Highview, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 10, 1980

250 N.L.R.B. 549 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

HIGHVIEW, INCORPORATED
Highview, Incorporated and American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO. Cases 10-CA-1I 1174 and 10-CA-11941
July 10, 1980
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENELLO
On April 1, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Norman Zankel issued the attached Supplemental
Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respond-
ent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Supplemental Decision in light of the ex-
ceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the
rulings, findings,' and conclusions 2 of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended
Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Highview, In-
corporated, Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall pay to Mamie Lee
Fullens as net backpay the amount set forth by the
Administrative Law Judge in his recommended
Order.
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Producrrs
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd 188 F2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
We find merit to two of Respondent's exceptions relating to factual
statements made by the Administrative Law Judge which are not fully
supported by the record, but which, however, are insufficient to warrant
a different result from that reached by him in this proceeding. Employee
Fullens testified that during the backpay period she went to several em-
ployers two or three times, but not to each of the 16 named employers
Second, Fullens did not state that she visited the Georgia Unemploymenr
Security Office six times. While Fullens did not specifically state the
number of times she visited this office. it appears she did so on al leasi
four occasions.
2 The Administrative Law Judge incorrectly stated Ihal the Hoard. pro
forma, adopted the backpay formula used in George Webel d/b/a Wcbcl
Feed Mills d Pike Transit Company. 229 NLRB 178 (1977) The Board
did not so limit its adoption of the underlying decision in that case
250 NLRB No. 90
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NORMAN ZANKEL, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me in Atlanta, Georgia, on Febru-
ary 21, 1980, based on a backpay specification which
issued on August 29, 1979, for the purpose of resolving a
controversy over the amount of backpay due to Mamie
Lee Fullens under the terms of an order of the National
Labor Relations Board issued on September 8. 1977,1
and enforced by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 2
I. THE ISSUES
1. Did the General Counsel use an appropriate formula
for computation of Fullens' backpay.
2. Did Fullens incur a willful loss of earnings.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to partici-
pate in the hearing, to present material evidence, to ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and
to file briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and careful con-
sideration of the briefs submitted on behalf of the Gener-
al Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following:
11. FINDINGS AND CONCt USIONS
A. Background
On March 8, 1976, when, as the Board found, Fullens
had been discriminatorily discharged, she was employed
by Respondent as a nurses aide. Fullens held that posi-
tion continuously from June 5, 1974, until her discharge.
Previously, Fullens had been employed by Respondent
for unspecified periods of time beginning in 1968. During
these periods of broken service, Fullens worked as a
housekeeper, maid, and dietary aide. Respondent reinstat-
ed Fullens as a nurses aide on May 21, 1979. It is ad-
mitted that the backpay period encompasses the date of
Fullens' discriminatory discharge to the date of her rein-
statement.
Respondent agrees that Fullens had no interim earn-
ings during the backpay period. Respondent does not
challenge the General Counsel's use of 476.16 as the
measure of average hours Fullens worked per calendar
quarter during her most recent employment as a nurses
aide between June 5, 1974, and March 8, 1976. However,
as will be explicated immediately below, Respondent
does challenge the propriety of averaging Fullens' hours
for the entire period of her employment immediately pre-
ceding her discharge.
B. The Formula
The General Counsel contends that an appropriate
measure of the hours Fullens would have worked during
the backpay period is the average hours worked by her
during each calendar quarter of the entire last period of
her employment with Respondent before her discrimina-
231 NLRB1 1251
590 F 2d 174. 181 (5th Cir 1979)
549
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL IlAB()R RELATIONS BO()ARD
tory discharge. Respondent contends that the backpay
computation should be based on Fullens' average earn-
ings during only the calendar quarter immediately pre-
ceding that discharge.
Respondent argues that Fullens' attendance pattern for
the 3 months immediately preceding her discharge re-
flected numerous absences which Respondent claims "is
most closely representative of the pattern." Fullens
"would likely have continued past" the date of her dis-
criminatory discharge.
Traditionally, the actual earnings of employees in a
representative period prior to their discharge is a founda-
tional formula used by the Board in determining the
amount of backpay due discriminatees. This method was
recognized, with Board approval in Chef Nathan Sez Eat
Here. Inc.; Parmount Hudson Inc.; Art Rich Inc. d/b/a
Carnival World, and Irving Reingold, an Individual, 201
NLRB 343, 345 (1973), as "the most fair, suitable, and
equitable formula to employ, and should not be departed
from in the absence of special circumstances...." I
conclude that the General Counsel's proposed formula
substantially fits those requirements.
Fullens was absent from work for 3 weeks because she
had suffered from the flu. Administrative Law Judge
Peter E. Donnelly observed, in the underlying unfair
labor practice case, that Fullens was unable to report to
work between February 23 and March 8, the date of her
discharge. Moreover, Fullens' attendance record re-
vealed that she had been absent from work 20 days and
tardy 15 times between January 1 and February 25, 1976.
Apparently, some of those absences resulted from acci-
dents in which Fullens' son had been involved.
Fullens testified before me, without contradiction, that
she suffered from chronic asthma, but that she suffered
no illness throughout the backpay period which would
have prevented her from working. Indeed, Administra-
tive Law Judge Donnelly's decision indicates that Ful-
lens did, in fact, work during illnesses until contracting
the flu.
I recognize that the formula suggested by Respondent
has been held appropriate. McLoughlin Manufacturing
Corporation, et al., 219 NLRB 920, 922 (1975). Nonethe-
less, in framing backpay remedies, the Board has wide
discretion to use the most representative period of time.
NHE/Freeway, Inc.; National Labor Enterprises. Inc..
Health Facilities Inc., et al., 218 NLRB 259, 262, footnote
2 (1975), enfd. 545 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1976). In NHE, a
discriminatee's earnings during the fourth quarter imme-
diately preceding his discharge was held to be a proper
basis for computing backpay rather than the first quarter
since the discriminatee was absent on leave an inordinate
number of days during the first quarter.
The fact that one method, of several equally available
methods of computation, is used does not amount to such
an abuse of discretion as would require its rejection.
Bagel Bakers Council of Greater New York, et al. v.
N.L.R.B., 555 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1977). In accord with
these principles, the Board has exercised its discretion in
establishing backpay computations based upon average
earnings over a variety period of time. For example, in
Am-Del-Co., Inc. and Compton Service Company, jointly,
and Merchants Home Delivery Service, Inc., as a Successor,
234 NLRB 1040 (1978), backpay was computed on the
basis of averages obtained over a 4-month period imme-
diately preceding the discrimination. This time was
deemed reasonable to account for fluctuation in the em-
ployer's business. Similarly, in George Webel d/b/a Webel
Seed Mills & Pike Transit Company, 229 NLRB 178
(1977), an employer argued that the appropriate period
for measuring average weekly wages should be the cal-
endar quarter immediately prior to the discrimination. In
George Webel, the General Counsel contended the aver-
age properly was computed upon earnings for an entire
year preceding the unlawful conduct. The Board, pro
forma, approved the use of average earnings for the
longer period of time, giving apparent consideration to
the seasonal nature of the employer's business.
In assessing the conflicting contentions in this matter,
my duty is to make recommendations as to the most ac-
curate method of determining backpay. American Manu-
facturing Company of Texas, 167 NLRB 520 (1967). 1 per-
ceive no justification for applying Respondent's standard.
It presumes a fact contrary to the uncontradicted evi-
dence. Specifically, Respondent's claim presumes Fullens
would have been visited with a succession of debilitating
illnesses after her discharge. No evidence was presented
to refute her testimony that she suffered no such illness
during the backpay period.
On the other hand, the backpay specification reflects
substantial consistency of earnings throughout the period
used for averaging purposes by the Genieral Counsel.
There is no direct evidence before me upon which I can
conclude that Fullens' personal illnesses or the accidents
incurred by her son were likely to recur, as Respondent
suggests. Accordingly, I find that the comprehensive
basis upon which the General Counsel predicated his
computations of average number of hours worked by
Fullens is fair and reasonable. Thus, I adopt the General
Counsel's formula as set forth in the backpay specifica-
tion.
C. Willful Loss. of Earnings
As indicated, Respondent contrary to the General
Counsel asserts that Fullens' backpay should be reduced
because she did not make a good-faith effort to seek em-
ployment and thereby incurred a willful lohss of earnings.
The applicable legal principles were correctly restated
by Administrative Law Judge Shapiro in his Board-ap-
proved decision in Aircraft and Helicopter Leasing and
Sales., Inc., 227 NLRB 644, 646 (1976), as follows:
An employer may mitigate his backpay liability
by showing that a discriminatee "wilfully incurred"
loss by "clearly unjustifiable refusal to take desir-
able new employment," (Phelps-Dodge Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 199-200 (1941)), but this is
an affirmative defense and the burden is upon the
employer to prove the necessary fact. N.L.R.B. v.
Mooney Aircrajit, Inc., 366 F.2d 809, 813 (C.A. 5,
1966). The employer does not meet that burden by
presenting evidence of lack of employee success in
obtaining interim employment or a low interim
earning; rather the employer must affirmatively
550
HIGHVIEW, INCORPORATED
demonstrate that the employee "neglected to make
reasonable efforts to find interim work." N.L.R.B.
v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575-
576 (C.A. 5, 1966). Moreover, although a discrimin-
atee must make "reasonable efforts to mitigate [his]
loss of income . . . [he] is held . . . only to reason-
able assertion in this regard, not the highest stand-
ards of diligence." N.L.R.B. v. Arduini Manufactur-
ing Co., 394 F.2d 420, 422-423 (C.A.I, 1968). Suc-
cess is not the measure of the sufficiency of the dis-
criminatees' search for interim employment; the law
"only requires an honest good faith effort."
N.L.R.B. v. Cashman Auto Co., 233 F.2d 832, 836
(C.A. I). And in determining the reasonableness of
this effort, the employee's skill and qualification, his
age, and the labor conditions in the area are factors
to be considered Mastro Plastic Corp., 136 NLRB
1342, 1359.
The Board confirmed the validity of these principles
by adopting the decision of Administrative Law Judge
Robert M. Schwarzbart in Sioux Falls Stock Yards Com-
pany, 236 NLRB 543 (1978). In determining whether an
individual claimant has made a reasonable search for em-
ployment, the test is whether the record as a whole es-
tablishes that the employee had diligently sought other
employment during the entire backpay period. Saginaw
Aggregates, Inc., 198 NLRB 598 (1972); Nickey Chevrolet
Sales, Inc., 195 NLRB 395, 398 (1972).
It is also well established that any uncertainty in the
evidence is to be resolved against Respondent as the
wrongdoer. N.L.R.B. v. Miami Cola-Cola Bottling Com-
pany, 360 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1966); Southern Household
Products Company, Inc., 203 NLRB 881 (1973).
Fullens, a 46-year old female, testified without contra-
diction that she had worked as a housekeeper, maid, and
dietary aide during her former employment which pre-
ceded her tenure as a nurses aide for Respondent. Ful-
lens testified that she is unable to read and write, except
for her name. That testimony was unrefuted. Because of
her limitations, Fullens possesses no license to drive
motor vehicles. She travels by bus only when accompa-
nied by someone else. This is so because Fullens is in-
capable of identifying the bus route designations.
It is uncontested that Fullens applied for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits with the appropriate state
agency, and also registered at an employment agency
within approximately 3 days of her discriminatory dis-
charge. Although Fullens could not recall the name of
the employment agency, she identified its address. Also,
Fullens testified that she applied for work at Grady Hos-
pital and at Georgian Terrace (her former employer
where she performed the previously mentioned house-
keeping services), and at South Fulton Hospital within
the first 2 weeks of her discharge.
Fullens conceded she did not apply for work at nurs-
ing homes. However, she stated that she uniformly asked
for employment in any available job wherever she went.
It is true, as Respondent contends, that Fullens initially
identified only four places she looked for work. Specifi-
cally, she testified that she went to Grady Hospital,
Georgian Terrace, Peachtree Plaza, and Quality Inn. A
series of leading questions propounded by counsel for the
General Counsel elicited Fullens' testimony that she also
applied for work at Piedmont Hospital, Varsity Drive-In
Restaurant, Landmark Inn Hotel, Crawford Long Hospi-
tal, Holiday Inn, Old Hickory House Restaurant, West
Paces Ferry Hospital, J. C. Penney, Hilton Hotel, South
Fulton Hospital, Days Inn Motel, and a Sheraton Hotel.
Fullens testified that she returned to each of these em-
ployers some two or three times during the backpay
period. Additionally, she testified that she looked for
work every day during the backpay period.
Respondent argues Fullen's testimony regarding her
search for work was "unbelievably vague and indefinite,
and often contradictory .... " Respondent argues that
Fullens was so unresponsive that little weight should be
given her testimony. In support of these contentions, Re-
spondent points, inter alia, to the following: (1) On initial
examination, Fullens was asked by counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel whether she actively sought work. She re-
sponded, "[No], I didn't." When pressed, Fullens an-
swered she looked and applied for work "at Grady, for a
maid or anything that they had open." Respondent accu-
rately portrays this response as the only testimony of-
fered regarding Fullens' search for work presented
during her direct examination; (2) Respondent claims her
testimony relative to receipt or unemployment compen-
sation benefits was hazy and vague. The Georgia Unem-
ployment Security Law requires claimants to report "as
directed" to the local unemployment insurance claims
center to continue eligibility. Fullens testified that she re-
ported in person only six times. Respondent notes that
Georgia unemployment benetits are granted for 22
weeks. Thus, Respondent claims the record reveals no
reasonable explanation for Fullens' limited recall; (3) Re-
spondent argues Fullens' testimony is suspect because she
testified with greater clarity to events which occurred
shortly after her discharge than she did on matters oc-
curring subsequent in time: (4) Respondent asserts Ful-
lens' testimony is pervaded with generalizations, especial-
ly regarding the date of her visits to various prospective
employers; and (5) Respondent argues that Fullens' testi-
mony is statistically incredible. As to this, Respondent
has calculated that if Fullens were credited with having
looked for work, as she claimed, each day of the back-
pay period, she would have had to make a total of 835
visits to the 16 employers named by her.
Fullens' testimony that she could not read or write re-
mains unchallenged. Additionally, she testified "it's hard
for me to keep up with dates and things like that." I
have carefully examined the transcript and evaluated my
observations of Fullens' testimonial demeanor. These ele-
ments have been considered against the context of the
uncontested condition of Fullens' literacy. Fullens im-
pressed me with her sincerity and general intelligence.
In another context, there might well be merit to many
of Respondent's arguments. I find them only superficially
appealing. Throughout her testimony, Fullens patently
had difficulty comprehending the import of questions put
to her. In the total circumstances, I do not consider the
nature of the General Counsel's leading to adversely
impact upon Fullens' veracity. This conclusion is but-
551
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tressed by the failure of Respondent to adduce evidence
to refute Fullens' claims of the visits made by her to the
specific employers named. I place no significance upon
Fullens' admission that she did not file any employment
applications. I credit her testimony that she was consist-
ently told no application would be necessary because no
job was immediately available.
It is logical that the specific defects (items (I)-(5) enu-
merated above) urged by Respondent as a reason to dis-
credit Fullens are ascribed to her educational deficiency.
Thus, Fullens' initial response that she did not look for
work, exhibited unbalanced recall and was generalized in
her narrations are satisfactorily explained. The discrepan-
cy between unemployment compensation eligibility and
the number of times Fullens personally visited the claims
center was explained by the fact that Fullens apparently
satisfied the reporting requirements by use of a postcard
provided by the unemployment authorities for reporting
purposes. Even if Fullens did not receive her full entitle-
ment of unemployment compensation benefits, this fact is
not conclusive evidence of the reasonableness of her ef-
forts to locate interim employment. N.L.R.B. v. The
Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Moreover, I reject Respondent's argument that Fullens'
testimony defies statistical probability. In this connection,
Respondent urges it is more likely Fullens spent her time
functioning as a housewife, mother, and grandmother,
for the record shows a household full of family. I consid-
er the statistical argument ignores the record as a whole.
It requires a literal and narrow view of all the evidence.
Even if Fullens exaggerated, her uncontroverted testimo-
ny clearly demonstrates numerous visits to many em-
ployers. The fact that Fullens also may have tended to
her family is not sufficient basis for diminishing an other-
wise demonstrable diligent search for work. A claimant
was held to have made a diligent search even though
part of the day was spent going to a beach and visiting
friends where the daily want ads were checked, relevant
telephone calls were made, visits to the state unemploy-
ment office were made, and job interviews were taken.
American Medical Insurance Company, Inc., 235 NLRB
1417 (1978). At most, Respondent's statistical analysis
creates an element of doubt. Any doubts should be re-
solved in favor of the backpay claimant rather than Re-
spondent wrongdoer who is responsible for any uncer-
tainty which may exist. United Aricrafi Corporation, 204
NLRB 1068 (1973); Southern Household Products Compa-
ny, Inc., supra; N.L.R.B. v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling
Company, supra.
In sum, I find Fullens' level of literacy reasonably ex-
plains whatever record defects may exist. Accordingly, I
fully credit Fullens.
Respondent produced three witnesses, Mary Wakem
(Respondent's personal director), Jeanne M. Susemihl
(director of nurses for Montair Nursing Home), and
Harve R. Baugness (director of A. G. Rhodes Nursing
Home). Their testimony was mutually corroborative. In
essence, the substance of their testimony reveals that the
turnover rate for nurses aides and other nonprofessional
nursing home personnel, generally, is extremely high and
that there is a virtual constant search for nurses aides by
nursing homes. Also, Baugness testified that he had pre-
pared an official study in which it was concluded that
the national average turnover rate in long-term nursing
homes, such as Respondent, was 75 percent annually.
The study revealed that in the Atlanta area such turn-
over was between 60 and 70 percent. Respondent's testi-
mony also shows that nurses aides are hired from a vari-
ety of sources including applicants who walk in from the
street, personal and governmental referrals, and newspa-
per advertisements.
Respondent offered a series of newspaper advertise-
ments which appeared in Atlanta newspapers during Ful-
lens' backpay period.
I consider Respondent's evidence of little probative
value upon the issue of Fullens' diligence to obtain inter-
im employment. Because Fullens could not read, I de-
cline to fault her for being inattentive to newspaper ad-
vertisements. Indeed, the fact that jobs were advertised
in local newspapers does not establish that such jobs
would have been available if and when "[Fullens] ...
had arrived to apply for them, or that if she had arrived
in time to apply for them, she would have been selected
for a position." Airports Service Lines, Inc., 231 NLRB
1272, 1280 (1977). In the instant context where the cred-
ited testimony reflects an otherwise diligent effort to
seek work, the newspaper advertisements in evidence do
little to support Respondent's cause. See also Florence
Printing Company, 158 NLRB 775, 777 (1966), enfd. 376
F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 840.
Respondent cites the cases of Knickabocker Plastic Co.,
Inc., 132 NLRB 1209 (1961); Heinrich Motors, 166 NLRB
783 (1967); and NHE/Freeway, Inc., supra. Respondent
urges these cases impose a burden upon Fullens to have
specifically searched for work as a nurses aide or dietary
employee.
I agree with Respondent that those cases, in relevant
part, oblige a backpay claimant before the Board to seek
a position for which he or she has "extensive experi-
ence." Nonetheless, I find the cited authority inapposite.
In my view, the predicate for application of these cases
is absent. Respondent relies upon Fullens' testimony
(noted above) that she did not visit any nursing homes to
look for work. This, Respondent reasons, signifies that
Fullens did not seek work as a nurses aide. In the cir-
cumstances here, no such interpretation is warranted.
When Fullens answered the question "Did you apply for
any nursing aide positions with any employers?" Fullens
answered "No, I didn't apply for any nursing aide posi-
tions; but I applied for help, at Grady [Hospital], for a
maid or anything that they had open." As earlier indicat-
ed, I found Fullens to be an intelligent person. She made
a strenuous effort to respond to questions by counsel in
as literal, albeit inarticulate, terms as she could under-
stand. Thus, her seemingly negative reply to the subject
question is literally true. I note, however, that the final
qualifying phrase of Fullens' response gives meaning to
the first part of her answer. Respondent's proposition ig-
nores the uncontroverted evidence that Fullens applied
for work at the Grady Hospital and four other hospitals
identified above. It is reasonable to presume that when
Fullens applied at those health care facilities for "any-
thing that they had open," she also would have enumer-
552
HIGHVIEW, INCORPORATED
ated her prior experience as a nurses aide and also a di-
etary aide. Upon the foregoing, I conclude that it is an
evidentiary distortion and illogical to conclude Fullens
had not applied for jobs in which she had experience.
Finally, Respondent argues that "the almost incredible
fact that (Fullens) earned no interim earnings in over 3
years certainly gives rise to an inference that she did not
exercise reasonable diligence throughout this 3-year
period in her search for alternative employment." Such
an argument was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
N.L.R.B. v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Company, supra at
575. Thereafter, the Board by adopting Administrative
Law Judge Bott's recommended Order in Valley Mold
Company, Inc., 215 NLRB 211, 215 (1974), confirmed
that principle of the Miami Coca-Cola case. Accordingly,
I find the fact that Fullens had no interim earnings
during the backpay period not probative upon the issue
of whether she made a diligent search for work.
Upon all the foregoing, I conclude that Respondent
has not sustained its burden of proving that Fullens sus-
tained a willful loss of income or otherwise was not
available for work during periods when backpay is
claimed.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, and the
entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER3
The Respondent, Highview, Incorporated, Atlanta,
Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
3 In the event no exceptions as filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
make whole Mamie L. Fullens by paying her the sum of
$15,910.44, which is the total net backpay computation
attached as an appendix to the backpay specification and
further annexed to this Supplemental Decision an appen-
dix A.4
The payment ordered herein shall be made with inter-
est computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel
Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 5 Social security taxes
and income tax withholdings as required by Federal,
state, and local laws shall be deducted from the amount
due.
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
4 The total net backpay includes increases in wage rates which Re-
spondent admitted properly are includable in any backpay award
' See, generally, Isis Plumbing I Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716
(1962)
APPENDIX
YEAR
1976
1977
1978
1979
QTR. GROSS BACKPA Y NET BACKPA Y'
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
I
2
3
4
I
2
$182.29
1,080.88
1,080.88
1,080.88
1,180.88
1,185.95
1,214.21
1,214.21
1,299.92
1,299.92
1,299.92
1,299.92
1,471.33
1,018.62
$15,910.44
$182.92
1,080.88
1,080.88
1,080.88
1,180.88
1,185.95
1,214.21
1,214.21
1299.92
1,299.92
1,299.92
1,299.92
1,471.33
1,018.62
$15,910.44
' Mamie L. Fullens had
during this period of time.
no interim earnings or expenses
553