Hempstead Lincoln Mercury Motors Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 16, 2007

349 N.L.R.B. 552 (N.L.R.B. 2007)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
349 NLRB No. 52
552
Hempstead Lincoln Mercury Motors Corp. and Local
917, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Case 29–CA–27601
March 16, 2007
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND REMANDING
BY MEMBERS SCHAUMBER, KIRSANOW, AND WALSH
Upon a charge filed by Local 917, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters (Union), on April 24, 2006,1 the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint and notice of hearing on September
28, 2006, against Hempstead Lincoln Mercury Motors
Corp., the Respondent, alleging that it violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.2
Copies of the charge and the complaint were properly
served on the Respondent. The answer to the complaint
was due October 12, 2006.
The Regional Office did not receive an answer by Oc-
tober 12. On Monday, October 16, the Respondent’s
counsel telephoned the Regional Office. Counsel ac-
knowledged missing the October 12 deadline, and stated
that he would fax and send by overnight mail his answer
that day. The Regional Office received the answer the
next day, October 17, unaccompanied by a request for an
extension of time.
On October 30, counsel for the General Counsel filed a
Motion for Default Judgment. On November 1, the
Board issued an order transferring the proceeding to it-
self and a Notice to Show Cause why the motion should
not be granted. On November 3, the Respondent filed a
memorandum in opposition to counsel for the General
Counsel’s Motion for Default Judgment. On November
9, counsel for the General Counsel filed a response to the
Respondent’s memorandum in opposition.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
In the memorandum in opposition, counsel for the Re-
spondent avers the following. On Monday, October 16,
he spoke by telephone with the supervisory attorney for
Region 29 assigned to this case. He told her that his re-
cent work schedule had prevented his filing an answer by
October 12. When he told her that he would send the
answer by overnight mail and by fax that day, the super-
visory attorney responded by telling him “it was not a
problem.”

1 All dates are in 2006, unless otherwise noted.
2 The complaint alleges that, beginning in December 2005, the Re-
spondent failed to pay a required 20-percent increase in its monthly
contribution to the Union’s pension fund, and thereby did not fulfill its
obligations under the expired collective-bargaining agreement.
Counsel for the Respondent asserts that, on those facts,
“the need for a formal request for an extension was obvi-
ated” because he had “obtained authorization to file”
late.3 Counsel also contends that the Regional Office
disregarded the Board’s Casehandling Manual, Part One,
which states:
10280.3 No Answer Filed;
Motion for Default Judgment
If an answer has not been filed within the time allowed,
counsel for the General Counsel should communicate
in writing with respondent’s counsel, or with respon-
dent if it is not represented, advising that no answer has
been filed in accord with the Rules and Regulations and
that if an answer is not filed within a certain period of
time (normally not to exceed 1 week from date of writ-
ten communication), counsel for the General Counsel
will file a Motion for Default Judgment with the Board.
If an answer is not filed within the applicable deadline,
counsel for the General Counsel should file a Motion
for Default Judgment with the Board.
It is undisputed that the Regional Office sent no such writ-
ten communication.
In her pleadings, counsel for the General Counsel ac-
knowledges that the Respondent’s counsel telephoned
the Regional Office on October 16, but she does not ad-
mit or deny that the supervisory attorney assigned to the
case stated that the late filing “was not a problem.”
Counsel for the General Counsel maintains that, even if
the supervisory attorney made that statement, the Re-
spondent’s counsel could not have relied on it to his det-
riment because the deadline for filing an answer had al-
ready passed by the time of their telephone conversation.
In response to counsel for the Respondent’s citation of
the Casehandling Manual, counsel for the General Coun-
sel cites cases holding that the Casehandling Manual is
not binding on Regional Office personnel.4

3 The Respondent relies on Stage Employees IATSE (Crossing
Guard Productions), 316 NLRB 808, 808–809 (1995), where the Board
denied summary judgment after a misunderstanding arising out of a
telephone conversation between counsel led to a late-filed answer.
4 Bricklayers Local 31, 309 NLRB 970 (1992), enfd. mem. 992 F.2d
1217 (6th Cir. 1993); Superior Industries, 289 NLRB 834, 835 fn. 13
(1988), enfd. mem. 902 F.2d 40, 41 (9th Cir. 1990). The Casehandling
Manual is issued by the General Counsel, not the Board, and we have
repeatedly stated, with court approval, that it is not binding authority on
the Board. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cedar Tree Press, Inc., 169 F.3d 794,
796 and cases cited in fn. 2 (3d Cir. 1999); Sioux City Foundry Co. v.
NLRB, 154 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1998), citing Children’s National
Medical Center, 322 NLRB 205, 205 fn. 1 (1996). Indeed, as the
Casehandling Manual expressly states in its introduction, it is intended
to be used for guidance only, and it does not bind the Board or even the
conduct of the Regional Offices or other General Counsel staff. Ac-
cordingly, we do not join our colleague’s statement that it is “mislead-
HEMPSTEAD LINCOLN MERCURY MOTORS CORP. 553
Analysis
We find, in the absence of any denial, that the Re-
gional Office’s supervisory attorney made the statement
attributed to her by counsel for the Respondent. And,
even though counsel for the General Counsel is correct in
asserting that the Respondent was already in default at
the time of the telephone conversation, we do not find
that fact dispositive: Section 10280.3 of the Casehan-
dling Manual, quoted above, contemplates that additional
time will usually be granted after the time for filing the
answer has passed, and our case law demonstrates that
such informal extensions have been granted in those cir-
cumstances.5 On the facts of this case, we find that the
supervisory attorney effectively extended the filing dead-
line, in a manner akin to that suggested by Casehandling
Manual Section 10280.3, by her oral response to counsel

ing” for the Board or the General Counsel to disseminate the manual
but take the position that it is not binding authority.
5 See, e.g., Lake States Industrial Services, 349 NLRB No. 25
(2007), not reported in bound volume (granting default judgment where
the respondent missed its filing deadline, which the Region had ex-
tended following the respondent’s failure to file by the due date in the
complaint); Willis Roof Consulting, 349 NLRB No. 24 (2007), not
reported in bound volume (same).
for the Respondent. Accordingly, the General Counsel’s
Motion for Default Judgment is denied.6
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the General Counsel’s Motion for
Default Judgment is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding is re-
manded to the Regional Director for Region 29 for fur-
ther appropriate action.

6 Member Schaumber additionally observes that the Board generally
disfavors default judgments: “While the Board strongly encourages
strict compliance with its procedural rules, including those concerning
the manner of filing and serving answers to complaints, the Board
recognizes that the law favors a determination on the merits.”
Paolicelli, 335 NLRB 881, 882 (2001) (citing M. J. McNally, Inc., 302
NLRB 120 (1991)). Moreover, the Casehandling Manual clearly indi-
cates that counsel for the General Counsel “should” send an advisory
letter and give a brief extension where a respondent has failed to file a
timely answer. The Board holds its Casehandling Manual out to the
public, and the home page of the Board’s public website includes a link
to it. While there is language in the introduction indicating that the
Manual is not binding, there is additional language that it is “expected”
that Regional Directors and their staffs will follow the Manual’s guide-
lines, although there will be situations in which they may adapt the
guidelines to the circumstances. Member Schaumber finds it mislead-
ing to take the position that the Casehandling Manual provision regard-
ing untimely filing is not binding (see cases at fn. 4, above) while si-
multaneously holding it out to the public as indicating the manner in
which the General Counsel should operate.