01986705
03-29-2001
Henry D. Hawkins, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Henry D. Hawkins v. USPS
01986705
March 29, 2001
.
Henry D. Hawkins,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01986705
Agency No. 4F-907-1057-96
Hearing No. 340-97-3041X
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision
concerning his formal complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the final agency
decision is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established by
preponderant evidence that he was discriminated on the bases of race
(Black), sex (male), and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when management
instructed him to work overtime but later reassigned the work to another
employee, and when he volunteered to work on Christmas Day but was not
listed on the holiday work schedule.
BACKGROUND
Complainant, employed as a Special Delivery Messenger at the
Hillcrest Station of the agency's Inglewood Sectional Center, filed a
formal complaint on March 4, 1996, in which he alleged what has been
identified as the issue presented. The agency accepted the complaint
for investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant
was provided with a copy of the investigative file and informed of
his right to elect a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)
or an immediate final decision from the agency. Complainant elected
the former. Consequently, the case was forwarded to the appropriate EEOC
District Office, and subsequently assigned to an AJ. After examining the
evidentiary record, the AJ determined that there were no material facts
in dispute, and therefore issued a decision without a hearing finding no
discrimination. The agency's final decision adopted the AJ's findings.
It is from that decision that complainant appeals.
Information in the evidence of record indicates that on December 12, 1995,
complainant's supervisor informed complainant that he would work two hours
of overtime that day. Later that day, the station manager changed the
supervisor's instruction, and reassigned the work to a casual employee.
According to management officials, the agency's overtime policy is to,
first, refer to the overtime desired list (OTDL) and use the employees on
that list for up to ten hours of overtime in the order of management's
discretion so long as the amount of overtime distributed is equitable
at the end of the quarter. Second, the agency mandates that all
employees work any overtime if needed to complete their assignments.
And third, the agency utilizes anyone on the OTDL to cover any overtime
hours needed after that. But before availing themselves of the agency's
overtime policy, management officials use casual and PTF employees to the
fullest extent. That prevents the agency from having to pay employees
for overtime when employees are available who can be paid straight time.
The evidence of record also indicates that complainant volunteered to work
on Christmas Day in 1995. According to an agency official, complainant
was not put on the holiday work schedule because he volunteered the
day after the holiday sign up sheet had closed. That agency official
stated that when complainant informed her that he was interested in
working on Christmas Day, she had already posted the holiday schedule
after scheduling in the volunteers that had signed the holiday sign
up sheet before it had closed. She also stated that when she learned
that complainant wanted to work on Christmas, she contacted another
supervisor to see if that supervisor could schedule complainant for
the holiday. That supervisor agreed to allow complainant to work on
Christmas Day doing express deliveries for the North Inglewood station.
Complainant was informed of the decision to allow him to work on the
holiday, but failed to report to work on that day.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Decision Without a Hearing
The United States Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is
appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal
and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine
issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non moving party must be
believed at the summary judgement state and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the non moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is �material� if it has the potential
to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgement is not appropriate.
In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an
AJ may only properly consider summary judgement after there has been
adequate opportunity for development of the record. After examining
the testimonies of the various witnesses and other evidence provided by
the parties, we find that the AJ's decision to issue a ruling without
a hearing was appropriate.
Race, Sex, and Reprisal Discrimination
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging
discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see, Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation
for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976),
aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to
retaliation cases). First, complainant must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the agency must articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency
is successful, then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was
a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case to whether s/he has demonstrated by
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
In this case, the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions. Specifically, the agency stated that complainant
was not allowed to work overtime on December 12, 1995, because the work
available was reassigned consistent with the agency's overtime policy.
The agency also stated that complainant was not initially scheduled to
work on Christmas Day, 1995, because he volunteered a day after the sign
up period had lapsed.
Because the agency has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the alleged discriminatory events, complainant now bears
the burden of establishing that the agency's stated reason is merely a
pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this
by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.
Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
In this case, complainant has failed to meet that burden. Complainant
presented no evidence which suggests that the agency's stated reasons
were pretext designed to mask discriminatory animus. For that reason,
his discrimination claim fails.
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's
decision summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws. We discern no basis to disturb
the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,
including complainant's arguments on appeal, the agency's response,
and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision,
the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 29, 2001
__________________
Date