Hitoshi NakaiDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 2, 201914877313 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/877,313 10/07/2015 Hitoshi NAKAI JR-723-4250 3686 27562 7590 10/02/2019 NIXON & VANDERHYE, P.C. 901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR ARLINGTON, VA 22203 EXAMINER MOSSER, ROBERT E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3715 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com pair_nixon@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte HITOSHI NAKAI ____________ Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,3131 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judges. ASTORINO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–30. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 “The real party in interest is Nintendo Co., Ltd., a corporation of Japan.” Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Subject Matter on Appeal The Appellant’s invention provides a game apparatus that allows a user to simply and promptly play a game, for example, a multiplayer- participating-type role playing game that utilizes the Internet. See Spec. 1:18–19, 3:1–3. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter. 1. An apparatus operable by a user to start an application, the apparatus comprising: a communication circuit; and at least one processor coupled to a memory, the at least one processor being configured to cooperate with the communication circuit, and to at least: generate, in response to the communication circuit of the apparatus receiving an electronic message from a server located remote from the apparatus and in dependence on whether the received electronic message originated from an allowed source, a display that provides: (a) a first user input option to enable the user to indicate that the application is to be started, and (b) a second user input option to enable the user to indicate that the application is not to be currently started, and enable the user to start the application, in response to the apparatus receiving user input in accordance with the first user input option, without the user having to provide additional input via the apparatus prior to the user starting the application. Rejection Claims 1–30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 3 ANALYSIS Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 4 rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 5 “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. USPTO § 101 Guidance The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance. Claims 1, 2, 11–15, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 27–30 The Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 11–15, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 27–30 as a group. Appeal Br. 13–42. We select independent claim 1 as Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 6 representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim Construction Claim 1 calls for an apparatus that includes a communication circuit and a processor coupled to a memory, where the processor and the communication circuit communicate to perform two functions. Appeal Br. 48 (Claims App’x). The first function is to “generate . . . a display” based on a condition. The condition refers to the claim language, “in response to the communication circuit of the apparatus receiving an electronic message from a server located remote from the apparatus and in dependence on whether the received electronic message originated from an allowed source.” Id. (emphases added). This condition refers to information from a server, however the server (and thus any operation thereof) is not an element of the claimed apparatus. Additionally, the claim does not require the apparatus, itself, to determine whether a message is from an “allowed” source, the message just needs be received by the apparatus from an “allowed” source. Thus, the first function amounts to an instruction to generate a display that includes first and second user input options to enable a user “to indicate” to start and not to start an application, respectively, based on a condition (i.e., a rule). See id. Claim 1 does not require the apparatus to include a display screen for actually displaying these options, and does not require an input device for indicating whether or not to start the application. The second function is to “enable the user to start the application,” based on a condition; namely, “in response to the apparatus receiving user input in accordance with the first user input option.” Id. The second Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 7 function also includes some claim language specifying how the enablement of the start of the application occurs; namely, “without the user having to provide additional input via the apparatus prior to the user starting the application.” Id. Thus, the second function amounts to an instruction to enable the user to start the application in a certain way, based on a condition (i.e., a rule). Claim 1 does require the apparatus to actually have an application (e.g., a game) started thereon. In view of the foregoing, we determine that the first and second functions do not call for the start of an application. See id. Put simply, the first function calls for an instruction to generate a display with two options and the second function calls for an instruction to enable a user to start an application in a certain way, where each function is activated based on a rule. Again, claim 1 does not require the actual start of the application (e.g., a game). Preemption The Appellant’s argument as to the lack of preemption (Appeal Br. 33–34) is unpersuasive. Cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e- commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 701 (2015). Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 8 disclose patent ineligible subject matter” under the Alice framework, “preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id. Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework Does the claim recite a judicial exception? Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the Examiner determines that claim 1 concerns the start of an application in response of receiving a server message and a user input. See Final Act. 4. The Examiner determines that claimed subject matter is a concept that is abstract for various reasons, including because it falls within “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity.” Id. In response, the Appellant argues that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 19–37; Reply Br. 5–12. The Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. Under Step 2A, Prong 1, of Office Guidelines (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54), we evaluate whether the claim recites an abstract idea. As discussed above, the limitations of claim 1 recite an instruction to generate a display with two options and an instruction to enable a user to start an application in a certain way, wherein each instruction is activated based on a rule. These instructions equate to inviting a person to join a game when an invitation is received from a trusted person, and, if the person accepts this invitation, enabling the person to join the game in a convenient manner (e.g., without having to supply his/her name or credentials). These limitations recite functions for managing interactions between people, which is one of the certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance as an abstract idea. See 2019 Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 9 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Therefore, claim 1 recites a judicial exception under Prong One of the 2019 Guidance. Is the claim “directed to” the recited judicial exception? Under Step 2A, Prong 2, of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we look to whether the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception,” i.e., “integrates the . . . judicial exception into a practical application,” such that it is not directed to the identified abstract idea. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. The Appellant argues that claim 1, as a whole, includes features that underscore that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 33–34. Specifically, the Appellant identifies the following features: “(i) the message ‘originating’ from ‘an allowed source’”; “(ii) the two user selectable option reflected in parts (a) and (b)”; and “(iii) the ‘direct start’ feature of claim 1 that enables the user to start the application ‘without the user having to provide additional input via the apparatus prior to the user starting the application.’” Id.; see id. at 37–38. The Appellant contends that these features are not properly accounted for in the § 101 analysis. Id. at 34. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. These features are not additional elements because they are part of the abstract idea itself. As for the message originating from an allowed source, this equates to the person’s invitation to join the game being from a trusted person. As discussed above, claim 1 does not require the apparatus, itself, to determine Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 10 whether a message is from an “allowed” source, the message just needs be received by the apparatus from this “allowed” source. As for the user-selectable options (a) and (b), this equates to the person having the option to either accept or decline the invitation. As discussed above, claim 1 does not require the apparatus to include a display screen for actually displaying these options, and does not require an input device for indicating whether or not to start the application. As for the alleged “direct start” feature of claim 1, this equates to the person being able to join the game in a convenient manner (e.g., without suppling his/her name or credentials). As discussed above, claim 1 does not require the apparatus to actually have an application (e.g., a game) started on it. Under the first step of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1230 (2017) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon . . . . Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 11 the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant technology] . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention as a whole is directed to. The Specification describes a portable communication terminal 30, including communication circuit 44, CPU 48, non-volatile memory 50. Spec. 14:21–15:14. The Specification also provides various flowcharts that reflect the instructions particular to portable communication terminal 30, including those that generate a display that includes first and second user input options to enable a user to start and not to start an application, and enable a user to start the application in a certain way. See, e.g., id. at 33:13–21, Fig. 33. An examination of claim 1, shows that claim 1 recites an apparatus comprising a communication circuit and at least one processor coupled to a memory. See Appeal Br. 48 (Claims App’x). The communication circuit, at least one processor, and memory are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. 14:21–15:14, 25–27, Figs. 1, 4, 5; see also Spec. 1:18–19 (“With respect to a multiplayer-participating-type RPG (Role Playing Game) which utilizes [I]internet, Ultima Online provided by Electronic Arts Square is well known.”). Claim 1’s conditional language, “in response to the communication circuit of the apparatus receiving an electronic message from a server located remote from the apparatus and in dependence on whether the received electronic message originated from an allowed source,” i.e., feature (i), is insignificant pre-solution activity. See also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 12 (instructing that limiting the abstract idea to a particular technological environment and adding insignificant post-solution activity does not circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas). When considered collectively, the recitations of claim 1 describe an instruction to generate a display with two options, i.e., feature (ii), and an instruction to enable a user to start an application, which are features of the identified abstract idea. Additionally, we note that the certain way that the enablement of the start of the application occurs; namely, “without the user having to provide additional input via the apparatus prior to the user starting the application,” i.e., feature (iii), provides a further detail as to the abstract idea. Therefore, analysis of claim 1, as a whole, confirms the Examiner’s determination that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. The Appellant also argues that claim 1 presents a technical solution to a technical problem and are patent eligible based on the reasoning in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See Appeal Br. 13–16, 34–37; Reply Br. 2–4; see Appeal Br. 39–41 (The Appellant argues that claim 1 is similar to Example 21 of the USPTO’s PowerPoint presentation from the “Abstract Idea Workshop II Materials,” available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ai- workshop-ii.pptx (last visited Sept. 17, 2019)); Reply Br. 13–14. When viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Appellant contends that the additional elements of claim 1 integrate the abstract idea into a practical application by “reflect[ing] an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 13 In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be transported instantly away from a host’s website after clicking on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory subject matter because they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” Id. The court cautioned that “not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. at 1258. And the court contrasted the claims to those at issue in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), in that, in DDR Holdings, the computer network was not operating in its “normal, expected manner” and the claims did not “recite an invention that is [] merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1258–59. Here, the Appellant contends that the claim addresses how to “solve issues with how logged-in and logged-out players might communicate with one another -- which represents a solution to a problem specific to computer networks.” Appeal Br. 13–14. We disagree. Although the Specification addresses problems specific to computer networks (e.g., processing at a server or coordinating many different components), the problems addressed by the claimed apparatus concern instructions that generate a display and enable a user to start an application. Therefore, unlike DDR Holdings, here, the purported solution comprises the use of a conventional computing device or processor operating in its ordinary capacity. See supra. The Appellant does not direct attention to, and we do not see, where the Specification Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 14 describes computer components, such as a communication circuit and processor, acting in an unconventional manner. We stress, again, that claim 1 does not require a display, an input device, and/or the actual start of the application. In contrast, the claims under review in DDR Holdings required a link to be “activated” by a visitor computer and the transmission of a “composite” webpage to the visitor computer. See DDR, 773 F.3d. at 1249. The Appellant argues that claim 1 passes the machine-or- transformation test. See Appeal Br. 37–38. The Appellant acknowledges that in determining patent eligibility “the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool.” See id. (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604); Reply Br. 13. However, we note the Bilski also holds that “[t]he machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’” See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604. A review of the Specification demonstrates that the claim elements are not improvements in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field. See supra. And, the claimed features, alone and in combination, are no more than generic components operating in their ordinary capacity. Moreover, we find no evidence that the additional elements, alone or in combination, implement the abstract idea with a particular machine that is integral with the claim; apply the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular environment; or otherwise integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance at 55 Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 15 (identifying exemplary considerations indicative that additional elements may have integrated the exception into a practical application). Further, we note that the level of abstraction at which the Examiner describes the invention does not change the accuracy of the Examiner’s determination. Apple v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction”). On this record, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework Under step two of the Alice framework, and under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we find supported the Examiner’s determination: The additional element(s) or combination of elements in the claim(s) other than the abstract idea(s) per se including a communications circuit, a processor, a memory, . . . amount(s) to no more than: (i) mere instructions to implement the idea on a computer, and/or (ii) recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic computer functions that are well- understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry per the applicant’s description (Applicant’s specification Pages 1, 11, and 45). Viewed as a whole, these additional claim element(s) do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Accordingly, as presented the claimed invention when considered as a whole amounts to the mere instructions to implement an abstract idea [software or equivalent process steps] on a generic computer [controller and gaming devices] without causing the improvement of the generic computer or another technology field. Final Act. 4–5. Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 16 The Appellant argues that claim 1 includes limitations that recite significantly more than the abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 37–42. Taking the claims’ elements separately, the communication circuit, at least one processor, and a memory are purely conventional. See supra. It is clear, from the Specification, including the claim language, that the claim “limitations require no improved computer resources [the Appellant] claims to have invented, just already available computers, with their already available basic functions, to use as tools in executing the claimed process” performed by the claimed system. Additionally, the instructions performed by the processor by use of the program module and the various sub-modules are purely conventional. Again, when considered collectively, the recitations of claim 1 describe an instruction to generate a display with two options, i.e., feature (ii), and an instruction to enable a user to start an application, is the abstract idea. Additionally, we note that the restrictive way that the enablement of the start of the application occurs; namely, “without the user having to provide additional input via the apparatus prior to the user starting the application,” feature (iii), provides a further detail as to the abstract idea. This concept is part of the abstract idea, and the inventive concept under step two of the Mayo/Alice test cannot be the abstract idea itself: It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot be the abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged “inventive concept” is the abstract idea. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). Therefore, analysis of claim 1, as a whole, confirms the Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 17 Examiner’s conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Conclusion The Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now- superseded USPTO guidance, (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 16–19, 31–32, 46; Reply Br. 4–5) and have been considered but are not persuasive of error. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”)). Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 11–15, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 27–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claims 3–10, 16, 19, and 22–26 The Appellant argues claims 3–10, 16, and 22–26 separately. Appeal Br. 42–46; see Reply Br. 14. Generally, the Appellant argues that the additional recitations of these claims provides even less of a preemption concern and is not routine/conventional. See Appeal Br. 42–46. The Appellant also argues that the additional recitations include features that contributes to the technological solution to a technical problem, specifically: “when and how to contact to disparately located players who are logged out”; “having to coordinate all of the disparate computing elements”; and “having to manage a network game with disparately-located players, some of whom are logged in and some of whom are logged out.” Id. at 43–45. The Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of Examiner error. Appeal 2017-010201 Application 14/877,313 18 Claims 3, 4, 5, 16, and 19 are drawn to similar subject matter as claim 1. Appeal Br. 48–50 (Claims App’x). Claims 6–10 recites limitations concerning the computer readable storage medium storing information. Id. at 49. Claims 22–25 further limit the server referenced in claim 1. Id. at 51. As discussed above, the server and any functionality thereof, is not an aspect of the claimed apparatus. Claim 26 recites a limitation concerning the at least one processor being configured to transmit information. Id. At best, these claims provide further detail as to the abstract idea. Moreover, for similar reasons as discussed above, the features of these claims do not contribute to the technological solution to a technical problem. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 3, 4, 5, 16, and 19. DECISION We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–30. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation