Herman Wilson Lumber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 7, 1970

185 N.L.R.B. 914 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Herman Wilson Lumber Company and International
Woodworkers of America , AFL-CIO-CLC. Case
26-CA-2536
October 7, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On December 29, 1966, Trial Examiner Thomas
N. Kessel issued his Decision on Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent, Herman Wilson Lumber
Company, had engaged in and was engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner specifically
rejected the request of the Charging Party that the
Respondent be directed to make whole its employees
for any losses suffered by reason of the unlawful
refusal to bargain. Thereafter, the Respondent and
the Charging Party filed exceptions and briefs in
support thereof.
As the compensatory remedy sought by the Charg-
ing Party poses novel and important issues, the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board on May 26, 1967, granted
oral argument in this and three related cases' and
consolidated this and the three aforesaid related cases
for purposes of such argument. The Board granted
a number of motions for permission to file briefs
amicus curiae and invited certain other interested
parties to file them and to participate in the oral
argument which was conducted on July 12 and 13,
1967. Briefs were received from the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States, the National Association
of Retail Merchants, the , American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, all
of whom participated in the oral argument. Briefs
were also submitted by the National Association of
Manufacturers, Preston Products Company, Inc., and
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
' Ex-Cell-O Corporation, 185 NLRB No 20, Zinke's Foods, Inc., 185
NLRB No 109, Rasco Olympia, Inc d/b/a Rasco 5-10-25c, 185 NLRB
No 110
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are here-
by affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs of
the parties and those submitted amicus curiae, the
oral arguments made before the Board, and the entire
record in the proceeding, and hereby adopts the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner.
There are no issues of fact. On March 22, 1966,
the Board conducted an election in Case 26-RC-
2605 in which a majority of the votes was cast for
the Charging Party. The Respondent filed timely
objections to conduct affecting the results of the elec-
tion. The Regional Director duly considered the objec-
tions and on April 27, 1966, issued his report on
objections in which he recommended that the objec-
tions be overruled in their entirety and that the Charg-
ing Party be certified as the bargaining representative
of the employees in the stipulated unit. Thereafter,
on July 7, 1966, the Board sustained the Regional
Director's recommendations and certified the Charg-
ing Party.
Respondent admits that it has, since the Union's
bargaining request on May 4, 1966, refused to bargain
and intends to refuse to bargain until it has exhausted
its judicial remedies in Case 26-RC-2605. Respondent
further admits that it unilaterally granted a general
wage increase on July 17, 1966. For the reasons
fully expressed in the Trial Examiner's Decision, we
agree that the Respondent, by engaging in the forego-
ing conduct, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
At the hearing, the Charging Party argued that
the customary remedy adopted in such cases, i.e.,
directing future bargaining on demand of the Union,
is wholly inadequate herein, and, as set forth above,
it sought an additional remedy of compensation for
any employee losses which might have been suffered.
The Trial Examiner refused to grant such a compensa-
tory remedy, concluding that it was too speculative
in_nature. Ex-Cell-0 Corporation,' sets forth fully
the Board's reasons for concluding that in that case
a reimbursement remedy, such as is sought in the
instant proceeding, was not warranted. Those reasons
are equally applicable to the case now before us.
Accordingly, we shall not order such a remedy herein,
' Supra.
185 NLRB No. 125
HERMAN WILSON LUMBER COMPANY
but shall adopt the remedy recommended by the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders
that the Respondent, Herman Wilson Lumber Compa-
ny, Monticello, Arkansas, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
' For the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion in Ex-Cell-0
Corporation, supra. Member Brown would grant the compensatory remedy
sought by the Union herein
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION ON MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
THOMAS N. KESSEL, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge
filed September 6, 1966, by International Woodworkers
of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, herein called the Union,
against Herman Wilson Lumber Company, herein called
the Respondent, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional
Director for Region 26, issued his complaint dated Septem-
ber 23, 1966, alleging the Respondent's violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act The complaint alleged the
Union's selection as exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the Respondent's employees in a secret-ballot
election conducted by the Regional Director and its subse-
quent certification as such representative by the Board.
It further alleged the Union's request after certification
to the Respondent to bargain collectively with it for the
unit employees, the Respondent's refusal to honor this
request, and its unilateral grant of a wage increase to
the employees in disregard of its obligation to bargain
with the Union. The Respondent's answer to the complaint
admits the Board's certification of the Union as representa-
tive of its employees, acknowledges the Union's request
for bargaining, and concedes its refusal to accord this
request and its unilateral grant of a wage increase after
notice to the Union of its intention to do same. To justify
this admitted conduct the Respondent asserts the invalidity
of the aforementioned representation election and, in effect,
the invalidity of the Union's bargaining certificate. The
answer expressly states the Respondent 's intention "to
exhaust its judicial remedies in Case 26-RC-2605." This
was the representation proceeding which resulted in the
Union's certification.
Following the filing of the Respondent's answer the Gen-
eral Counsel, on October 12, 1966, filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings contending that no litigable
issue was raised by the answer requiring a hearing to
receive evidence. The General Counsel asserted the patent
invalidity of the defense as stated in the answer and main-
tained that the Respondent's admissions therein established
its liability in the case. In connection therewith the General
915
Counsel noted the facts in the representation proceeding
in Case 26-RC-2605 which in this case are judicially noticea-
ble.
The foregoing motion was referred for ruling to Trial
Examiner Charles W. Schneider who, by order dated Octo-
ber 17, 1966, directed all parties hereto to show cause
in writing whether the motion should be granted. The
parties were required to submit briefs or proposed findings
with their responses to the order. The Respondent thereupon
filed a motion in opposition with supporting argument
and the Charging Party filed a brief in behalf of the
General Counsel' s motion.
On November 25, 1966, the Chief Trial Examiner desig-
nated Trial Examiner Thomas N. Kessel in place of Trial
Examiner Schnieder to rule on the General Counsel's
motion. Upon consideration of the arguments of counsel
for and against the motion I conclude, for the reasons
and in accordance with the findings elaborated below, that
the statutory violations alleged in the complaint are estab-
lished by the pleadings and that no litigable issue remains
for disposition requiring a hearing for the purpose of receiv-
ing evidence. Accordingly, the General Counsel's motion
for judgment on the pleadings is hereby granted
Upon the basis of the record before me, including the
Board 's official records in Case 26-RC-2605, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. COMMERCE FACTS
The Respondent is an Arkansas corporation engaged
in Monticello, Arkansas, in the manufacture of yellow
pine lumber . During the 12 months preceding issuance
of the complaint the Respondent manufactured, sold, and
shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points located outside the State of Arkansas. I find from
the foregoing that the Respondent is engaged in interstate
commerce within the meaning of the Act and that the
purposes of the Act will be effectuated by the assertion
of the Board's jurisdiction in this case over the Respondent's
operations.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization admitting to member-
ship the Respondent's employees.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Pursuant to stipulation by the parties a consent election
was conducted on March 22, 1966, in Case 26-RC-2605
by the Regional Director to determine whether the Respond-
ent's employees desired to be represented by the Union
for purposes of collective bargaining The appropriate unit
comprising these employees consisted of all production and
maintenance employees, including truckdrivers, at the
Respondent's Monticello, Arkansas, plant, excluding office
clerical employees, professional employees, supervisors,
watchmen, and guards as defined in the Act. The tally
916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of ballots issued after the election shows that of 120 valid
ballots cast, 62 favored and 57 were against the Union.
One ballot was challenged.
On March 29, 1966, the Respondent filed timely objections
to conduct affecting the results of the election. These objec-
tions, as revealed by the Regional Director's report on
objections, all related to a handbill distributed by the Union
to the voting employees on the day prior to the election
The Respondent complained that the handbill contained
material misrepresentations and omissions which deceived
the employees and thereby interfered with their freedom
of choice in the selection of a bargaining representative.
In his report the Regional Director noted that the objections
had been investigated, with full opportunity afforded all
parties to submit evidence bearing on the issues. The Region-
al Director found that the Union's handbill did not misrepre-
sent or depart from truth and that the Respondent's objec-
tions were without merit. He, accordingly, recommended
that the objections be overruled and that the Union be
certified as collective-bargaining representative of the
Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions with the Board to the
Regional Director's report On July 7, 1966, the Board
issued its decision adopting the Regional Director's findings
and recommendations and certifying the Union as exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent's
employees in the appropriate unit.
As noted, the Respondent's answer admits the Union's
bargaining request following its certification and concedes
its refusal "commencing on or about May 4, 1966 (the
date in the answer, 1959, is an apparent typographical
error), and at all times thereafter" to recognize or bargain
with the Union. The answer further asserts that the Respond-
ent had notified the Union on July 5, 1966, of its intention
"to exhaust its judicial remedies in Case No. 26-RC-
2605." It is clear therefrom that the Respondent is in
this case justifying its admitted refusal to honor the Union's
certificate by attacking the validity of the election won
by the Union in the foregoing representation proceeding
The Respondent's answer further expressly states that
its attack upon the Union's certificate is grounded upon
the claim that the voters in the March 22, 1966, election
were prevented by the Union's asserted misrepresentations
from freely expressing their choice of bargaining representa-
tive. It is thereby evident that the Respondent in the
instant case is seeking to test the propriety of the Regional
Director's and the Board's determinations that the Respond-
ent's objections to the Union's preelection conduct lack
merit and did not warrant setting aside the election These
issues may not be relitigated before a Trial Examiner.
The Board's determinations in a representation proceeding
are binding upon the Trial Examiner conducting an unfair
labor practice case involving the Respondent's refusal to
honor the certificate issued in the representation proceeding.
See Genesco, Inc., 161 NLRB No 98. The issues determined
by the Board in Case 26-RC-2605 may be relitigated
in this unfair labor practice case only if the Respondent
has relevant evidence newly discovered or previously una-
vailable. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. N L.R.B , 313
U S. 146; Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Miami, Inc, 153 NLRB
1342. No showing was made by the Respondent in its
response to the order to show cause that it has such
evidence to present at a hearing and it is obvious from
the assertions in the answer that the Respondent would
introduce and rely on the same evidence as that already
considered by the Regional Director and the Board in
passing on the objections filed by the Respondent to the
aforementioned election. There is, therefore, in this case
no triable issue concerning the validity of the Union's
certificate requiring a hearing for the purpose of taking
evidence. Contrary to the Respondent, as argued in its
opposition to the General Counsel's motion for summary
judgment, due process is not denied by the grant of the
General Counsel's motion for judgment on the pleadings
without a hearing. There is no reason to "hear" what
is legally insignificant. See N.L.R.B. v Douglas County
Electric Membership Corporation, 358 F 2d 125 (C.A. 5).
No valid defense having been raised by the answer to
the complaint allegation that the Respondent unlawfully
refused to honor the Union's certificate by recognizing
and bargaining collectively with it pursuant to its request
I hereby find that on and since May 4, 1966, the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
No valid defense is asserted by the answer to the complaint
allegation that the Respondent in violation of its collective-
bargaining duty on July 17, 1966, unilaterally granted its
employees a wage increase. The conduct, admitted by the
answer, is not legally excused by the argument, advanced
by the Respondent in its opposition to the General Counsel's
motion, that it was motivated by legitimate business consid-
erations and was not intended to thwart the rights of
"employees" to bargain collectively. These arguments are
irrelevant to a finding that an employer violates Section
8(a)(5) of the Act when in disregard of its duty to bargain
collectively with a labor organization representing its
employees it bypasses the representative, as here, by unilater-
ally granting a wage increase to the employees. Nor is
the conduct justified by the fact, as pleaded, that the
Union had been notified before July 17, 1966, of the
Respondent's intention to grant the wage increase. I assume
the Respondent means thereby that the Union's failure
to protest the intended action upon notification constitutes
a waiver of its rights to bargain collectively over the wage
increase. Whatever merit such argument may have where
an employer has an established bargaining relationship with
a labor organization certainly does not obtain where, as
here, the Respondent concedes it refused to recognize the
Union as the bargaining representative of its employees
and even went so far as to declare its refusal to do so
in the July 5, 1966, letter to the Union apprising it of
the intended wage increase That letter was a clear indication
to the Union that its protest would be futile. By the
July 17, 1966, unilateral wage increase to employees the
Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with its operations
in section I, above, have a close , intimate , and substantial
HERMAN WILSON LUMBER COMPANY
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Respondent
has refused and still refuses to bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit herein. It will therefore be recom-
mended that the Respondent bargain collectively upon
request with the Union as the exclusive representative of
these employees and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
The Charging Party strenuously argues that the foregoing
remedy, conventional in cases of 8(a)(5) violations, is here
inappropriate Such remedy is criticized as wholly inade-
quate. The Respondent is accused of deliberate procrastina-
tion in fulfilling its collective-bargaining duties. The legal
procedures herein involved assertedly were initiated not
for the sincere testing of the validity of the Board's determi-
nations in the representation proceeding but to secure the
material advantages to be derived from the time consumed
by these and the subsequent legal procedures envisioned
including Board and court proceedings. The Charging Party
estimates that the Respondent's tactics will consume 2
to 3 years before their final termination. In the course
of these maneuverings the Respondent's employees asserted-
ly have already lost and will continue to lose the material
benefits of collective bargaining. Specifically, according to
the Charging Party, had the Respondent acted in good
faith after the Union was certified and made its bargaining
demands its employees, within some reasonable time after
the commencement of bargaining, would have obtained
benefits surpassing the wage increases unilaterally bestowed
by the Respondent in July 1966. These losses to employees
are noted as an obvious monetary gain by the Respondent
who, as the Charging Party states, becomes the beneficiary
of its own misconduct. Moreover, the strength of the Union
is so sapped by its failure without fault effectively to repre-
sent the Respondent's employees that its capacity for future
bargaining is destroyed. As seen by the Charging Party,
the conventional remedy which merely orders collective
bargaining will at such time as it obtains the finality of
a court decree become meaningless.
The Charging Party acknowledges that the foregoing
result would obtain even if the Respondent had not invoked
the delaying procedures of this case just to procrastinate.
Granting an employer's right to invoke legal procedures
to test the Board's determinations in a representation case,
the Charging Party suggests that the remedy for the
Respondent's refusal to abide by these determinations until
exhaustion of all legal procedures should be more than
the conventional bargaining order. The employer who desires
to test the Board's determination should be required to
proceed at his peril so that should he fail to vindicate
his challenge to these determinations he should not material-
ly benefit from his miscalculation.
917
What the Charging Party seeks is "compensatory or
other financial relief" for the Respondent's employees who
were allegedly "victimized" by the Respondent's misconduct
and dilatory tactics. It is suggested that the remedy at
the present stage should merely require the Respondent
to make whole these employees for their losses with determi-
nation as to the precise sums to which they are entitled
to be left to "subsequent negotiations or proceedings."
The Charging Party is plainly asking for the type of make-
whole remedy which the Board customarily orders in cases
of 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharges with backpay due the
employees determined in a compliance proceeding if agree-
ment by the parties is not reached before then.
The Charging Party's critique of the conventional remedy
in 8(a)(5) cases testing the Board's collective-bargaining
certifications merits serious and sympathetic consideration.
In the course of my experience with numerous cases of
this sort,' I too have felt the inadequacy of a mere bargaining
order as the total remedy for an employer's refusal to
honor the Board's bargaining certificate to a union I appreci-
ate, as the Charging Party insists, the possiblility that
an employer in a representation proceeding may file specious
objections to an election with the purpose of delaying
bargaining with the union chosen by its employees to repre-
sent them. I am aware of the detriment to the employees
and their chosen representative by such tactics as depicted
by the Charging Party. Yet, I do not perceive in the
present case how an appropriate remedy of the kind sought
by the Charging Party can be fashioned.
I am not persuaded that the Respondent has undertaken
to exhaust its judicial remedies in Case 26-RC-2605 merely
to avoid its statutory bargaining obligation. Lack of basis
for this assumption would not, however, have deterred
me from proceeding to a make-whole or other equitable
remedy for, in my opinion, there is merit to the argument
that an employer testing the validity of a union's bargaining
certificate should be liable to its employees for the damages
caused them by the employer's failure to sustain an attack
upon the certificate. I am, however, deterred by the absence
in this case of any objective criteria by which it may
be decided that the employees did in fact lose material
benefits by the Respondent's actions or, if so, how these
losses could in this or in a subsequent compliance proceeding
be measured.
What the Charging Party would have me find is that
had the Respondent bargained with the Union pursuant
to its May 1966 request, it would at some "reasonable"
date thereafter have concluded an agreement with the Union
raising the wages of its employees to some unstated level.
The Charging Party proposes these two yardsticks for meas-
uring the gains which the employees would have derived
through bargaining:
1. By comparing the increases, both direct and indi-
rect, enjoyed by Respondent's employees from 1966
I Observe the comment by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in N L R B v Air Control Products of St Petersburg, Inc ,
335 F 2d 245, "The 8(a)(5) cases of this sort are legion " And by the same
court in N L R B v Douglas County Electric Membership Corporation,
supra, "Another of a growing list of cases where the Section 8(a)(5) failure to
bargain is the vehicle for testing the validity of the representation
proceeding
918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to the time the Board's order is complied with, with
the average increases negotiated by the Woodworkers
with other Arkansas-located employers engaged in the
manufacture and sale of lumber and related products.
2. There is the less desirable comparison of Respond-
ent's employees' economic gains with the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' average figures of negotiated increases
for the geographical area, the particular industry, or
for the manufacture and sale of lumber and related
products generally.
Neither of the foregoing criteria is sufficiently objective
tc.permit application.
One may only speculate as to the agreements the Union
would have obtained in collective bargaining with the
Respondent or, as to when any agreement would have
been concluded. The wage rates and benefits accorded
employees by other employers in the area in similar business-
es provide some but i:ot enough indication to establish
what agreements in these respects the Union would have
achieved through bargaining with the Respondent. The
Respondent might in good faith have simply refused to
meet the wages paid by other employers. Depending on
the condition of the labor market, the Respondent might
adamantly have withstood union pressure for wage increases
in the firm belief that neither the Union nor the employees
were able or willing to strike for their demands Conceivably
the Respondent could not and therefore would not have
paid the wages prevailing in other businesses. Perhaps the
Union, as in many cases, would have traded off wage
increases for other benefits such as seniority, arbitration,
or term of contract In the face of these imponderables,
I must, as the Board stated in another related situation,'
conclude that "it is speculative, and cannot be determined,
what or rates of pay might have governed [the employment
of the Respondent's employees] had the Respondent fulfilled
its obligation to bargain with their representative " Nor
do I forsee how in a subsequent compliance proceeding
these speculations could be dispelled. Accordingly, I shall
not expand the remedy hereinabove recommended.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Herman Wilson Lumber Company is an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees, including
truckdrivers, at the Respondent's Monticello, Arkansas,
plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional
employees, supervisors, watchmen, and guards as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
2 Chemrock Corporation, 151 NLRB 1074.
4. On March 22, 1966, and at all times thereafter the
Union was and now is the representative of a majority
of the Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit
described above for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5 By refusing on and after May 4, 1966, to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of all its employees in the above-described unit the Respond-
ent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally granting the employees in the above-
described appropriate unit on July 17, 1966, a general
wage increase without notice to and without bargaining
with the Union therefor the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this
proceeding, I recommend that Respondent Herman Wilson
Lumber Company, Monticello, Arkansas, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from the following:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International
Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive
representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and condition of employment.
(b) Unilaterally increasing the wage rates of its employees
in the appropriate unit or making any other changes in
their terms or conditions of employment without notice
to and opportunity for bargaining by the aforementioned
labor organization.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) On request, bargain collectively with International
Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit
and embody any understanding reached in a signed contract.
(b) Post at it plant at Monticello, Arkansas, the attached
notice marked "Appendix "' Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall,
after being duly signed by an authorized representative
of the Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notice to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words
"Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words
"a Decision and Order "
HERMAN WILSON LUMBER COMPANY
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26 in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.'
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director
for Region 26, in writing, within 10 days from the date of receipt
of this Order, what steps the Company has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that-
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with
International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all
our employees in the appropriate unit described below
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment , and other terms and conditions of employment
and, if an agreement is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed contract. The appropriate unit
is:
919
All production and maintenance employees,
including truckdnvers, at our Monticello, Arkan-
sas, plant excluding office clerical employees, pro-
fessional employees, supervisors, watchmen, and
guards as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT grant wage increases to our employees
in the above-described appropriate unit or make any
other changes in their terms or conditions of employ-
ment without first giving notice to International Wood-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, and opportunity
to this labor organization to bargain collectively with
us.
Dated By
HERMAN WILSON LUMBER
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative)
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Borad's Regional Office, 746 Federal
Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee
38103, Telephone 534-3161.