Heck's Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 28, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 186 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Heck's Inc. and Food Store Employees Union, Local
#347 Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO. Case
9--CA-3728
June 28, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On March 30, 1967, Trial Examiner Sidney Sher-
man issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Decision and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions ' of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Heck's Inc., Ashland,
Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order.
i The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's finding that the
union authorization card of employee Morris was properly authenticated,
and, by motion incorporated in its brief, moves that the record be
reopened and a subpena be issued, requiring the Trial Examiner to appear
and testify concerning his qualifications as a handwriting expert. The
Respondent contends that failure to grant its motion should result in the
rejection of Morris' card, inasmuch as Morris did not testify at the hearing
and no other witness testified that he saw Morris sign the card.
After the hearing the parties stipulated that Morris was unavailable to
testify, his whereabouts being unknown. The Trial Examiner (sec III, C,
3, b, 4 of his Decision), after comparing the purported siggnature of Mor-
ns on the union authorization card with a specimen signature taken from
the Respondent's payroll records, concluded that the card was signed by
Morris, and found that such a comparison is a proper method of proving
the authenticity of a signature (see In. 29 of the Trial Examiner's Decision
and the authorities cited therein) The Trial Examiner further found that
it is proper to presume that the card was signed on the date shown thereon
(fn. 30 of the Trial Examiner's Decision).
We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that Morris ' card was
properly authenticated . (See also Combined Metal Mfg Corp., 123
NLRB 895; Phdamon Laboratories , Inc, 131 NLRB 80, enfd. 298
F.2d 176 (C.A. 2).) In any case , we note that even without Morris'
card the Union had a majority of employees in the appropriate unit
when it made its recognition demand Accordingly , as we find the
Respondent 's motion to reopen the record lacking in merit, it is hereby
denied.
2 We agree that the Respondent 's polling of its employees was in the
circumstances of this case violative of Sec . 8(a)(1) of the Act. Therefore,
we find it unnecessary to rely on or adopt the Trial Examiner's additional
or alternative grounds for that finding , as set forth in the last sentence
of fn 10 of his Decision.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SIDNEY SHERMAN, Trial Examiner: The instant charge
was served upon Respondent on October 22, 1965,' the
complaint issued on December 16, and the case was
heard on February 1, 1967. The issues litigated related to
allegations of unlawful interrogation, threats of reprisal,
creating the impression of surveillance, and unlawful
refusal to bargain. After the hearing briefs were filed by
Respondent and the General Counsel. On March 16,
1967, an order was issued proposing certain corrections
in the record and the incorporation therein of certain ex-
hibits, and disposing of certain other matters. No objec-
tion has been received to this order, and it is hereby
affirmed.'
Upon the entire record and my observation of the wit-
nesses, I adopt the following findings of fact and conclu-
sions:
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Heck's, Inc.,3 herein called Respondent, is a West Vir-
ginia corporation engaged in the operation of retail stores
at various locations in the States of West Virginia' and
Kentucky. The Respondent annually has gross sales of
more than $500,000, and annually purchases from
out-of-State points goods valued in excess of $50,000.
Respondent is engaged in commerce under the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Food Store Employees Union , Local #347, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, is a
labor organization under the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues
The pleadings, as amended at the hearing, raise the fol-
lowing issues:
1. Whether Respondent's president, Haddad, told em-
ployees on or about May 24, that he had discharged an
employee when she admitted signing a union card?
i All events herein occurred in 1965, unless otherwise stated
2 In addition, it is now ordered (1) that Respondent' s motions to strike
appearing at pp 24 and 28 of the transcript, as to which ruling was
reserved at the hearing, are hereby granted, and (2) that Respondent's ob-
jection to evidence, which objection appears at p 100 of the transcript,
and as to which ruling was reserved at the hearing, is hereby granted and
the evidence objected to is hereby struck.
3 Respondent's name appears as amended at the hearing
166 NLRB No. 32
HECK'S INC. 187
2. Whether the interrogation of employees on October
8, by Respondent's operations manager, Darnell, vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act or was privileged under
the Board's Blue Flash doctrine?
3. Whether Respondent's assistant store manager,
Mitchell, unlawfully created the impression of surveil-
lance?
4. Whether Mitchell told an employee that another su-
pervisor had been discharged because of the Union and
invited the employee to resign?
5. Whether Respondent's admitted refusal to recog-
nize the Union violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act?
B. Sequence of Events
Respondent operates a chain of discount stores in Ken-
tucky and West Virginia. The instant case involves only
its Ashland, Kentucky, store.
The instant organizing campaign began early in 1965,
and by October 8 the Union had obtained a number of
signed cards from persons working in the Ashland store.
On May 24, during the foregoing campaign, Respond-
ent's president, Haddad, addressed the assembled store
employees, and, after telling them, in effect, that the sig-
ning of a union card would not immunize them from
disciplinary action, cited an incident involving the
discharge of an employee in another store who had volun-
teered to him the information that she had signed a union
card. There was some conflict in the testimony at the
hearing, which will be considered below, as to the precise
reason given by Haddad for the discharge of that em-
ployee.
On October 8, Union Agent Spencer called Respond-
ent's counsel, Holroyd, stated that he had obtained
signed cards from a majority of Respondent's Ashland
employees, and requested recognition. Holroyd sug-
gested that Spencer write him a letter to that effect. On
October 8, Respondent's operating manager, Darnell,
asked virtually all the employees in the Ashland store
whether he (or she) wanted to be represented by the
Union. In a letter of October 11 to Holroyd, Spencer re-
peated the substance of the foregoing oral demand, offer-
ing to show Respondent the Union's cards. On October
13, Holroyd replied by letter, declining to recognize the
Union because of an alleged ambiguity in the Union's def-
inition of the unit, and because a poll taken by Respond-
ent demonstrated that the majority of the Ashland em-
ployees did not wish to be represented by the Union. On
October 25, Spencer again wrote Holroyd, renewing the
Union's demand, but received no reply.
There was uncontradicted testimony by employee
Clare that early in October Assistant Store Manager
Mitchell, an admitted supervisor,4 told her that Respond-
ent knew which employees had signed, and which had
not signed, union cards, and that the Union attained
majority status when Clare signed a union card (on Oc-
tober 6).
C. Discussion
1. Union animus
Respondent ' s union animus is amply attested by the
Board's findings in 150 NLRB 1565 (Ashland store), 156
NLRB 760 (Parkersburg store), 158 NLRB 121 (Parker-
sburg store), 159 NLRB 1151 (Huntington store), and
159 NLRB 1331 (Huntington store). Perusal of these
cases shows that at the foregoing stores Respondent
reacted to a union organizational campaign by mounting
a counteroffensive of interrogation and threats, did not
hesitate to resort to discriminatory discharges, and that
it consistently rejected requests for recognition. Thus, in
150 NLRB 1565, involving a campaign in 1964 by a dif-
ferent union (Retail Clerks) to organize the instant store,
it was found that Respondent, through its president, Had-
dad, and operations manager, Darnell, engaged in exten-
sive interrogation, that a supervisor threatened em-
ployees with discharge for union activity, and that an ac-
tive union adherent was, in fact, discriminatorily
discharged.
2. The 8(a)(1) issues
a. The Haddad speech
Riffe testified that on May 24, President Haddad told
the assembled employees at the Ashland store that they
could sign all the union cards they wished, but they still
had to do their work, and that he then mentioned the case
of a girl in Respondent's Parkersburg store who after
volunteering to him the information that she had signed
a union card, had been "fired on the spot." Menshouse
testified to the same effect, and Maynard corroborated
this version with only the, minor embellishment that Had-
dad asserted that the Parkersburg employee had
"flaunted" the fact that she had signed a union card.
While agreeing otherwise with Riffe, Clare testified that
Haddad interpolated the-explanation that the girl in Par-
kersburg had been discharged because she took the posi-
tion, in effect, that, having signed a union card, she was
free to neglect her work, and Carter testified to substan-
tially the same effect.
All the foregoing employee witnesses were called by
the General Counsel and were apparently sincere. Their
testimony may be reconciled on the assumption that Had-
dad, purposely or otherwise, cast his remarks in such a
form that they were susceptible of different interpreta-
tions. Thus, if he stated, as Maynard testified, that the
employees could sign all the union cards they wanted, but
still had to do their work, and, that he had discharged a
Parkersburg employee for flaunting the fact that she had
signed a union card, it was understandable that some of
the employees, like Clare, would interpret the last re-
mark, taken in context, as implying that the case of the
Parkersburg employee was given as an illustration of
Haddad's thesis that the signing of a union card did not
relieve the employees of their obligation to do their job.
However, if, as Menshouse, Riffe, and Maynard testified,
Haddad did not make it clear that the discharge of the
Parkersburg employee was for any reason other than her
avowal of union adherence, it was expectable that some,
at least, of the employees would construe his remarks as
implying, if not that all union adherents would be sum-
marily discharged, that Respondent, at the very least,
would be quick to discharge union adherents who gave it
any offense. Moreover, in resolving the foregoing con-
flicting versions of Haddad's remarks, I deem it particu-
larly significant that Respondent, without offering any ex-
planation at the time, failed to call Haddad to testify, not-
" The denial in the Respondent's answer of Mitchell's supervisory
status was withdrawn at the hearing
188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
withstanding that it was pointed out to Respondent's
counsel at the hearing that such failure would invite the
inference that Haddad's testimony would not aid
Respondent.5
In view of this, I am constrained to find that, as in-
dicated by the testimony of Menshouse, Riffe, and
Maynard, Haddad's remarks were couched in such a way
as to lead his listeners to believe that adherence to the
Union would subject them to reprisals, and that Respond-
ent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
b. Darnell's interrogation
Admittedly, Darnell on October 8 systematically inter-
rogated all the employees in the Ashland store about their
desire for union representation. According to Darnell, he
approached the employees in the store and read the fol-
lowing from a sheet of paper which he held in his hands:
You are probably aware that the Food Handlers
Union are (sic) trying to organize the store. They
have made a demand of the Co. stating that they have
a majority of our employees who desire them (the
Union) to represent them. Do you want the Union to
represent you? This will in no way have any bearing
on your job. You do not have to answer this.
The sheet also listed the names of the employees and
opposite this list were three ruled columns captioned,
respectively "Yes," "No," and "Neutral." According to
Darnell he indicated in one or the other of these columns
the nature of each employee's reply to his question re-
garding their desire for union representation.6 He testified
that the majority of the employees interrogated repu-
diated the Union, and the tally on the sheet, eliminating
the answers of those found below to be supervisors,
shows that only 12 favored the Union while 23 opposed
it. The answers of three employees were not recorded.'
While three of the employees (Clare, Smith, and
Menshouse) testified that Darnell's remarks to them cor-
responded to the foregoing quoted matter, Rife testified
only that Darnell asked her if she wanted to be
represented by the Union, and Carter and Gates were
specific that, in interrogating them, Darnell gave no as-
surance that their answers would not affect their jobs.
As I was favorably impressed by the demeanor of the
latter three witnesses, and by the circumstantiality of
their version of the interrogation incident, I credit them
as against Darnell, and find that he offered them no as-
surance against reprisals.
5 In his brief Respondent's counsel asserts that he did not defend the al-
legation relating to Haddad's speech because of his understanding that it
had been struck However, at the close of the General Counsel's case I
stated on the record that I was reserving ruling on Respondent 's motion
to strike that allegation, and in my order of March 16, 1967, that motion
was finally overruled. On the same date I advised Respondent's counsel
by letter that, if he deemed himself prejudiced by this ruling, I would en-
tertain a motion to reopen the hearing to receive further evidence on the
matter . No such motion was filed.
6 The foregoing document was offered in evidence at the hearing as
Resp. Exh 1, but was received only for the purpose of showing what Dar-
nell purportedly read to the employees. However, upon reconsideration,
the document was by my order of March 16, 1967, received in evidence
without any limitation , since the contents of the entire document were in
effect, adopted by Darnell in his testimony
' Darnell testified that he may have missed a few employees in making
the round of the store
8 Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591; Johnnie's Poultry Co , 146
NLRB 770.
Respondent contends that the foregoing interrogation
was permissible under the Board's Blue Flash rule,8
which sanctions interrogation of employees about their
desire for union representation, provided, inter alia, (1)
that the purpose is to verify a union 's contemporaneous
claim to represent a majority of the employees, (2) that
such interrogation is accompanied by an assurance
against any reprisals for union activity, and (3) that such
interrogation does not occur in a context of employer
hostility to union organization.
I am satisfied that none of the foregoing conditions was
met here. As to (1), it is clear from Clare's undenied
testimony related in more detail below, that Respondent
already knew on October 6, which employees had signed
cards and that when Clare signed a card on that date the
Union had achieved majority status, and there is no
evidence that Respondent believed that such majority
had been obtained by improper means.9 Accordingly,
Darnell's polling of the employees was not necessary to
verify the Union's claim, and it seems fair to infer that
Respondent's only reason for taking the poll was the ex-
pectation that some of the union adherents would be
reluctant to admit their true sentiments to Darnell, even
if they were given assurance against reprisals, and that
the result of such a poll would, therefore (as proved to be
the case here), be more favorable to Respondent than a
count of the cards known by Respondent to have been ac-
tually signed. I do not believe that to permit such a
"recount" by Respondent would conform to the letter or
spirit of Blue Flash. 10
As to the requirement of Blue Flash that the interroga-
tion be accompanied by an assurance against reprisals, it
has already been found that in the case of at least three
employees Darnell neglected to convey that assurance.
As to the requirement of absence of union animus, it
must be remembered that Darnell's interrogation oc-
curred against the background of President Haddad's
speech of May 24, in which, as found above, he cited the
case of an employee whom he had discharged on the spot,
when she announced that she had signed a union card.
Although this speech had been delivered more than 4
months before the polling of the employees, such a dra-
matic threat to their job security by the top representative
of management could not have failed to make a lasting im-
pression on the assembled employees.
Moreover, it is relevant here to consider Respondent's
union animus, as demonstrated by the Board' s findings in
the various cases cited above, particularly the Board's
findings that in March 1964, at the instant store, both
Haddad and Darnell engaged in unlawful interrogation,
8 In any event , since the record, including Darnell 's own testimony, is
devoid of any evidence that he asked any of the employees on October 8
about the methods used by solicitors for the Union to induce the em-
ployees to sign the cards , it is clear that Respondent had no concern on
this point.
10 Prior to Blue Flash, the Board had long held that systematic inter-
rogation of employees about their union sentiments was unlawful as an in-
vasion of their right to privacy and freedom from coercion in Blue Flash,
the Board balanced the mischief of such interrogation against the interest
of the employees in verifying the accuracy of a union 's claim to represent
a majority of his employees, and struck a balance in favor of the employer
See Johnnie's Poultry Co , supra . However, where as here, there is ample
basis for finding that the employer is already aware from other sources of
the facts as to the Union' s status , no legitimate purpose would be served
by permitting him even the limited invasion of his employees ' rights ac-
corded by Blue Flash.
HECK'S INC.
Respondent threatened discharge of all the union ad-
herents, and did discriminatorily discharge, Menshouse,
a prominent union protagonist;11 and, so far as appears
from the record, such unfair labor practices were still un-
remedied on October 8.12 It is difficult to see how, under
such circumstances, Darnell's poll could be deemed to
meet the requirement of Blue Flash that such interroga-
tion must not occur in a context of hostility to union or-
ganization.
It may be noted, finally, that, in finding interrogation of
an employee to be coercive, the Board and the courts
have frequently cited the fact that the employee falsely
disclaimed any interest in union representation.13 Here,
according to Darnell's own testimony the vast majority
of the 38 Ashland employees disclaimed any desire for
union representation, even though, as found below, 21 of
them had signed union cards, and there is no evidence
that any of them had prior to October 8 sought to revoke
their cards.
For all the foregoing reasons, it is found that Darnell's,
interrogation violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
c. The Mitchell-Clare incidents
Clare signed a union card on October 6. She testified
that early in October , she had discussions about the
Union with Assistant Store Manager Mitchell , who told
her that Respondent knew what employees had and had
not signed union cards , and that the Union had gotten
"over the hump" and achieved majority status, when she
signed a union card . Mitchell did not testify. I credit
Clare. A statement reflecting such precise knowledge of
the number of union adherents14 could not fail to create
an impression of close surveillance by management of
union activities, through employee informers or other-
wise.15 It is accordingly found that, by creating such an
impression, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
Clare testified further that some time after Darnell's
" 150 NLRB 1565, enfd. 369 F.2d 370 (C.A 6)
12 While Menshouse had been rehired by October 8, there was no
evidence as to the extent to which Respondent had otherwise complied
with the Board's order by that date.
13 See, e.g., 159 NLRB 1151, section III , D, of the Trial Examiner's
Decision (involving Respondent 's Huntington store), which was affirmed
on this point by the Board , where the variance between the result of an
employee poll and the card count was cited as a reason for finding the poll
coercive.
14 Moreover, as found below, the Union did in fact get "over the hump"
on October 6, when it obtained its 20th (and 21st) card (Both Clare and
Brown signed cards on that date)
i5 While it is not clear from Clare's testimony whether this conversation
took place before or shortly after the October 8 poll, it is evident that
Mitchell was not referring to that poll as the source of Respondent's infor-
mation regarding the union sentiments of the employees For one thing,
that poll elicited repudiations of the Union from the vast majority of the
employees , and it is not apparent, in any event, how Respondent could
have determined from that poll the precise date on which the Umon ob-
tained the decisive card.
Respondent cites certain testimony by Clare to the effect that she and
Mitchell were on friendly terms, that she "probably " initiated discussions
of the Umon with him, that she "might have" told him before the forego-
ing incident that she knew that most of the employees had signed union
cards ; and that, on the occasion in question , she agreed with Mitchell's ob-
servation on this point. However, there is no evidence that Clare dis-
closed to Mitchell the identity of the union adherents or that she herself
had signed a card, and the fact that Mitchell and Clare were on friendly
terms or that she initiated the discussions of the Union could not detract
from the coercive effect of Mitchell's imputation to higher management of
189
visit to the store on October 8, Mitchell referred to a
rumor then circulating among the employees that Store
Manager McCann had been "discharged"16 because of
"the union and the employees," and that, in this connec-
tion, on a particular Saturday evening Mitchell told the
witness that the employees and the Union had "shafted"
McCann, and that the employees were not going to
"shaft" Mitchell As Mitchell did not testify, I credit
Clare. It is apparent from the foregoing that Mitchell at-
tributed the actual or supposed downfall of McCann to
the extent of the employees' union activity. Such a state-
ment to an employee, implying, as it did, that manage-
ment would not hesitate to discharge a supervisor for
tolerating union activity, could not fail to impress upon
such employee that those engaging in such activity might
share the supervisor's fate. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.17
The General Counsel alleged a further violation based
on Clare's testimony concerning an invitation to her by
Mitchell to resign her job. However, the most that can be
made of Clare's rather confused testimony on this point
is that, while this remark was made by Mitchell on the
same evening that he referred to the "shafting" of Mc-
Cann, the occasion for the remark was not Clare' s union
activity or sentiments but a disagreement over an entirely
different matter, unrelated to the Union, and that the very
next day Mitchell apologized to her therefor. Ac-
cordingly, I find no violation here.
3. The 8(a)(5) issue
a. The appropriate unit
It was agreed at the hearing, and I find, that the follow-
ing unit is appropriate for purposes of collective bargain-
ing:
All employees at Respondent's store in Ashland, Ken-
tucky, excluding guards, professional employees, and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.18
exact knowledge of the identity of the union adherents.
16 As McCann apparently continued as store manager at Ashland until
November 1966, the foregoing discussion either must have occurred after
that date, or must have been based on misinformation as to McCann's
status.
17 Had McCann in fact been discharged because of a permissive at-
titude toward the Union, such discharge would clearly have been unlaw-
ful Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 NLRB 295, enfd. 213 F 2d 208
(C.A 5), Jackson Tile Manufacturing Co., 122 NLRB 746, enfd. 272
F 2d 181 (C.A 5); General Engineering, Inc., and Harvey Aluminum
(Incorporated), 131 NLRB 648 The rationale of these cases is that such
a discharge tends to instill in employees the fear that they will suffer the
same fate if they persist in their union activities. Such fear is nonetheless
real, where , as here , the employees are told that their union activities
caused the supervisor's discharge , whether or not that was actually the
case.
i8 The original complaint provided for the exclusion of office clericals
from the unit. The record shows that on October 8, Respondent had only
one office clerical employee-Ruth Conley. (Cahal, who also worked in
the office, was classified as a department head, and is found to be a super-
visor.) Conley worked in a small enclosure in a corner of the store where,
among other things, she compiled records of cash receipts and processed
employee timecards Some time after October 8, she was transferred to
the cosmetics department. At the hearing, the General Counsel moved to
amend the complaint to include office clerks and Respondent stipulated to
their inclusion. Under all the circumstances , I find that such inclusion was
proper (Heck's Inc, 159 NLRB 1151; Ohrbach's, Inc, 118 NLRB 231;
Taunton Supply Corp, 137 NLRB 221), particularly as it was agreed
to by Respondent at the hearing (cf. Heck's Inc, 156 NLRB 760, fn. 17;
Heck's Inc, 159 NLRB 1151 fn 1)
190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It was also agreed at the hearing, in conformity with the
Board's finding in the prior case involving the instant
store,19 that the six department heads at Ashland were
supervisors , and that the night watchman at that store
was a guard . They will accordingly be excluded.
b. The Union's majority status
At the hearing Respondent presented a document con-
taining a list of 45 names, which were identified by Mc-
Cann, the former manager of the Ashland store, as the
names of all employees and department heads on the
payroll for that store during the week beginning October
8.20 Of the foregoing persons, it was stipulated at the
hearing that six, who were listed as department heads,
were supervisors and that one who was listed as the
"nightwatchman" was a guard. Of the remaining 38, there
was a dispute at the hearing only as to Roger Davis, who
was listed on the exhibit as a department head. The
General Counsel also contended at the hearing that the
list was incomplete. However, after the hearing, the
General Counsel withdrew this contention,21 and
Respondent indicated that it was satisfied that, as con-
tended by the General Counsel, Davis was not a super-
visor on October 8, but an employee.22 It follows that the
parties are now in agreement, and it is found, that on Oc-
tober 8 and during the ensuing week the unit consisted of
38 employees.
At the hearing the General Counsel offered in evidence
30 signed union authorization cards, which bore dates
prior to October 8.23 One of these cards, signed by Mc-
Guire, was later withdrawn, another was rejected
because signed by France, a supervisor, and the card of
Color is hereby rejected for the same reason. Of the
remaining 27 cards, the record shows that 6 purport to
bear the signatures of individuals who were not in
Respondent's employ on October 8. There remain 21
cards, most of which are challenged in Respondent's brief
on various grounds, as follows:
1. Twelve cards are challenged on the ground that the
signatory did not testify at the hearing. However, these
cards were properly authenticated by witnesses at the
hearing, who attested to the signing of the card.
2. Criswell's card is contested on the ground that he
was a department head. However, the record does not
support this contention.
3. Clare's card is attacked on the ground that France,
her department head, talked to her about the Union.
While Clare ' initially acknowledged that, before she
19 150 NLRB 1565
20 Trial Examiner 's Exh 1.
21 Trial Examiner's Exh 2
22 Trial Examiner's Exh 3
23 An additional card, that of Linda Fields, bore the date of November
27, which was subsequent to the Union 's demands for bargaining in Oc-
tober
At a later point in the hearing , the General Counsel offered in evidence
19 new cards , of which 17 were shown to have been signed by persons
employed in Respondent's Ashland store on various dates in January
1967 The General Counsel would add these cards to those already in
evidence , and contends that there was a continuing demand by the Union,
in January 1967, at a time when, as allegedly shown by such cards, the
Union enjoyed majority status , and that such demand was rejected by
Respondent for invalid reasons However , in view of my ultimate findings
below , there is no need to pass on this issue.
24 149 N LRB 1283 , 1287, enfd . 363 F 2d 702, 708 (C A D C )
25 Radio Station KVEC, 93 NLRB 618, 623.
signed the card, she discussed the Union at some length
with France, who expressed the view that it "would be a
good thing" if the Union organized the employees, at a
later point in her testimony she professed to be unable to
recall whether France talked to her about the Union be-
fore or after she signed the card, and averred that she had
little contact with him other than in connection with her
work, as they were not "very fond of each other." She in-
sisted, moreover, that she signed the card at the request
of a union agent, after discussing the pros and cons of
union representation, and she denied that France's endor-
sement of the Union had any bearing on her decision to
sign the card, explaining that she signed it because she
"didn't like how things were," and she did not like France
and how he "ran things." It thus appears that it was her
resentment of France's conduct as a supervisor, rather
than his endorsement of the Union, that impelled her to
sign the card.
Moreover, in Aero Corporation 24 in rejecting the con-
tention that a card was invalid because solicited by a
minor supervisor, the Board said:
... to permit Respondent now to rely on Johnson's
activities to justify its refusal to recognize the Union
designated by a majority of its employees, would en-
courage Respondent to have just such marginal su-
pervisors join in the employees' organizing activity,
secure in the knowledge that if the Union should gain
a majority, disclosure of the supervisor's real status
would defeat that majority.
This rationale was specifically approved by the court
of appeals in that case.
Under all the foregoing circumstances, it is found that
Clare's card is valid.25
4. The cards of Wheeler and Morris were attacked on
the ground that they were authenticated at the hearing
only by specimens of their signatures taken from Respon-
dent's payroll records.26 However, after the hearing the
parties submitted a stipulation to the effect that Wheeler's
card was signed by him on the date shown thereon,27 and,
in view of this stipulation, no valid reason appears for re-
jecting his card.28 As to Morris, it was stipulated only that
his whereabouts were unknown and that he was unavaila-
ble to testify. However, I am satisfied from a comparison
of his purported signature on the union card with the
specimen referred to above that the card was signed by
him.29 While there was no testimony at the hearing that
such card was signed on the date shown thereon (October
2), it is proper to presume the accuracy of that date.30
It is concluded therefore that on October 8, the Union
26 Tax-withholding certificates
29 See Trial Examiner 's Exh. 4 and my order of March 16, 1967.
28 At the hearing , ruling was reserved on the admission of his card It is
hereby ordered received in evidence
29 As to the propriety of proving the authenticity of a union authoriza-
tion card through comparison of the signature thereon with a specimen
signature, see Arco Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283, 1285-86, and 28
USCA, Sec. 1731, which authorizes such comparison by Federal courts,
without any limitation as to the conditions under which such comparison
may be made For common law authorities to the same effect , see Wig-
more, Evidence, § 2016 (fn 1) (3d ed )
30 Wigmore, Evidence , §2520(b) (3d ed .). While such presumption is
rebuttable, there is no contrary evidence here, and, indeed, the only other
evidence on the point is the notation made by Darnell on the sheet, on
which he recorded the results of his October 8 poll (Resp Exh. 1), indicat-
ing that Morns aligned himself on that date with the union adherents Such
evidence is not only consistent with, but tends to confirm, the presump-
tion that Morris signed a union card on a date prior to October 8
HECK'S INC.
had signed cards from 21 out of 38 employees in the unit,
and that it represented a majority of such employees on
that date.
c. The Union's request
Respondent contends that the Union did not make a
proper request for bargaining. Union Agent Spencer
testified that on October 8, he told Holroyd that the
Union represented a majority of the "employees,"
whether or not department heads were included in the
unit, and Spencer's letter of October 11 reaffirms the
Union's claim to represent a majority of the "employees"
in the Ashland store, regardless of the status of the de-
partment heads;31 and he there prognosticates, on the
basis of his experience with Respondent, that the issue of
the appropriateness of the Ashland unit would probably
reach the Board, but he asserts that, no matter how the
Board should rule on the department heads, the Union
would still have a majority.
In his reply of October 13, Holroyd acknowledges that
in their October 8 conversation, Spencer claimed to
represent a majority of the "employees" in the store, and
the letter continues:
Pursuant to my questioning you stated that such
majority existed with or without the department
heads and you were making a demand to include the
department heads or to exclude them depending
upon what the Board decided in their case. This
answer resulted in a very confused demand and we
must therefore conclude that you did not demand
recognition in an appropriate unit.32
In his reply of October 25, to the foregoing letter,
Spencer made it clear that he was presently defining the
unit as either a storewide unit including "non-supervisory
department heads" or as one which excluded department
heads. Spencer was thus, offering Respondent a clear,
present choice between (1) a unit which included depart-
ment heads, on the assumption that they were not super-
visors, and (2) one which excluded them. Respondent
contends that, because it was offered such a choice,
Spencer's unit request was ambiguous. However, there
was no ambiguity in Spencer's request in the sense that it
was not clear what unit he was willing to bargain for.
Each of the alternative units was precisely defined, and
he made it abundantly clear that he was equally willing to
bargain for either one. Essentially, the situation is the
same as if Spencer had merely proposed the exclusion of
supervisors, and indicated that he was willing to abide by
Respondent's determination as to the supervisory status
of the department heads.
Moreover, even if the Union had erroneously insisted
on including the six department heads, it appears that the
Board would not have deemed its bargaining request de-
3' In this letter and his subsequent letter of October 25, Spencer speci-
fies the exclusion of the office employees. While the one such employee
here involved has been included by me in the unit, it is well settled that
such a slight variance is immaterial. See Heck's, Inc., 156 NLRB 760.
32I do not credit the foregoing self-serving, hearsay version of
Spencer's demand, insofar as it conflicts with his testimony.
33Heck's, Inc., 156 NLRB 760, involving the Parkersburg store
There the Board found that a request for inclusion of as many as 5 em-
ployees out of a unit of 37 was not defective, even though the 5 were
found ineligible. Here, there were, as found above, 38 in the appropriate
unit.
191
fective for that reason.33 It is not clear why the Union
should be in a worse position, because it indicated indif-
ference to the unit placement of the department heads.
Respondent had no greater burden here than it had in the
case just cited, involving its Parkersburg store. Here, as
there, Respondent was required only to indicate in what
respect it deemed the requested unit to deviate from the
one it considered proper. Moreover, here unlike there,
Respondent was assured that the Union would adapt its
unit request to Respondent's views.
Accordingly, I find no fatal defect in the Union's bar-
gaining request of October 8 or any of its subsequent
requests.
d. The "good faith" issue
Respondent offered no oral testimony at the hearing
concerning the reason for its decision not to recognize the
Union. Darnell averred only that the authority to make
that decision was delegated to Respondent's labor rela-
tions adviser, Holroyd, who was also its trial counsel,
and, although the Union called upon Holroyd to take the
stand, he refused to do So. 34 Accordingly, the only insight
into Respondent's reason for refusing to recognize the
Union is afforded by Holroyd's letter of October.13,
which, after alleging that the Union's unit request was de-
fective for the reasons noted above, continued as follows:
Irrespective of this and in addition, we have caused
a poll of all employees in that store to be conducted,
the resulting answer produced an overwhelming
statement that you did not represent the employees.
Accordingly, recognition is declined until such time
as you have been certified as the majority representa-
tive of the employees involved by the N. L. R. B.
It has already been found, on the basis of Darnell's un-
contradicted testimony, that the result of this poll was in
fact adverse to the Union. However, it has also been
found that such poll did not conform to the requirements
of the Blue Flash rule and was coercive. It is well settled
that, in rejecting a union's recognition request, manage-
ment may not, consistently with the requirements of good
faith, rely on a count of union adherents obtained under
coercive circumstances. 35 Such a poll has the twofold
vice that it is patently not a reliable measure of employee
sentiment, and that it is calculated to deter the employees
from remaining union adherents in the future. Ac-
cordingly, it is found that, by its resort to, as well as its
reliance on, the foregoing poll, Respondent demonstrated
its bad faith.
I am mindful of the Board's finding in 159 N LRB 1151,
involving Respondent's Huntington store, that in that
case the polling of employees by management concerning
their union sentiments, "while unlawful was not so
34 As the Union did not press the matter further, I had no occasion to
rule on the propriety of such refusal . It is clear , however, that , if, as Dar-
nell insisted , Holroyd was vested with sole responsibility for making such
a decision regarding Respondent's labor relations policy as was here in-
volved , he was subject to examination regarding his motivation to the
same extent as any other representative of management, provided only
that he could not be required to disclose any communications with his
client that entered into the matter
35 Pre,ser Scientific, Inc, 158 NLRB 1375 and cases there cited
Home Pride Provisions , Inc, 161 NLRB 634.
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
flagrant that it must necessarily have had the object of
destroying the Union's majority status ... nor was
Respondent's conduct of such a character as to support
an inference that Respondent's refusal to bargain was
made in bad faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act."
However, here, unlike there, it was shown that
Respondent was satisfied, even before taking the poll,
that the Union had achieved majority status. Respondent,
therefore, could have had no object in polling the em-
ployees on October 8, other than to coerce them into
repudiating the Union. Thus, there is present here an es-
sential element found to be lacking in the Huntington
case- namely, coercive conduct which "necessarily . .
. had the object of destroying the Union's majority
status."
Moreover, even if this be viewed as a case where
Respondent engaged in no unduly coercive conduct at the
time of its refusal to honor the Union's request, it would
still be found that such refusal was unlawful. Such a find-
ing would be consistent with the Board's current policy
as enunciated in John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99,
Aaron Brothers Company, 158 NLRB 1077, and H &
W Construction Co., 161 NLRB 852. The net effect of
these cases appears to be that, where there is no prior bar-
gaining relationship , an employer, who is confronted with
a request for recognition based on cards, need only
refrain from any unfair labor practices "of such a
character as to reflect a purpose to evade an obligation to
bargain," and that, if this condition is met, the Board will
not infer that his failure to recognize the union was in bad
faith- i.e., because of rejection of the principle of collec-
tive bargaining. However, in the foregoing cases the
Board imposed a limitation on the foregoing rule, which
is especially significant here- namely, that, even if the
foregoing requirement is met, an employer's refusal to
recognize a union will still be found unlawful, if it affirma-
tively appears that he in fact entertained no doubt of the
Union's majority status.36 Presumably, the rationale of
this is that an employer cannot have a good-faith doubt,
if he had no doubt at all.
Here, there was affirmative evidence indicating that
Respondent was aware on October 6, only 2 days before
the Union's initial demand , that it had achieved majority
status on that date.37 No attempt was made to dispute this
evidence '38 and on the basis thereof it has been found
that on October 6 Respondent was in fact aware of the
Union's majority status. Accordingly, on that ground
alone, it would be consistent with current Board policy to
find that Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union
was unlawful.
Respondent contends, finally, in its brief that it was
justified in refusing to bargain because of a letter dated
36 See particularly the discussion of this point in Aaron Brothers, supra,
and H & W Construction Co., supra See, also, Greyhound Terminal,
137 NLRB 87, enfd 314 F.2d 43 (C.A. 9), Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB
709, enfd 308 F 2d 687 (C.A 9). While the foregoing cases dealt with an
inspection of cards tendered by a union, no logical reason suggests itself
why a different result should apply where the employer has ascertained
the union 's majority status from other sources . See Member Jenkins' con-
curring opinion in Aaron Brothers, wherein he states that an unlawful
refusal to bargain may be proved , inter alia , "by independent knowledge
of the employer that a union has a majority "
31 The last 2 of the Urron's 21 valid cards were in fact signed on Oc-
October 1, received by Darnell, which read as follows:
Mr. Fred Haddad, President
Tri-State Distributors Inc.
19th Street
Nitro, West Virginia
Dear Mr. Haddad:
This is to notify you that Retail Clerks Union Local
1059 has interest in your Hecks Inc. store located
3503 Winchester Avenue, Ashland, Kentucky,
therefore, we hereby inform you that any agreements
with any other Labor Organization would be in con-
tradiction to the above stated interest and we will
take all necessary legal action to protect such in-
terest.
Please contact the undersigned in the event you have
any questions concerning this matter.
Sincerely,
William E. Harvey,
President
Retail Clerks Union Local
1059
187 South High Street
Columbus, Ohio 43125
Admittedly, Respondent did not reply. The foregoing
letter was not authenticated as having been in fact sent by
Retail Clerks. Moreover, there was no testimony that
such letter motivated Respondent's refusal to recognize
the Union, and, significantly, Holroyd's letter of October
13, although purporting to detail the reasons for Respond-
ent's refusal to recognize the Union, makes no mention
of Retail Clerk's alleged "interest."
In addition, although a number of employees had
signed cards for Retail Clerks as late as March 1964,39
Menshouse testified, without contradiction, that no
representative of the Retail Clerks had appeared at the
Ashland store since the latter part of 1964, which was
several months before the Union began its organizing
campaign, and nearly a year before the Union's bargain-
ing requests. While in the case last cited, Retail Clerks
filed, inter alia, a refusal-to-bargain charge, that charge
was either withdrawn or dismissed before the hearing
held in that case on July 14, 1964; and, so far as appears
from the record, the only basis for Retail Clerks' claim in
the October 1 letter that it had an "interest" in the
tober 6. Thus, Mitchell's aforenoted statement to Clare that Respondent
knew that the Union had obtained the decisive card when she signed one
(on October,6) was factually correct on the assumption that she was the
first to sign on that date In any case, it suffices that Respondent knew by
October 8 that the Union had a card majority
38 Respondent did not even call any representative of higher manage-
ment to deny that Respondent had the knowledge of the Union's majority
status imputed to it by Mitchell. This circumstance, in itself, warrants the
inference that such imputation was correct
39 See the findings in Heck's, Inc., 150 NLRB 1565.
HECK'S INC. 193
Ashland store were the cards dating back to March 1964,
and the outstanding order of the Board issued in that case
on February 5, 1965, requiring Respondent to refrain
from discouraging, or interfering with, employee activi-
ties on behalf of Retail Clerks.40
While the Board has held that, when he is confronted
with competing claims by two rival unions, which give
rise to a real question concerning representation, an em-
ployer need not, and, indeed, may not, recognize either
one,41 there was here no demand by Retail Clerks for
recognition or any claim to represent the employees, but
only a vague assertion of an "interest" in the employees,
and a caveat against negotiating any contract with the
Union, and Respondent admittedly made no effort to ob-
tain clarification of the Retail Clerks' foregoing am-
biguous position. In view of these circumstances, as well
as the absence of any competent evidence that the forego-
ing letter was actually sent by Retail Clerks, that Re-
spondent's refusal to recognize the Union was prompted
to any extent by that letter, or that Retail Clerks had any
valid authorization cards on October 1, it is found that
Respondent's reliance on that letter is misplaced.42
It is therefore concluded that, by refusing to recognize
the Union on and after October 8, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended
that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent refused to bar-
gain in good faith with the Union, which represented a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Ac-
cordingly, I shall recommend that the Respondent be or-
dered to bargain, upon request, in good faith with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All employees in Respondent's Ashland, Kentucky,
store, including office clerks, but excluding guards,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
2. At all times material the Union has been and still is
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining,
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing since October 8, to bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its em-
ployees in an appropriate unit, the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By interrogation of employees about their union ac-
tivities, threatening reprisals for such activities, and
creating the impression of surveillance thereof, Respond-,
ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, and has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and the foregoing
findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended
that Respondent, Heck's, Inc., Ashland, Kentucky, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain concerning rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment
with Food Store Employees Union, Local #347 Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
all employees in its Ashland, Kentucky, store, including
office clerks, but excluding professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees about their
union activities, threatening reprisals for such activities,
and creating the impression of surveillance thereof.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the
above-named Union, or any other labor organization and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the ex-
tent that such right may be affected by the provisos to
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith
41 That order was enforced by the court of appeals on November 29,
1966, 369 F.2d 370 (C A. 6).
Respondent cites Blade-Tribune Publishing Company, 161 NLRB
1512, apparently as authority for the continuing vitality of the Retail
Clerks' 18-month old cards However, that case is clearly distinguishable,
as it holds merely that, when an organizing campaign is interrupted by the
processing of unfair labor practice charges and thereafter resumed by the
same union , culminating in a demand for recognition , a card signed before
such interruption may be regarded as still valid, even though over a year
old Here , there was no resumption of the organizing campaign by Retail
Clerks at any time after its apparent suspension or abandonment late in
1964, nor any subsequent demand by that union for recognition This dif-
ference in the factual setting of the two cases is of prime significance. For,
in Blade-Tribune the employer was in essence attempting to avoid its bar-
gaining obligation by relying on the disruption of a union 's organizing cam-
paign through its own unfair labor practices . Policy considerations were
clearly opposed to the employer's position and required that the otherwise
stale cards be validated, so that the employer might not profit by his own
wrong. Here, on the other hand, Respondent would profit by its own
wrong if it were allowed to rely on Retail Clerks ' 18-month old cards as a
reason for not bargaining with the Union , since the only basis for validat-
ing such cards would be Respondent's own unfair labor practices in 1964.
Whether the result here reached would be prejudicial to Retail Clerks is
speculative , as there is no evidence that it intended to, or did , renew its
campaign at any time There can be no doubt, however, of the prejudicial
effect on the employees ' interest in self-organization , if Respondent's con-
tention is sustained , as they will then be denied the right to representation
by a union to which they adhered in the face of Respondent 's unremedied
unfair labor practices.
The Boy's Market, Inc., 156 NLRB 105, 107
42 Boy's Market, Inc., supra The Board there held that the refusal to
recognize a union is not excused by a rival union 's claim which is "clearly
unsupportable or specious, or otherwise not a colorable claim " Here, not
only was there no substantial basis for Retail Clerks ' claim, but the fact
that Holroyd's letter of October 13 does not even advert thereto is per-
suasive that Respondent recognized the speciousness of such claim. See
also Essex Wire Corporation, 130 NLRB 450.
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with Food Store Employees Union, Local #347 Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
all employees of the Respondent, in its Ashland, Ken-
tucky, store, including office clerks, but excluding guards,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the
Act, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its store in Ashland, Kentucky, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."43 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 9, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writ
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 44
43 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice.
In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words
"a Decision and Order."
44 In the event that this Recommended Order is adoi ted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 9, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
WE WILL bargain in good faith , upon request, with
Food Store Employees Union , Local #347 Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the bargaining unit described
below in respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of em-
ployment , or other conditions of employment and, if
an understanding is reached , embody it in a signed
agreement . The bargaining unit is:
All employees at our Ashland, Kentucky , store,
including office clerks , but excluding guards,
professional employees , and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees about their union activities, threaten
reprisals for such activities, or create the impression
of surveillance thereof.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist Food Store Employees Union, Local #347
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor or-
ganization, to bargain collectively through represen-
tatives of their own choosing and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain
from any or all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by the provisos to
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
HECK'S INC.
Employer
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407,
Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202, Telephone 684-3663.