0120070942
09-18-2008
Hilary E. Sadler, Complainant, v. Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.
Hilary E. Sadler,
Complainant,
v.
Carlos M. Gutierrez,
Secretary,
Department of Commerce,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120070942
Agency No. 03-55-00214
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's September 28, 2006 final
decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.
For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final
decision.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant
worked as an Import Policy Analyst at the agency's Office of Import
Association (IA) of the International Trade Administration (ITA) facility
in Washington, D.C. On November 28, 2003, complainant filed an EEO
complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on the bases of race
(African-American), sex (female)1, and reprisal for prior protected EEO
activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when:
1. Complainant's assignments are little more than clerical tasks
such as copying and delivering documents;
2. Co-worker, C1, implies that complainant is lazy because she
takes a lunch break and does not stay late every night;
3. Although complainant had not identified C5 as a reference,
S1 told C5 that she had heard complainant was a "maverick;"
4. Complainant was not made to feel welcome in IA (Office of Import
Association). Complainant was not introduced to her coworkers or the
Assistant Secretary and has been excluded from staff meetings. She did
not receive a telephone or office supplies;
5. C1 tried to give complainant orders although he is not a
supervisor and has been in IA only three weeks longer than she has;
6. S1 told senior management she was disappointed with complainant's
work;.
7. S1 and S3 (complainant's second level supervisor at the time)
conceded that complainant was eligible for an immediate promotion to
GS-13, but S3 told her it was his policy that no one received a career
ladder promotion until they had been in IA at least six months;
8. S1 and C1 closely monitored complainant's whereabouts by
constantly calling her on her cell phone; S1 called if she was a few
minutes late for work or in other areas of the building;
9. Complainant did not receive access to the executive correspondence
tracking system (WEB-CIMS) until more than a month after her reassignment
and never received guidance on responding to "Priority B" letters;
10. On December 16, 2002, S1 finally introduced her to the Assistant
Secretary, but apparently only for the purpose of diffusing a situation
where S1 and C1 had complained about the rules of a door decorating
contest; complainant was not involved in the matter and was embarrassed
at having to "cover" for them;
11. On January 10, 2003, complainant picked up medications for S1,
delivered them to her apartment, and assisted her with searching a
storage area for pillows. Complainant claimed she was compelled to do
this because she was afraid that S1 would escalate the hostility against
her if she refused;
12. On January 13, 2003, S1 took away an assignment on the grounds
that it was too complex for complainant;
13. S1 directed complainant to produce 70 letters in one day as
condition for taking leave the following three days to care for her
father;
14. S1 told complainant and senior management that she had to
help complainant with her work and go behind complainant to make sure
complainant had done her work properly;
15. Throughout January 2003, S1 and C1 interjected themselves into
the processing of Priority B letters, re-did work complainant had already
done, assigned her menial tasks, and implied to others that they had
to step in to clear up a backlog without mentioning that the backlog
pre-dated complainant's arrival in IA by one year;
16. C1 was quick to take individual credit for his work, but when
complainant completed a task, said "we" accomplished it;
17. On January 24, 2003, after S1 was unable to satisfactorily answer
S3's questions about overdue correspondence, she implied that her poor
showing in the meeting was complainant's fault. In the same conversation,
complainant discovered that C1 had been feeding S1 information about
complainant's attendance;
18. Because S1 has perpetuated the impression that complainant cannot
work independently, senior managers do not consult complainant for any
purpose and address their questions only to S1 and C1;
19. S1 accepts C1's interpretation of correspondence conventions
and office policies without question, but double checks or completely
disregards complainant's interpretations. She also overlooks C1's
mistakes, but not complainant's mistakes;
20. On January 28, 2003, S1 praised C1's abilities to a visitor to
the office, but said nothing about complainant;
21. S1 could not bring herself to congratulate complainant when
complainant's former work unit won a quarterly award for work done while
complainant was there;
22. When S1 is absent, C1 is in charge. If C1 is also out,
complainant must answer to a GS-9 African American female or a White
male who was previously a GS-11 or 12 but is now a GS-13;
23. S3 ignored complainant's requests to meet with him;
24. S1 quizzed complainant repeatedly in front of complainant's
co-workers about whether she had included the incoming letter with an
assignment;
25. By March 2003, complainant had cleared up the backlogged
correspondence, but S1 refused to acknowledge complainant's contribution;
26. By the time S3 finally met with complainant in April 2003, he
had been promoted so he and his successor, S4, met with complainant. S4
questioned complainant about her attitude, and S3 told her she would not
be promoted because of two mistakes that were actually S1's mistakes. S1
thereafter told complainant her promotion was on hold for at least three
more months;
27. In or about May 2003, complainant learned that the personnel
office had a pending request to change complainant's job series from
1140 to 1101; C1, who is an administrative job series, was not forced
to change upon his assignment to IA;
28. Deputy Assistant Secretary M12 refused to look into complainant's
claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and suggested
she return to Market Access Compliance (MAC);
29. On May 5, 2003, S3 and S4 told complainant, she was being
reassigned to the World Trade Organization Rules Negotiating Group for
three months, after which she would be reassigned to the Sunset Team;
she would not be promoted unless complainant's new supervisor, S2,
supported it;
30. Although complainant was nominally S1's back-up on Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) inquiries, S1 coordinated FOIA responses with C1;
31. In June 2003, while S1 was on sick leave and C1 was in charge,
C1 became upset with complainant's handling of assignments, altered work
products she had carefully coordinated with other offices and screamed
at her when she refused to attach complainant's name to an assignment
he had revised incorrectly;
32. After two months, S2 told her he would not approve an immediate
promotion; shortly thereafter S1 told her in front of complainant's team
members that complainant's reassignment to the Sunset Team was postponed
as well;
33. C1 intercepted a phone call from a law firm complainant had
contacted regarding a FOIA request. C1 handled the call while ignoring
complainant's assertion she was working on the matter;
34. C1 and C2 excluded complainant from preparing briefing books
while S1 was out of the office; when S1 returned, she chided complainant
for not asking for work;
35. C1 took sick leave while S1 was out of the office, but made
complainant stay to finish an assignment even after she told him she
had a doctor's appointment that afternoon;
36. S1 did not issue complainant a performance plan until July 2003,
and complainant did not agree with the description of the critical
elements;
37. In August, S2 again told complainant she would not be
promoted because her performance was satisfactory but did not exceed
expectations; S2 told her she would have to wait at least three months
after complainant's reassignment to the Sunset Team before he would
revisit the question of her promotion;
38. Although S2 remained vague about the effective date of
complainant's reassignment, everyone else in IA seemed to know the
reassignment was going to take place;
39. C1 kept the office thermostat so low complainant developed
bronchitis; C1 refused to turn it up despite complainant's repeated
requests;
40. On August 2, 2003, when S1 returned from leave, she was surprised
to see that complainant had not moved to the Sunset Team office. S1 and
S2 told complainant to move immediately despite the lack of any official
reassignment date and some uncertainty about who would be complainant's
supervisor of record;
41. Complainant was not permitted to sit by the window in her new
office because those spaces were reserved for GS-13's who had not been
hired yet;
42. S4, S2 and S5 ignored complainant's September 4, 2003 request
for a meeting to discuss her personnel issues; when S2, S4 and staff
of the ITA personnel office finally did meet with her on October 30,
2003, it was only after S2 denied complainant's request to reschedule
the meeting due to the death of a family friend earlier in the day;
43. No one informed complainant's Sunset Team supervisor, C3, when
complainant would be moving to the Sunset Team office or how she would
divide her time between the Sunset Team and her communications duties;
44. After complainant moved to the Sunset Team office, she received
no communications assignments until October 2003, and had no contact
with S1 for almost six weeks although she was nominally still under S1's
supervision;
45. C3 monitored whether complainant was at her desk and what she
was doing and fed the information to S1;
46. During the meeting referenced in claim (42), S2 refused to discuss
complainant's reassignments from MAC to IA and from the Communications
Team to the Sunset Team and said her former position in MAC had been
backfilled (implying she could not return to MAC). Complainant asserted
she had accepted the reassignment to IA only on the condition that she
would receive a promotion to GS-13. Complainant also discovered at this
meeting that S1, a GS-13, allegedly was not officially a supervisor;
47. On October 31, 2003, S2 gave complainant a performance
appraisal. S2 did not give her any advance notice of the appraisal and
had S5 sit in as a witness, which complainant felt compromised S5's
ability to judge her future performance objectively;
48. The personnel office extended S2's time to respond to
complainant's grievance (filed September 29, 2003) to November 14, 2003;
49. S1 was not qualified to sign her position classification record,
which is both inaccurate and incomplete; and
50. Complainant's performance plan covering her Sunset Team duties
does not reflect the actual duties of her position or the job announcement
for the position for which she was hired.3
By letter dated February 18, 2004, the agency accepted the complaint
with the exception of claim (48) that was dismissed pursuant to 29
C.F.R. �1614.107(a)(1) for posing a collateral attack on the agency's
administrative grievance process.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with
complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b) concluding that complainant failed to prove that
she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.
In its decision, the agency affirmed the dismissal of claim (48) on
the grounds cited in its letter of February 18, 2004. With respect to
the remaining claims, the agency found no evidence in the record that
agency management acted to harass or discriminate against complainant
because of her race, sex or protected activity. The agency noted that
S3 and S1 denied any knowledge of complainant's previous EEO activity.
S1 was aware that complainant had a difficult situation in her prior
position in the Market Access and Compliance office, but S1 was unaware
that complainant engaged in EEO activity.
The agency found that the evidence did not show that complainant was
treated any differently during her tenure in IA, nor during the transition
of her position on the Sunset Team. The agency found nothing in the
evidence showed that complainant was subjected to harassment based on
her race, sex or in reprisal for her prior EEO activity. Specifically,
the agency found that complainant, S1, C1 and others all did some copying
and delivery of documents in the absence of office clerical support.
While the agency noted that complainant and C1 did not work together
well, the agency speculated that the reason was not complainant's race,
sex or EEO activity, but complainant's belief that she should have been
the acting official in S1's absence, rather than C1.
With respect to complainant's promotion to the GS-13 grade level,
the agency found no evidence to support complainant's allegation that
she was promised a promotion to GS-13 when she was reassigned to IA.
To the contrary, S3 indicated he needed at least six months to observe
complainant's work before he would consider a promotion for her. The
agency found that neither S2 nor S3 believed complainant's performance
merited a promotion to GS-13 during those reviews that occurred in May
and August 2003. The agency found nothing in the evidence to show that
the agency's reasons for denying complainant's promotion were a pretext
to mask discrimination.
With respect to complainant's claim of harassment (taking into
consideration all 49 remaining claims), the agency found that the evidence
did not show that the harassment complainant allegedly endured was
motivated by complainant's race, sex or prior EEO activity. Accordingly,
the agency found that complainant did not show that discrimination
occurred as alleged.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo
review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management
Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that
the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine
the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,
and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions
of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must
satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant
must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or
she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances
that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will
vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately
prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to
an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal
claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell
Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,
425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),
and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473
(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of
reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;
(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,
he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a
nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.
Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340
(September 25, 2000).
Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's
race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is
unlawful. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded
as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker
v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the
harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII
must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Complainant alleges that she was subjected to harassment. To establish
a prima facie case of harassment, a complainant must show that: (1) she
is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to
harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving
the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the
statutorily protected class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. �1604.11.
Further, the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe and pervasive
to alter the conditions of complainant's employment and create an abusive
working environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 23 U.S. 75
(1998). In the case of harassment by a supervisor, complainant must
also show that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.
See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
As an initial matter we find that the agency investigation was adequate
for the Commission to issue a determination on the merits of the
complaint.
We find the agency properly dismissed claim (48), involving the agency's
extension of time for response to complainant's administrative grievance.
We find this claim is a collateral attack on another agency forum,
the agency's grievance process and, as such, cannot be the subject of
an EEO complaint. We find the agency properly dismissed claim (48)
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1).
We observe that most of complainant's claims fall into several broad
categories.
In claims (5), (8), (12), (13), (22), (31), (43), (44), and (45),
complainant objects to the manner in which she received supervision.
Claims (2), (3), (6), (10), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), and (24), allege
actions by complainant's supervisors or co-workers, which complainant
believes were taken to malign her reputation.
Claims (7), (23), (26), (27), (29), (32), (35) - (40), (42), (46), (47),
(49), and (50), describe alleged irregular handling, errors and omissions
with respect to complainant's personnel issues including her promotion
to GS-13, performance plans, performance reviews, leave, and conditions
of her immediate work space.
Claims (1), (4), (9), (30), (31), (33), (34), and (41), allege
dissatisfaction and interference with the performance of complainant's
job duties, and general working conditions.
Claims (16), (20), (21), and (25), allege failure on the part of
complainant's supervisors (and acting supervisors) to acknowledge
complainant's contribution to the office and agency's mission.
We find the agency's final decision regarding claim (1) is entirely
supported by the record. Specifically, multiple witnesses indicated that
the members of the Communications Unit, to which complainant was assigned,
often performed duplication and delivery tasks. We find no evidence
that complainant was singled out for excessive clerical duties based
on her sex, race, or in retaliation for her prior protected activity.
We further find that complainant has not shown that C1 was responsible
for controlling the thermostat in complainant's work space (claim (39)),
nor that control of the temperature in complainant's work space could be
attributed to any agency official. We therefore find neither of these
claims describes discriminatory conduct either alone, or when viewed as
part of complainant's overall claim of harassment.
We find that complainant has not shown that the manner in which she
was supervised (claims (5), (8), (12), (13), (22), (31), (43), (44),
and (45)), was related to her sex, race or motivated by her prior
protected activity. Rather, we find the agency provided reasonable,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. For example, we note
that while complainant was unwilling to accept supervision by C1, he
was appointed to act in place of S1 during her absence and had been
hired into the newly formed IA Communications Unit before complainant.
While complainant objected to C1's supervision, we find nothing in the
record indicates that C1 treated complainant differently than he treated
other employees not in complainant's protected classes, nor that the
relationship between C1 and complainant was impacted by complainant's
sex, race or prior EEO activity. With respect to claim (12), we find
the assignment and reassignment of particular tasks to be well within
S1's authority and that complainant did not show that S1's decision to
reassign work was motivated by complainant's race, sex or reprisal.
We find the agency properly concluded that the supervision to which
complainant was subjected during her tenure with the Communications Unit
was not discriminatory.
Regarding complainant's claims that agency officials (and coworkers)
sought to damage her reputation in the agency, we find that complainant
has not shown that she suffered any discrete harm with respect to the
incidents she has described in claims (2), (3), (6), (10), (14), (15),
(17), (18), (19), and (24). We find that the agency officials involved
have denied many of complainant's allegations (for example, claim (2)
and (3)), and that other comments regarding complainant's performance
were accurate and justified (claims (6), (14) and (17)). We find that
complainant's perceptions were not confirmed regarding still other events
(claims (10) and (19)). More importantly, we find that complainant
has not shown that any of these claims were related to her sex, race,
or prior EEO activity. We find the agency's final decision is supported
by the record regarding the excess scrutiny to which complainant feels
she was subjected. Specifically, complainant's supervisors found her
performance did not meet their initial expectations and therefore greater
oversight of her work was necessary and appropriate.
With respect to the claims (claims (7), (23), (26), (27), (29), (32),
(35) - (40), (42), (46), (47), (49), and (50)) regarding personnel
issues (inaccurate or untimely performance plans, untimely promotions,
job series reassignment and general working conditions), we find the
actions are adequately documented in the record. We find complainant has
not shown that she was reassigned to the IA Communications Unit with an
understanding that she would receive a promotion upon her arrival (claim
(46)), nor that she was denied a promotion to GS-13 based on her race,
sex or in reprisal for her prior EEO activity (claim (7)). Rather we
find the agency officials reasonably explained that while complainant
was eligible for promotion to GS-13, such promotions are not automatic
and complainant was expected to work in her new position before she would
be considered for promotion. This explanation was essentially the same
one given to her on successive occasions (claims (26), (29), (32) and
(37)) when complainant was reassigned to the Sunset Team. Further,
we find the record does not show that other employees were given any
more notice in advance of receiving their performance reviews (claim
(47)) or that complainant's race, sex or prior EEO activity in any way
impacted complainant's performance plan.
With respect to complainant's job series, accurate personnel action
documents, job descriptions and performance plans (claims (27), (36),
(49) and (50)), we find complainant has not shown any harm to a term,
condition or privilege of employment and that any errors in documentation
were corrected by the agency when discovered. We further find that while
some miscommunication seems to have accompanied complainant's reassignment
to the Sunset Team (claims (38), (40), and (43)), complainant has not
shown that her transfer was impacted by her race, sex or that any actions
(including the denial of her requests for a window cube) were motivated
by reprisal for her protected activity.
We find that in claims (16), (20), (21), and (25) (in which complainant
essentially alleges that her work, accomplishment and contributions
are either ignored or minimized), complainant has not shown how she
is aggrieved by the actions alleged or that any of these actions were
motivated by discrimination.
In claim (11) (complainant picked up medications for her supervisor),
we find the record does not support complainant's claim that she was
compelled to assist S1 with her personal errands out of fear that she
would be subjected to increased harassment if she refused. We observe
that the management official identified in claim (28) was not located
during the investigation of complainant's claims. We consider that the
evidence shows that complainant informed a number of agency officials
that she believed she was being treated unfairly and that her allegations
were generally addressed, albeit not always as quickly as complainant
would have liked or to her satisfaction. Ultimately, complainant
exercised her right to request EEO counseling and pursue her claims
through the EEO process. We conclude that assuming M1 did refuse to
investigate complainant's claims that she was being treated unfairly,
complainant clearly sought redress for acts and events she considered
discriminatory through alternate means. Had the agency or the Commission
found harassment occurred and persisted despite complainant's notice
to management of its occurrence (which we do not find), complainant's
allegation in claim (28) would bear on the agency's liability given
her efforts to pursue relief by notifying appropriate agency officials.
In the instant case, we find no evidence to conclude that M1 failed to
investigate complainant's claims because of complainant's race, sex or
prior EEO activity.
We conclude that where events described in complainant's complaint (as
amended) occurred as complainant alleged, the incidents described were
not so frequent or severe that they rose to the level of harassment.
We find the record does not support complainant's version of many
incidents, and other incidents do not involve any harm to a privilege
term or condition of employment. Finally, there is not a preponderance
of evidence to show that any of the alleged actions in the complaint
were motivated by discrimination.
We AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0408)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 18, 2008
__________________
Date
1 Sex (female) was added by amendment as a basis of complainant's
complaint in March 2004.
2 This agency official has also been identified in the record as the
IA's Director for Policy and Planning.
3 We have slightly edited the numbering of complainant's claims.
??
??
??
??
2
0120070942
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036
12
0120070942