Hiawandus Gause, Appellant,v.Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 8, 2000
01972427 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 8, 2000)

01972427

03-08-2000

Hiawandus Gause, Appellant, v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.


Hiawandus Gause v. Social Security Administration

01972427

March 8, 2000

Hiawandus Gause, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01972427

) Agency No. SSA-684-94

Kenneth S. Apfel, ) EEOC No. 210-95-6177X

Commissioner, )

Social Security Administration, )

Agency. )

________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the final agency

decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint,

which alleged discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the 501

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the agency has afforded appellant the

relief to which she is entitled.

BACKGROUND

Appellant filed a formal complaint on June 13, 1994, in which she alleged

that she had been discriminated against based on race (Black) and physical

disability (bone deformity and related impairments) when she was placed

on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) from November 13, 1993 to January

5, 1994, and when she was terminated during her probationary period,

effective January 21, 1994. Following an investigation of her complaint,

appellant requested a hearing, which was held before an administrative

judge (AJ) on October 18 and 19, 1994, and then resumed on December 14 and

15, 1995. In a thirty-two page Recommended Decision (RD) dated July 12,

1996, the AJ found that the agency discriminated against appellant on

all bases alleged. The AJ further concluded that appellant incurred

compensatory damages and that these damages were "obvious[ly]" related

to the discrimination. The AJ recommended the following remedies:

(1) she be reinstated retroactively to the position from which she was

terminated, or a substantially equivalent position;

(2) she be given retroactively all employee benefits, rights, and

privileges, including but not limited to back pay, interest, cost of

living adjustments, overtime, and any other benefits she would have

received had there not been any discrimination;

(3) because of the passage of time [that] she be recycled through the

formal training, and the receiving office, remedial and advanced training;

(4) unless reasonable accommodation pursuant to the RA [Rehabilitation

Act] would dictate otherwise, she be placed in a unit comparable to

that where other new trainees are normally initially placed, and that

she be provided all reasonable accommodation,[sic] requested by her for

her disability, in accord with [the] RA [Rehabilitation Act] and which

is not burdensome on the Agency's operation;

(5) she be provided equal quality, degree and extent training provided

other trainees, includ[ing][Comparatives 1 and 2];

(6) she be provided sustained equal quality, degree and extent of

mentorship provided other trainees, including, [Comparatives 1 and 2]

which is constant, one-on-one, and sitting at a desk(s) next her mentor(s)

to minimize the amount of walking;

(7) all training and mentoring records for her and all other Claims

Representative trainees for the same period of time be preserved intact

for a couple years thereafter;

(7) [sic] with all [due] respect, the Agency is directed to immediately

post the NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES, made part and parcel thereof, throughout the

facility for sixty (60) days so that all its staff will be apprised; and

(8) inasmuch as the complainant is also requesting compensatory damages,

and inasmuch as I have found that the complainant was discriminated

against because of her race and/or disability, and inasmuch as I now

find that she suffered mental stress, confusion and frustration due to

the disparate treatment she was subjected to because of her disability,

and the obvious anguish she continues to suffer as a result of her

termination from employment, I recommend that she be awarded a reasonable

sum for compensatory damages.

The agency asked appellant to provide it with information concerning

her request for compensatory damages. The agency received appellant's

response on October 22, 1996. On December 27, 1996, the agency issued

a final agency decision (FAD) denying appellant's request for pecuniary

compensatory damages with respect to reimbursement for personal loans,

unincurred medical expenses, unpaid bills, Thrift Savings Plan - Matching

contributions, and future losses. In addition, the agency reduced the

amount appellant requested for job search expenses, as well as expenses

associated with the filing of an EEOC claim, and moving expenses.

Finally, the agency reduced the amount of non-pecuniary compensatory

damages awarded from the requested amount of $118,577.16 to $331.20.

It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission notes at the outset that the agency found that appellant

had been discriminated against solely on the basis of disability with

regard to the issues alleged. Appellant did not appeal the agency's

finding of no discrimination with regard to race discrimination.

Accordingly, the Commission limits its review on appeal to the issues

of relief specifically addressed by the agency in its FAD.

Section 102 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 CRA) 105 Stat. 1071,

Pub. L. No. 106-166, codified at 42 U.S.C. � 1981a, authorizes an award

of compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for intentional

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended. Section 1981a(b)(2) indicates that compensatory

damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other

type of equitable relief authorized by Title VII. Section 1981a(b)(3)

limits the total amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded

each complaining party for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

and other nonpecuniary losses, according to the number of individuals

employed by the respondent. The limit for a respondent who has more than

500 employees is $300,000.00. 42 U.S.C. � 1981a(b)(3)(D).

The Commission has held that compensatory damages are recoverable in the

administrative process.<1> Thus, if a complainant has alleged that she

is entitled to compensatory damages and the agency or the Commission

enters a finding of discrimination, the complainant must be given an

opportunity to submit evidence establishing her claim. To receive an

award of compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate that she

has been harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory action;

the extent, nature, and severity of the harm; and the duration or

expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Appeal No. 01934156 (July 22, 1994), request for reconsideration denied,

EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Compensatory Damages and

Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of

1991, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992).

"[C]ompensatory damage awards must be limited to the sums necessary

to compensate [a complainant] for actual harm, even if the harm is

intangible." Id. at 13 (citing Carter v. Duncan - Higgins, Ltd., 727

F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Thus, a compensatory damages award should

reimburse a complainant for proven pecuniary losses, future pecuniary

losses, and nonpecuniary losses.

Past Pecuniary Damages

A complainant may recover past out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a

result of the intentional discrimination. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at

8. As noted above, the AJ found that appellant suffered mental anguish

and anxiety, which resulted in her expending monies for the following:

1. Loans

Appellant requested reimbursement of $17, 819.00 that she borrowed from

relatives to pay for living expenses during her period of unemployment.

The agency denied this claim as a compensatory damage. The agency argued

that as a successful complainant, she will be receiving back pay damages

with interest which will reimburse her for her lost salary during her

period of unemployment and enable her to pay the loans she incurred

during her period of unemployment. After a review of the record, we see

no basis to disturb the agency's denial of subsistence damages that will

be covered by her award of back pay. Therefore, this claim is denied.

2. Job Search Expenses

Appellant requested reimbursement for transportation expenses in the

amount of $417.20 that she incurred during her search for employment.

However, because appellant submitted no documentation for this claim,

the agency allowed $200.00 for this claim. Generally, the amount to be

awarded for past pecuniary losses is determined by receipts, records,

bills, canceled checks, confirmation by other individuals, or other proof

of actual losses and expenses. Damages for past pecuniary losses will not

normally be awarded without documentation. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002

at 9. Therefore, we see no basis to disturb the agency's allocation of

$200.00 for job search expenses.

3. Expenses Associated with Filing EEOC Claim

Appellant requested reimbursement of the $126.20 she spent for

transportation and lunches when visiting EEOC to pursue her charge

of discrimination. The agency denied appellant's claim for $95.00 for

lunches relying on appellant's back pay award to compensate her for her

living expenses during the period in question. However, the agency allowed

the transportation costs, despite appellant's lack of documentation for

this claim. As such, the $31.20 for transportation was allowed. We find

no reason to disturb the agency's allocation of $31.20 for transportation.

4. Medical Expenses

Appellant requested medical costs in the amount of $2,715.00 for

medical procedures she contends she was unable to have because she was

unemployed. As noted by the agency, the law provides for reimbursement

of out-of-pocket medical expenses appellant incurred that would have

been covered by her health insurance. See EEOC v. Service News Co., 898

F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1990). The law does not provide for reimbursement

of medical procedures the employee did not have. As such, this claim

is denied.

5. Unpaid Bills

Appellant has requested $3,873.00 to pay for personal bills she was unable

to pay during her period of unemployment.<2> This claim is denied for

the reasons stated above.

6. Thrift Savings - Matching Contributions

Appellant requested that her Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) be restored to

reflect the balance she would have had if she had not been terminated.

When a discriminatory action eliminates or reduces these contributions,

make whole relief includes not only the contributions themselves, but

the interest that would have been earned but for the discriminatory

action. Fiene v. United States Postal Service, 04920009 (September 3,

1992); See also Korchnak v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05910483 (November 15, 1991). Therefore, we find that appellant's

TSP should be restored, with interest, from the date of her termination.

7. Moving Expenses

Appellant requested reimbursement for $150.00 in moving costs she

incurred moving from her apartment into her sister's home. She stated

that the move was necessary because after her termination she could

not afford her apartment any longer. This is an allowable expense,

however, appellant failed to provide any documentation in support of

this claim. Nevertheless, because of the relatively small amount of

the claim requested, the agency allowed $100.00 for the claim. We see

no basis to disturb this amount.

Future Pecuniary Damages

We find no basis to award future pecuniary damages. First, we note that

appellant has requested an unidentifiable amount of money as pecuniary

future losses for not being able to purchase a car, furniture, or

take vacations that she planned because she was terminated. However,

future pecuniary losses are quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses that

are likely to occur after conciliation, settlement, or the conclusion of

litigation. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 9. Therefore, future losses are

not purchases appellant had to forego because she was discriminatorily

terminated. Therefore, unless appellant can provide some evidence of

losses likely to occur after resolution of this complaint, appellant is

not entitled to future pecuniary damages.

Nonpecuniary Damages

The AJ found that the evidence of record established that appellant

suffered mental stress, confusion, anguish, and frustration due to the

disparate treatment she was subjected to because of her disability, and

subsequent termination from employment. The AJ based this finding on

appellant's testimony of record. Appellant also submitted statements

that due to the discrimination she suffered humiliation, embarrassment,

loss of self-esteem, depression, loss of credit rating, and gained thirty

pounds. She also stated that she was labeled an incompetent for allegedly

not having the ability to learn the basics of the job. After being hired

by the agency, she had obtained her own apartment and lived independently.

She stated that she had to give this all up when she was terminated.

Appellant had to move into an apartment with her niece. This caused

her to lose the enjoyment of life as she knew it for she became totally

dependant on others for her support. As the agency offered nothing to

rebut this evidence, we find that appellant suffered emotional harm

as a result of her disparate treatment and termination. Accordingly,

we find that appellant is entitled to an award of nonpecuniary damages.

Having determined that appellant proved that she suffered emotional

distress causally connected to agency action, we must next determine

the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded for that harm. In

determining the amount of a compensatory damages award, we are guided

by the principle that a compensatory damages award is limited to the

sums necessary to compensate appellant for the actual harm caused by the

agency's discriminatory action and attempt to affix a reasonable dollar

value to compensate her for that portion of her emotional distress that

was caused by the agency's discrimination. EEOC Notice No. N. 915.002

at 13.

There are no definitive rules governing the amount of nonpecuniary

damages to be awarded. However, nonpecuniary damages must be limited to

the sums necessary to compensate the injured party for actual harm, even

where the harm is intangible, see Carter v. Duncan - Higgins, Ltd., 727

F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and should take into account the severity of

the harm and the length of time that the injured party has suffered the

harm. Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652

(July 17, 1995); EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 14. The Commission notes

that for a proper award of nonpecuniary damages, the amount of the

award should not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not

be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with

the amount awarded in similar cases. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago,

865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations,

Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

We note that there have been several Commission decisions which have

awarded, nonpecuniary damages for emotional distress. In Mullins

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01954362 (May 22,

1997), the Commission ordered an award of $10,000.00 in nonpecuniary

compensatory damages where the evidence established that the complainant's

depression--which included features of pessimism, helplessness, loss

of concentration, poor memory, anxiety, tension, difficulty with trust,

paranoia, feelings of alienation, low self-esteem, isolation withdrawn

behavior, loss of initiative, resentment, and hostility--was directly

related to the emotional damage the complainant suffered in her work

environment as a result of sexual harassment and reprisal. In White

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01950342 (June 13,

1997), the Commission ordered an award of $5,000.00 in nonpecuniary

damages where the complainant's testimony and his psychologist's report

indicated that the harassment the appellant endured, which took both

sexual and nonsexual forms, led appellant to suffer from anxiety,

depression, emotional fatigue, occasional nightmares, and insomnia.

In Bever v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01953949 (October

31, 1996), the Commission ordered an award of $15,000.00 in nonpecuniary

compensatory damages where the evidence established that the complainant's

situational anxiety was directly linked to a hostile work environment,

that the complainant was required to take medication as a result thereof,

and that the complainant's symptoms included uncontrolled crying, weight

loss, and depression. In Lawrence v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996), the Commission ordered

an award of $3,000.00 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages where the

complainant established that she suffered emotional distress as a result

of sexual harassment and the agency's failure to respond promptly to

her allegations.

In Rountree v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01941906 (July

7, 1995). affirmed, EEOC Request No. 05950919 (February 15, 1996), the

Commission ordered an award of $8,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages where the

complainant's statement and a psychologist's report indicated that some of

the complainant's emotional distress, including feelings of inadequacy,

failure, and depression, were the result of a discriminatory performance

appraisal and the denial of bonus pay based on that appraisal. In Benson

v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01952854 (June 27, 1996),

the Commission affirmed the agency's award of $5,000.00 in nonpecuniary

damages where the complainant, his relatives, and his colleagues offered

testimony regarding the embarrassment and humiliation that the complainant

suffered at work as a result of the denial of promotional opportunities,

a suspension, and other adverse actions.

Having carefully considered the facts of this case, the Commission

finds that appellant is entitled to nonpecuniary damages in the amount

of $4,000.00. In reaching this amount, the Commission has considered a

number of factors. For example we considered the nature and severity of

the discrimination, as well as the nature and severity of appellant's

emotional distress and related symptoms. We considered the evidence

concerning appellant's emotional distress, including the AJ's findings,

appellant's brief statements, the statements of her father and niece in

support of her claims, as well as the lack of medical documentation.

Finally, we considered the amounts awarded in similar cases. Based on

all of these considerations, we find that $4,000.00 is a proper award

for the emotional distress which appellant has suffered.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

MODIFY the agency's final decision.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions:

(1) Within thirty calendar (30) days of the date on which this decision

becomes final, the agency shall tender to appellant past pecuniary

compensatory damages in the amount of $231.20.

(2) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date on which this decision

becomes final, the agency shall tender to appellant nonpecuniary

compensatory damages in the amount of $4,000.00.

(3) Within forty-five (45) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall provide appropriate payments to appellant's TSP

account commencing as of January 21, 1994. Such payments shall include

interest that his account would have earned during the relevant period.

(4) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance,

including proof that it has provided all the remedial relief provided for

in the AJ's recommended decision, as provided in the statement entitled,

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include

evidence that the corrective action has been taken.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the

agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the

agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of

Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision

becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's

fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,

D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the appellant. If

the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the appellant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408,

1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the appellant has the right

to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with

the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action" 29 C.F.R. ��

1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action

on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42

U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil

action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any

petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

this decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you

receive a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any

argument in opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to

reconsider MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting

party WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

request to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and

arguments must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director,

Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible

postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date

it is received by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file a

civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY

(90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. You

should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS

THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY

HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to

file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791,

794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 8, 2000

_________ _____________________________

DATE Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1 In Jackson v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01923388

(November 12, 1992) the Commission held that Congress afforded it the

authority to award such damages in the administrative process. It based

this assessment, inter alia, on a review of the statutory provisions

of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in relation to one another and on

principles of statutory interpretation which require statutes to be

interpreted as a whole. In particular, the Commission discussed the

meaning of the statute's definition of the term "compelling party"

and the significance of the reference to the word "action" in Section

102(a). In addition to the specific reasons set forth in Jackson for this

holding, Section 2000e 16(b)(Section 717) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.)(CRA) conveyed to the Commission the broad

authority in the administrative process to enforce the nondiscrimination

provisions of subsection (a) through "appropriate remedies." Similarly,

in Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of 1991), Congress

refers to its first stated purpose as being "to provide appropriate

remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the

workplace;", thereby reaffirming that authority. Consequently, it is our

view that in 1991, Congress clearly intended to expand the scope of the

"appropriate remedies" available in the administrative process to federal

employees who are victims of discrimination. Moreover, in Section 717(c)

of the CRA, the term "final action" is used to refer to administrative

decisions by agencies or the Commission, as distinguished from the term

"civil action," used to describe the rights of employees after such

final action is taken. Therefore, the Commission reaffirms the holding

therein. See Cobey Turner v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal

Nos. 01956390 and 01960518 (April 27, 1998).

2 Appellant's personal bills included Columbia House Music Club, BMG

Music, Doubleday Music Club, Book of the Month Club, Marshall Fields,

Carson, Pirie, Scott, and Amoco Merchandise Center.