HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT LP

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 20, 2020

2019001854 (P.T.A.B. May. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/151,436 05/10/2016 Tao Jin 90482239 3025
56436 7590 05/20/2020
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
3404 E. Harmony Road
Mail Stop 79
Fort Collins, CO 80528
EXAMINER
LI, SIDNEY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2136
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chris.mania@hpe.com
hpe.ip.mail@hpe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte TAO JIN, JASON M. FOX, and NAVEEN BALI
___________

Appeal 2019-001854
Application 15/151,436
Technology Center 2100
_________________

Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and
JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge
Opinion dissenting filed by SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–27, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 2.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Hewlett
Packard Enterprise Development LP. Appeal Br. 3.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
August 21, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed December 28, 2018);
the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 21, 2018) and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 31, 2018); and the
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to “methods, storage arrays and
computer readable media for scale-out implementations that enable path
discovery and volume move operations.” Spec. ¶ 1; see id. ¶¶ 2–4
(describing problems solved by the claimed invention).
As noted above, claims 1–27 are pending. Claims 1, 11, 18, and 25
are independent. Appeal Br. 19 (claim 1), 22 (claim 11), 24–25 (claim 18),
26–27 (claim 25) (Claims App.). Claims 2–10 depend directly or indirectly
from claim 1, claims 12–17 depend directly or indirectly from claim 11,
claims 19–24 depend directly or indirectly from claim 18, and claims 26 and
27 depend directly from claim 25. Id. at 19–28.
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized, is
representative.
1. A method for path discovery to ports of a Fibre Channel
storage system that includes a multi-array pool, the multi-array
pool being part of a group of arrays, the method comprising:
executing, by a group leader array of the group of arrays, a
pull operation to gather a port status of each one of the arrays in
the group of arrays, the group leader array being an array of the
group of arrays designated to execute management functions for
the group of arrays;
executing, by the group leader array of the group of arrays, a
push operation to populate a local cache of each array in the
group of arrays with the port status of each one of the arrays in
the group of arrays; and
executing the pull operation and the push operation on a
periodic schedule to push changes occurring at particular ones of

Specification (“Spec.,” filed May 10, 2016)). Rather than repeat the
Examiner’s findings and determinations and Appellant’s contentions in their
entirety, we refer to these documents.
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the arrays of the group of arrays to each one of the arrays in the
group of arrays.
Id. at 19 (emphases added). Claim 11 recites “[a] method for processing a
volume move from a source pool to a destination pool of a group of arrays in
a Fibre Channel storage system.” Id. at 22. Claim 18 recites
[a] storage array arrangement comprising: a group of arrays,
wherein the arrays in the group of arrays each has an active
controller and a standby controller, wherein a volume move
process is executed by a group leader array of the group of arrays
to move the volume from a source pool to a destination pool of
the group of arrays, the group leader array being an array of the
group of arrays designated to execute management functions for
the group of arrays and including
logic to perform functions, substantially as recited in claim 11. Id. at 22,
24–25. Claim 25 recites “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium
having stored thereon instructions that when executed by a processor, cause
the processor to” perform functions, substantially as recited in claim 11. Id.
at 22, 26–27.
The Examiner relies on substantially same findings and arguments in
rejecting claims 1–27 (Final Act. 2–9), and Appellant does not contest the
rejection of any claim separately from independent claim 1 (see Appeal
Br. 17 (“The same arguments apply to independent claims 11, 18, and 25.
Therefore, independent claims 1, 11, 18, and 25 are statutory under 35
U.S.C. §101.”); Reply Br. 4–12). Therefore, we focus our analysis on
independent claim 1.
REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed
to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–9. We review the appealed
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rejection for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light
of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). For the reasons given
below, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection.
ANALYSIS
Patent Eligible Claims
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”). According to the Court, concepts determined to be abstract
ideas and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing
human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at
219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook,
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437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
In Diamond v. Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical
formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook). Nevertheless, the
Court noted that “[i]t is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.” Id. at 187; see also BASCOM Global
Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (Even if the individual components were known, “an inventive
concept can be found in the ordered combination of claim limitations that
transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical
application of that abstract idea” (emphasis added).).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we next “must examine
the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
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566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. Office Patent Eligibility Guidance
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the Office
applies the Court’s two-part framework, the Office published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).3 In Step One of our
analysis, we look to see whether the claims, as written, fall within one of the
four statutory categories identified in § 101. Id. at 53 (“Examiners should
determine whether a claim satisfies the criteria for subject matter eligibility
by evaluating the claim in accordance with the criteria discussed in
MPEP4 2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a statutory category (Step 1) and
the Alice/Mayo test for judicial exceptions (Steps 2A and 2B)”).
Under the guidance, we then look to whether the claim recites:
(1) Step 2A – Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and

3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility, 2 (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Note, the feedback received
was primarily directed to examination procedures and, accordingly, this
update focuses on clarifying practice for patent examiners. However, all
USPTO personnel are expected to follow the guidance.”).
4 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP, Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
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(2) Step 2A – Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).
C. Step One – Claims Are Directed to Statutory Categories
Appellant’s independent claims 1 and 11 and their associated
dependent claims are directed to methods, i.e., a “process”; claim 18 and its
associated dependent claims are directed to storage array arrangements, i.e.,
a “machine”; and claim 25 and its associated dependent claims are directed
to non-transitory computer readable media, i.e., a “manufacture.” Appeal
Br. 19–28 (Claims App.); see In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356–57 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (transitory embodiments are not directed to statutory subject
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matter). Thus, the pending claims are directed to recognized statutory
categories.
D. Step 2A, Prong One – Claim 1 Does Not Recite an Abstract Idea
Applying the first part of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step 2A), the
Examiner found, “[c]laim(s) 1-27 is/are directed to the abstract idea of
updating port status.” Final Act. 2. In particular, the independent claims
recite[] in part, identify a volume to be moved, transferring a
local cache of one array in the source pool to a local cache of an
array in the destination pool, initiating a transfer of data,
executing a bin migration process, and updating one or more
paths by a push operation. These steps describe the concept of
recognizing and storing data in the memory. The identification
of the volume to move recognizes the data and the other steps are
in regards to the storage to data.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added); Ans. 3–5; see Content Extraction and
Transmission LLC v Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“Applying Mayo/Alice step one, we agree with the district court
that the claims of the asserted patents are drawn to the abstract idea of 1)
collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and
3) storing that recognized data in a memory.”); Electric Power Group, LLC
v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The focus of the
asserted claims, as illustrated by claim 12 quoted above, is on collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis.”). Thus, we understand the Examiner finds that claim 1 recites,
“[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility at 7 (citing Electric Power Group).
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The Office explains, “[c]laims do not recite a mental process when
they do not contain limitations that can practically be performed in the
human mind, for instance when the human mind is not equipped to perform
the claim limitations.” October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at
7; see Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas, 3–4 (Jan. 7,
2019) (Regarding claim 2 of Example 37, the Office explains, “the claim
does not recite a mental process because the claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, does not cover performance in the mind but for the
recitation of generic computer components. For example, the ‘determining
step’ now requires action by a processor that cannot be practically applied in
the mind.”).
The Examiner finds “there is nothing in the claims in regards to the
interactions between the group leader array and the other arrays, the claim
merely states the group leader array executing a pull operation to gather port
status of the arrays.” Ans. 9; see Final Act. 6–8. Nevertheless, claim 1
recites, “the group leader array being an array of the group of arrays
designated to execute management functions for the group of arrays.”
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Appellant contends, “the
independent claims recite interactions between the group leader array and
the other arrays in a group to retrieve port status information and to update
the port status information of the arrays in each of the arrays.” Id. at 14;
Reply Br. 10; see Appeal Br. 9–10 (discussing execution of the pull and
push operation “by the group leader array of the group of arrays”). The
Specification explains, “when arrays are placed in a group, data management
is required to identify where specific volume data is stored in the arrays.”
Spec. ¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 32 (describing Fig. 7B as depicting a flow chart
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implemented by a management function), Fig. 7B (items 722 and 724
describing pull and push processes as the management function). In
particular, Figure 7B depicts
a flow diagram of a process implemented by [group data daemon
(GDD)] 297 to maintain the [report target port groups (RTPG)]
information current, in accordance with one embodiment. In
operation 720, a group leader (GL) is an array of a group of
arrays that is designated as the array that will execute
management functions. Thus, GDD 297 is executed by a GL of
a group of arrays. In operation 722, the process for maintaining
RTPG information current includes executing a pull process to
gather [asymmetric logical unit access (ALUA)] status of ports
from each array in the group of arrays. . . .
In operation 724, GDD 297 is configured to execute a push
process in order to cache/write ALUA status of ports of all arrays
in the group to local cache of each array in the group.
Id. ¶¶ 88, 89. While we do not import limitations from the Specification into
the claims, we understand the claims in light of the Specification’s
disclosure. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Consequently, we agree with Appellant.
The recited methods of claim 1 employ a group leader array that
interacts with other arrays in the group to pull information on port status
from the arrays and to push information on “changes occurring at particular
ones of the arrays of the group of arrays to each one of the arrays in the
group of arrays.” See Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). On this record, we are
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not persuaded claim 1 recites an abstract idea, in particular, a mental
process.
E. Step 2A, Prong Two – Claim 1 Integrates the Abstract Idea into a
Practical Application
Even if the Examiner had better supported the conclusion that claim 1
recites an abstract idea, the identified abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application. Claim 1 recites the additional elements of “ports of a
Fibre Channel storage system that includes a multi-array pool, the multi-
array pool being part of a group of arrays,” where the “ports” are associated
with particular “arrays” and each of the arrays includes “a local cache.”
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). A “group leader array” is linked to each port,
such that it can gather (i.e., pull) the status of each “port” and communicate
(i.e., push) the port status of each array to the other arrays. Id. Appellant
contends that these additional elements describe a particular arrangement of
physical components of a particular machine or apparatus. Id. at 9–10.
Moreover, as discussed above, the components are integral to the
performance of the recited method, and their operation together is recited
with particularity. See MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the components
involvement in the method’s steps goes beyond mere extra-solution activity
or the identification of a field of use. Id.
The Examiner finds that the method steps merely apply computer
components to achieve the identified abstract idea. Ans. 6–7; see MPEP
§ 2106.05(f). Appellant contends, however, that “the independent claims
recite operations in which the port status information is pushed by a group
leader array to a local cache array. In other words, the independent claims
include the physical and tangible operation of populating the local cache
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arrays with the port statuses.” Reply Br. 5. Moreover, Appellant contends,
“claim 1 clearly recites interactions between the group leader array and the
other arrays. In addition, independent claims 11 and 18 recite the
interactions between the group of arrays in greater detail.” Id. at 10. Given
our understanding of the interaction between the physical components
recited in the claims, as discussed above, Appellant persuades us that the
claims recite more than the mere application of generic computer technology
to accomplish an abstract idea.
For at least these reasons, even if we were persuaded that the claim
recites “the abstract idea of updating port status,” i.e., a mental process, we
are persuaded that Appellant’s claims integrate updating port status into a
practical application.
Because we do not find that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we need
not reach the Step 2A, Prong Two, analysis; and we do not reach the Step 2B
analysis. Consequently, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1. The
Examiner relies on the arguments with respect to claim 1 to support the
rejection of independent claims 11, 18, and 25 and of the dependent claims.
See Ans. 4–5, 10. Consequently, we also do not sustain the patent
ineligibility rejection of claims 2–27.
DECISION
1. The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
2. Thus, on this record, claims 1–27 are not unpatentable.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–27.
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In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–27 101 Eligibility 1–27
Overall
Outcome
1–27

REVERSED

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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte TAO JIN, JASON M. FOX, and NAVEEN BALI
___________

Appeal 2019-001854
Application 15/151,436
Technology Center 2100
_________________

Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and
JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting.

I am persuaded that the pending claims are directed to judicial
exception, i.e., a mental process, without significantly more and, therefore,
are patent ineligible. Consequently, I respectfully disagree with the reversal
of the Examiner’s patent eligibility rejection of the pending claims, and I
would affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
1. Claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Claim 1 is representative and broadly recites (1) gathering data
(“executing, by a group leader array of the group of arrays, a pull operation
to gather a port status of each one of the arrays in the group of arrays”);
(2) storing data (“executing, by the group leader array of the group of arrays,
a push operation to populate a local cache of each array in the group of
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arrays with the port status of each one of the arrays in the group of arrays”);
and (3) repeating the data gathering and data storage steps on a periodic
schedule (“executing the pull operation and the push operation on a periodic
schedule to push changes occurring at particular ones of the arrays of the
group of arrays to each one of the arrays in the group of arrays”). See
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that the steps of claim 1
describe the concept of gathering recognized data with a pull operation and
storing the data with a push operation, and repeating the gathering and
storing steps on a periodic schedule, which is an abstract idea. Final Act. 3
(citing Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat.
Ass’n., 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In that case, the Federal Circuit
stated that the claims were drawn to the abstract idea of collecting data,
recognizing data within the collected data, and storing the recognized data.
Id. at 1347.
The Office explains that “claims do recite a mental process when they
contain limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind,
including for example, observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions.”
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 7 (Oct. 17, 2019). As an
example, the Office identifies a claim reciting a mental process as “a claim
to ‘collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis,’ where the data analysis steps are recited at a high
level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the
human mind.” Id. (quoting Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830
F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Office explains:
Claims can recite a mental process even if they are claimed as
being performed on a computer. . . . The courts have found claims
requiring a generic computer or nominally reciting a generic
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computer may still recite a mental process even though the claim
limitations are not performed entirely in the human mind.
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 8.
Here, the claim recites steps for “executing . . . a pull operation to
gather [data] of each one of the arrays in the group of arrays; executing . . . a
push operation to populate a local cache of each array in the group of arrays
with the [gathered data]; and executing the pull operation and the push
operation on a periodic schedule . . . .” Such steps comprise a mental
process which constitutes an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7, 2019) (Section
I(b)). Therefore, I am persuaded that claim 1 recites a mental process.
2. Claim 1 does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
I also am persuaded that claim 1 does not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application. Claim 1 recites “a Fibre Channel storage system
that includes a multi-array pool, the multi-array pool being part of a group of
arrays,” with “the group leader array being an array of the group of arrays
designated to execute management functions for the group of arrays,” and “a
local cache of each array.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). Appellant
contends, “the independent claims recite a group leader array and a group of
arrays, which are physical storage arrays, and thus, hardware.” Reply Br. 4–
5; see Appeal Br. 8–10. The Examiner finds that the claimed “Fibre
Channel storage system, a multi-array pool, a group of arrays, . . . are all
generic computer elements.” Final Act. 3. I agree with the Examiner.
The Specification makes clear that the group of arrays, each array
including a local cache, are generic components performing known
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functions of storing data.5 E.g., Spec. ¶¶ 2 (“Storage arrays are used to store
data . . . . The storage media of a storage array may include one or more hard
disk drives (HDDs) and/or one or more solid state drives (SSDs)), 113–128
(discussing Figure 12, which shows storage array 202 includes HDDs and
SSDs), 121–123 (discussing that SSDs operate as cache). The components,
considered individually, do not link the abstract idea to a particular machine
or technology or describe an improvement to the functioning of a computer.
Appellant contends that the independent claims include the physical
and tangible operation of a group leader array interacting with other arrays
to populate the local cache arrays with the port statuses. Reply Br. 5–6, 10
(citing Spec. ¶ 91); see Appeal Br. 9–10. The Examiner finds that using
push and pull operations to gather and store port statuses is directed to the
abstract idea of data gathering and data storing. Ans. 7. I agree with the
Examiner. The quoted section of Paragraph 91 of Appellant’s Specification
describes the push operation to populate a local cache of each array with the
port status of each one of the other arrays. The push operation is physical in
the sense that it is performed by a computer storing data in memory, but
contrary to Appellant’s contention, the push operation does not include a
particular machine. Rather, the push operation as claimed, read in light of
Paragraph 91 of the Specification, is the mental process of storing data,

5 I acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two,
properly may be evaluated under the second part of the Alice/Mayo
framework (Step 2B of the Office guidance). For purposes of maintaining
consistent treatment within the Office, I evaluate those considerations under
first part of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step 2A of the Office guidance).
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55 nn.25, 27–32.

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categorized by the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance
as an abstract idea. See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility
at 7–8; Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1356; Content Extraction, 776
F.3d at 1347.
Appellant contends that the pushing by the group leader array of the
port status to the local caches of each array in the group of arrays results in
the consistent port status information being populated into the local caches
of each of the arrays, which is the technological improvement of reducing
errors and reducing processing time. Reply Br. 7–8; Appeal Br. 10. The
Examiner finds that performing routine computer tasks such as gathering
and storing data is not a technological improvement that renders the claim
patent-eligible. Ans. 7–8. I agree with the Examiner. “[R]elying on a
computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is
insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or
efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise
abstract idea.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a
computer amounts to a mere instruction to ‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on
. . . a computer,’ that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.”).
Appellant contends that the claims here are similar to those of McRO,
because the claims define a particular set of rules in a specific way to solve a
problem to achieve a desired outcome, i.e., periodically pushing port statuses
of each array to the group of arrays. Reply Br. 9 (citing McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016));
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Appeal Br. 10–12. The Examiner finds that the claims of McRO, unlike
Appellant’s claims, allowed performance of a function not previously
performable by a computer. Ans. 8. Appellant contends that the Examiner
does not establish that pushing port statuses of each array to the group of
arrays was previously performable by a computer. Reply Br. 9. I agree with
the Examiner. As discussed above, claims for gathering and storing data are
drawn to an abstract idea. See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility at 7–8; Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1356; Content
Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347. Appellant’s contention that pushing port
statuses was previously unknown in the prior art does not render the claims
patent-eligible. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the
abstract idea itself”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.”).
Thus, in view of Appellant’s claim recitations and Specification and
consistent with the Examiner’s determinations, I am persuaded the rejected
claim does not recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
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See MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). Thus, I conclude that claim 1 does not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea.
3. Claim 1 does not add significantly more than the abstract idea.
Because I find that claim 1 recites an abstract idea and does not
integrate that abstract idea into a practical application, I now consider
whether claim 1 includes additional limitations, such that the claim amounts
to significantly more than the abstract idea. The claim recites limitations
beyond the abstract idea, which are a “Fibre Channel storage system that
includes a multi-array pool, the multi-pool being part of a group of arrays . .
. the group leader array being an array of the group of arrays . . . [and] a
local cache of each array in the group of arrays.” Such limitations are
recited in the claim at a high level of generality as performing generic
computer functions routinely used in computer applications, and amount to
no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system.
The use of generic computer components to gather and store data does not
impose any meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract
idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements
do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial
exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the
elements taken individually.
Appellant contends that the Examiner fails to demonstrate that the
additional components recited in the claims are well-understood, routine,
and conventional, as required by in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2018). Reply Br. 6–7. Nevertheless, as noted above, the
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Specification shows the components are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Spec. ¶¶ 2, 113–128; Fig. 12; see Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP., Inc.), 3–4 (Apr. 19, 2018) (The
specification may evidence that components are well-understood, routine,
and conventional.); see also In re TLI Communications LLC Patent
Litigation, 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (As the specification shows, a
server that receives data, extracts classification information from the
received data, and stores the digital images is insufficient to add an inventive
concept.).
Appellant contends that the Examiner has failed to provide evidence
to show that the push and pull operations are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Reply Br. 6–7. To the extent Appellant relies on the push and
pull operations as indicative of the inventive concept, such steps amount to a
mental process, which is categorized in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance as an abstract idea as discussed above. The
Federal Circuit has held that “the ‘inventive concept’ [under the second part
of the Mayo/Alice test] cannot be the abstract idea itself” and “Berkheimer
. . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held
claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract
idea.” Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at 1374 (Moore, J., concurring); see BSG Tech
LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been
clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”); Synopsys, 839
F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”);
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SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“What is needed is an inventive concept in the non-abstract application
realm.”).
On this record, I agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites generic
computer components performing generic computer functions, which,
considered individually or as an ordered combination, are well-understood,
routine, and conventional; and claim 1 does not recite significantly more
than the identified abstract idea. Appellant does not contest the patent
eligibility rejection of the remaining claims separately from claim 1.
Consequently, I am not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining
that the pending claims are patent ineligible, and I would sustain that
rejection.