Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 1955

111 N.L.R.B. 1220 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

1220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Tennessee , and other points within that State. The employer there had 22 employees,
used 15 buses, and had a gross annual revenue exceeding $ 100,000 . His direct
interstate imports totalled $37,500 in 1 year . In asserting jurisdiction , the Board
said:
Our experience has shown that public utilities , including public transit systems
of the type here involved , have such an important impact on commerce as to
warrant our taking jurisdiction over all cases involving such enterprises, where
they are engaged in commerce or in operations affecting commerce, subject only
to the rule of de minimis.lo
The principle enunciated in the Local Transit case was followed in several later
cases involving local transit systems.ll This was the posture of the law at the time
of the hearing in the instant matter . Under this test, the present action might be
entertained . However , since the close of the hearing in the instant case, the Board
refused to take jurisdiction over a public bus transportation system in San Jose City
Lines, Inc., 106 NLRB 1167 . The Board 's decision in that case discloses no under-
lying facts pertaining to the jurisdictional question . The Board there stated:
The Employer operates a public bus transportation system in San Jose, Califor-
nia, and the immediate surrounding area. However, the record fails to estab-
lish to our satisfaction that these operations , as such , affect commerce within
the meaning of the Act . Furthermore , although there is some evidence that
the Employer is a subsidiary of an enterprise incorporated and operating in
another State , we do not believe that the record establishes that the Employer
is part of a multistate transit system . Upon the entire record herein, we find
that the Employer is not engaged in commerce , or in activities affecting com-
merce, within the meaning of the Act.
The San Jose case, being the most recent pronouncement of the Board on the sub-
ject , is controlling here. Accordingly , I find that the Respondent herein is not en-
gaged in commerce , or in activities affecting commerce, within the meaning of the
Act.
One other point remains to be disposed of. The General Counsel urges that the
Respondent 's purchases from out of State "approaches the $500,000 figure required
for the assertion of jurisdiction on this basis alone." But, as the tables set forth above
clearly indicate , in no year has the total of out-of-State and in-State purchases reached
the $500,000 minimum set up by the Board for direct out-of-State purchases.12
Thus, jurisdiction cannot be bottomed upon the Respondent's purchases.13
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
IU Local Transit Lines, 91 NLRB 623, 624.
u Gastonia Transit Company, 91 NLRB 894; Louisville Transit Co., 94 NLRB 20;
Columbus - Celina Coach Lines, at al ., 97 NLRB 777; and Texas Electric Bus Lines,
100 NLRB 67.
12 I deem it unnecessary to decide whether, as the General Counsel contends , the in-State
purchase of gasoline , fuel, and lubricants should be considered as sndirect out-of-State
purchases.
Is Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 NLRB 638 ; and Florida Mattress Factory, Inc ., of Tampa
91 NLRB 772.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 996 and
OAKLEY A. DAHLBERG AND RUTH N. DAHLBERG, CO-PARTNERS D/B/A
WAIALUA DAIRY. Case No. 37-CC-3. March 30, 1955
Decision and Order
On December 22, 1954 , Trial Examiner David F. Doyle issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding finding that the
Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached
111 NLRB No. 196.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1221
hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Interme-
diate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme-
diate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.'
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Hawaii Teamsters and Al-
lied Workers Union, Local 996, and its officers, representatives, and
agents, shall:
1. Cease and desist from inducing and encouraging the employees
of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to perform services for their employer,
where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of Waialua Dairy, or to cease doing business
with Waialua Dairy.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its business offices on the Island of Oahu, Territory of
Hawaii, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report
marked "Appendix A." 2 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Twentieth Region, shall, after being duly
signed by official representatives of the Union, be posted by them im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by them for sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Union to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within ten (10)
days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply
herewith.
1 In asserting jurisdiction herein, we rely upon the fact that , as the record shows, Dairy-
men's Association , Ltd, annually receives at its milk plant in Honolulu shipments from
points outside Hawaii valued at more than $ 500,000 Jonesboro Grain Drying Coopera-
tive, 110 NLRB 481 ; Cantera Providencia, 111 NLRB 848.
Member Murdock finds it unnecessary to adopt the Trial Examiner 's finding that, as-
suming arguendo , the admissibility of parol evidence to vary the terms of the contract be-
tween the distributors and the Union , a Conway's type clause did not afford the distribu-
tors' employees the right to refrain from handling goods of a struck employer.
2 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner" in the caption thereof, the words "A Decision and Order." In the event
that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be
substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order " the words "Pursuant to a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
1222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, herein called the Act, was heard at Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii,
on August 10-12, 1954, pursuant to due notice to all parties. The complaint, dated
July 7, 1954, issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
and duly served on the Respondent, was based on charges duly filed by the above-
named Charging Parties. It alleged in substance that the above-named Union, on
or about March 9, 1954, by its representatives, had engaged in a course of conduct,
designed to induce and encourage, and actually inducing and encouraging, the em-
ployees of Dairymen's Association, Ltd.,' to engage in a strike or concerted refusal
in the course of their employment to handle, process, or work on certain materials
or commodities, with an object of forcing or requiring the aforesaid Association to
cease using, selling , handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of,
or to cease doing business with, the Waialua Dairy, and thereby had engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and Section
2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
The Union, in its duly filed answer admitted that it was a labor organization, as
defined by the Act, and that on March 9, 1954, a picket of the Union appeared in
the immediate vicinity of a truck owned by the Waialua Dairy, and that the picket
carried a sign which indicated that a labor dispute existed between Waialua Dairy
and the Union, and that at that time the truck was in the vicinity of the plant of the
Association in the city of Honolulu, Hawaii. The answer denied all other allega-
tions of the complaint and that the Union had committed any unfair labor practices.
All parties were represented at the hearing, were afforded a full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence bearing on
the issues, to argue the issues orally upon the record and to file briefs and proposed
findings. Oral argument was presented by the General Counsel, and counsel for
the Union filed a brief.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANIES
A. Waialua Dairy '
It is undisputed that Oakley A. Dahlberg and Ruth N. Dahlberg, who are husband
and wife, as copartners conduct a business in the Territory of Hawaii under the as-
sumed name of Waialua Dairy. The enterprise is devoted to the production and
sale of milk. The husband described the operations of the partnership, stating that
it owned a ranch at Hana, which is not involved in this proceeding, and a dairy
farm near the town of Waialua, which is located in an agricultural area approxi-
mately 30 miles from Honolulu on the island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii.
The dairy farm is comprised of 18 acres on which the partners have approximately
200 dairy cows, which produce approximately 2,200-2,400 quarts of milk per day.
The acreage of the dairy farm does not afford pasturage for the animals; they are-
pen-fed from grass which is cut by employees of the dairy. On March 9, 1954, the
Dahlbergs had approximately 14 employees. Of this number, two men were engaged
in fixing fences and doing odd jobs; the other employees were grass cutters, engaged'
in cutting feed for the animals, or cow milkers.
It was likewise undisputed that prior to August 21, 1953, Waialua Dairy had
equipment and employees engaged in the processing of milk and the delivery of
milk to its customers. On August 21, 1953, Waialua Dairy and Dairymen's Associa-
tion, Ltd , executed a contract entitled, Dairymen's Association Milk Pool Producer's
Contract. By this contract, Waialua agreed to sell and deliver to Dairymen's at
agreed prices, all milk produced, and Dairymen's agreed to pay specified prices for
the milk, to pool the milk with that of other producers, and to process and dispose
of the whole, either by retail sale to its customers, or by consumption of the milk
in its manufacturing processes. Incidental to the execution of this contract, Dairy-
men's purchased from Waialua all equipment previously used in the processing and
distribution of milk, and absorbed into its employment those employees of Waialua
1 This corporation is hereafter referred to as Dairymen's or the Association ; the partner-
ship of the Dahlbergs d/b/a Waialua Dairy, is hereafter referred to as Waialua ; and the
partners are referred to as the Dahlbergs.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1223
previously engaged in processing and distributing milk. Thereafter, Waialua had
employees engaged in only three capacities, in grass cutting, milking, and odd jobs.
B. Dairymen's Association, Ltd.
It is likewise undisputed that Dairymen's Association, Ltd., is a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, which is engaged in the business
of processing and distributing milk and milk products. George Cannon, vice presi-
dent and manager of the milk division of Dairymen's, testified as to the operations
of that corporation. He said that Dairymen's operates a milk plant at Sheridan and
Elm Streets, Honolulu, which is composed of a group of approximately eight build-
ings, all of which are used by various departments in the milk division of the Asso-
ciation. The number of employees in the department varies. The milk plant proper,
the main building, has 232 employees. Three buildings devoted to warehousing are
staffed by six employees. A fifth building houses the building maintenance shop and
the automotive shops, where 38 persons are employed. In the shop offices there are
3 employees, and in the automobile service station there are 2 employees. Another
building houses the advertising department with 9 employees, and the engineering
department with 18 employees. This property also has parking area for the com-
pany's trucks. Another building houses the feed department of the company with
17 employees, and the industrial relations office of the company with 4 employees.
The feed department sells cattle and poultry feed directly to customers of the
corporation.
In addition to this milk plant at Sheridan and Elm Streets, the company operates
an ice cream plant in the city of Honolulu, where 70 people are employed. A branch
of the Association at the Schofield Barracks, United States Army, employs approxi-
mately 17 persons in the distribution of ice cream and milk on the north side of the
island of Oahu. The Association also operates the Waialua Ranch, which produces
milk, in the vicinity of Diamond Head, with about 69-70 employees. A third branch,
which is located at the town of Kailua, on the island of Oahu, employs approximately
nine persons in the distribution of its products.
The corporation also owns and operates an ice cream manufacturing and distribu-
tion plant in the city of Hilo, on the island of Hawaii, in which it employs approxi-
mately 24 persons.
Dairymen's has contractual relations with approximately 35 milk producers on
the island of Oahu, all of whom are bound by contracts similar to that with Waialua,
to supply milk exclusively to Dairymen's.2 Examination of the Milk Pool Producer's
Contract between Waialua and Dairymen's, discloses that Waialua agrees (1) to de-
liver certain quantities of milk daily; (2) not to dispose of more than 10 percent of its
cows during the term of the agreement ; and {3) to accept payment in accordance with
a pricing formula set forth in the contract. Dairymen's agrees (1) to receive the milk
delivered; (2) to check it for butterfat content and other qualities; (3) to pool it with
other milk of similar grade, to sell it, and to pay Waialua for it in accordance with
the pricing formula.
According to the pricing formula, Dairymen's will accept all milk produced by a
producer, but only an amount up to a certain quota will be accepted and paid for as
class 1 milk. Class I milk is defined as that which is sold by Dairymen's to the
public through its retail outlets. Milk above the quota amount (which is estimated
as sufficient to satisfy public demand), is deemed surplus milk, and is used in Dairy-
men's manufacture of ice cream, cheese, and other milk products. The price paid
to producers by Dairymen's for class I milk is the net, of an average price per quart,
less certain commissions due Dairymen's. The price paid for surplus milk is the San
Francisco wholesale price per pound for butter and milk solids, plus freight, San
Francisco to Honolulu, for the particular month involved.
The contract has other provisions, but their exposition at this point would serve
no useful purpose. In general , the milk producers pool contracts form a practical,
orderly system whereby the milk of the producers has an immediate sale, regardless
of fluctuation in either supply or demand within certain limits, at a price previously
agreed upon. Other provisions of the contract appear designed to effectuate this
general purpose.
if. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Upon the pleadings, and the evidence as a whole, I find that Hawaii Teamsters and
Allied Workers Union, Local 996, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 10 is the contract of August 21, 1953 , between Waialua
and Dairymen's
1224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At the hearing it was established that for many years past the Union has been the
bargaining representative of Dairymen's employees on the island of Oahu. Dairy-
men's and the Union apparently negotiated labor agreements on a yearly basis. The
General Counsel introduced into evidence a contract between the parties dated
October 7, 1953, which by its terms was to become effective as of October 1, 1953,
and be in force until September 30, 1954 , and from year to year thereafter , unless
modified by agreement of the parties. Section III of this document states that the
employees covered by the agreement , "are all employees of the company , including
office and clerical employees , but excluding guards, professional employees , salesmen
and supervisors , as defined in the National Labor Relations Act as amended, em-
ployed on the Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, pursuant to N. L. R. B. certifica-
tion Case Numbers 37-RC-131 and 37-RC-132." Other provisions of the contract
cover the usual subjects relating to wages, hours, and working conditions of the
employees.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background of present controversy
At the hearing certain statements of counsel and undisputed testimony established
the following facts as the background of the present controversy . The first meeting
of the Dahlbergs and union representatives occurred on or about July 30 , 1953. On
that date Rutledge and Collier , representatives of the Union , called at the Dahlberg
home and informed the Dahlbergs that the Union represented the employees of
Waialua Dairy, and requested recognition as representatives of the employees. There
is a conflict of testimony between Collier on one side , and the Dahlbergs on the other,
as to the temper with which the Dahlbergs rejected the Union 's claim of representa-
tive status , and refused recognition to the Union , but it is undisputed that the Dahl-
bergs rejected the Union 's claim , and refused recognition on this occasion. At the
time of this first meeting , Waialua Dairy was engaged in the production and the
processing and distribution of its milk to its customers , but the change in Waialua's
operations , incident to its contract with Dairymen 's, was at that time in contempla-
tion . Dahlberg told the union representatives that he was about to sign a contract
with Dairymen 's, and give up the processing and distribution of milk.
Upon being refused recognition by the Dahlbergs , the Union in turn petitioned the
National Labor Relations Board and the Territorial Labor Board for certification as
the representative of Waialua 's employees . However, these efforts were unsuccessful,
because each Board refused to entertain the petition on the ground that the employees
of Waialua were agricultural workers. Whether these decisions were affected by the
imminent change in Waialua 's methods of operation , which fact was made known to
all concerned , is not disclosed by the statements of counsel or the evidence. On
August 21, 1953, the Dahlbergs and Dairymen 's executed the contract mentioned
above . Incidental to the execution of the contract , Dairymen 's purchased Waialua's
processing and distribution equipment , and accepted on its payroll , all employees of
Waialua engaged in processing and distribution , except two employees who found
jobs elsewhere. The transfer of these employees from the Waialua to the Dairy-
men's payroll was accomplished after consultation of representatives of Dairymen's,
Waialua, and the Union . By the terms of the union -shop provision of the contract
between the Union and Dairymen's, the transferred men were required to become
and remain members of the Union within 30 days of their date of employment by
Dairymen 's. Thereafter , Waialua had no employees except those engaged in grass
cutting, milking, and odd jobs.
Since Waialua, after September 1, 1953 , had no employees except those in the
classifications above, and all processing and distribution employees had been trans-
ferred to Dairymen 's, the efforts of the Union to obtain recognition as the representa-
tive of Waialua 's employees subsided . Apparently, Waialua operated from
September 1, 1953, until March 8, 1954, on a nonunion basis without interference
by the Union . However , it is undisputed that this peaceful phase came to an end
on March 8, 1954, when the Union embarked on the course of conduct which is the
subject of this proceeding.
B. The events of March 8 and 9, 1954
There is no substantial dispute between either the parties, or the witnesses, as to
the events of March 8 and 9, 1954, which constitute the factual basis of this proceed-
ing. The Dahlbergs , the representatives of the Union , and an officer and various em-
ployees of Dairymen 's, all testified to the events of those dates , and the testimony
of these witnesses is singularly free of diagreements or conflicts . To all appearances,
all the witnesses , whose testimony is hereafter related , testified with a commendable
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1225
candor , and a minimum of bias, or self-interest . In general , I have credited the
testimony of all witnesses on the main points of their testimony, for on those points
they were in agreement. As to the few minor differences in their testimony, 1 have
accepted that testimony which is most consistent with all other evidence in the case.
The undisputed testimony of the witnesses established the following facts.
On March 8, Walter Whitcomb, a representative of the Union, phoned the Dahl-
berg home. His first call was received by Mrs. Dahlberg at approximately 6 o'clock.
Whitcomb asked to speak to Mr. Dahlberg, but he was not at home. At 9 o'clock he
called again, but Mrs. Dahlberg told him that Dahlberg had not yet arrived home.
Whitcomb then identified himself as a representative of the Union and said that he
wanted to talk to the Dahlbergs about a union contract. Mrs. Dahlberg said that
she had never seen a union contract and asked what it was about. Whitcomb said
that the Union wanted to talk about the producers' contract. Mrs. Dahlberg asked
what it contained. Whitcomb said that if she would like to hear the producers'
contract he would read it to her over the phone. He proceeded to read a contract
to her. She explained to Whitcomb that they had recently executed a 5-year con-
tract with Dairymen's and she asked if the Union could break that contract. Mrs.
Dahlberg also asked the purpose of the contract. Whitcomb replied that the Union
desired the contract to be signed, "because some of the producers were receiving less
than 16 cents a quart," and were dissatisfied with their arrangements with Dairymen's.
She asked Whitcomb what the Union intended to get for the producers-what price.
Whitcomb said that the Union was going to get 20 cents a quart , the same as pro-
ducers were getting on the mainland . Mrs. Dahlberg again asked Whitcomb about
the effectiveness of their 5-year contract with Dairymen's, but Whitcomb made no
answer . Finally, Mrs. Dahlberg said that they were not interested in signing any
contract , whereupon Whitcomb said that the Union had a way of taking care of
people who did not cooperate with it. That ended the conversation.
On the morning of March 9, following his usual routine, Dahlberg loaded his milk
on his truck and drove to the plant of Dairymen's at Honolulu. When he arrived
at the unloading platform of the milk plant, he saw Whitcomb, the union representa-
tive, seated in his car, which was parked in front of the unloading platform. Whit-
comb left his car and said to Dahlberg, "You will have to sign a union contract or
you won't be able to unload your milk this morning." Dahlberg said that there were
some men across the street and that he wanted Whitcomb to tell him the same thing
in the presence of witnesses. Dahlberg and Whitcomb crossed the street to the
service station where several men were standing. Dahlberg told one of the group,
Orlando, a milk inspector, that Whitcomb had told him that he wouldn't be able to
unload his milk unless he signed a union contract. Whitcomb corrected Dahlberg.
Whitcomb said that he had told Dahlberg he was going to "have some trouble" un-
loading his milk, unless he signed a union contract. Dahlberg then asked Whitcomb,
directly, if he was going to have some trouble; Whitcomb replied in the affirmative.
With that, Whitcomb turned to Collier, another union representative who was present,
and said, "Show it to him, Collier." Collier then displayed to Dahlberg a picket sign
which read, "Waialua Dairy Unfair," and at the bottom the name of the Union,
Teamsters and Allied Workers, AFL, 996. 3
Dahlberg then went into the plant and told Cannon, vice president and manager
of Dairymen 's milk division , that the Union was not going to let him unload his
truck. Cannon and Dahlberg went to the unloading platform. Whitcomb had
moved his car a few feet, so Dahlberg moved his truck up to the platform. At that
point, Collier, the second union representative, clambered upon the platform and
stood at the conveyor belt which carried the milk from the platform into the plant.
Collier displayed the picket sign, previously described. Cannon told Dahlberg to
unload his cans onto the conveyor and that he would have the men start the con-
veyor. Dahlberg put three cans on the conveyor while Cannon, accompanied by
Kauai, the plant manager, and Whitcomb, went inside the plant. Dahlberg could
see Cannon and the others inside the plant, and he heard Cannon tell the receiving
clerk to operate the conveyor and to unload Dahlberg's truck, but the receiving clerk
did not start the conveyor. In about 10 minutes, Cannon and Kauai came out of
the plant and Cannon conferred with some men across the street. When Cannon
came back to the truck about 15 minutes later, he asked Dahlberg to move his truck
forward, to allow another producer to unload, but he told Dahlberg not to move his
truck so far that he would leave the platform. Dahlberg moved his truck forward
a few feet and the other producer unloaded. During this unloading, Collier did
not display the picket sign , the conveyor belt was operated by the receiving clerk,
and this producer's cans moved into the plant. As soon as the other producer had
8 It was stipulated by counsel that the picket sign read as stated above.
1226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unloaded, Dahlberg backed up his truck and put his three cans back on the conveyor
belt and Collier resumed his former position displaying the picket sign. Dahlberg
waited about 15 minutes, but nothing happened. He observed, during this time, that
the man who operated the conveyor belt and his assistant just waited at their station.
After about 15 minutes Cannon came to Dahlberg and said, "You'll have to take
your milk home and dump it. I've asked them to start the conveyor and they are
not going to start it." Dahlberg said that he would take the milk home and dump
it, but that somebody was going to count the cans and see that they were full, and
that someone was going to pay him. Cannon and Anderson of the Dairymen's staff
counted and inspected the cans and then Dahlberg went home.
George Cannon testified that about 6 o'clock on the evening of March 8 he received
a telephone call from Rutledge, the president of the Union. Rutledge said that he
had called Cannon to tell him that there was probably going to be some trouble with
some of the producers on the following morning. Cannon said that if there was
going to be trouble, he would like Rutledge to let him know, so he could be ready
for whatever might arise. Rutledge agreed to notify Cannon. About 9 o'clock
that evening Cannon received a telephone call from Whitcomb who said that the
Union was attempting to organize the producers, and that if the producers didn't
get in line there was going to be some trouble. The Union was going to put up a
picket line at Dairymen's plant on the following morning. Whitcomb said that he
had tried to get hold of the Dahlbergs of Waialua Dairy, and he thought it would
be a good idea if Cannon would talk to them on the phone, and tell them that they
had better recognize the Union because there would be trouble the following morn-
ing. Cannon told Rutledge that Dairymen's was not interested in whether the pro-
ducers signed contracts with the Union or not, and that Dairymen's would not advise
anybody to sign any contract. About 2 a. in. on March 9, Whitcomb phoned
Cannon again . He told Cannon that there would be trouble at the plant in the
morning, definitely. Cannon talked to Whitcomb for a few minutes, and then Whit-
comb called Rutledge to the phone. Rutledge said that he had promised Cannon
to notify him if there was going to be trouble at the plant, and Rutledge said that
there was, definitely, going to be trouble with Dahlberg in the morning.
Cannon arrived at the milk plant at approximately 7:15 a. in. on March 9. About
8 a. in. Dahlberg came to his office, saying that he couldn't pull up to the unloading
platform because Whitcomb's car was blocking it. Cannon and Kauai, the plant
manager, went down to the unloading platform. Collier, a representative of the
Union, was standing on the platform with a picket sign. Whitcomb was also near
the platform. When Cannon saw the sign he went into the plant, accompanied by
Whitcomb and Kauai. He spoke to the receiving clerk, Wayne Nakamura. Cannon
testified that he said to Nakamura, "If I order you to receive this milk will you
receive it?" Nakamura replied, "No." Cannon asked, "Why?" Nakamura said
that he had been told not to receive it. Cannon asked, "Who told you not to
receive it?" Nakamura answered, "Whitcomb." Cannon then asked Whitcomb to
tell Nakamura to receive the milk, but Whitcomb refused.
Cannon then went into the office and made a telephone call to Rutledge, the
president of the Union, but was unable to reach him. He again requested Whitcomb
to order the men to receive the milk, but again Whitcomb refused. He then asked
Whitcomb if there wasn't some way they could work the situation out but Whitcomb
replied in the negative. Cannon then asked Dahlberg to remove his truck. Dahlberg
asked if he was going to be paid for his milk. Cannon replied that he had tried to
deliver it, so he had done his part. Dahlberg asked Cannon to count and inspect
the cans of milk, which Cannon did. Dahlberg then drove his truck , containing the
milk, from Dairymen's premises.
Wayne S. Nakamura testified that for approximately 8 years he had been employed
as milk receiving clerk at Dairymen's milk plant in Honolulu. In his duties he is
assisted by another employe named Sabagala. Both Nakamura and Sabagala are
members of the Union. Their duties include the operation of the conveyor belt on
which cans of milk unloaded at the unloading platform are moved into the plant,
the taking of samples of butterfat from each can unloaded, and the keeping of an
account of the amount of milk received. When Nakamura came to work on the
morning of March 9 he saw Collier, the union representative at the plant. About
7:45 a. in., Nakamura, accompanied by Sabagala, went to Collier's car, where the
men sat down with Collier. Nakamura asked Collier what was up. Collier said,
"Waialua Dairy." Nakamura said, "That's nonunion milk, then. We are going to
have trouble with him." Collier then told Nakamura not to take Dahlberg's milk
when it came in, to which Nakamura said, "0. K." When Collier told him this,
Sabagala was also seated in Collier's car, but Sabagala does not understand English
very well.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1227
A short time after this conversation , Dahlberg drove his truck up to the receiving
platform and unloaded some milk. Nakamura told Sabagala , "Don't run the con-
veyor because it's nonunion milk. If you ever run the conveyor , you are going to
get into trouble ." Neither Nakamura nor Sabagala operated the conveyor . Kauai,
the superintendent of the milk plant, came on the unloading platform and signaled
Nakamura to operate the conveyor and take away the milk. He signaled his refusal
to Kauai and said, "I cannot." In a few moments Cannon , Kauai, and Whitcomb
came into the plant and Cannon said, "Supposing I order you to run the conveyor,
would you run it?" Nakamura said , "No." At that time Collier was sitting on the
receiving platform carrying the picket sign. Cannon asked Nakamura who told him
not to run the conveyor , but, according to Nakamura , he did not answer that ques-
tion . On the witness stand Nakamura explained this failure to answer , saying
"Nobody told me, but when it's non-union I don't want to get in trouble ; I cannot
run it, I got no choice about it."4
Later in the day he told Superintendent Kauai , "I am sorry I had to do this to
the company , but I had no choice whatsoever ." When Nakamura was examined
as to what he meant by his remark to Kauai he explained that he had no choice,
because the milk was nonunion and if he ran the conveyor all the other employees
would walk out on him .5
Francisco Sabagala, assistant to Nakamura , testified that he was on duty with
Nakamura on the morning of March 9 . He said that Dahlberg's milk was not un-
loaded by either Nakamura or himself because it was not union milk.
Toshi Kauai , superintendent of the milk plant, testified that he has been employed
by Dairymen 's for approximately 7 years. When he reached the plant on March 9,
he saw Whitcomb and Collier . Whitcomb was in his car, which was parked near
the receiving platform, and Collier was sitting on the receiving platform with a
picket sign over his shoulder with the blank side exposed . He spoke to Whitcomb,
and in the course of the conversation Whitcomb said that the union representatives
were there to stop Waialua from unloading its milk. Another producer was at the
platform unloading milk.
Kauai testified that Nakamura and Sabagala were the employees who regularly
operated the conveyor in the unloading of trucks . When Dahlberg's truck was
brought to the receiving platform, Dahlberg unloaded several cans on to the con-
veyor chain , but the chain did not move , so Kauai jumped up on the platform, looked
through the opening, and waved to Nakamura to operate the conveyor and take the
cans away . Nakamura waved back to him in a negative manner, from which he
understood that Nakamura refused to start the conveyor . He repeated his signal,
but Nakamura only repeated his previous signal that he would not operate the con-
veyor . Kauai went to the office and reported the refusal of Nakamura to operate
the conveyor to Cannon . Kauai then went back to the platform where he was joined
in a few minutes by Cannon , and the two men went inside the plant to talk to
Nakamura . Whitcomb followed them into the receiving room where Nakamura and
Sabagala were standing near the button for the conveyor belt. Kauai heard Cannon
say to Nakamura, "If I order you to do so will you receive it')" Nakamura answered,
"No." With that , Cannon , Whitcomb , and Kauai all left the receiving room. Can-
non crossed the street and had a talk with Rutledge, president of the Union , who was
standing at the service station. Kauai went along with Cannon and heard the con-
versation between Cannon and Rutledge . He gathered that the Union would not per-
mit Dahlberg to deliver the milk.
Kauai also testified that, in the course of the incident concerning the unloading
of Dahlberg , he at one time requested Whitcomb to move his car forward a few
feet so that the truck of another producer could be unloaded , and that Whitcomb
complied with his request . When this truck was unloaded , Nakamura operated the
conveyor belt.
At the conclusion of his talk with Rutledge, Cannon went to Dahlberg and in-
formed him that his milk could not be received and asked him to take his milk away.
Dahlberg then drove away.
Edward Collier , one of the union representatives , testified that on the morning of
March 9 about 3 a . in., he and Whitcomb went to Dairymen 's with a picket sign
with the intention of putting a picket line at the milk plant at the time Dahlberg
would arrive. Collier saw Kauai around 8 a. in. at approximately the same time that
Dahlberg's truck arrived at Dairymen 's. At that time both Whitcomb and Collier
had their cars parked at the unloading platform, thereby blocking Dahlberg's truck
from the unloading platform. Kauai asked Whitcomb and Collier to move their
* Transcript , page 47.
5 Transcript , page 53.
1228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cars so that he could take care of Dahlberg. Whitcomb and Collier moved their cars
a few feet, and then Dahlberg moved his truck to the platform. Collier immediately
jumped onto the platform with his picket sign , taking a position near the truck and
the conveyor. Kauai asked Dahlberg not to unload his milk, but Dahlberg put 3
or 4 cans on the conveyor. The conveyor didn't move so everybody just stood there.
Collier moved a packing case over and sat down upon it, displaying his picket sign.
Finally Dahlberg moved his truck away from the unloading platform. At that point
Collier descended from the platform and walked across the street to talk to some men
at the tire shop. That concluded his picketing for the day.
Collier also testified as to a conversation which was held by Rutledge and himself
with the Dahlbergs in May 1953 in which they called upon the Dahlbergs and told
them that the Union had signed up their employees 'In Collier's account of this
conversation he portrays the Dahlbergs as being deeply angered by this information,
and of being abusive and threatening toward the union representatives.
Walter E. Whitcomb, the other union representative previously mentioned, testi-
fied that he called Mrs. Dahlberg on March 8, and asked her to sign the union con-
tract. In the course of the telephone conversation he read the contract to her. She
said that it was a stupid contract and she would not sign it. As a result of this con-
versation he requested Collier's assistance, and the two union representatives arrived
at the milk plant on the following morning around 3 o'clock. They went to the plant
early, thinking Dahlberg might go to the plant earlier than usual. They put their
cars alongside the platform. Other producers arrived at the plant, so they moved
their cars away from the platform, far enough to enable these producers to unload
their milk, as the union representatives were "expressly looking for" Dahlberg.
Dahlberg arrived at 8:05 a. in. Whitcomb spoke to Dahlberg, asking him to sign the
union contract. Dahlberg refused.
Whitcomb testified that he had no conversation with Kauai until after Dahlberg
had arrived with his truck in the vicinity of the platform. At that point Kauai ap-
proached him and told him that he could handle Dahlberg and that he didn't want
any trouble. Whitcomb told Kauai that he had seen some producers get in front of
the unloading platform and hold the operation up for several hours, and that by
having their cars there they were able at least to see to it that the union producers
had a chance to deliver their milk. Kauai told Whitcomb not to worry about that,
"As far as we are concerned we will see to it that Dahlberg gets out of here." Whit-
comb asked Kauai if he was sure, and Kauai replied, "Don't worry about it, I will
take care of Dahlberg." When Dahlberg arrived and found the cars at the chute,
he left his truck and went upstairs. In accordance with the conversation of Whit-
comb with Kauai, Whitcomb and Collier moved their cars away from the unloading
platform. Dahlberg came downstairs, got into his truck and drove it up to the plat-
form. When he did this, Collier took the picket sign and stood beside the truck.
Dahlberg started to unload his milk cans. After he had unloaded one can and was
moving a second, Kauai went to Dahlberg and said, "Now, Dahlberg, look here.
You're not going to hold up my whole operation. Now look. Just put these back on
the truck and move out of here." Dahlberg told Kauai that he would put the cans
on the conveyor and that he would go in and run the conveyor himself. Kauai said,
"You're not going to do it because the rest of the people in the plant probably won't
work and I don't want any trouble." Dahlberg continued to try to unload his truck
over the objection of Kauai. Finally, Dahlberg sat down on the platform, and there
seemed to be a stalemate of about 15 minutes, while Kauai, Dahlberg, and Collier
all stood on the platform. At that point Cannon came out of the plant and asked
Whitcomb where Rutledge was. Whitcomb replied that he did not know. Cannon
then said that they had to get this thing straightened out somehow. As Cannon
turned away he motioned to Whitcomb, and Whitcomb followed him inside the
plant. Cannon went to Nakamura and asked him why he wasn't running the con-
veyor, and Nakamura said , "Tow (Kauai) and Whitcomb said not to." When the
question was repeated to him, Nakamura said , "Tow and Whitcomb said not to,
that Dahlberg was nonunion." Cannon then said to Nakamura, "If I asked you to
start the machine up, what would you do?" Nakamura replied, "I can't. What
would you do?" Cannon and Whitcomb then left the plant. Cannon again asked
for Rutledge, and about that time Rutledge, the president of the Union, appeared.
Cannon and Rutledge talked for about 6 or 7 minutes. Cannon then talked to Dahl-
berg, who then drove away in his truck.
C. Evidence excluded at the hearing
At the hearing, counsel for the Union sought to adduce testimony from witness
Cannon, and to introduce other evidence which would tend to establish that, although
it was not contained in the current contract between the Union and Dairymen's, those
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1229
parties had an understanding that a "Conway" clause , formerly in the contract, would
be given effect. Upon objection by the General Counsel, the Trial Examiner ruled
that the evidence was inadmissible. The question and the ruling arose in the follow-
ing manner.
In the cross-examination of Cannon, counsel for the Union asked Cannon if he
knew that the 1943 contract between the Union and Dairymen's contained a "hot
cargo" clause, by which employees would not be required to handle goods which were
declared "hot" or "unfair" by the Union. Cannon answered that he did not have
knowledge on that point. Counsel pursued this type of inquiry, examining the witness
as to (1) the refusal of Dairymen's truckdrivers to cross a picket line at Hawaiian
Pineapple Company during a labor dispute, (2) the refusal of an employee of Dairy-
men's to deliver ice cream to the Rico Ice Cream Company, which had been declared
"unfair" by the Union, and (3) an incident in which a business agent of the Union
had padlocked the warehouse of Dairymen's because the Union had a dispute with
the Hawaii Transfer Company. Cannon replied (1) that there had been some dis-
cussion about a driver's refusal to cross the picket line at Hawaiian Pineapple Com-
pany, but that the question had been solved so that employees of Dairymen's passed
through the picket line; (2) that he was aware of the incident concerning the Rico
Ice Cream Company, and (3) that he also remembered the incident in which a busi-
ness agent of the Union locked the door of Dairymen's warehouse without Dairy-
men's permission, because the Union had a dispute with Hawaii Transfer Company.
He said the Union had no right to lock up the company's warehouse. At that point,
the General Counsel objected to an inquiry of a similar nature on the basis of ma-
teriality and relevancy. Counsel for the Union then stated his purpose in seeking
to adduce the testimony.6 He said that it was the contention of the Union that by
an unwritten mutual understanding, the parties had in effect in the contract a Con-
way 7 clause, which allowed the employees to refuse to handle hot goods if they so
desired, or if the Union so directed, and that the incidents about which he was ex-
amining, illustrated the operation of that understanding.
When the above explanation was made, counsel for the General Counsel then
stated that he objected to the proffered testimony on the further ground that, by
means of this parol evidence, counsel for the Union sought to alter, vary, or modify
the terms of a written instrument, and that therefore the testimony was inadmissible.
Counsel for the Union then said that section 4 of the current contract beween the
Union and Dairymen's, which was then in evidence, was the section to which the
understanding of the parties was directed . Section 4 reads as follows:
SECTION 4. NO DISCRIMINATION, SERVICE BY EMPLOYEES
The company agrees to refrain from employing unfair labor practices to dis-
criminate against any employee for reason of union affiliations and/or for
legitimate and bona fide activities on behalf of the Union , or for reason of race,
color, or creed. The Union agrees for its members (who are employees of the
company ) that inconsideration of faithful performance by the company of this
Agreement they will individually and collectively perform loyal and efficient
work, that they will use their influence and best efforts to protect the property
of the company and to assist whenever possible the further use of company
products and services.
Counsel for the Union then stated that the Union had a letter from the counsel
representing Dairymen 's in the 1943 negotiations , in which the Conway clause was
,eliminated , which contained a statement , rather ambiguously phrased , that the parties
could drop the Conway clause from the contract, and still have the same effect. Upon
his recommendation the clause was dropped from the contract , and had remained
out ever since, but the parties had an understanding that section 4 of the present
contract would be given the same effect as the Conway clause . Counsel for the
General Counsel stated that section 4 of the contract , as he read it, appeared not
s Transcript , page 89.
7 The reference is to a type of contractual provision involved in Conway's Empress, 87
NLRB 972, affirmed 195 F 2d 906 (C. A. 2). In that case, the secondary employers and
Teamsters were parties to an area agreement . By a provision of the agreement, the
Teamsters "reserved the right to refuse to handle goods or freight of any employer in-
volved in a labor dispute." The Board held that by executing the contract containing this
provision , the secondary employers "consented in advance to boycott Conway's. As they
consented , their employees ' failure to deliver freight to or accept freight from Conway
trucks was not in the literal sense a strike or refusal to work, nor was any such concerted
insubordination contemplated by the Respondent when it caused the employees to exer-
cise their contractual privilege ," and that in these circumstances Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
did not apply.
1230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to support the position of counsel for the Union; it was not ambiguous, nor could
any reasonable interpretation of the section convert it into a Conway clause.
Counsel for the Union said that he thought it could be proved, if the evidence
would be heard, that "Legitimate and bona fide activities on behalf of the union"
was intended to include and did include the right to respect a picket line and to refuse
to handle hot goods. In explanation, he said: 8
I think that a great deal has to be said down here, Mr. Examiner, on the basis
of under-the-table agreements. This is a very tight, non-union town, they don't
like union activities. In fact, they don't like the Dairymen's Association to have
the union shop either, which is a great concession on behalf of the Dairymen's
Association, I am sure. But they certainly don't like the hot cargo clause, they
never have. And we have been forced to live under these sub rosa arrangements
for many years, and I think the proof will show that we have so lived. Of
course, that is a basis of disagreement here today.
The Trial Examiner then said that apparently the parties in omitting the clause
from the 1943 contract had taken cognizance of the fact that agreements of the hot
cargo type were not in public favor in the community, and that because of this
unpopularity, they had mutually agreed to omit from the written document that
unpopular clause.9 Now, however, when the clause might exculpate one of the
parties from certain results of its conduct, it sought to reinsert in the contract the
eliminated clause. The Trial Examiner said that under the circumstances he was
of the opinion that parol evidence could not properly be used to place back in the
contract the eliminated clause, or substitute the eliminated clause for some other
clause or paragraph of the written instrument. At that point the Trial Examiner sug-
gested that counsel for the Union make a formal offer of proof on the subject, and
that he would rule on the question after hearing all counsel on the subject.
Later in the hearing, counsel for the Union made the following offer of proof: 10
Mr. Examiner, I wish to make the following offer of proof in relation to the
question of the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement presently
existing and which existed at the time of the picketing in question in this
proceeding.
As I stated earlier, there is in the collective bargaining agreement Section 4,
which read by itself is not only ambiguous but perhaps a little senseless. I
offer to show the background for that section and to show the understanding
arrived at by the parties as to the true meaning of that section, and to show
further that the parties by their actions over the past dozen years have confirmed
our contention as to the meaning of that section.
I offer to prove that by way of background that in a collective bargaining
agreement which existed between the company and the present union in the
summer of 1943 there appeared the following clause, which at that time was
Section 10 of the contract. The clause stated as follows:
Handling of goods during a labor dispute. The union reserves the right
on behalf of its members to refuse or cease handling or transporting any of
the company's products, goods or property to or from any other firm which
is engaged in a labor dispute or which is being struck and/or which is
being picketed by any bona fide labor union.
I would be willing to show by means of a witness present at the time of the
negotiations, which took place in the summer of 1943, that representations were
made by the company that this clause should be removed from the contract, not
because the parties disagreed with the intention or had any intention to fail
to live up to the terms of this clause but merely because it was embarrassing to
the company because of pressure placed on the company by other businesses in
the community.
I am prepared to submit by way of confirmation of this discussion a letter
from the law firm of Smith, Wilde, Beebe & Cades, of Honolulu, T. H., dated
August 5, 1943, signed by Arthur G. Smith, who at that time was the attorney
for the company, in which he made a number of statements to the effect that
it would not be necessary to have the Section 10, which I referred to previously,
8 Transcript, page 93 , et seq.
9 By the clause one employer agrees, at the request of the Union to boycott any other
employer, with which the Union has a dispute Potential targets of the boycott naturally
resent the arrangement
10 Transcript, page 146, et seq.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1231
in the contract , but that the union would have the right to respect picket lines
and to refuse to handle hot goods, even without Section 10.
By way of further confirmation, I am prepared to submit a letter written by
Arthur A. Rutledge, at that time executive secretary of the Dairy Workers Union,
Local No. 22432, which is the successor of the Teamsters Local 996, who is
the respondent in the present case, a letter written to the Department of Labor,
asking for some explanation and confirmation of the opinion given by Mr.
Arthur Smith. And as I understand the background, the opinion of Mr. Smith
was enclosed with the letter to the Territorial Department of Labor.
I would like to submit these two items in evidence and mark them for identi-
fication as respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively.ll
I further offer to prove by means of the testimony of Mr. Rutledge that after
this exchange of correspondence it was agreed by and between the company
and the union that the former Section 10 dealing with hot cargo could be elimi-
nated from the written contract and that a new section, which is the same as
the present Section 4, should be inserted, with the understanding between the
parties that the ambiguous language in Section 4, which nevertheless gives the
union employees the right to engage in any and all bona fide activities, would
include the right to refuse to handle hot cargo.
I further offer to prove that on at least three occasions since this change in
language in the contract the company has recognized the right of the union to
either refuse to cross picket lines or to refuse to handle hot cargo. One of these
instances being a refusal to cross a picket line at the Hawaiian Pineapple Corpo-
ration when they were engaged in a strike, a second being a refusal by the
plant-one of the plant employees at the ice cream plant, Mr. George Gouveia,
to give Rico Ice Cream Company any popsicles because the Rico Ice Cream
Company was engaged in a labor dispute with the Teamsters Union. I further
go on to show by the testimony of Mr. Gouveia that after he had refused to
deliver these goods to the unfair employer that a great deal of pressure was
brought on Dairymen's Association and they made a show of suspending him
for two weeks, that they then called him into the office, told him to keep quiet
about it, and gave him his full pay for the time he was off the job.
We will further show by the testimony of Mr. Whitcomb, who is the business
representative for the Teamsters, that approximately 2 years ago the Teamsters
Union convinced the company that they should cease doing business one [sic]
Hawaii Transfer, with whom the Teamsters had a dispute, that the company
did cease doing business with them and put on another transfer company in
their place. And that all of these actions were taken under the understand-
ing between the parties that while they would not write a hot cargo clause into
the agreement, that they certainly would allow the action that was taken.
I think that completes my offer of proof.
The Trial Examiner then sustained the objection of Counsel for the General Coun-
sel that the proffered evidence (1) would constitute parol evidence which would alter,
vary, or change the terms of the written instrument or add additional terms thereto;
(2) that portions of the proffered evidence were inadmissible hearsay; and (3) that
all the proffered proof was irrelevant and immaterial.
Concluding Findings
The above testimony demonstrates that there is no serious dispute as to the basic
facts of the controversy. I find them to be as follows:
On approximately June 30, 1953, the Union informed the Dahlbergs that it had
been authorized to represent in collective bargaining the workers employed by
Waialua, and requested recognition as bargaining agent. The Dahlbergs disputed
the Union's claim to representative status, refused recognition, and informed the
Union that they were about to execute a contract with Dairymen's, and as an inci-
dent thereof, discontinue the processing and distribution of milk. The Union then
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board, and the Territorial Labor Board for
certification as bargaining representative of Waialua's employees. Both boards dis-
missed the petition of the Union, on the ground that the workers employed by Wai-
alua were "agricultural workers" and not "employees" as defined in their respective
acts.12 Upon the execution of the Waialua-Dairymen's contract, Waialua discon-
u The documents are marked Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, and can be found in
the file of rejected exhibits
12 The territorial act involved is the Hawaii Employment Relations Act.
1232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tinued its processing and distribution, and thereafter had on its payroll only workers
engaged in odd jobs, milking, and feed cutting.
Despite the dismissal of the Union's petitions by the territorial and national boards
on the ground that the workers on Waialua's payroll were agricultural workers, and
not employees, the Union persisted in its demands that Waialua recognize it as bar-
gaining agent for these workers and sign a contract with the Union as the representa-
tive of the workers. To attain that objective, on the morning of March 9, 1954, the
Union picketed a truck of Waialua, while it was at the unloading platform of Dairy-
men's and issued orders to two employees in the receiving department of Dairymen's
not to receive or unload Waialua's milk, because Waialua was "unfair" to the Union.
As a result of that action, Nakamura and Sabagala, employees of Dairymen's, who
were members of the Union, refused to receive or unload Waialua's milk, and as a
result of their concerted refusal Dairymen's refused to accept Waialua's milk, which
was then taken back to the farm.
Several features of the picketing are likewise undisputed. The picketing was con-
ducted on Dairymen's premises, in close proximity to Waialua's truck, and for only
that period of time during which Waialua's truck was at the receiving platform.
Also the picket sign clearly stated that Waialua (not Dairymen's) was "Unfair."
However, it is not disputed, and I find, that the result of both the picketing, and the
instructions of the union representatives to the aforementioned employees, was to
force Dairymen's to cease handling or dealing in the products of Waialua and to
cease doing business with Waialua.
The General Counsel contends that the Union, by the conduct above, violated
Section 8 (b) (4) (A). The Union contends that its conduct is not a violation of
the Section.
The language of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) which is here essential, is as follows:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed
person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person; .. .
In N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S.
675, the Supreme Court defined the nature and the scope of the prohibition in the
above section, stating that it restricted "a labor organization and its agents in the
use of economic pressure where an object of it is to force an employer or other
person to boycott some one else." 13 At the same time, however, the court also
decided N. L. R. B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, in which it
held that Section 8 (b) (4) did not abridge or diminish a union's right to engage in
a traditional or primary strike, even when it caused incidental harm to a neutral
employer.
These decisions left unanswered the question of a union's right to picket a truck
of a primary employer while it was on the premises of a neutral employer. As cases
of this type arose, the Board announced its "ambulatory situs" rule and applied it to
the facts of each case.14
The problem, and the rule, are stated in N. L. R. B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs,
supra, as follows:
The trouble lies in determining what is "incidental" and "primary" in a case
like this where the primary employer's business, travelling about on wheels,
rolls up to the secondary employer's door or onto his premises. To hold that,
in such circumstances, the union may not there picket the primary employer
in any way, because the secondary employer might thereby be injured, would be
virtually to deprive the union of a powerful weapon which Congress meant to
preserve.
" See also, N L R. B. v. Denver Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675; Electrical Workers v.
N. L. R. B , 341 U. S. 694; Carpenters Union v. N. L. R. B , 341 U S. 947.
14 See Moore Drydock, 92 NLRB 547; Schultz Refrigerated Service, 87 NLRB 502; Getreu
v Truck Dravers, 34 LRRM 2621, U S. No Dist. Georgia (1954). N. L. R B. v. Service
Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F 2d 65 (C A. 2)
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1233
3. Since its decision in the instant case, the Board , in subsequent decisions,
has evolved criteria for determining what constitutes legitimate picketing where
the business of a primary employer has a roving situs and where the picketing
affects secondary employers. The Board's several enunciations of these criteria
perhaps have not been wholly consistent . However that may be, we regard
as a sound interpretation of the Act the principles laid down in Sailor 's Union
of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 547. There the Board said that "picketing of the
premises of a secondary employer is primary if it meets the following conditions:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located
on the secondary employer 's premises ; ( b) at the time of the picketing the
primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs ; ( c) the picket-
ing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs ; and (d) the
picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer."
Here , the Union argues that its conduct on March 9 , 1953, met the criteria, set
forth above, and that its picketing must therefore be deemed primary, and not a
violation of the Act.
While it is true that Waialua Dairy was located in an agricultural area, some 30
miles from Honolulu, and that the picket sign clearly indicated that Waialua only
was unfair, and the picketing occurred only when a truck of Waialua was present,
and in close proximity to the truck, I cannot agree that the facts of this case bring
it within the ambulatory situs doctrine . Here, the Board 's decision in Washington
Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107 NLRB 299, appears to be controlling. In that
case the Board held that the criteria, set forth above, were applicable only in situa-
tions where it had found that the situs of the dispute was at the premises of the
neutral employer. When the primary employer has a primary place of business in
the locality which can be picketed by the union, that place is the situs of the dispute.
Here, the primary situs of any dispute between its workers and Waialua, was the
dairy farm of the latter, which was located approximately 30 miles from Honolulu.
In addition to the above, there are other substantial reasons for rejecting the
Union's argument, based on the ambulatory situs doctrine. In the instant case, there
is no need to resort to the use of the above criteria to determine whether the harm
caused this neutral employer was "incidental" to a "primary" or "traditional" strike,
or was caused "to force an employer . . . to boycott some one else." The undis-
puted facts of this case ( 1) point unmistakably to the illegal object of the Union's
conduct, and (2) rules out the possibility of a contrary finding. They are: (1)
There was no primary or traditional strike of any employees of Waialua, or of any
agricultural workers of Waialua, if a strike of the latter can be considered primary
or traditional within any meaning of the words; (2) Waialua's truck was driven by
one of the proprietors of the company, thus none of Waialua's workers were on Dairy-
men's premises at the time of the picketing, where they could possibly be affected
by the picketing; (3) prior to the picketing, the union representatives told Dahlberg
that unless he signed a contract, the Union would prevent the unloading of his milk
by Dairymen's; (4) when Dahlberg refused to capitulate, the only actions taken by
the Union, the picketing and the instructions , were directed at Dairymen 's employees
and no one else; (5 ) when those employees engaged in a concerted work stoppage,
Dairymen's directed Dahlberg to take his milk home, though by contract the Asso-
ciation was required to accept it; (6) when Dahlberg removed his milk from Dairy-
men's premises, the picketing ceased and Dairymen's employees resumed work. It
is significant , also, that this conduct of the Union was the only action taken by the
Union of any kind which would in any way disclose that any difference existed be-
tween Waialua and the Union. This picketing incident is neither prologue nor epi-
logue to any other action of the Union or Waialua's workers, save the Union's naked
demand that Waialua sign a contract. On this set of facts there was no "traditional"
or "primary" strike of which the concerted action of Dairymen's employees could be
considered the "incidental" byproduct. The only strike or work stoppage in this rec-
ord, was that of Dairymen's employees which was caused directly by the Union's
picket, and the Union's orders.
In the latter part of the opinion in N. L. R. B. V. Service Trade Chauffeurs, supra,
the court said:
4. The Union clearly violated the Act in picketing the Read Warehouse.
For no trucks operated by the primary employer were present at the ware-
house, nor were any of its employees there engaged in the primary employer's
business. The Board's findings, amply supported by the evidence, make it plain
that, by this picketing, the Union induced Read's warehouse employees to en-
gage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform their
customary services-i. e., to quit work-and that they did quit , in part at least,.
1234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
because they were so induced by this picketing. The Board was also clearly
right in concluding that the objects of the Union's inducement were those pro-
scribed by (A) and ( B) of § 8 (b) (4)-namely, to force Read to cease doing
business with the primary employer and to force the primary employer to recog-
nize the Union as the representative of its employees, although the Union had
not been certified as a representative. To that extent, therefore, the Board's
decision was correct and will now be enforced.
Also, in Richfield Oil Corporation, 95 NLRB 1191, the Board found that the con-
duct of pickets clearly showed that the picketing in part at least, was designed to
force Richfield to cease doing business with Superior, and that the union thereby
violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A).
The Union also argues that Waialua and Dairymen's must be considered "allies,"
within the meaning of such cases as Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., 87 NLRB 54; Douds
v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 21 LRRM 2256, 75 Fed. Supp. 672. With
that contention, also, I disagree. While it is true that Waialua and Dairymen's were
bound by a contract, by which Waialua sold, and Dairymen's purchased, Waialua's
entire output of milk, and Waialua, among other things, agreed not to dispose of
its herd of producing cows, this contractual arrangement did not render the parties
"allies" in the labor dispute. The cases holding that 2 or more companies are allies
in a labor dispute, all turn upon facts showing that 1 company is a subsidiary of the
other, or the 2 have common ownership, common control, or common labor policy
to the extent that the separate identities of the companies are merged or lost in the
course of the labor dispute. Here, the Dahlbergs are sole owners of Waialua, and
their only connection with Dairymen's is by contract. Likewise, Dairymen's exists
as a separate entity. While the contract between the two has peculiar provisions,
these find their source not in a desire to merge identities, or to give control to one, but
in the fluctuating nature of the dairy business. Dairymen's sought a constant supply
of milk, and Waialua a constant buyer of its product; they agreed for their mutual ad-
vantage upon the terms of a contract designed to bring stability to their operations.
They agreed to nothing more. For many years, Dairymen's has been unionized; for
an equal number of years Waialua has been nonunion. Each, as a separate business
entity, pursued its individul course, until the Union, because of its difference with
Waialua, induced and encouraged the employees of Dairymen's, with which com-
pany the Union had amicable relations, to refuse, in the course of their employment,
to handle Waialua's milk. There is no factual basis to support a finding that Dairy-
men's and Waialua are allies in the dispute.
The Union also argues that there was no inducement to concerted action in the
present case, citing N. L. R. B. v. International Rice Milling, Inc., supra, and Joliet
Contractors Association, 202 F. 2d 606. I must also reject this contention, for
several reasons. I have found that representatives of the Union ordered Nakamura,
in the presence of Sabagala, not to unload Waialua's milk. Conceding, for the
sake of argument, the point made by the Union, that it is highly probable that
Sabagala, because of his difficulty with English, did not understand these orders of
the union representative, yet it is undisputed that Nakamura transmitted the orders
to Sabagala, and that, at the critical moment, both men refused to operate the con-
veyor. It is true that no general strike of Dairymen's employees occurred, but for
only one reason; it wasn't necessary. The Union's sole and complete purpose was
achieved when the two receiving clerks of the neutral employer refused to operate
the conveyor and handle Waialua's milk.
At that moment, the operations of Dairymen's began to stop, just as effectively as
if Nakamura and Sabagala had pulled a switch cutting off all power into the plant.
At that moment, Dairymen's was confronted with the alternatives presented by the
Union, to boycott Waialua and resume operation, or refuse to boycott Waialua and
continue to suffer a work stoppage. That the action of Nakamura and Sabagala was
concerted, is further established by Nakamura's warning to Sabagala, that if the
conveyor was started all the employees would walk out of the plant.
Furthermore, I must agree with the rationale of those cases which hold that
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) is violated when the action of the Union induces and en-
courages the proscribed concerted activity regardless of whether the inducement or
encouragement actually succeeds or fails in obtaining the concerted activity of the
employees who are the target of the Union's conduct.15
I find that the conduct of the union representatives on the morning of March 9,
1954, was clearly designed to effect objects proscribed by the Act, namely to force
Ic N. L R. B v Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 193 F. 2d 241 (C. A.
10) ; Professional and Businessmen's Life Insurance Company, 108 NLRB 29; Stover Steel
Service, 108 NLRB 221.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1235
Dairymen's to cease using , selling, handling , transporting , or otherwise dealing in
the products of Waialua Dairy, and to cease doing business with Waialua Dairy, and
that the Union has thereby violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) as alleged in the
complaint.1e
At this point , I believe it proper to give some of the reasons for excluding the
evidence offered by the Union to prove that an "understanding" of the parties
effectively placed a Conway clause in their current contract.
We may take as a starting point the Board's decision in Conway's Express, supra,
for in addition to giving a name to a type of hot cargo clause, that decision is the
cornerstone of the Union's offer of proof.
As related previously, Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, proscribed as unfair labor practices certain practices of the unions, among
which were those tactics commonly called secondary boycotts. On December 16,
1949, the Board handed down its decision in Conway's Express, supra. It had been
found by the Trial Examiner in that case, and affirmed by the Board, that the union
had taken certain action in reference to the employees of certain secondary em-
ployers who did business with Conway's. The General Counsel contended that the
conduct of the union as found by the Board constituted a violation of the Act. The
Teamsters urged as a defense, that it had a contract with the secondary employers
which rendered lawful the conduct found to have been committed by the Board. The
decision of the majority of the Board has been the target of many critics, who have
given special attention to that portion of the decision pertinent to our question. That
portion speaks for itself as follows:
8. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that at Central Warehouse,
Oppenheimer and McEwan, and Palmer Lines the Respondent did not violate
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the amended Act.
Each of these employers was a party to an area agreement with the Re-
spondent, entered into before the effective date of the amended Act, which
reserved to the Respondent the right to refuse to handle goods or freight of
any employer involved in a labor dispute. In reliance on this contractual pro-
vision, Respondent's shop stewards at each of the three establishments ceased
handling Conway's freight upon being advised by the Respondent's office that
the Conway strike was "on." And each of the employers, apparently mindful
of its contractual obligation, acquiesced in its employees' refusal to handle the
"hot" cargo.
It is evident from these facts that the three secondary employers, in effect,
consented in advance to boycott Conway's. As they consented, their employees'
failure to deliver freight to or accept freight from Conway trucks was not in
the literal sense a "strike" or "refusal" to work, nor was any such concerted
insubordination contemplated by the Respondent when it caused the employees
to exercise their contractual privilege. In the circumstances, Section 8 (b) (4)
(A) cannot apply, unless we accept the General Counsel's argument that the
"hot cargo" contracts were repugnant to the policy of the amended Act and
therefore invalid after the effective date of the 1947 amendments. But we find
no merit in this argument. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act prohibits labor
organizations from "forcing or requiring" the participation of neutral employers
in secondary boycotts by the use of certain forms of employee pressure, namely,
strikes or work stoppages (either actually engaged in, or "induced" or "encour-
aged" by the union). This section does not proscribe other means by which
unions may induce employers to aid them in effectuating secondary boycotts;
much less does it prohibit employers from refusing to deal with other persons,
whether because they desire to assist a labor organization in the protection of
its working standards, or for any other reason. An employer remains free,
under that section of the amended Act, as always, to deal with whatever firms,
union or nonunion, he chooses. And by the same token, there is nothing in the
express provisions or underlying policy of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) which pro-
hibits an employer and a union from voluntarily including "hot cargo" or
"struck work" provisions in their collective bargaining contracts, or from honor-
ing these provisions. That is all that happened in this case. We therefore find
1s N. L. R B. V. Shingle Weavers Council , 211 F. 2d 149 ( C. A 9), enfg. 101 NLRB 1159.
See also, Di. Giorgio Wine Company, 87 NLRB 720, in which a similar fact situation and
the sections of the Act here involved are thoroughly discussed . Enforced in 191 F. 2d 642
(C A., D. C.), cert denied 342 U . S 869. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 110 NLRB 748,
Lakeview Creamery Company, 107 NLRB 601.
344056-55--vol. 111-79
1236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act by causing
employees of Palmer Lines, Central Warehouse, and Oppenheimer & McEwan
to exercise their contractual privilege of declining to handle Conway freight.
A footnote to the majority opinion set forth the substance of the pertinent con-
tracts as follows:
The area warehouse agreement reserved to the Union "the right to refuse to
handle goods from any firm which is engaged in any controversy with this or
any other Union." The area trucking agreement reserved to the Union "the
right to refuse to accept the freight from, or to make pick-ups from or deliveries
to establishments where picket lines, strikes, walk-outs and lock-outs exist."
- Board Member Reynolds, concurring in part and dissenting in part , as to the inci-
dents with which we are concerned, wrote as follows:
The evidence is otherwise with respect to Central Warehouse 17 and Oppen-
heimer and McEwan. These two employers regularly did business with Rabouin.
However, during the course of the strike of Rabouin's employees, on the occa-
sions detailed in the Intermediate Report, these employers ceased doing busi-
ness with Rabouin. The circumstances under which this occurred were sub-
stantially the same in the case of both employers. The Respondent was the
collective bargaining representative of the employees employed by these em-
ployers. Among the employees of each employer was a shop-steward for the
Respondent. When a Rabouin truck called at either of the employer's premises,
the shop-steward phoned the Respondent to ascertain whether the strike at
Rabouin's was still in effect. Upon being informed that it was, the shop-steward
and other employees refused to move freight on or off Rabouin's trucks. In
this posture of the case, I am of the opinion that the action of these employees
was in each instance induced by the Respondent with the object of forcing Cen-
tral Warehouse and Oppenheimer and McEwan to cease doing business with
Raboum, thereby violating Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
The Respondent, however, contends that its conduct was protected as it had
reserved the right in its contracts with Central Warehouse and Oppenheimer
and McEwan to refuse to handle Rabouin's goods. In effect it argues that by
reserving this right to itself , the contracts contained provisions which amounted
to an agreement in advance to engage in secondary boycotts. the Act, how-
ever, unequivocally proscribes secondary activity on the part of unions. To
the extent that these contract provisions authorize such activity, they are re-
pugnant to the basic public policies of the Act. As the Board in the public
interest is charged with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices, contracts
which are repugnant to the Act and which conflict with this duty of the Board
must obviously yield. Unions or employers cannot nullify the provisions of
the Act which circumscribe their activities by inducing each other, or employees,
to agree by contract in advance to waive their respective rights under the Act.
This Board has therefore in many complaint cases refused to give effect to con-
tracts, otherwise valid, which were asserted as a defense to unfair labor prac-
tices when such contracts were utilized to accomplish results clearly incom-
patible with provisions of the Act. Similarly, in representation proceedings the
Board has refused to honor contracts which it believed were contrary to various
basic policies of the Act. Such agreements between private parties cannot di-
vest the Board of the exclusive jurisdiction bestowed upon it by Section 10 (a)
of the Act and thus thwart the assertion by this Board of the public rights which
are aimed at the prevention of unfair labor practices. Accordingly, as I am
of the opinion that the Respondent's contracts with Central Warehouse and
Oppenheimer and McEwan are repugnant to the Act, I would not consider such
contracts as valid defenses to the 8 (b) (4) (A) unfair labor practice allega-
tions herein.
In this proceeding the Union seeks to carry the rationale of the decision in Con-
way's Express one step further through the medium of parol evidence. It represents
that in the 1943 negotiations, section 10 of the 1943 contract, the hot cargo clause,
was omitted by mutual consent of the parties because provisions of that type were
in general disfavor in the business community, and that thereafter the provision was
omitted from all subsequent written contracts, but it seeks to prove by parol evidence,
that in the 1943 negotiations a secret understanding was reached to the effect that the
omitted provision would in fact continue, sub rosa, and that this understanding has
11 Conway's Express is the assumed name of an individual named Rabouin. Evidently,
each member named the same party differently
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION 1237
been observed through the intervening 11 years, and has survived the amendment of
the Act.
Generally, parol evidence cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to, or sub-
tract from, the terms of a valid written instrument. When the parties have memo-
rialized their agreement by a writing, they are bound by it, except in exceptional cir-
cumstances. If this ancient rule has proper application in any litigation, it must be
applied in this proceeding, which, brought in the public interest, is concerned with
public rights, and the administration of the national law. In this proceeding there
are rights of the public, as well as the rights of individuals, which must be protected
against fraud and uncertainty. Here, the written contract and the rule are the only
safeguards which the public has. The contract was executed by representatives of
Dairymen's and the Union, and only their representatives are in a position to testify
to any secret understanding of the parties. Admittedly, the parties executed a con-
tract, complete and unambiguous on its face. To enjoy public favor, the parties
omitted from the contract, a provision deemed a "consent in advance" by one
party to certain acts by the other party. For 11 successive years the parties held
out the written document, here in evidence, as their contract, and enjoyed what-
ever popularity accrued them, by being in step with the accepted mores of their
business community. Now, however, when an official of the Government presents
a complaint, based on the charge of an aggrieved third party, alleging that the con-
duct of the Union has violated the national public policy as enunciated in the
amended Act, the Union seeks to answer that the written contract of the parties, is
in fact, not the real agreement of the parties, that in addition to the written agree-
ment, the Union had a secret agreement whereby the employer "consented in ad-
vance" to conduct which now violates the law. In my opinion a prudent respect for
the national interest and the public aspect of labor contracts, requires the applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule to that proposal. The Act requires that unions and
employers bargain on wages, hours, and conditions of employment, and that when
agreement is reached, the terms of the agreement be embodied in a written instru-
ment. Under the Act certain conduct is forbidden to employers and to unions, and
certain rights are conferred on each. Labor contracts come into being by mandate
of the Act, deal with subjects covered by and regulated by the Act, and may not by
their terms contravene the Act. Thus, labor contracts, while they are the free acts
of the individuals, are in addition instruments either promoting or frustrating the
public labor policy of the nation.
Viewed in this light then, I am of the opinion, that parties to a labor contract may
not, for a period of 11 years represent a certain document, whose terms conform to
the national labor policy, to be their complete contract, and in the eleventh year,
when charged with a violation of the national regulatory law, be permitted to prove
by parol evidence that the parties had a secret understanding, substantially at vari-
ance with the written document, that one party "consented in advance" to the com-
mission of certain acts, which the law proscribes, by the other party, and thereby
frustrate the national labor policy. Failure to apply the rule in an administrative
proceeding such as this, to representations such as these, would open wide the door
to all manner of fraud, which would nullify the Act.
Also I deem proof of the 1943 clause, irrelevant and immaterial, because, even
assuming, arguendo, that the parol evidence was admissible, the language of section
10 of the 1943 contract, set forth above, is clearly designed to afford Dairymen's
employees the right to refrain from crossing picket lines in making deliveries for
Dairymen's, and does not afford them the right to refrain from handling the goods
of other employers brought to the premises of Dairymen's. In giving effect to the
Conway doctrine, the courts and the Board have always construed Conway clauses
narrowly.18
Upon all the evidence, I also find that Waialua and the Association are engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.19
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union, Local 996, set
forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Waialua
and the Association described in section I above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend
'8 Jag-K Independent Lumber Corp., 108 NLRB 1323. N. L. R. B. v. Shingle Weavers
Council, supra.
19 By Inadvertence this specific finding was omitted from section I of the report
Panaderia Sucesion Alonso, 87 NLRB 877.
1238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Union has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings
of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Oakley A. Dahlberg and Ruth N. Dahlberg, co-partners d/b/a Waialua Dairy,
and Dairymen's Association, Ltd., are employers within the meaning of Section
2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union, Local 996, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.20
3. By inducing and encouraging employees of Dairymen's Association, Ltd., to
engage in a concerted refusal to perform services for their employer with an object
of requiring such employer to cease doing business with Waialua Dairy, Hawaii
Teamsters and Allied Workers Union, Local 996, has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Appendix A
NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS OF HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION,
LOCAL 996
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re-
lations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, we hereby give notice that:
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform
any services for their employer , where an object thereof is to force or require
any employer or other person to cease using , selling, handling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in the products of Waialua Dairy, or to cease doing business
with Waialua Dairy.
HAWAII TEAMSTERS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION , LOCAL 996,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By----------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
eo Di Giorgio Wine Company, supra.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, TONA-
WANDA, N. Y., FORGE PLANT 1 and INTERNATIONAL DIE SINKERS
CONFERENCE, INDEPENDENT UNION, PETITIONER. Case No. 3-RC-
1478. March 30,1955
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before John M. Shea, Jr., hearing
1 The Employer's name appears as amended at the hearing.
111 NLRB No. 199.