Henry M. DeLaTorre, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 11, 2010
0120092695 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 11, 2010)

0120092695

06-11-2010

Henry M. DeLaTorre, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.


Henry M. DeLaTorre,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092695

Hearing No. 550-2009-00143X

Agency No. 4F-956-0179-07

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's April 3, 2009 final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Manager, Customer Service, at the agency's Hughes Station facility

in Fresno, California. On November 25, 2007, complainant filed an EEO

complaint alleging that he was discriminated against on the bases of

race/national origin (Hispanic)1 when:

1. On August 9, 2007, complainant was told that his request for

a lateral transfer to the position of Postmaster, Clovis California,

was denied.

2. On various occasions, complainant was denied OIC/detail

assignments.

3. On December 18, 2007, complainant was notified that he was not

selected for the Selma Postmaster position.

By letter dated December 24, 2007, the agency dismissed claim (2) for

untimely EEO Counselor contact. The agency found that complainant failed

to specify the dates upon which he learned that his requests for Officer

in Charge (OIC) or detail assignments to other positions had been denied.

Accordingly, the agency found that the incidents to which complainant

refers in claim (2), did not occur within 45 days of complainant's initial

request for counseling on August 21, 2007. The agency therefore dismissed

claim (2) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a)(2).2 The agency accepted

the remaining claims for investigation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested

a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case determined sua sponte that the

complaint did not warrant a hearing and over the complainant's objections,

issued a decision without a hearing on March 16, 2009.

In her decision, the AJ found the following facts were undisputed.

Complainant applied for the position of Postmaster of the Clovis,

California post office in March 2007. Complainant was subsequently

informed that the vacancy announcement did not draw the number of

applicants the selecting official (S1) desired, and so, the position

was reposted for applications.3 Complainant requested that the agency

consider his application for a non-competitive re-assignment to an EAS-22

level Postmaster position. Complainant received an interview, but the

selecting official notified complainant that he would not be selected

for the Clovis position. The selecting official (S1) stated that he

believed complainant did not possess the leadership skills necessary to

deal with the issues at the Clovis Post Office. Further, the AJ noted

that S1 explained that complainant's answers to the interview questions

did not persuade S1 that complainant would be successful in the position

if selected. The AJ found no dispute that no selection for the Clovis

postmaster position was made in 2007. Further, the AJ found that though

complainant disagreed with S1's evaluation of his skills, nothing in

the evidence showed that complainant's national origin (Hispanic) played

any role in S1's decision not to select complainant for the position.

With respect to the Selma Postmaster position, the AJ found that again,

complainant received an interview for the position, but was not selected.

The AJ noted that S2, the selecting official, explained that he found the

selectee, E1, was more suitable for the Selma Postmaster position based

upon his answers to S2's interview questions. Further, the AJ observed

that S2 had made several postmaster selections in 2007 through 2008 and

that S2 has selected two Caucasian females, one Asian male (E1), and two

Hispanic females for similar positions. The AJ found that complainant

presented no evidence that S2's explanation for his selection of E1 was

a pretext to mask discrimination.

Accordingly, the AJ found the material facts were undisputed and

that taking every reasonable inference in the light most favorable to

complainant, complainant did not show that his national origin (Hispanic)

motivated the agency's decisions. The agency subsequently issued a

final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove

that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

On appeal, complainant states that the AJ's decision fails to explain

why complainant's request for a downgrade or lateral reassignment was

denied while other employees, not in his race/national origin protected

class were granted their requests for lateral transfers and downgrades.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

We find AJ properly issued her decision without a hearing. We concur with

the AJ that the material facts are undisputed. We find no dispute that

complainant applied for and was qualified for the position of postmaster

for both the Clovis Post Office and for the Selma Post Office. Further,

neither party disputes that no selection was made for the Clovis Post

Office in 2007. We find nothing in the record shows that complainant's

application was treated differently than that of any other applicant,

nor that applicants outside of complainant's protected classes received

preferential treatment with respect to the Clovis position in 2007.

We note that with respect to claim (3), we find that both complainant

and the selectee, E1, applied for the position and both were qualified.

We do not find that complainant's qualifications were plainly superior to

those possessed by E1 and we decline, as did the AJ, to second guess S2's

determination that E1 was the best qualified candidate for the position of

Postmaster at the Selma Post Office based upon the applications submitted

and upon S2's evaluations of the candidates' interviews.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 11, 2010

__________________

Date

1 Complainant's complaint and various agency documents, list the basis

of his claims as race (Hispanic). The AJ reframed the basis of the

complaint as race/national origin (Hispanic).

2 We find the AJ did not address claim (2) in her decision and complainant

does not challenge the agency's dismissal of claim (2) on appeal.

Therefore claim (2) is not at issue in this decision.

3 The record shows that the position of Postmaster for the Clovis Post

Office was reposted a number of times before a candidate was selected

in May 2008. Complainant subsequently filed an additional complaint

in which he alleged discrimination after learning that a candidate had

been selected. Complainant appealed the agency's decision regarding

that complaint, docketed by the Commission as Henry DeLaTorre v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120092694.

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0120092695

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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