0720080043
05-29-2009
Herman Landrum, Complainant, v. Mary E. Peters, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.
Herman Landrum,
Complainant,
v.
Mary E. Peters,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0720080043
Hearing No. 530200600234X
Agency No. TD01B
DECISION
Following its May 28, 2008 final order, the agency filed an appeal which
the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). On appeal,
the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of relief
ordered by an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) pursuant to a finding of
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Additionally,
complainant filed a cross-appeal disputing the AJ's finding that he was
not subjected to harassment and retaliation, and is further requesting an
increase in relief. For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES
the agency's final order.
BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to this complaint, complainant worked as a
Supervisory Airways Transportation Systems Specialist at the Allegheny
County Airport in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania. Beginning in August 2004,
complainant's supervisor (S1) told complainant that he would have to
submit documentation to her for any and all sick leave. When complainant
asked why, S1 told him that she was required to ask that of everybody.
Complainant later found out that other employees were only required to
submit medical documentation if they took leave that lasted longer than
three days, or if their supervisor believed they were abusing their
sick leave.
On August 13, 2005, complainant applied for the position of Supervisory
Airway Transportation Systems Specialist, FV-2101-J, located
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and reporting to the Pittsburgh System
Management Office (SMO). Complainant and four other individuals were
placed on the selection list. S1 was one of the selecting officials.
Ultimately, two other individuals who had much less supervisory experience
and lesser qualifications were chosen for the position.
The same day complainant interviewed for the position, he received a
phone call from S1, who told him that he was going on a 90-day detail.
Complainant began his detail on September 20, 2005. While on detail,
complainant was supposed to receive opportunities for mentoring and
development under S1's guidance. Instead, complainant sat at S1's
secretary's desk while S1 was away on travel for most of the detail.
Complainant alleges that he was subjected to ridicule from his co-workers
and was humiliated while sitting at the secretary's desk.
On December 13, 2005, S1 denied complainant the use of 3.5 hours of
credit time, and she told complainant that he would have to request to
earn credit hours in advance. None of complainant's peers were required
to get advance permission to earn credit hours. Additionally, on January
31, 2006, complainant requested annual "spot leave" seven days in advance.
S1 told complainant that she needed him in the office that day, and he
could not use the leave unless he told her why he needed it.
Complainant alleges that after he filed his formal complaint of
discrimination against S1, she began undermining him to his subordinates.
Specifically, on an unspecified date, S1 told complainant that he had to
assign an employee to an unpopular job assignment, and that he should
expect the employee to file a union grievance after the assignment.
Complainant asked S1 if she would support him if a grievance were filed,
and S1 said yes. When the employee filed the grievance, S1 sided with
the employee instead of complainant. Further, on an unspecified date,
S1 assigned complainant to investigate and recommend discipline for
employee conduct issues, then failed to support his recommendations.
On January 5, 2006, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging
discrimination on the basis of his race (African-American) when he
was not selected for the position of Supervisory Airway Transportation
Systems Specialist, FV-2101-J. Further, complainant alleged that he
was subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliated against for
his prior protected EEO activity by S1.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing, which was held July 26 and 27, 2007. The AJ issued a
decision on January 31, 2008, finding that complainant established that he
was discriminated against on the basis of race when he was not selected
for the Supervisory position. The AJ further found that complainant
failed to establish that he was subjected to retaliation or a hostile
work environment. The AJ ordered the agency to award complainant the next
available Supervisory Airway Transportation Systems Specialist position
in Pittsburgh, PA, or any other location to which complainant agreed;
the difference in pay between his current position and the position he
was not selected for; non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $9,250.00;
and training for the responsible management officials. The AJ did
not award any pecuniary damages, and did not provide an explanation or
justification for not awarding pecuniary damages. On April 15, 2008,
the AJ issued an additional decision awarding complainant attorney's
fees and costs in the amount of $8,995.58. Complainant had originally
requested $17,638.50 in attorney's fees and $352.66 in costs, but the
AJ awarded complainant half the requested amount since complainant was
successful on half of his complaint.
On May 28, 2008, the agency issued a final order. In the final order, the
agency adopted the AJ's finding that complainant was discriminated against
when he was not selected for the Supervisory position. The agency also
adopted the AJ's finding that complainant failed to establish that he was
retaliated against or subjected to a hostile work environment. However,
the agency rejected the AJ's award of compensatory damages and appealed
to the Commission. Subsequently complainant filed a cross-appeal.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, the agency does not contest the AJ's finding that complainant
was discriminated against when he was not selected for the Supervisory
position. The agency asserts that the AJ's award of compensatory damages
was inappropriate, because complainant did not establish that the harm
he suffered was the result of the non-selection.
In his cross-appeal, complainant asserts that while the AJ was correct
in finding that he was discriminated against when he was not selected
for the Supervisory position, the AJ erred in finding that he was not
subjected to harassment and retaliation. Further, complainant asserts
that compensatory damages should be increased to include additional
out-of-pocket expenses. Finally, complainant asserts that the AJ erred
when he reduced the attorney's fees and costs by one half.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or
on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or
other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so
lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.
See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).
Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment
Complainant alleged that he was retaliated against and subjected to
a hostile work environment when he was placed in a detail position,
was required to submit medical documentation for sick leave, was denied
the use of credit time, and when S1 undermined him to his subordinates.
The AJ found that complainant failed to establish that he was retaliated
against or was subjected to a hostile work environment.
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to
an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal
claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell
Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,
425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),
and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473
(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of
reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;
(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he
or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus
exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire
v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25,
2000).
In determining whether an objectively hostile or abusive work environment
existed, the trier of fact should consider whether a reasonable person in
the complainant's circumstances would have found the alleged behavior to
be hostile or abusive. Even if harassing conduct produces no tangible
effects, such as psychological injury, a complainant may assert a
Title VII cause of action if the discriminatory conduct was so severe
or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees
because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin. Rideout
v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01933866 (November 22, 1995)
(citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993))
request for reconsideration denied EEOC Request No. 05970995 (May 20,
1999). Also, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances,
including the following: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
The AJ found that S1 did not know of complainant's EEO activity until
May 10, 2006, and because the alleged retaliatory acts occurred prior
to this date, complainant failed to establish retaliation. However,
the record shows that S1 was contacted by an EEO counselor in an attempt
to resolve the issue through ADR during the informal complaint stage.
While there is no date for the email, an unsuccessful ADR occurred on
January 9, 2006. Therefore, the record establishes that S1 knew that
complainant engaged in protected activity by January 9, 2006.
Despite this, we agree with the AJ that complainant failed to establish
that S1's actions were retaliatory. Specifically, complainant alleges
that he was retaliated against when he was required to submit medical
documentation for sick leave. However, complainant admitted that he
was required to submit medical documentation beginning in August 2004,
over one year prior to when complainant first engaged in protected EEO
activity. Similarly, complainant was put into the detail position in
August 2005, which was approximately five months prior to complainant's
protected activity. Complainant also alleges that he was retaliated
against when S1 denied him the use of credit time in December 2005.
This action also occurred prior to when S1 had knowledge that complainant
engaged in protected activity. Finally, complainant alleges that he was
retaliated against when S1 undermined him to his subordinates. However,
complainant failed to identify dates for these allegations. As a result,
complainant is unable to establish that the alleged retaliatory acts
occurred after S1 was aware of complainant's engagement in protected
activity, or that a temporal nexus exists between the protected activity
and the alleged retaliatory acts. Therefore, we affirm the finding
that the claim of retaliation was not established. Additionally, we
affirm the finding that complainant was not subjected to harassment,
as the alleged retaliatory acts were not severe or pervasive enough to
establish a hostile work environment.
Non-Pecuniary Damages
The AJ awarded complainant non-pecuniary damages in the amount of
$9,250.00. The agency asserts that the AJ incorrectly awarded complainant
non-pecuniary damages for harm that he suffered from his unsuccessful
retaliation and hostile work environment claims. Specifically, the
agency contends that the AJ failed to establish the causation between
the non-selection and the harm complainant suffered.
Awards are limited to compensation for the actual harm suffered
as a result of the agency's discriminatory actions. See Carter
v. Duncan-Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Notice at 13.
The agency is only responsible for those damages that are clearly shown
to be caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct. Carle v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993); Fazekas v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01954627 (April 7, 1997); see also
Johnson v. Department of Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961812 (June 18,
1998). To recover damages, the complainant must prove that the agency's
discriminatory actions were the cause of the pecuniary or non-pecuniary
loss. Notice at 8. An award of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary
losses, including emotional harm, should reflect the extent to which the
agency's discriminatory action directly or proximately caused the harm
and the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. Notice at
11-12 ("To recover damages, the complaining party must prove that the
employer's discriminatory act or conduct was the cause of his loss. The
critical question is whether the complaining party incurred the pecuniary
losses as a result of the employer's discriminatory action or conduct").
At the hearing, complainant testified to difficulty sleeping, an impact on
his relationship with his wife and children, missing work due to sickness,
an increase in medication, and the need for professional counseling.
The agency asserts on appeal that complainant's harm did not begin until
approximately four months after his non-selection.
In the brief in support of the cross-appeal, complainant's attorney
stated, "The agency is correct that [complainant's] emotional problems
started several months after his non-selection." Despite this
acknowledgement, complainant's attorney asserts that had he been selected
for the position, the harm would not have occurred. As an example,
complainant's attorney states that had complainant been selected for the
Supervisory position, he would not have been subjected to the humiliation
of sitting at a secretary's desk during his detail. However, during
the hearing, complainant stated that the emotional distress began in
January 2006 "after [he] came back from [his] detail and after the
Christmas break," and was a result of S1's retaliation and the hostile
work environment.
Based on a review of the entire record, we find that complainant failed
to establish that the agency's discriminatory non-selection was the
proximate cause of the harm he suffered. See Ortiz v. Social Security
Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0120062670 (February 4, 2009) (finding
that complainant was not entitled to compensatory damages because he
failed to establish the requisite proximate cause between the agency's
adverse action and the alleged harm). We note that it is complainant's
burden to provide objective evidence in support of his claim and proof
linking the damages to the alleged discrimination. Papas v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01930547 (March 17, 1994). It is clear
in the record that the harm complainant suffered happened four months
after his non-selection, and was the result of the alleged retaliation
and harassment beginning in January 2006. Because complainant was not
successful on his retaliation and harassment claims, he cannot recover
for those claims. Therefore, we find that complainant is not entitled
to an award of non-pecuniary damages.
Pecuniary Damages
Complainant asserts that the AJ failed to address out-of-pocket expenses
that complainant incurred as a result of the agency's discrimination.
Specifically, complainant asserts that he should be awarded: $214.95
for attorney retention (parking and mileage related to meeting with
attorney and attending hearings); $471.99 for prescription co-pays;
$100.00 for doctors' visits co-pays; and $10,888.25 for mileage for the
commuting difference between complainant's current job and the denied job.
The agency did not object to these expenses during the hearing.
Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses that are incurred as a result
of the employer's unlawful action, including moving expenses, medical
expanses, psychiatric expenses, physical therapy expenses, and other
quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory
and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 14, 1992), at 11-12, 14. We have
already determined that any emotional or medical harm complainant suffered
arose from complainant's unsuccessful retaliation and harassment claims,
and as a result, complainant is not entitled to out-of-pocket expenses
related to that harm. Additionally, we find that complainant is not
entitled to reimbursement for attorney retention in regards to parking
at the attorney's office and mileage to and from the attorney's office.
This harm, flowing from the EEO process itself, is not compensable.
See Rajterowski v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01984767
(June 20, 2000) (calls to complainant's EEO representative are not
compensable to complainant); Roundtree v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC
Request No. 05950919 (February 16, 1996) (damages only available for harm
caused by the discriminatory action, not for that caused by the processing
of the underlying complaint); Loving v. Department of the Treasury,
EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (September 3, 1997) (damages not available for
claimant's concern that she spent much time prosecuting her complaints).
Therefore, complainant cannot recover for these out-of-pocket expenses.
However, we find that complainant may recover for the cost of commuting
between his current job and the denied job, because had the agency
not discriminated and had complainant been selected for the position,
he would not have incurred those costs. Complainant asserts that he drove
an additional 25 miles one way to the Allegheny County Airport than if he
had drive to the Pittsburgh International Airport. Complainant drove this
distance twice a day for 449 days after his non-selection. Complainant
asserted that he should be awarded 48.5 cents per mile (the 2007 General
Services Administration reimbursement rate for privately owned vehicles),
at a total of $10,888.25. We find that this amount is reasonable.
Attorney's Fees and Costs
On April 15, 2008, the AJ issued a decision incorporating the award
of attorney's fees and costs. The AJ found that complainant's claims
were fractionable into two equal claims of equal weight, and therefore
complainant was entitled to half of the requested attorney's fees and
costs because he was only successful on the non-selection claim. As a
result, complainant was awarded $8,819.25 in attorney's fees and $176.33
in costs. After reviewing the entire record, including the documents
in complainant's cross-appeal, we agree that complainant's claims were
equally fractionable into two claims, and we agree that complainant is
only entitled to half of the requested attorney's fees and costs since
he was only successful on half of his claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the agency's
final decision, and order the agency to comply with the order below.
ORDER
To the extent that it has not already done so, the agency is hereby
ordered to:
1. Within sixty (60) calendar days from the date this decision becomes
final, the agency shall award complainant $10,888.25 in pecuniary
damages;
2. Within sixty (60) calendar days from the date this decision becomes
final, the agency shall award complainant $8,819.25 in attorney's fees and
$176.33 in costs, and any additional reasonable attorney's fees and costs
that were incurred during this appeal (see "Attorney's Fees," below).
3. The agency shall award complainant the position of Supervisory Airway
Transportation Systems Specialist, FV-2101-J, or a comparable position
in the Pittsburgh SCC, or in any other SSC to which complainant agrees;
4. The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay, with
interest, and other benefits due complainant pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.501. The back pay shall reflect the difference in pay between
complainant's current position and the Supervisory Airway Transportation
Systems Specialist position he applied for. The difference in pay
shall be calculated from the period beginning October 16, 2005, and
until complainant is placed in the Supervisory Airway Transportation
Systems Specialist, FV-2101-J, position or a comparable position in the
Pittsburgh SCC, or in any other SSC to which complainant agrees;
5. The agency shall take action to ensure that S1 is never placed in a
supervisory role over complainant;
6. Within sixty (60) calendar clays of the date that this decision
becomes final, the agency shall provide all management officials at
its Allegheny County Airport in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania and the
Pittsburgh System Management Office with at least eight (8) hours of
EEO training regarding their obligations and responsibilities under the
federal employment anti-discrimination laws, paying particular attention
to disparate treatment;
7. The agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action
against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not
consider training to be disciplinary action. The agency shall report
its decision to the compliance officer. If the agency decides to take
disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the agency
decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s)
for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible
management officials have left the agency's employ, the agency shall
furnish documentation of their departure date(s); and
8. The agency shall post the attached notice as described below.
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the
agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due complainant,
including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G0900)
The agency is ordered to post at its Allegheny County Airport in West
Mifflin, Pennsylvania, and the Pittsburgh System Management Office
facilities copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after
being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall
be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date
this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)
consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take
reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be
submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph
entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)
calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid
by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees
to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar
days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall
be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,
DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,
and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.
If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant
may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action
to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following
an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,
1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant
has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in
accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil
Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject
to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of
the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0408)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion
of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion
of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after
one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your
complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until
such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.
If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,
identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 29, 2009
Date
2
0720080043
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
11
0720080043
12
0720080043