hobson told McBride not to disclose or discuss, with anyone, the 20
conversation that he had with him and Tanner earlier in the day about his reasons for terminating
Lopez. Hobson’s action was a clear restriction of McBride’s Section 7 right in violation of the
Act. See Kinder-Care Learning Centers, supra. (employer rule prohibiting employees from
discussing their terms and conditions of employment with parents of children enrolled in the
school violates the Act); Verizon Wireless, 349 NLRB 640 (2007) (banning employees from 25
discussing workplace concerns about discipline violates the Act).
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has established that Respondent, through
Hobson, told McBride that he could not discuss the termination of Lopez with anyone in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.30
H. Unlawful Termination of Lopez
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act
by terminating Lopez for engaging in protected concerted activity. Respondent counters that 35
Lopez was a supervisor and therefore not entitled to protection under the Act. Even assuming,
however, that Lopez was not a supervisor, Respondent insists that she was terminated because of
her history of insubordination; and issues related to her job performance.
As with 8(a)(3) discrimination cases, the Board applies the Wright Line23 analysis to 8(a) 40
(1) concerted activity cases that involve an employer’s motivation for taking an adverse
employment action against employees. Hoodview Vending Co., 359 NLRB 187 (2012),
reaffirmed 362 NLRB No. 81 (2015); Saigon Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 353 NLRB 1063, 1065
(2009). The burden is on the General Counsel to initially establish that a substantial or
motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse employment action against an 45

23 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
JD–78–16
28
employee was the employee’s union or other protected activity. In order to establish this initial
showing of discrimination, the evidence must prove: (1) the employee engaged in protected
concerted activities; (2) the employer knew of the concerted nature of the activities; and (3) the
adverse action taken against the employee was motivated by the activity. Once the General
Counsel has met its initial showing that the protected conduct was a motivating or substantial 5
reason in employer’s decision to take the adverse action, the employer has the burden of
production by presenting evidence the action would have occurred even absent the protected
concerted activity. The General Counsel may offer proof that the employer’s articulated reason is
false or pretextual. Hoodview Vending Co., supra.
10
The General Counsel retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination. Wright Line,
id. However, where “the evidence establishes that the reasons given for the Respondent’s action
are pretextual—that is, either false or not in fact relied upon—the Respondent fails by definition
to show that it would have taken the same action for those reasons, absent the protected conduct,
and thus there is no need to perform the second part of the Wright Line analysis.” Golden State 15
Foods Corp., 340 NLRB 382, 385 (2003) (citing Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722
(1981), enfd. 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982)). The Wright Line analysis is not applicable when
there is no dispute that the employer took action against the employee because the employee
engaged in protected concerted activity. Phoenix Transit System, 337 NLRB 510, 510 (2002),
enfd. 63 Fed. Appx. 524 (D.C. Cir. 2003).20
A Wright Line analysis is appropriate in this case because Respondent’s motive is at
issue. In order to sustain its initial burden of proof, the General Counsel must first prove that
Lopez engaged in concerted protected activity and it was the substantial or motivating factor in
Respondent’s decision to discharge her. Upon such a showing, Respondent then must present 25
evidence that it would have terminated Lopez even absent the protected concerted activity. See
Correctional Medical Services, 356 NLRB 277, 278 (2010).
1. Lopez’ protected concerted activity
30
Clearly, Lopez’ termination is an adverse employment action. Therefore, the next
question is whether she engaged in protected concerted activity. The Respondent insists that
Lopez’ complaints to Respondent about issues at the company were “rife with personal
complaints.” Despite Respondent’s argument to the contrary, I find that the evidence clearly
establishes that Lopez engaged in protected concerted activity. (R. Br. 17)35
The evidence is undisputed that after the employee meeting on July 6, Lopez expressed
her concerns to coworkers about the requirement that they had to sign Respondent’s company
policies and CA or risk termination. They agreed that Lopez would research the legality of the
company policies and CA, and discuss those concerns and findings with Hobson. When Lopez 40
met with Hobson on July 8, she raised issues of a personal nature, but a larger portion of their
conversation involved Lopez’ objections to and questions about the company policies and CA;
and her contacting the Board and other federal agencies to complain about those documents.
Lopez’ actions are the epitome of protected concerted activity. The personal nature of some of
Lopez’ complaints does not negate the fact that her objections about the ban on discussing pay 45
with other employees and specific provisions in the CA are protected concerted activity because
the acts were taken for the mutual aid or protection of all the employees (getting the provisions
JD–78–16
29
in the company policies and CA rescinded for all employees). See, Fresh & Easy Neighborhood
Market, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 12, slip op. at 3 (2014) (explaining the “mutual aid or protection”
analysis focuses on whether there is a connection between the activity “and matters concerning
the workplace or employees’ interests as employees.”); Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271 (2001);
Verizon Wireless, 349 NLRB 640, 658–659 (2007).5
Lopez engaged in protected concerted activity when she voiced to Hobson, the Board
and, or her coworkers concerns about the unfairness of the Respondent’s company policies and
CA; the disparate manner in which the Respondent issued bonuses; and the change to the dress
code and bereavement policies. While her complaints about the vacation accrual, dress code, 10
and bereavement policies may have contained an element of selfish motivation, it is undisputed
that she discussed those subjects with her coworkers and any changes to the dress code and
bereavement policies would have affected the entire work force. See Fresh & Easy
Neighborhood Market, 358 NLRB 537 (2012); Caesar’s Palace, supra.; Verizon Wireless, supra.
Moreover, Lopez’ discussion with her coworkers about the CA and the company’s policy15
restrictions on employees’ discussion of their wages is considered “inherently concerted”
activity. See Automatic Screw Products Co., 306 NLRB 1072, 1072 (1992) (employee
discussions of wages are inherently concerted);
Accordingly, I find that Lopez engaged in protected concerted activity.20
2. Respondent’s knowledge of Lopez’ protected concerted activity
I have already determined that Lopez engaged in protected concerted activity in the
meeting with Hobson on July 8. The evidence is uncontroverted that Lopez engaged in a
discussion with Hobson for about 1-½ hours on July 8, questioning and objecting to the 25
Respondent’s company policies prohibiting employees from talking about their pay with other
people and the discipline and, or fines levied for violating their provisions and those of the CA.
There was also discussion about Lopez’ contact with the Board; and Hobson’s questions to her
regarding that contact. It is impossible for Hobson to deny being aware of Lopez’ actions since
he was obviously a participant in the conversation. Moreover, the evidence supports a finding 30
that Respondent, through Hobson, was aware that Lopez’ actions were protected concerted
activity. In his meeting with Lopez, Hobson interrogated her about whether she had discussed
with other employees her concerns with Respondent’s part A and B and the CA. His
interrogation of her supports a finding that Hobson recognized the protected concerted nature of
Lopez’ activities. Further, his questioning of Wishon the following day about her opinion on the 35
legality of the documents; and a subsequent announcement to several employees that Lopez’s
information about the company policies and CA were incorrect and all employees were required
to sign them, also bolster my finding that Respondent, through Hobson, was aware that Lopez
was engaged in protected concerted activity.
40
Consequently, I find that Respondent had knowledge of Lopez’ protected concerted
activity prior to her termination.
3. Adverse employment action based on discriminatory animus
45
The remaining step is for the General Counsel to establish whether the Respondent
terminated Lopez because of discriminatory animus. If the General Counsel establishes an initial
JD–78–16
30
showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the Respondent to show, as an affirmative
defense, that it would have terminated Lopez even in the absence of her concerted protected
activities.
In its brief, the General Counsel contends that the evidence is replete with examples of 5
Hobson’s personal animus towards Lopez as a result of her protected conduct. Moreover, the
General Counsel argues that Hobson committed independent violations of the Act that constitute
evidence of animus when he unlawfully: “(1) interrogated Lopez about her protected
conversations with her co-workers and Board agents and threatened Lopez with unspecified
reprisals for doing so; (2) prohibited Lopez from discussing her terms and conditions of 10
employment with others; (3) interrogated Lopez about her protected communications with Board
agents; and (4) threatened Lopez with unspecified reprisal as a result of her contacting the
Board.” (R Br. 53.) The General Counsel also contends that the timing of Lopez’ termination (5
days after her meeting with Hobson to complain about the company policies and CA and inform
him of her contact with the Board) is evidence of Hobson’s discriminatory animus towards her. 15
Finally, the General Counsel insist that several other factors support a finding of discriminatory
animus: (1) Hobson informing McBride that Lopez protected activity was a reason for her
termination; and (2) Hobson’s insistence on disciplining Lopez for being a “no call/no show”
despite Wishon assuring him that Lopez had provided the appropriate notification.
20
Respondent counters that Lopez was terminated because she was insubordinate and
disrespectful towards the owner and president of the company; and experienced a decline in her
job performance, exhibited by the RBC incident. The Respondent also insists that the decision to
terminate Lopez was made before she engaged in the protected concerted activity; and there is no
evidence of discriminatory animus by Hobson towards Lopez.25
Discriminatory animus can be inferred from both circumstantial and direct evidence. The
Board considers several factors in determining whether an inference of discriminatory animus
can be sustained. The factors to consider are proffering false reasons in defense of taking the
adverse action, disparate treatment of certain employees with similar work records or offenses, 30
deviation from past practice, and the proximity in time of the discipline to the protected activity.
Embassy Vacation Resorts, 340 NLRB 846, 847 (2003); Austal USA, LLC, 356 NLRB 363, 363
(2010); Lucky Club Co, 360 NLRB No. 43 (2014).
I find that the Respondent’s actions evinced discriminatory animus when: Hobson 35
unlawfully interrogated Lopez about her protected concerted activity; unlawfully prohibited her
from discussing terms and conditions of employment with other employees; and unlawfully
interrogated her about her protected contact with the Board.24 Hobson’s and Lopez’ conversation
on July 8, contained several instances of Hobson assuring Lopez that she had the right to file a
claim with the Board; and he would remove the offending provisions from the company policies 40
and CA. However, he would almost immediately disavow those statements and accuse Lopez of
acting against his best interest. Likewise, the illegal provisions remained in the company
policies and CA, which he later reissued to employees to sign and return to him. The offending

24 As noted earlier in the decision, I did not find that Hobson unlawfully threatened Lopez with
unspecified reprisal for contacting the Board or coworkers.
JD–78–16
31
provisions were not removed until after Lopez’ termination. See, e.g., Sunrise Health Care
Corp., 334 NLRB 903, 2011 (independent 8(a)(1) violations constitute evidence of animus);
Further, the record supports a finding that Hobson was pleased with Lopez’ job
performance until she began to complain about the company’s policies and the CA. Although 5
Hobson testified that he had been displeased with Lopez’ job performance since early to middle
2014, there is no evidence that over the next year he documented this alleged decline. On the
contrary, the evidence contains one performance appraisal for Lopez; and it lists as the only area
for improvement a caution for her not to discuss personal complaints “in front of other
Employees.” (GC Exh. 14) There is nothing else in the record that shows written documentation 10
of a decline in the quality of Lopez’ work performance during her tenure with Respondent.
Moreover, in their meeting on July 8, Hobson characterized Lopez as a “stellar employee.” (GC
Exh. 13, Part 2 p. 9.) In the same meeting he repeatedly reminded her that: she was his highest
paid employee; he supported her in the face of opposition from other people, including his wife;
he did not believe her actions regarding the MOS and RBC incidents were intentional; and she 15
was doing a good job. Despite Hobson’s failure to document Lopez’ alleged decline in job
performance, and contradictory statements that she was a “stellar” employee; a mere 5 days after
her discussion with Hobson about the illegality of Respondent’s company policies and CA; the
revisions to the dress code and bereavement policies; and notice of her contact with the Board’s
representatives, Respondent terminated Lopez.20
Based on the evidence of record, I find that Respondent’s actions establishes
discriminatory animus towards Lopez because she engaged in protected concerted activity.
Consequently, I find that the General Counsel has met its initial burden of proof.
25
Since the General Counsel has met his initial burden, the Respondent must show that
Lopez would have been terminated even absent her protected concerted activity. While
acknowledging that Hobson expressed displeasure with Lopez for talking with coworkers and the
Board about Respondent’s company policies and CA, Respondent notes that he told her she had
a right to file a claim; and Respondent also contends that the decision to fire Lopez had been 30
made “days before she contacted the NLRB.” (R. Br. 16.) Further, Respondent insists that Lopez
was terminated because she was insubordinate and disrespectful to Hobson.
I find that the Respondent has failed to establish its burden of production; and that the
proffered reasons for terminating Lopez are pretextual.35
Listening to the recording of the meeting on the July 8, between Hobson and Lopez, it
was obviously contentious at times. Both of them were guilty of poor behavior. While it
appears that at certain points Lopez goaded Hobson into making incriminating statements, the
evidence is clear that he voluntarily took the bait. During the meeting, she frequently interrupted 40
him and was often argumentative. Moreover, Lopez made clear to Hobson that she disliked his
wife and was angry with him for seemingly taking his wife’s side against her in their disputes.
Lopez also told Hobson that she was frustrated with the attendance and work habits of his
daughter, Halle. She complained several times that she was bored with her job because Hobson
had not provided her with enough meaningful duties. The conversation was peppered with 45
profanity, accusations, and, or sarcasm by both of them. Nevertheless, Lopez’ behavior does not
negate the evidence which supports a finding that but for her protected concerted activities she
JD–78–16
32
would not have been terminated. Although it is evident to me from the tenor of the conversation
that Lopez was not intimidated by Hobson in the meeting, it is also obvious to me that Hobson
was frustrated and angry by her actions involving the company policies, CA, and contact with
the Board and other employees about the unlawfulness of those documents.
5
The Respondent argues that the evidence is devoid of animus; and Hobson’s actions
towards Lopez were supportive, rather than hostile. It is undisputed that in a meeting with Lopez
on July 8, Hobson acknowledged to Lopez her right to file a claim. He made several comments
that he was not “bothered” by her contact with the Board because he had not purposely tried to
break the law. Moreover, Hobson told Lopez that he was confident in her advice about the 10
documents’ unlawfulness; and repeatedly told her that he would delete the offending language
from the company policies and CA. During their meeting, he also made numerous statements
supportive of Lopez. Significantly, Hobson told Lopez that he had always been supportive of
her; and would not have retained her if he felt that she were “bad business.” (GC Exh. Part 3 p.
7.) He noted that she was a stellar employee, highly intelligent, and had a wonderful attitude 15
with him. Towards the end of their meeting, Hobson encouraged Lopez to take on responsibility
for sales because it is the “highest paid position in any company.” Id. He explained to her that
she would train Tanner on bearings; and could learn from him because Tanner has a vast
knowledge of sales and the bearing’s market.
20
I do not find Respondent’s argument persuasive for a several reasons: (1) Respondent’s
shifting rationale for terminating Lopez; (2) Hobson’s repeated disavowals of his statements
supporting Lopez exercising her Section 7 rights and his overall lack of credibility; and (3) the
suspicious timing of Lopez’ termination.
25
During the hearing and in its post hearing brief, Respondent argued Lopez was
terminated because she was insubordinate, erroneously sent company information to its customer
(RBC), failed to follow instructions regarding MOS, suffered a decline in her job performance,
and was a “no call/no show” on July 10. I find, however, that Respondent’s argument is not
supported by the evidence. In response to questioning by the counsel for the General Counsel, 30
Hobson testified that examples of Lopez’ insubordination were: her occasionally crossing her
arms when talking with him, snatching papers from his hands, rolling her eyes and turning her
back to him, and walking away from him while he was talking to her. As previously found,
however, the record is devoid of evidence that Respondent disciplined Lopez for or documented
those or any other instances of her alleged insubordination. Likewise, there is no evidence that 35
Hobson mentioned to Lopez that he felt some of her actions towards him were disrespectful and
insubordinate until their meeting on July 8, when she began to complain about the company
policies and the CA.
Equally as weak as the charge of insubordination, is Respondent’s argument that an 40
alleged decline in Lopez’ job performance was a factor in the decision to terminate her. Again,
there is no evidence documenting a decline in her performance. Moreover, in his meeting with
her on July 8, Hobson reminded Lopez that he had “not once written her up.” (GC Exh. 13, Part
3, p. 3) The lone performance appraisal of record makes mention of only one area that needed
improvement, the admonishment that Lopez “not bring up personal complaints or problems in 45
front of other Employees.” (Tr. 159–160; GC Exh. 14)
JD–78–16
33
Hobson also testified that Lopez was terminated because she sent “damning” confidential
company information to one of Respondent’s China suppliers. I do not find his testimony
credible on this point. During his meeting with Lopez on July 8, he clearly told her that he
believed she sent MOS the information without malicious intent. Significantly, their discussion
about this incident was rather detailed with Hobson spending several minutes assuring her that he 5
believed her motives were innocent. Therefore, it strains credulity to believe that Lopez’ action
was a legitimate factor in Respondent’s decision to terminate her. Similarly, Hobson testified
that the catalyst for his decision to fire her was Lopez informing a RBC representative that she
was told by Hobson not to send them weekly status reports. (Tr. 260) I do not credit his
testimony on this point because Respondent never counseled or otherwise disciplined Lopez for 10
this incident, making it unlikely that it was a credible factor in Respondent’s decision to
terminate her.
Hobson testified that Lopez’ “no call/no show” was the final act, in a series of acts, that
resulted in her termination. However, Respondent’s post hearing brief contradicts his testimony 15
noting that Hobson made the decision to terminate Lopez after the RBC incident. (R. Br. 16)
Regardless, I do not find either contention is credible. McBride credibly testified to the reasons
Hobson gave him for firing Lopez and none included her “no call/no show.” Another strike
against Hobson’s credibility on this point is his response to Lopez’ complaint about the revision
to the Respondent’s sick leave policy. Hobson told her because she was a salaried employee she 20
did not have to be concerned with sick pay, implying that she did not have to worry about taking
a reasonable amount of sick leave. The Respondent attempted to show that Lopez was required
to personally notify Hobson if she was going to be absent, and her failure to do so resulted in her
termination. However, I previously found Wishon’s testimony credible that about a year prior to
Lopez’ termination, Hobson had informed employees that Wishon should be notified if they 25
would be late to or absent from work. Except for his self-serving testimony, there is no
substantive or credible evidence to establish that Lopez was exempted from this procedure and
instead had to personally notify Hobson. Last, Hobson acknowledged that, during her tenure
with Respondent, Lopez had to sign the company polices, including the document addressing
attendance. (Tr. 67–68; GC Exh. 3, 4) The document that Lopez and other employees signed 30
does not specify a particular person to notify if they are absent or late to work. Hobson admitted
that in a “normal situation” the company policies addressing the procedure for reporting
“tardies” or absences and the discipline employees are subject to for infractions also applied to
Lopez an “in a normal situation.” However, he provides no credible reason why the situation at
issue was not “normal” other than to testify that “I was upset.” The fact remains that Lopez35
provided advanced notice of her absence.
In response to the General Counsel’s argument that the timing of Lopez’ termination is
evidence of discriminatory animus, Respondent contends that the decision to fire Lopez had been
made “days before she contacted the NLRB.” I do not find Respondent’s arguments credible for 40
several reasons. Hobson argued that in April he started contemplating firing Lopez but because
of the RBC incident, he made the decision to terminate Lopez after Tanner started working for
Respondent and had been fully trained. In his sworn affidavit for the OSHA complaint, Hobson
attested “I [then] began discussions with Evan Tanner in early June of 2015 to hire him, to
absorb most of Ms. Lopez’ responsibilities, with the intent of firing her or demoting her with a 45
reduction in pay. Those discussions led to his hiring on June 24 with a start-date of July 10th”
(Tr. 80) His statement reveals Hobson was still uncertain about Lopez’ status in the company.
JD–78–16
34
Tanner reaffirmed the uncertainty of Respondent’s decision to either fire or demote Lopez
stating that the “discussions at that time, were more of uncertainty about Tera and what would
take place now that I was coming into HBI. I can’t recall fully if Gene discussed whether he had
talked to Tera about me coming in, or what her role would be subsequently.” (Tr. 105) It has
been established that Hobson initially contacted Tanner in April about working for Respondent. 5
Tanner testified that about 2 weeks after that contact he spoke with Hobson on the telephone who
told him that Hobson’s plan was to hire Tanner; and Lopez would train him to take over her
position. Hobson also told him that Hobson was uncertain of his plans for Lopez but noted he
might move her to a lesser position. Even Hobson’s text message to Norman revealed he had not
decided whether to demote or fire Lopez. (GC Exh. 7)10
Again, it must be noted that Hobson told Lopez on July 8, that he would not have kept
her as an employee if he felt she had malicious intent regarding her actions in the MOS and RBC
incidents. He also complimented her on being highly intelligent, a stellar employee, and
performing well in her position. It was not until after their July 8, conversation that Hobson 15
contacted Respondent’s attorney for advice of terminating Lopez. I find that the timing of
Lopez’ termination also supports a finding of discriminatory animus.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s action to terminate Lopez violates Section the Act.
20
I. Supervisory of Tera Lopez
Respondent argues that Lopez is a supervisor, and therefore not entitled to protection
under the Act. The General Counsel disagrees with this designation, asserting Lopez was merely
a worker. However, assuming that Lopez is found not to be an employee under the Act, the 25
General Counsel contends that her termination remains a violation of the Act because
“unimpeded access to the Board’s processes is essential and available to supervisors and
managers. In support of his position, the General Counsel cites Hi-Craft Clothing Co., 251
NLRB 1310 (1980). See also General Services, Inc., 229 NLRB 940 (1977); SNE Enterprises,
347 NLRB 472, 497 (2006) citing Hi-Craft Clothing Co., 251 NLRB 1310 (1980).30
The burden of establishing supervisory status is with the party alleging that status. The
party asserting supervisory status must set forth specific facts which prove the existence of
supervisory authority. Commercial Movers, Inc., 240 NLRB 288, 290 (1979); Under Section
2(11) of the Act, the status of supervisor is determined by the duties performed and not the title 35
or job classification. Section 2(11) defines a supervisor as any person
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if … 40
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
Based on the statutory language, an individual is a supervisor if: the individual has
authority to take one of the actions listed in Section 2(11) or to effectively recommend such 45
action; the individual exercises this authority in the interest of the employer; and the exercise of
this authority is not merely routine or clerical in nature, but instead requires the individual to use
JD–78–16
35
independent judgment. NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861, 1864
(2001); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 573–574 (1994). Moreover,
the Board has consistently held that the evidence must show that a presumed supervisor is
accountable for a subordinate’s work performance. In re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB
686, 691–692 (2006).5
Respondent argues that Lopez was a supervisor because she had authority to: hire and fire
employees, perform employee evaluations, access QuickBooks, approve employees’ sick leave
requests, and organize work parties. Further, according to Respondent, Lopez assumed control
of the work force when Hobson was away from the facility. Respondent admits that Hobson 10
removed some of those duties from Lopez, but insists it was done because she was insubordinate,
and had committed mistakes involving MOS and RBC. Lopez counters that in late-December
2014, Hobson removed from her control: authority to hire and fire employees, perform employee
evaluations, access QuickBooks, approve employees’ sick leave requests, and organize work
parties.15
I find the evidence does not establish that Lopez meets the statutory definition of a
supervisor. Hobson admitted that he retained sole authority to hire permanent employees.
Occasionally, Lopez was allowed to work parties and hire temporary employees or reassign
permanent employees to assist with special projects. Moreover, Hobson’s testimony that he 20
could not recall the last employee Lopez hired is not credible. Respondent employed fewer than
10 employees, so I find it highly unlikely that he is unable to recall the last employee Lopez
allegedly hired. Hobson’s failure to truthfully testify on this point cause me to discount his
testimony about Lopez’ hiring authority.
25
Lopez, according to Respondent, had authority to independently evaluate, discipline, and
discharge employees. Hobson testified that Lopez terminated several employees: Maturino,
Halverson, Tracy, Shawn, and Eastman. He provided limited information about the
circumstances surrounding their departures, except for estimates on their lengths of employment
with Respondent. Hobson did, however, admit that Lopez sought his approval to terminate 30
Eastman. In contrast, Lopez testified that Hobson instructed her to fire Maturino and Halverson;
and Hobson, without her input, made the decision to terminate Tracy and Eastman. She noted
that Shawn voluntarily quit for a position with another employer. I am finding that Lopez’
testimony about her ability to terminate and evaluate employees more credible than Hobson’s
contradictory statements on this point. Unlike Respondent, the General Counsel produced 35
objective evidence establishing that Lopez’s only role in the performance appraisals was to write
whatever Hobson told her to include in an employee’s evaluation. (GC Exh. 20) There was also
objective evidence that Hobson made decisions on disciplinary actions and work assignments.
(GC Exh. 21) Moreover, Hobson contradicted his own testimony that Lopez had authority to
independently fire employees. An example of Hobson’s contradictory statements is his retelling 40
of Lopez’ attempt to get him to terminate an unnamed warehouse worker with a heart condition.
According to Hobson, Lopez told him that he should terminate the worker because he was a
“liability” due to his heart condition. A few days later, McBride also tried to persuade him to
fire the worker; and Hobson felt it was part of a coordinated plan by Lopez and McBride to get
the worker fired. This reveals possibly a coordinated effort by two employees to get their boss to 45
fire a coworker; but it clearly does not establish that Lopez had independent authority to fire
employees. The entire incident points to the contrary conclusion.
JD–78–16
36
As previously noted, one of Lopez’ job responsibilities was to conduct forecasting.
Hobson attempted to show that it was a supervisory function that Lopez performed
independently because he rarely reviewed her forecasting reports. This argument fails for two
reasons. There is objective evidence that Hobson reviewed and had final approval of her
forecasting reports. (GC Exhs. 24, 28) More importantly, Respondent failed to provide a legal 5
argument or case cites for the proposition that “forecasting” is a uniquely supervisory function.
Finally, Respondent attempted to show, through the testimonies of Greenwood and Halle,
that Lopez exercised supervisory authority over them. Greenwood testified that Lopez gave him
general help in the warehouse, and assisted with “my days off for my sick days, and just 10
overseeing the pulling and shipping of the orders.” (Tr. 300–301) Likewise, Halle testified that
Lopez reviewed her duty drawback25 paperwork before it was processed, and “if I needed to
leave early, I would ask her.” (Tr. 297) The General Counsel aptly notes in its post hearing brief
that the Board has consistently held that inferences, suppositions or conclusory statements
without detailed, specific evidence fails to prove supervisory authority. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 15
304 NLRB 193 (1991); Securitas Critical Infrastructure Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 817 F.3d 1074
(2016)
Accordingly, I find that the evidence does not establish that Lopez meets the definition of
a supervisor as set forth in Section 2(11) of the Act. I do find, however, that Respondent 20
violated the Act when Respondent terminated Lopez because she engaged in protected concerted
activity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Hobson Bearing International, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce 25
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By, on or about July 13, terminating Tera Lopez because she engaged in protected
concerted activities, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act.
3. By, on or about January 16, maintaining, and since about July 6, reissuing and 30
maintaining an unlawful rule prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and, or bonuses,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By, on or about January 16, physically distributing to employees, promulgating and
since then maintaining a rule titled Agreement of Restriction/Confidentiality, restricting 35
employees from discussing or sharing confidential information, defined as including but not
limited to, individuals’ proprietary information; vital company information; and our information,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By, on or about mid-June, Respondent, through Gene Hobson, prohibiting employees 40
from discussing their terms and conditions of employment, including disciplinary issues,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By, on or about July 6, telling employees that they were required to sign agreements to

25 Halle defined duty drawback as processing a claim to receive reimbursement for the duty paid on
an imported product.
JD–78–16
37
abide by unlawful policies prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and threatening
employees with termination if they violated them; and an overbroad confidentiality agreement
prohibiting employees from discussing their terms and conditions of employment, Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5
7. By, on or about July 8, prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and other
terms and conditions of employment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By, on or about July 8, interrogating employees about their protected concerted
activities by asking employees if they had complained about the company policies and the 10
confidentiality agreement, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. By, on or about July 8, interrogating employees about their protected concerted
activities, by asking employees about conversations they had with agents of the Board regarding
Respondent’s company policies and confidentiality agreement, Respondent has violated Section 15
8(a)(1) of the Act.
10. By, on or about July 9, prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and other
terms and conditions of employment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
20
11. By, on or about July 9, telling employees that they were required to sign agreements
to abide by the company policies and confidentiality agreement, Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
12. By, on or about July 13, prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and 25
other terms and conditions of employment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
13. By, on or about July 13, threatening to terminate employees for discussing their
wages and other terms and conditions of employment, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.30
14. By, on or about July 13, prohibiting employees from discussing the termination of an
employee, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
15. The above violations are unfair labor practices that affects commerce within the 35
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
16. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set forth above.
REMEDY40
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order
it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
45
Respondent having discriminatorily terminated Tera Lopez must offer her reinstatement
and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits she suffered as a result of the
JD–78–16
38
discrimination against her from the date of the discrimination to the date of her reinstatement.
Backpay shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with
interest as provided in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed
in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
5
Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating backpay
to the appropriate calendar quarters. Respondent shall also compensate Tera Lopez for the
adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards covering
periods longer than 1 year, Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10
(2014).10
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended26
ORDER15
The Respondent, Hobson Bearing International, Inc., Diamond, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from 20
(a) Terminating or otherwise discriminating against any employee for engaging in
protected concerted activities.
(b) Interrogating employees about their protected concerted activities; and interrogating 25
them about their contact with the Board.
(c) Maintaining and reissuing and maintain an unlawful rule prohibiting employees from
discussing their pay and, or bonuses.
30
(d) Distributing to employees, promulgating and maintaining an overbroad
confidentiality agreement restricting employees from discussing or sharing confidential
information, defined as including but not limited to, individuals’ proprietary information;
vital company information; and our information.
35
(e) Prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of
employment, including disciplinary issues.
(f) Telling employees that they are required to sign agreements to abide by unlawful
policies prohibiting employees from discussing their wages and threatening employees 40
with termination if they violated them; and an overbroad confidentiality agreement
prohibiting employees from discussing their terms and conditions of employment.

26 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–78–16
39
(g) Threatening to terminate employees for discussing their wages and other terms and
conditions of employment.
(h) Prohibiting employees from discussing the termination of an employee.
5
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies
of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Tera Lopez reinstatement to
her former position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, 10
without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Tera Lopez whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the
decision.15
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any
reference to the unlawful termination of Tera Lopez, and within 3 days thereafter notify Tera
Lopez in writing that this has been completed and that the discharge will not be used against her
in any way.20
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in 25
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Diamond,
Missouri, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”27 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 14 Sub-region 17, after being signed by the 30
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees and
members are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees 35
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time 40
since January 16, 2015.

27 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–78–16
40
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated: August 19, 20165
Christine E. Dibble (CED)
Administrative Law Judge10
‘,.4.1.94))
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT terminate any employee for engaging in protected concerted activity, including
contacting the Board agents.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from discussing their terms and conditions of employment,
including wages and disciplinary issues.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their protected concerted activities of contact with
agents of the Board.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from discussing the termination of other employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain and reissue and maintain unlawful rules prohibiting employees from
discussing their pay and, or bonuses.
WE WILL NOT maintain and distribute to employees overbroad and unlawful confidentiality
agreements.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Tera Lopez the position at
issue or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Tera Lopez whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the
decision.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any
reference to the unlawful termination of Tera Lopez, and within 3 days thereafter notify Tera
Lopez in writing that this has been completed and that she will not be retaliated against in any
way.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating backpay to the
appropriate quarters.
WE WILL compensate Tera Lopez for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or
more lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer than 1 year.
HOBSON BEARING INTERNATIONAL, INC.
(Employer)
DATED: __________ BY__________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and
how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the
Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
1222 Spruce Street, Suite 8.302
St. Louis, Missouri 63103–2829
Telephone: (314) 539–7770
Fax: (314) 539–7794
Hours of Operation: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. CST
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/14-CA-156114 or by
using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by
calling (202) 273–1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE.
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE
OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH
ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (314) 539–7770.