Hearst Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 19, 2004

343 N.L.R.B. 689 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

HEARST CORP. CAPITAL NEWSPAPER
343 NLRB No. 79
689
The Hearst Corporation Capital Newspaper Division
and Local 31034, Newspaper Guild of Albany,
Communication Workers of America, AFL–
CIO, CLC. Case 3–CA–22256
November 19, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, WALSH, AND MEISBURG
On August 30, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Wal-
lace H. Nations issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel and Charging Party filed cross-
exceptions and answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusion and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
order that the Respondent, The Hearst Corporation, Capi-
tal Newspaper Division, Albany, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to deduct and remit to the Un-
ion dues and/or fees owed by employee Valerie Shea.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Deduct and remit to the Union dues and/or fees as
required by the terms of any applicable collective-
bargaining agreement.
(b) Make whole the Union for the loss of dues and/or
fees owing to the Union from employee Valerie Shea as
a result of the Respondent’s unlawful failure to comply

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 In accordance with the cross-exceptions of the General Counsel
and the Charging Party, we shall correct the judge’s inadvertent failure
to provide in his recommended Order for the payment of interest on the
dues and/or fees owed to the Union. We shall also conform the judge’s
recommended Order and notice to the Board’s standard remedial lan-
guage.
with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement,
with interest computed in the manner set forth in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of dues and/or
fees and interest on dues and/or fees due under the terms
of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Albany, New York, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since May 3, 1999.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD690
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to deduct and remit to the
Union dues and/or fees owed to the Union by Valerie
Shea.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, deduct and remit to the Union dues and/or
fees as required by the collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL, make whole the Union for the loss of dues
and/or fees owed to the Union by Valerie Shea as a result
of our unlawful failure and refusal to deduct and remit to
the Union those dues and/or fees required by our collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, with interest.
THE HEARST CORPORATION CAPITAL NEWSPAPER
DIVISION
Alfred M. Norek, Esq., for the General Counsel.
L. Michael Zinzer, Esq., of Nashville, Tennessee, for the Re-
spondent.
Barbara L. Camens, Esq., of Washington, D.C., for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WALLACE H. NATIONS, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Albany, New York, on April 30, 2001. The charge
was filed by Local 31034, Newspaper Guild of Albany, Com-
munication Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC (Union) on
December 3, 1999,1 and the complaint was issued on November
30, 2000. The complaint was amended on January 30, 2001.
The complaint alleges that The Hearst Corporation, Capital
Newspaper Division (Respondent) has engaged in certain con-
duct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National La-
bor Relations Act (Act). Respondent filed a timely answer and,
inter alia, admits the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, has been engaged in the pub-
lication, printing and sale of newspapers at its facility in Al-
bany, New York. The Respondent admits and I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section

1 All dates are in 1999 unless otherwise indicated.
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.2
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues for Determination
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated the Act by
on or about June 3, 1999, failing to continue in effect all the
terms and conditions of the collective-bargaining agreement, by
unilaterally terminating the deduction and remittance of agency
fees to the Union for unit member Valerie Shea, following her
resignation from the Union, notwithstanding that Shea had
executed a voluntary written assignment pursuant to section 13
(dues checkoff) of the collective-bargaining agreement and that
such assignment was operative at all material times.
B. Relevant Facts
Melissa Nelson3 was employed by Respondent as an adver-
tising artist from December 8, 1980, until June 4, 1999. For the
last 5-1/2 years of her employment there she was President of
the Union. The Union has represented a unit of Respondent’ s
employees for 65 years. The Union represents employees in
the advertising department, the editorial department, the busi-
ness office, the systems department, and the maintenance de-
partment. As of the time she left Respondent’s employ in July,
there were approximately 275 persons in the bargaining unit.
As pertinent, the Respondent and the Union were parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement with a term running from Au-
gust 1, 1997, to August 1, 2000. Nelson was the chief negotia-
tor for the Union in negotiations that led to this agreement.
Valerie Shea has been a permanent employee of Respondent
since 1985. She is employed in retail advertising sales and be-
came a union member on October 8, 1985. At some point she
signed a union dues deduction authorization form and to date
has not revoked the authorization. On March 24, 1999, Shea
sent a memo to Respondent’s publisher, Dave White, asking
that the Respondent stop deducting dues from her salary due to
“issues of private right and conscience.” The memo was sent at
the suggestion of White who also suggested the wording, hav-
ing referred Shea to section 2(A)(2) of the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement.
On March 26, 1999, Nelson was informed by Respondent’s
general manager, Bob Wilson, that Respondent was convening
a meeting of the joint classification and compensation commit-
tee regarding Shea’s request. Nelson responded to Wilson with
a letter stating that a meeting of the committee over the Shea
request was unnecessary as the matter of dues deductions was
covered by section 13 of the collective-bargaining agreement.
The two sections of the collective-bargaining agreement
cited above are vital to this case and are set out here for refer-
ence.
Section 2 A of the agreement, entitled guild membership:
employee obligation, reads:

2 Respondent’s answer denies the labor organization status of the
Union, but it admitted this fact at the hearing.
3 During the timeframe about which Nelson testified, she was
Melissa Locke. She subsequently married and uses the name Melissa
Nelson.
HEARST CORP. CAPITAL NEWSPAPER 691
1. Not fewer than nine (9) out of ten (10) employees
coming under the terms of this agreement and hired after
June 30, 1949, and in the case of former Press Company,
Inc., employees hired after October 15, 1960, shall apply
for membership in the Guild.
For purposes of this Section 2, the term “membership”
shall mean fulfilling such financial obligation as may be
enforced through a union security clause, pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act. In the event of failure to be-
come a member no later than thirty (30) days from the
start of employment the employee shall, upon notice from
the Guild, be discharged.
All employees who are now, or may become, members
of the Guild shall remain members in good standing dur-
ing the life of this agreement, and for failure to do so such
employee, after having exhausted or abandoned his/her re-
course under the Newspaper Guild constitution, and upon
expulsion from the Guild, shall be discharged upon formal
notice from the Guild.
2. Both the Company and the Guild recognize that
compulsory membership in any organization involves is-
sues of private right and conscience.
Therefore, except as stated in the ensuing paragraph, it
will be the responsibility of the Job Classification and
Compensation Joint Committee, on request of either the
Company or the Guild, to appropriately consider and en-
deavor to resolve any indicated desire of any member of
the Guild to be relieved of whatever obligation this section
may impose on him/her.
Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, the Joint
Committee will have no authority to consider any matter
involving termination of membership, obligation by opera-
tion of law (e.g., promotion to supervisory position, etc.).
Neither this section nor the Joint Committee’s consid-
eration, resolution or non-resolution of any matter this sec-
tion consigns to it will be subject to grievance or arbitra-
tion.
Nelson referred to section 2(A)(1) as a “one in ten” provi-
sion, explaining that 1 in each 10 employees hired by the Re-
spondent is offered nondues paying representation. The Guild
represents the employee, but that employee is not obligated to
pay dues. If the employee refuses this status, the Respondent
must wait to the end of the next 10 hirings to offer that status to
another new employee.
While Nelson was a union officer, no unit employee had
availed himself or herself of the relief offered by section
2(A)(2) of the section. She testified that the classification and
compensation joint committee (JCCJ Committee) has histori-
cally been used for new job classifications. The parties stipu-
lated that the JCCJ Committee has never convened to consider
an issue under section 2(A)(2), or the language which histori-
cally preceded it, prior to the issues raised by Valerie Shea.
Section 13 of the collective-bargaining agreement, entitled
“Dues Checkoff,” in pertinent part, provides:
Upon an employee’s voluntary written assignment, the
Company shall deduct weekly from the salary account of
such employee and pay to the Guild on the fifteenth (15th)
day of each month, but in no event later than the twentieth
(20th), all membership dues levied by the Guild for the
current month. Such membership dues shall be deducted
from the employee’s salary in accordance with a schedule
furnished the Company by the Guild on the first (1st) day
of each month. The Company shall notify the Guild of any
changes in classification or step-ups in years of experi-
ence. An employee’s voluntary written assignment shall
remain effective in accordance with the terms of such as-
signments. All such deductions shall be made in confor-
mity with local, state, or federal legislation.
The form dictated by this section for the written assignment
states in pertinent part:
This assignment and authorization shall remain in ef-
fect until revoked by me, but shall be irrevocable for a pe-
riod of one (1) year from the date appearing below or until
the termination of the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween yourself and the guild whichever occurs sooner. I
further agree and direct that this assignment and authoriza-
tion shall be renewed automatically and shall be irrevoca-
ble for successive periods of one (1) year each or for the
period of each succeeding applicable collective agreement
between yourself and the Guild, whichever period shall be
shorter, unless written notice of its revocation is given by
me to yourself and to the Guild by registered mail not
more than thirty (30) days and not less than fifteen (15)
days prior to the expiration of each period of one (1) year,
or of each applicable collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween yourself and the Guild, whichever occurs sooner.
Such notice of revocation shall become effective for the
calendar month following the calendar month in which
you receive it.
Pursuant to the terms of section 13, the Respondent for years
has deducted from employees’ weekly paychecks union dues
which are directly deposited in the Union’s account. On a
monthly basis, Respondent gives the Union a written report
reflecting the deductions and deposits made for the 4 weeks
making up the month. Nelson testified without contradiction
that, though the reports are compiled by Respondent on a
weekly basis, they had for years been tendered to the guild on a
monthly basis.
On March 29, Wilson sent a letter to Nelson stating that Re-
spondent considered Shea’s request to be a matter that could be
raised under section 2(A)(2) of the agreement. Nelson replied
on April 7, in a letter wherein she stated that section 2(A)(2)
deals with the subject matter of “compulsory membership in
any organization” as it relates to “issues of private right and
conscience.” She noted that Shea’s request dealt with dues
deductions covered by section 13, and further noted that Shea
could rescind her dues deduction authorization in accordance
with the terms of section 13.
On April 8, Nelson sent a letter to Shea setting out several
options that Shea could elect with respect to her union dues. It
noted that Shea could rescind the dues deduction authorization
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD692
during a window period from May 12 to 27,4 and the Respon-
dent would stop deducting dues, though Shea would still be
responsible for paying them. Nelson pointed out that Shea
could resign from the Union and become an “agency fee
payer,” paying an amount equal to dues. She also noted that
Shea could become an agency fee payer objector or a so-called
“Beck” objector (Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988)) and pay only that portion of the fee that is directly
related to the costs of representation, about 75 to 80 percent of
normal dues. She also sent a union brochure elaborating on the
options outlined in the letter. Shea acknowledged that she re-
ceived this letter.
Shea sent a letter to Nelson on April 14, asking to resign
from the Union and offering to discuss the matter with Nelson.
Nelson testified she met with Shea on April 16, and reiterated
the options outlined in her letter of April 8. According to Nel-
son, Shea said she did not want to become a Beck objector and
wished to continue having her dues deducted. Nelson testified
that following this meeting she sent Shea a letter stating that it
was her understanding that Shea wished to resign from the
Union and become an agency fee payer. She stated that Shea’s
resignation from the Union was effective as of the date of the
letter.5
Nelson next received a letter from Wilson dated April 15,
stating that Respondent felt the matter of Shea’s request to stop
having dues deducted was a matter to be determined by the
JCCJ Committee and requested a meeting of the committee to
deal with Shea’s request. On receipt of this letter, Nelson
phoned Wilson and reiterated the Union’s position that conven-
ing a committee meeting to deal with Shea’s request was im-
proper. According to Nelson, Wilson then informed her that the
Respondent was going to declare an impasse and stop deduct-
ing Shea’s dues.6 Nelson responded that under the collective-
bargaining agreement, if Respondent did so, the Union could
request that Shea be fired. Wilson stated that the Respondent
would not dismiss Shea and the Union would have to arbitrate
the request. Nelson noted that the Union could also file an
unfair labor practice charge with the Board. She also pointed
out the history of section 2 of the contract came from a memo
that dealt with compulsory membership. After some more con-
versation, Nelson suggested that perhaps Shea could become
the next “one in ten” employee. Wilson stated that the company

4 The collective-bargaining agreement gives an annual window pe-
riod during which dues deduction authorizations can be revoked. This
is a period of either 30 days before the anniversary date of the individ-
ual joining the Union or 30 days before the expiration of the collective-
bargaining agreement, whichever comes first.
5 Shea denied ever having a face-to-face conversation with Nelson
about the dues issue. Shea did remember several telephone conversa-
tions with Nelson about the subject. She never contradicted the state-
ments in Nelson’s April 16 letter in writing. However, she believed that
she told Shea in a June phone conversation that she did not want to
become an agency fee payer, but wanted instead to pay nothing to the
Union. Shea’s memory of the events in question were very hazy com-
pared to Nelson. I credit Nelson’s testimony in any instance where it
varies from that of Shea.
6 Wilson testified that he could not remember declaring an impasse. I
credit Nelson’s testimony as Wilson’s subsequent actions make Nel-
son’s testimony the more credible.
intended to propose this remedy in the JCCJ Committee meet-
ing.
Nelson followed up this conversation with a letter dated
April 19, pointing out the Union’s position that Shea’s request
was to stop having dues deducted and did not deal with her
obligation to pay dues. It also pointed out that Shea had re-
signed from the Union and was an agency fee payer. It further
noted that Shea could revoke the dues deduction authorization
but had not done so.
Wilson wrote to Nelson on April 27, stating that he had spo-
ken with Shea and that she denied having any extensive com-
munication with Nelson about her request. Wilson then unilat-
erally stopped deducting dues from Shea’s paycheck during the
next month. After receiving this letter, Nelson again spoke
with Shea in early May. According to Nelson, Shea continued
to tell her that she wanted her fees deducted. In early June,
Nelson was planning to leave the Respondent and move to
another city. Nelson was trying to clear up continuing issues
before she stepped down as union president and Shea was one
of those issues. So on June 7, she called Shea. In this conversa-
tion, Shea for the first time brought up the JCCJ Committee.
Shea said that Wilson had told her that the committee was an
avenue she should pursue. Nelson told Shea why the Union
opposed using the committee to resolve Shea’s dispute. The
conversation ended.
On June 8, Nelson was at Respondent’s facility meeting with
her successor as union president, Tim O’Brien, and with the
Union’s office manager, Janna Ptilyk. Ptilyk was responsible
for checking the monthly dues-checkoff report from Respon-
dent. She pointed out to Nelson and O’Brien that Shea was only
shown on the May report for a portion of the weeks covered.
Since May, Shea has not paid agency fees or dues and Respon-
dent has not deducted or remitted such fees or dues to the Un-
ion.7 Shea had not to date of hearing revoked her dues deduc-
tion authorization form. After gaining the knowledge of Re-
spondent’s unilateral action, Nelson left Wilson a message
stating that the Union was willing to negotiate the situation.
Nelson then called Shea. Nelson memorialized her conversa-
tions with Shea in a letter to Shea dated June 21. She noted to
Shea that the cessation in dues deductions was not in accord
with the collective-bargaining agreement and that a grievance
would be filed over the issue. She requested Shea to pay her
fees and again outlined Shea’s options.
On June 9, Wilson wrote to Nelson stating that a meeting of
the JCCJ Committee was the proper way to resolve the Shea
matter. Nelson responded to this letter with one of her own
dated June 21, wherein she reiterated the Union’s position that
the JCCJ Committee was not the proper forum to discuss the
matter.
Also on June 21, the Union filed a grievance over the matter
of the cessation of Shea’s dues deductions.

7 Based on the credited testimony of Nelson and O’Brien, I find June
8 to be the first day that the Union had sure knowledge that Respondent
was no longer deducting dues or fees from Shea’s paycheck. The
charge in this case was prepared November 30 and filed on December
3, 2000.
HEARST CORP. CAPITAL NEWSPAPER 693
Shea wrote Nelson on June 25, stating that she did not feel
she owed the Union anything based on section 2(A)(2) of the
contract.
On July 8, Wilson wrote Nelson and informed her that the
grievance was denied based on Respondent’s interpretation of
section 2(A)(2) of the contract. The Union sought to arbitrate
the issue, but Respondent refused. At about this point in July,
Nelson moved away from the area and Tim O’Brien became
the union president. The collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the Union and Respondent was scheduled to expire on
August 1, 2000. It was extended until a new agreement was
reached, which expires on August 1, 2004. The new agreement
contains no changes to sections 2(A)(2) and 13.
O’Brien, in his new union role, wrote Wilson on September
27, asking that the parties meet to discuss the matter. On Octo-
ber 12, Wilson wrote to O’Brien demanding the Union accede
to Respondent’s interpretation of section 2(A)(2). O’Brien re-
sponded with a letter dated November 1, noting that the Union
will file a demand for arbitration. O’Brien followed that letter
with one dated November 30, stating that the Union was mov-
ing the grievance to arbitration.
On November 24, by letter, bargaining unit member Gregory
Therien requested Respondent to stop deducting dues for rea-
sons similar to those of Shea. Wilson wrote O’Brien on No-
vember 30, notifying him of Therien’s request and Respon-
dent’s willingness to convene the JCCJ Committee to deal with
the request. O’Brien, in a letter dated December 22, while not
forgoing any other stances the Union had taken, agreed to meet.
Wilson responded asking for dates.
The JCCJ Committee was convened on January 26, 2000.
This meeting was to discuss the Therien request. Therien was
not present and Wilson said it was not necessary for either him
or Shea to be present. O’Brien asked how the concerns of the
two employees on the issues of private right and conscience
could be addressed without knowing what they were. O’Brien
also raised the Union’s concern about the whole bargaining unit
deciding they did not want to pay dues. The parties discussed
possible solutions to the issue. The Union suggested that the
Respondent make Shea a 1-in-10 employee and forego its next
1-in-10. The Respondent was not interested in sacrificing a
future 1-in-10. The meeting ended without any solutions to
issues being reached. They met the next day to discuss Shea.
No solutions were reached at this meeting.
The JCCJ Committee was again convened on February 11,
2000, to again discuss the Therien matter. O’Brien had written
Therien asking what his issues were. Therien responded by
telling O’Brien he did not want to disclose them. Because of
this response, O’Brien told Wilson at the meeting that the Un-
ion could not proceed. The committee next met on February
18, 2000, to again discuss the Shea request. The Union put
forth four options: (1) that Shea could become a full dues pay-
ing member again; (2), that she could stay an agency fee payer;
(3) that she could become a Beck objector; and (4) she could
become a 1-in-10, but the Company would then forgo its next
1-in-10. Wilson took the options under advisement and said he
would get back to the Union.
By letter dated February 23, 2000, Wilson declined to accept
any of the options. O’Brien responded by letter dated March 7,
2000, expressing his disappointment and noting that Shea was
still obligated to pay agency fees and the Respondent was still
obligated to deduct them from her pay. There was no contact
between the Union and Respondent between March 7 and No-
vember 1, 2000. Though O’Brien and Wilson met on that date
to seek settlement of the matter, no settlement was reached. The
Union to date has not requested that Shea be discharged for
failure to pay dues.
A. Discussion and Determination of the Issues
In Auto Workers Local 1752 (Schweizer Aircraft), 320
NLRB 528 (1995), the Board addressed the underlying issue
presented in this case.
In short, when an employee working under a contract
with a union-security clause signs a checkoff authoriza-
tion, the employee agrees to a particular method for pay-
ing whatever dues and fees can be lawfully required of
him pursuant to the union-security clause. Under the terms
of a checkoff authorization, the employee may be pre-
cluded from revoking his agreement to that method of
payment, so long as the revocability restrictions are con-
sistent with Section 302)(c)(4).8 [Id. 532.]
See also Polymark Corp., 329 NLRB 9, 11 (1999):
In the case of both checkoff and the dues obligation imposed
by the union-security clause, an employee’s resignation places
him in a position, under Beck, to claim the right to pay dues
only for the support of the union’s “representation activities.”
But, just as his resignation does not nullify his dues obligation
in toto, so his resignation should not nullify his checkoff au-
thorization.
It is well established that an employer violates Section
8(a)(5) by ceasing to deduct and remit dues in derogation of an
existing contract. Shen-Mar Food Products, 221 NLRB 1329
(1976) (“Each monthly failure to deduct and remit dues
. . . /constitutes/ a separate violation of the Act. MBC Head-
wear, Inc., 315 NLRB 424, 428 (1994). See also King Manor
Care Center, 308 NLRB 884, 887 (1992).
Respondent’s reliance on the language of section 2(A)(2) of
the contract is misplaced. Arguably, the JCCJ Committee could
have and indeed did take up Shea’s request and reached some
agreement. But it did not. There is nothing in the language of
that sction which would allow the Respondent to unilaterally
abrogate the clear terms of section 13 of the contract. Neither
the Union’s refusal to meet pursuant to the terms of section
2(A)(2) or its refusal to agree with Respondent’s position when
the JCCJ Committee was convened is neither subject to griev-
ance nor arbitration. The section is thus really a nullity unless
some agreement is reached. Section 13 of the contract has been
in full force and effect for all material times. Thus, absent revo-
cation of her authorization pursuant to the contract terms, in
accord with Schweizer, Shea remained “obligated to make

8 Here, the collective-bargaining agreement allows revocation of au-
thorization within window period of 30 days annually. Shea has never
revoked her authorization pursuant to the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD694
payments even after a resignation of membership.” Under
Shen-Mar, Respondent’s failure to deduct and remit Shea’s
dues constitutes a clear violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.9
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, The Hearst Corporation, Capital News-
paper Division, is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Local 31034, Newspaper Guild of Albany,
Communication Workers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By, since the week of May 2, 1999, unilaterally failing and
refusing to deduct and remit to the Union proper dues and/or
fees from the salary of employee Valerie Shea, in derogation of

9 Respondent’s Sec. 10(b) defense is unfounded under MBC Head-
ware, supra. Apart from the independent continuing violation, the re-
cord established that the Union did not have notice of the cessation of
dues remittance until June 8, a date within 6 months of the filing of the
charge.
the terms of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement,
Respondent has engaged in activity in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
4. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent are
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Respondent must make whole the Union for the loss it suf-
fered by Respondent’s unlawful refusal and failure to deduct
and remit to the Union dues and/or fees from the pay of Valerie
Shea from on or about the week of May 2, 1999 to present, with
interest. El Centro Community Mental Health Center, 266
NLRB 1 (1983).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]