Highland Yarn Mills

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 27, 1994

315 N.L.R.B. 1169 (N.L.R.B. 1994)

1169
315 NLRB No. 146
HIGHLAND YARN MILLS
1 The principle underlying these cases is that the General Counsel
may not litigate an unfair labor practice allegation predicated on
events which the General Counsel knew or should have known about
when issuing an earlier complaint or at the time of the trial in that
earlier complaint, if that allegation is of the same general nature as,
or is related to, an allegation in the earlier complaint.
2 310 NLRB 644.
3 In vacating this Order, the Board notes that it was purely inter-
locutory and could have been reconsidered by the Board sua sponte
at any time before a final decision in the case. For this reason,
among others, the Board finds the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall, 63 U.S.L.W. 4005
(S.Ct. No 93–714, Nov. 8, 1994), which dealt with vacation of civil
judgments, inapposite.
Highland Yarn Mills, Inc. and Amalgamated Cloth-
ing and Textile Workers Union, AFL–CIO,
CLC. Cases 11–CA–15111 and 11–CA–15224
December 27, 1994
ORDER
On January 4, 1993, the Respondent filed with the
Board a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, assert-
ing that certain matters alleged as violations in Case
11–CA–15111 were known or should have been
known by the General Counsel when a prior consoli-
dated complaint in Cases 11–CA–14814 and 11–CA–
14868 issued and that, accordingly, the allegations set
forth in the instant proceeding are precluded by Jeffer-
son Chemical Co., 200 NLRB 992 (1972), and Peyton
Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358, 1360 (1961).1
Thereafter, on January 13, 1993, the General Coun-
sel filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion and, on
January 19, 1993, the Charging Party filed a response.
The General Counsel contended that the allegations in
Case 11–CA–15111 are not precluded by Jefferson
Chemical because they are not sufficiently related to
the allegations in Cases 11–CA–14814 and 11–CA–
14868 and were not contemporaneous with the allega-
tions previously litigated. The General Counsel also ar-
gued that Respondent had not shown that the General
Counsel was aware of the facts supporting the allega-
tions in Case 11–CA–15111 at the time of the trial of
Cases 11–CA–14814 and 11–CA–14868 or that the
General Counsel reasonably could have discovered
those facts.
The Board found that the Respondent met its prima
facie burden under Jefferson Chemical and, on March
12, 1993, issued a Notice to Show Cause2 why the Re-
spondent’s motion should not be granted. Counsel for
the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed re-
sponses to the Notice to Show Cause and the Respond-
ent filed a reply thereto.
On November 21, 1994, the Board was administra-
tively advised that on September 19, 1994, the above
proceeding was closed on compliance by the Regional
Director based on a non-Board settlement of the dis-
pute which included, inter alia, the execution of a 3-
year collective-bargaining agreement between the Re-
spondent and the Charging Party Union. In light of the
agreement between the parties, and the closing of this
proceeding on compliance, the procedural issues pre-
sented in the Partial Summary Judgment Motion are
moot. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is denied as moot and the
Notice to Show Cause reported at 310 NLRB 644 is
vacated.3
By direction of the Board: Joseph E. Moore, Deputy
Executive Secretary.