Hatteras Yachts, AMF, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 19, 1973

207 N.L.R.B. 1043 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF INC. 1043
Hatteras Yachts , AMF Incorporated and Peninsula
Shipbuilders Association. Case 11-CA-5207,
11-RC-3639,1 and 11-RC-3640
December 19, 1973
DECISION, ORDER, .AND
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On August 16, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Paul E. Weil issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions 3 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order and to certify the
results of the election conducted at the Employer's
New Bern, North Carolina, plant.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Hatteras Yachts,
AMF Incorporated, High Point, North Carolina, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
- ELECTION
It is hereby certified that a majority of the valid
ballots have not been cast for Peninsula Shipbuilders
Association and that said labor organization is not
the exclusive representative of all the employees, in
the unit herein involved, within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
i In his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge recommended, inter
alit, -that the election in, Case I1-RC-3639 be set aside and a second
election be conducted. Thereafter, the Employer waived the filing of
exceptions to this recommendation and requested severance. The Union
also filed a request with the Regional Director for Region 11 to proceed to
an immediate second election. Accordingly, on September 12, 1973, the
Board granted the motion- to sever and remanded Case I I-RC-3639 to the
Regional Director for Region I I for further proceedings in accordance with
the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge.
Thefeafter, the Employer moved to sever Case I 1-RC-3640 from Case
11-CA--5207 on grounds that no issues remained for Board determination.
Because of our disposition of the issues herein , the motion is hereby denied.
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F .2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
3 The Administrative Law Judge found- that Supervisor Stallings'
statement to employee Johnson that any employee who wanted to get his
union card back could do so by signing a letter in the personnel office, and
that Supervisor Nance' similar statement to employee Simth violated Sec.
8(axl) of the Act. We agree with this finding in the circumstances of this
case, inasmuch as Respondent 's maintenance of such forms in its personnel
office enabled Respondent to identify which employees , if any, chose to
withdraw their cards, thereby constituting an indirect means of unlawful
interrogation. Accordingly, we need not and do not adopt the Adnumstra-
tive Law Judge's broader statement with respect to the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of an employer's suggestion to employees as to the procedure
for withdrawal of authorization cards.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL E. WEIL, Administrative Law Judge: On December
22, 1972, Peninsula Shipbuilders Association, hereinafter
called the Union, filed with the Regional Director -for
Region 11 of the National Labor Relations Board,
hereinafter called the Board, two petitions seeking separate
elections in the two manufacturing plants of Hatteras
Yachts, AMF Incorporated, hereinafter called Respon-
dent, located at High Point, North Carolina, and New
Bern, North Carolina. On January 17, 1973, the Union and
Respondent signed a stipulation for certification upon
consent election , which was approved by the Regional
Director on that day, providing for an election to be held
on March 1, 1973. On January 24, 1973, the Union filed
with the said Regional Director charges alleging that
Respondent gave each employee a half hour off, contrary
to past practice, in an effort to thwart and impede and
interfere with the Union's organization; that Respondent
promulgated a rule prohibiting prounion employees from
wearing union buttons; that supervisors solicited with-
drawal of union authorization cards and questioned
employees about their union activities; that Respondent
discharged M. Shaemake for union activities; and that
Respondent discharged Beatrice Squires, apparently con-
tending that she ' was discharged because of her union
activities. All the above charges were docketed together as
Case 11--CA-5207. On February 20, 1973, an amended
charge was docketed alleging that the Employer violated
Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by terminating Michael Keith
Shoemaker and Annie E. Smith.
On March 1, the Regional Director conducted elections
at both plants and the Union lost both elections. Timely
objections to conduct affecting the results of both elections
were filed by the Union. The objections were identical.
On March 16, 1973, the charge was amended for the
second time realleging the termination of "Shaemake" on
or about January 15. On March 20, 1973, the Acting
Regional Director issued a complaint and notice of hearing
alleging that Respondent violated the Act by interrogating
employees; by creating an impression of surveillance of its
employees' union activities; by threatening to take away
207 NLRB No. 156
1044 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
benefits of its employees; by soliciting employees to revoke
their union authorization cards, all in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and by discharging Michael Shoemaker on January
15, 1973, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. On April
13, the Regional Director issued reports on the objections
in Cases 11-RC-3639 and 3640 directing a hearing on
certain issues raised by the objections and ordering them
consolidated for the purpose of hearing, ruling and
decision with Case I1-CA-5207. The reports overruled
certain of the objections in both cases but are not identical
in this respect as shall be set forth below.
On April 17, 1973, Respondent filed with the Regional
Director a motion that the reports on objections be made
more definite and certain in certain respects and an
opposition to the consolidation with Case 11-RC-3640,
which deals with the New Bern establishment, with Case
11-RC-3639 and Case I1-CA-5207, both of which deal
with the High Point plant. On May 3, 1973, the Regional
Director issued an amendment to his reports on objections
making somewhat more clear his decisions in both reports
and submitted the motion in opposition to consolidation to
the Division of Judges. On the same date, May 3, 1973, the
Board issued orders on both representation cases adopting
the Regional Director's recommendations as contained in
his report, overruling certain objections and directing a
hearing on others. Also on May 3, 1973, Administrative
Law Judge Arthur Leff issued a ruling, on Respondent's
motion to make more definite and certain and opposition
to consolidation, that the motion to make more definite
and certain was not appropriately before him and that the
Regional Director acted within the allowable area of his
discretion in consolidating the three cases; wherefore he
denied the Respondent's motion to sever.
On May 8, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss one of
the objections on the ground that the Regional Director
did not name agents of Respondent allegedly involved in
discriminate enforcement of company rules. On the
following day, May 9, 1973, Respondent filed a motion for
particulars and to make more definite and certain or in the
alternative to dismiss another of the objections on the
ground that there is insufficient identification of persons
alleged to have made certain statements and insufficient
identification of meetings in which such statements were
made. On May 15, 1973, these motions were referred to the
Administrative Law Judge for ruling. They were renewed
before me at the opening of the hearing and denied. On the
issues thus joined the matter came on for hearing before
me at High Point, North Carolina, on May 17 and 18 and
May 22 and 23, and at New Bern, North Carolina, on May
24, 1973.
All parties were represented by counsel and had an
opportunity to adduce relevant and material evidence, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally at
the close of the hearing, which argument was waived by all
parties, and to file briefs. Briefs have been received from
counsel for the General Counsel, the Respondent and the
Union. Or the entire record in this case and in considera-
tion of the briefs I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is a North Carolina corporation which
manufactures and sells pleasure boats at plants in High
Point, North Carolina, and New Bern, North Carolina.
Respondent annually imports raw material valued in
excess of $50,000 to its High Point, North Carolina, plant
from places outside the State of North Carolina and
annually performs services at points and places outside the
State of North Carolina valued in excess of $50,000.
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent builds large fiberglass yachts at its two
plants in North Carolina. Yachts ranging in length from 34
to 52 feet are produced at the High Point plant and larger
yachts are produced at the New Bern plant. Approximately
325 to 350 employees are normally employed at High
Point, and 450 or more at the New Bern plant.
The union organization commenced in October at the
New Bern plant and in November at the High Point plant.
A meeting was held on November 12 at a school near the
High Point plant. A second one was held there on
December 14.
Respondent became aware of the organizing campaigns
almost immediately as a result of the handbilling activities
of the Union at the gates of the two plants and commenced
its own campaign which consisted of posters on the
bulletin board containing questions and answers about the
Union and its claims; speeches to groups of employees by
Respondent's president, Parker; supplying forms in the
personnel offices of the two plants for the use of employees
in requesting return of their union designation cards; and
direct mailing of antiunion propaganda by the Employer to
its employees. In addition about December 12 a person
identified only as Dr. Heaton, who, over a long period of
time, has conducted some sort of training classes among
the supervisory employees, gave some instructions to the
supervisors, in the course of such a meeting at the High
Point plant, which apparently some of them construed to
be advice that they should go to the employees whom they
supervised and solicit them to withdraw their union
authorization cards. The General Counsel contends that
this solicitation violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act under
the circumstances in which it was conducted.
On December 4, 1972, five employees left the plant at
lunchtime without punching their timecards. Foreman
Balderson waited at the gate and when the five returned
called out two of them, Tony Maynard and Mike
Shoemaker, and took them to the office where he told them
that they had broken a company rule by not clocking out
for lunch and left them alone while he allegedly went to
HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF INC.
find out what sanctions to invoke. When the superintend-
ent learned of Balderson's action, the superintendent asked
whether the other three men had clocked out and
Balderson said that he did not know. Balderson then found
out that the other three employees had not done so and
called them to his office where he told them that he would
give $10 if they had only clocked out. He then issued
warning notices to Maynard and Shoemaker which stated,
.not punching out for lunch and leaving the ground while
still own (sic) clock next time will mean a layoff." He later
gave warnings to the other three employees stating
"warning about leaving for lunch did not punch out" or
"warning about leaving for lunch punch card." The
General Counsel contends that Balderson's different
reaction towards the two men who were leading union
adherents and the other three who were not reveals
Respondent's animus and propensity to discriminate.
Respondent contends that it had no knowledge that
Maynard and Shoemaker were union adherents at that
time and that the distinction noticeable in Balderson's
handling of the employees is based on the fact that the
three nonunion men were older employees and should have
known better and set a better example to Maynard and
Shoemaker.
B. The 8(a)(3) Allegation
On January 15, Shoemaker was discharged, allegedly for
wasting time. The General Counsel contends that he was in
fact discharged because of his union adherence and
activities.
Mike Shoemaker was first employed by Respondent in
November 1971, at the High Point, North Carolina, plant.
Shoemaker worked on finishing the boats, scraping and
sanding hulls and decks and painting them. His supervisor
was William Balderson.
In September 1972, Balderson needed Shoemaker to
touch up some paint and spent several minutes looking for
him before he found him in a paint booth rather than
where he was, supposed to be working. At this time he took
him to the office of the general foreman, Stallings, and
warned him that he was not to wander off his job so that he
could be located when he was needed. According to
Balderson, Shoemaker had been present in meetings when
employees were warned not to wander around the plant
and had been told in conversations not to go around or be
off their jobs. On this occasion in September Shoemaker
assured Balderson and Stallings that he would stay on his
job and was permitted to go back to work.
Early in December, Balderson again had to search for
Shoemaker and located him in the shed in which engines
and generators are tested. Balderson again took him to the
general foreman's office and Balderson suggested that he
be discharged. Shoemaker begged not to be discharged
because he had just bought a new car and needed a job.
Stallings left it to Balderson to decide whether Shoemaker
should be discharged and Balderson agreed to let him go
back to work again.
A few days later Shoemaker and Tony Maynard went
out to lunch with three, other employees, Jenkins, Jensen
1045
and Embry. When they returned from lunch Balderson was
waiting at the gate and called out to Shoemaker and
Maynard and asked if they had punched out. They
answered that they had not done so, whereupon he sent
them to get their timecards and took them to the foreman's
office where he told them to sit and wait. Thirty or forty
minutes later he came back and took them to Stallings'
office where Stallings explained - to them the importance of
punching out at lunchtime . Later that day Shoemaker and
Maynard received the warnings set forth above.
During the 30 to 40 minutes that Maynard and
Shoemaker were waiting in the office Balderson conferred
with Stallings, who asked about the other three men in the
group . Balderson checked and found that they had not
punched out for lunch either . He called them together in
Stallings' office and he told each of them that he would
have given $ 10 if they had punched out, that they had
gotten him in trouble with Stallings . Stallings talked to the
three men separately and told them that they should have
known better than to go to lunch without punching out'
and warned them about neglecting to punch out in the
future or they could lose their jobs . Subsequently Balder-
son gave each of them warning notices as set forth above.
A few days after this warning Balderson called Shoe-
maker into Stallings' office and asked him if he were riding
to work with Tony Maynard . Shoemaker said that he was
doing so and Balderson asked him to quit riding with
Maynard. Shoemaker went back to his job but continued
riding to work with Maynard. A few days later Balderson
came up to him as he was working and asked Shoemaker if
he was still riding with Tony Maynard. Shoemaker said yes
and Balderson said , "I thought I told you to quit that."
Shoemaker asked what it mattered how he got to work as
long as he got there and Balderson said that if he wanted
one and not the other to work overtime the one that had to
work overtime had no way to get home . Shoemaker
answered that he had talked it over with Maynard and they
decided that if either of them , had to work overtime it
would be his problem to find a way home . He assured
Balderson that he would have no trouble with that,
nevertheless Balderson told him not to ride with Maynard.
The union organization commenced in November and
the first union meeting, with about 50 persons present, was
held in the latter part of that month, A second meeting was
held on December 14. Maynard and Shoemaker took a
large part in the union organization talking to employees
and signing them up on union authorization cards as well
as attending the meeting., About a week after the second
meeting Balderson called Shoemaker off the job about 20
minutes before his lunchtime and took him to the cafeteria.
They sat at a table and Balderson asked Shoemaker how he
felt about the Union. Shoemaker answered that he did not
think it was any of Balderson's business. Balderson then
asked Shoemaker whether he had been soliciting cards or if
he had signed a, union card and Shoemaker answered that
he had not. Balderson asked him if he , had seen any of the
literature handed out at the gate and Shoemaker admitted
that he had . Balderson then launched into an antiunion
speech to which Shoemaker answered that "if the Union
was so had why didn 't the Company want it?" Balderson
I Jennings, Jensen and Embry were older employees.
1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
answered if it was so good why are hundreds of thousands
of workers laid off in southern California and out of jobs
and then went on to say that Respondent knew everyone
that was at the second union meeting. They knew what was
said and they knew which employees were involved in the
Union. He warned that if the employees did not change
their attitude toward the Union the Company would be
forced to take away some of their benefits. Apparently
realizing that he was not convincing Shoemaker, Balderson
ended with the statement "I guess you'll have to make up
your own mind won't you." It was then 11 o'clock and
Shoemaker left to eat his lunch.
Balderson did not specifically deny the conversation but
gave an account of a conversation with Shoemaker which
took place a week or 10 days after the incident of
December 4, in which he stated he took Shoemaker to the
breakroom to admonish him for again being away from his
work, threatened to discharge him and then when
Shoemaker begged not to be discharged, relented and let
Shoemaker go back to work without calling this to the
attention of Stallings.
I do not consider that Balderson's testimony concerning
this meeting is a credible contradiction of the breakroom
conversation reported by Shoemaker. The only denial
Balderson made was that he denied generally talking about
the Union to Shoemaker or to any employee except to
answer employees' questions. The conversation in the
breakroom reported by Balderson took place at least a
week before that reported by Shoemaker. If such a
conversation took place at all it in no way affects the
possibility of a second conversation in the breakroom more
than a week later as reported by Shoemaker. Furthermore I
do not credit Balderson's generalized denial. If there is any
one thing Balderson got from the meetings held among
supervisors it was the instruction to supervisors that they
should do everything in their power to break up and report
back any union activities engaged in by the employees
under their supervision. The plant manager testified that he
had determined that as a result of instructions given by Dr.
Heaton that supervisors were seeking out employees and
soliciting them to withdraw their union cards; Balderson
made it clear that he was well aware of the Employer's
antiunion status and prepared to do what he could to
further it. I conclude therefore the account of the
breakroom conversation contained in Shoemaker's testi-
mony is substantially accurate.
On January 15, shortly before the end of the workday,
Balderson took Shoemaker to Norman Stallings' office.
Stallings told Shoemaker he had just blown his last chance.
Shoemaker asked what the matter was and Stallings
answered that it had just come to his attention that
Shoemaker had been talking to a fellow employee, Earl
Parker, about wages that morning and was supposed to
have asked Parker how much he was making and to have
stated that if he did not make any more than that he would
do something about it. Stallings went on to say that that
was being an instigator and that Shoemaker was causing
trouble between the boys and he did not need that at
Hatteras. The only thing Balderson said during the
conversation was that he wished that he had fired
Shoemaker before that time. Shoemaker denied any
recollection of talking to Earl Parker on that day, although,
he testified, about a month prior to that occasion he had
had a similar conversation with Parker. Shoemaker left the
plant. The following day he had an interview with Mark
Lewis, the personnel manager. Lewis said that he had
investigated the discharge and that he thought that
Respondent had good cause for firing Shoemaker. Shoe-
maker again denied talking to Parker whereupon Clyde
Holder, the production manager, said that it really did not
matter what he was talking to Parker about, the fact is that
he was off the boat talking to Parker and he was wasting
the Company's time and accordingly the Company had
good reason to fire him.
According to the testimony of Balderson, another
supervisor came to him and told him that he had seen
Shoemaker talking to Earl Parker. Balderson asked Parker
if Mike had been talking to him and Parker answered that
he had for 5 or 10 minutes. Balderson then took Parker to
Stallings' office where Stallings asked him whether Mike
was talking to him. Parker answered "yes"; Stallings said
"for how long" and Parker answered "for 5 or 10 minutes."
At one place in his cross-examination Balderson testified
that Parker told him what conversation it was that they
had at the boat. At another place he testified that he asked
Parker what he was talking about and Parker answered,
"oh, he was just talking, shooting the breeze." Parker
testified that Balderson came to him and asked if he had
been talking with Shoemaker and he answered, "yes." In
answer to a leading question, Parker testified that Balder-
son asked how long they had been talking and he told him
5 or 10 minutes . On cross-examination Parker testified that
when Balderson came up to him the first thing he said was
"why weren't you working" and then asked why he had
quit. Other than these questions, which Parker testified he
assumed referred to his conversation with Shoemaker,
Parker recalled nothing at all of his conversation with
Balderson. He did not testify that he was taken to Stallings'
office and interrogated by Stallings about the conversation.
Stallings testified on direct examination that when
Balderson came to his office to report on the incident he
brought Parker with him. Stallings asked Parker whether
Mike was off his job talking to him and Parker answered
"yes." He then testified Parker had nothing else to say,
then agreed that it was possible that he talked about other
things, then stated that he believed that he asked Parker
how long the conversation lasted and Parker said 5
minutes . That was all Parker said to the best of his
recollection.
As the General Counsel points out in his brief, a direct
issue of credibility appears to arise from these various
accounts of what happened. I do not credit Parker; he
appeared to have no recollection of the incident except that
suggested to him by Respondent's counsel and in response
to similar suggestions from the General Counsel and from
the Charging Party's counsel and questions from me, he
could testify only that he did not remember anything more.
As between Balderson's and Stallings' account on the
one hand and Shoemaker's on the other, the General
Counsel has adduced extrinsic evidence that gives material
assistance in forming a credibility resolution.
Immediately after the discharge of Shoemaker, Mary
HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF INC.
Louise Johnson, a fellow employee, heard that Shoemaker
had been discharged and asked Balderson about it. He
answered that he "had nothing to do with the discharge,
that Stallings had done it because Mike (Shoemaker) was
overheard by another supervisor discussing wages with
another employee." Balderson went on to say that he
"begged Shoemaker to keep his mouth shut but he just
would not listen." This conversation was corroborated by
the testimony of Rochelle Pope who was also present. I
credit the testimony of employees Johnson and Pope which
is undenied by Balderson. With this factor in the balance I
credit Shoemaker's account of the discharge interview with
Stallings and conclude that Shoemaker was discharged
because he had been discussing wages with Parker and
urging him to do something about his low wages. Again, as
the :General Counsel points out, in the context of this case
doing something about low wages can have only one
meaning-union activity.
By the time, 2 days later, that the change-of-status form
was -filled out for the discharge Stallings wrote "after
repeated warnings this man was off his job and talking to
another worker, thereby keeping him from working. With
two people not working this causes too much loss of time."
This is scarcely credible in view of the fact that Parker
testified that he continued working throughout the conver-
sation, nevertheless by the time the formal discharge
document was filled out by the personnel department this
was transmuted into "waste of company time."
So obvious a twisting of the grounds of the discharge
requires an explanation. None is offered by Respondent.
Two factors may be considered that give a clue to the
reason. First the record is replete with evidence that
throughout the campaign until the election a group of five
or six company - oriented employees, including several
inspectors who had the run of the entire plant, were
spending large amounts of time campaigning against the
Union during working hours. There is no evidence that any
action was ever taken against any of them other than a
warning. To discharge an employee because of a brief
encounter during which he attempted to enlist the support
of a fellow employee on the basis of wages, the one subject
in the campaign with which the Company was not
prepared to deal, would have been fairly obvious discrimi-
nation in support of ' an unfair labor practice charge. The
other factor to be considered is that, Shoemaker had a
history commencing prior to the advent of the Union of
wandering around the plant and had twice been warned
because his supervisor was unable to find himi when he
needed him. A discharge for this reason would bear up
much better' under close scrutiny. Unfortunately for the
Respondent however it appears that the wandering ceased
and the best that it ca=me up with was a report of a
conversation alongside the boat on which Shoemaker was
employed. No 'attempt was made by Balderson in his
"investigation" of the incident to ascertain who started the
conversation and, if he is to be believed, what the
conversation was about. For all 'Balderson might have
known Parker and Shoemaker might havebeen talking
about their work. Further, if the stories of Balderson and
Stallings are to be believed, no one asked Parker whether
or not he had been working during the conversation. He
1047
testified that he had but his testimony indicates that
Stallings assumed that he had not. Nevertheless no
warning or other sanction was applied to Parker. I
conclude that the General Counsel has amply demonstrat-
ed Respondent's discriminatory intent in the discharge of
Shoemaker. I feel that this conclusion is corroborated by
Respondent's attempt to cover up the actual content of the
discharge interview and to twist the reason given for the
discharge on the forms which it uses to record personnel
actions. Under the circumstances of this case I conclude
that Respondent's discharge of Shoemaker resulted from
his activities on behalf of the Union and was discriminato-
ry in that similar activities against the Union were freely
permitted as I shall discuss below. Accordingly, I find that
the discharge of Shoemaker violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
C. The Allegations of Interference, Restraint and
Coercion
I have credited Shoemaker's testimony concerning his
conversation with Foreman Balderson in the break area a
week after the second union meeting. That conversation
contained interrogation of Shoemaker's union proclivities
and activities on behalf of the Union. It contained the
statement to Shoemaker by Balderson that Respondent
knew everyone that was at the union meeting, knew what
was said and knew who was involved in the Union, which
necessarily creates the impression of surveillance, and
contains the threat that Respondent would take away
benefits of employees who did not change their attitude
toward the Union. Each of the above are violations of
Section 8(a)(1).
Employee Anna Smith testified that Supervisor Alvin
Nance attempted to question her about the Union by
indirection . Nance testified that he did not recall said
conversation but, given an opportunity to deny having
such conversation , did not accept the opportunity. This is
coercive interrogation within the meaning of the Act and
violates Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
Mary Louise Johnson testified that Norman Stallings
called her into his office on the day of the Christmas party
and advised her that any employee that wants to get his
union card back can do so by signing a, letter in the
personnel office . Supervisor Nance made a similar sugges-
tion to employee Smith . The General Counsel contends
that this amounts to solicitation of employees to get back
their union cards.
I have no doubt that there were incidents of supervisors
telling employees that they could get their cards back by
going to the office and filling out a form which'they could
get there. Production Manager Holder testified, "I found
that some of the supervisors had been around talking to
some of our people telling them that if they knew of
anyone that was interested in getting their union card back
there was a way." I believe this testimony generally
corroborates that of the witnesses produced by the General
Counsel . Respondent contends however that its actions are
not unlawful, relying on the decision of the Fourth Circuit
in N.L.R.B. v. Brookside Industries Inc., 308 F.2d 224,(C.A.
4, 1962); N.LRB. v. Sun Company, 215 F.2d 379 (C.A. 9,
1954); Atlas Storage Division, 112 NLRB 1175, 1178;
1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Perkins Machine Company, 141 NLRB 697, 700; and
Warrensburg Board & Paper Corporation, 143 NLRB 398,
399.
In the first place I believe that Respondent's reliance on
N.L.R.B. v. Brookside Industries Inc.,2 is misplaced. In that
case the Board found violations in the actions of Director
of Human Relations Lee Head in stating in group meetings
that some of the employees had asked about a procedure
for obtaining the return of their union cards. He told them
as far as he knew it could be done only by a request to the
union representative and in response to a question as to
how they might indicate loyalty to the Company he gave
them his opinion that they might circulate a petition just as
the Union circulated union cards. The Board also found
that Supervisor Morris violated the Act in telling all of the
girls under her supervision to see Head if they wanted to
get their cards back, although none of the girls had
indicated such interest. In its decision the court stated at
308 F.2d at 226:
Disagreeing with the Board, we do not think Head
here overstepped the line between the right of free
speech-as permitted by section 8(c)-and coercion.
There were no threats or reprisals of any kind but
merely an explanation of the employees' rights. Here
was not the aggressive fostering of deunionization
decried in the precedents cited by the Board...."
The court made no mention of the violation found in the
conduct of Morris and ordered the Board's orders enforced
except as specifically noted in its opinion.
In the Sun case, cited by the circuit court in Brookfield
and by Respondent, the Board found a violation in a
statement by the company president during an antiunion
speech that anyone who wanted to withdraw from the ITU
could do so by writing to the union and telling them so.
The court of appeals found with regard to this statement
that the advice given to employees as to the manner in
which union membership could be canceled was within the
protection of Section 8(c). This decision does not appear
apposite to the issue before me of whether the solicitation
of employees to sign prepared requests to withdraw their
authorization violates Section 8(a)(1). The Atlas case also
cited by Respondent is to the same effect. The Perkins
Machine Company 3 and Warrensburg Board & Paper
Corporation 4 cases cited by Respondent both deal with the
announcement to employees of a contractual "escape
clause" and that forms for employees to withdraw their
authorizations were available. In both cases the announce-
ments were in the form of posted notices that assured the
reader that the use of the forms was voluntary on their
part. Again no direct confrontation of employees by
supervisors nor suggestion to employees is implicit in
Respondent's action.
In two cases involving the Deutsch Company, Electronic
Components Division,5 the Board considered the conduct of
the company at two plants in sending each employee a
letter with an accompanying stamped and addressed
postcard addressed to the union revoking the employees'
union cards. In that case the Board found violations,
upholding the findings of the Trial Examiners6 therein.
The Trial Examiners in both cases predicated their finding
of a violation on the fact that there was no demonstrated
need or request for assistance by the employer in revoking
the employees' cards. I believe that the test applied in the
Deutsch Company cases is the appropriate one and should
be applied in the instant case. Here there was no
demonstrated need or request for assistance in withdraw-
ing union authorization cards. So far as the record reveals
no employee had considered doing so at the time that the
supervisors, at the recommendation of Dr. Heaton,
commenced the solicitation of employees to withdraw their
cards. I believe also that the solicitation was rendered
somewhat more persuasive by the fact that it was done on
a one-to-one basis by the supervisors rather than through a
notice posting or a general speech to employees as in some
of the cited cases. Here the employee, if he had signed a
card, had reason to believe that this was known to the
Employer, otherwise why would the supervisor suggest a
means of withdrawing the card. Against the background of
Respondent's campaign against the Union this assumes an
aspect of coercion on the employee to withdraw his card. I
find that the solicitation by supervisors of employees and
the offers of assistance to them in withdrawing their union
authorization constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
IV. THE OBJECTIONS-HIGH POINT
Because the Regional Director conducted no independ-
ent investigation of the objections other than a considera-
tion of the evidence produced by the parties to the election,
his report deals with documentary evidence, such as
election propaganda, dispositively and in all instances
where any issue of credibility or fact appears, a hearing has
been ordered. With regard to certain allegations in both
objections, the Regional Director's findings are no more
than a statement that the Regional Director determined
from the evidence submitted that it appears that substan-
tial and factual issues exist which may appropriately be
resolved at a hearing. In this state of affairs, in order that
some semblance of due process be afforded Respondent
Employer, I have limited the receipt of evidence and my
consideration thereof, insofar as it has been possible, to the
allegations spelled out in the objections to the election filed
by Petitioner. Where the Petitioner has sought to go
beyond the allegations in his objections, I have declined to
receive evidence and I have not gone beyond the
objections as originally stated.
Paragraph I(B) of the objections relates to alleged
misrepresentations contained in various documents pro-
mulgated by Respondent. The Regional Director overruled
the allegations with regard to all but one document; a
poster placed on the bulletin board at the High Point plant
containing two questions and the answers thereto. The text
of the document is as follows:
2 308 F.2d 224 (C.A. 4, 1962). 5 180 NLRB 8, 20; 165 NLRB 140.
3 141 NLRB 697. 6 The title "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
4 143 NLRB 398. Judge" effective August 19, 1973.
HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF INC. 1049
QUESTION??
13. IF THE UNION WERE TO BE VOTED IN AND THERE
WAS A CONFLICT IN THE CONTRACT, COULD THE
COMPANY HIRE MEN TO TAKE THE PLACE OF UNION
MEMBERS THAT WERE ON STRIKE? IF SO, COULD UNION
MEMBERS GET THEIR JOBS BACK WHEN THE CONTRACT
WAS SETTLED? I WOULD LIKE AN ANSWER TO THE LAST
PART OF THIS QUESTION, ALSO.
14. HOW WILL THE UNION AFFECT OUR VACATION?
ANSWER!!
13. YES, HATTERAS COULD HIRE MEN TO PERMANENTLY
REPLACE ECONOMIC STRIKERS.
14. SHOULD THE UNION GET A MAJORITY OF VOTES IN
THE MARCH 1ST ELECTION, THEY WOULD BECOME YOUR
EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE. HATTERAS YACHT
MANAGEMENT AND THE UNION WOULD MEET TO DECIDE
WHAT BENEFITS YOU WOULD HAVE. THERE IS no
GUARANTEE AS TO WHAT YOU WILL HAVE AFTER THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. MANY OF THE BENEFITS THAT PSA
MEMBERS HAVE NOW ARE INFERIOR TO YOURS. HOW DO
YOU THINK THE PSA WILL AFFECT YOUR VACATION?,.?
The Union's contention in this objection is that the
language "Many of the benefits that PSA members have
now are inferior to yours" is misleading . The evidence
reveals that the- poster in question was posted on the
bulletin board some 2 weeks before the election. As
counsel for the Petitioner stated at the hearing "the real
question here is for us to demonstrate that there is not a
single benefit which the PSA members have that is inferior
to the Hatteras employees' benefits." All parties appeared
to feel that the comparison should be made between the
benefits spelled out in 'a contract that Petitioner has with
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company and
the benefits currently had by the employees of Hatteras.
The ' Union is peculiarly in a position to state what
benefits it has secured for its members in a plant other than
Respondent's and it had 2 weeks to present such evidence
or argument to the employees. Presumably, copies of the
contract in force at Newport News would contain most of
the answer if not all of it. There is no showing that the
Union was not able to do this during the 2-week period.
The evidence reveals that with regard to monetary items
the Hatteras employees were paid less than the contract
called for. However, there is no evidence as to some terms
and conditions of employment and with regard to the
health and welfare provisions of the contract as compared
with the health and welfare provisions offered to Hatteras
employees, any comparison of benefits would have to go
into much greater depth than the Petitioner went to show
that as l to the employees at Hatteras, under the conditions
under which they worked, either was better than the other.
I recommend that the objection be overruled. Not only do
I find that there is insufficient support for it in the record,
but I find that Petitioner had an adequate opportunity to
answer the allegedly misleading propaganda and accord-
ingly, if it failed to do so, it may not now claim that the
voters were misled.
The second objection certified for hearing, was "II.
Increasing wages of certain individuals as much as .20 per
hour within 1 week of election."
The Union presented no evidence that any wage increase
was given any employee at the High Point plant within 1
week of the election. The record reveals that over a period
of 3 months prior to the election, raises were given to a
very substantial proportion of the employees and that
during the "critical period" between the date of filing of
the petition, December 22, 1972, and the election on
March 1, 1973, numerous wage raises were given. Howev-
er, this evidence does not support the objection and as I
stated above, due process requires that the evidence be
limited to the matters raised by objection in a timely
fashion by the Union. Accordingly, I recommend that this
objection be overruled.7
The third objection certified for hearing is as follows
"IV. Singling out any employee who supported the
Peninsula Shipbuilders Association by calling over fellow
employees and making derogatory remarks."
The evidence adduced in support of this objection
consists of the testimony of Kay S. Burroughs that
Foreman Tommy Julian saw her wearing a PSA button
and told her that she was a fool for wearing a PSA button,
that PSA could not do anything for her. She testified also
that Julian made a similar statement to another employee,
Doug West .8 There is no evidence as to when this
conversation took place but there is some evidence that the
union buttons were not available prior to the filing of the
petition. Accordingly, I can assume that it took place
during the critical period. I find no evidence of any other
remarks which could be characterized as derogatory and I
find that this evidence constitutes insufficient grounds to
set aside an election. Considering that the unit in which the
election was conducted exceeded 300 persons and the
greatest number of persons to whom such derogatory
remarks were directed is not shown to'exceed two, I do not
believe the objection warrants further consideration.
Accordingly, I recommend that it be overruled.
One of the union objections was stated as follows "In
employee meetings with the Company, the example was
given of an AMF plant which was organized and
subsequently the employees' wages and benefits were
substantially reduced." The evidence submitted by the
Union in support of this objection reveals, that the basis for
it is a statement made by Respondent President Parker at
all of the meetings with employees which he conducted
that at an AMF plant in South Carolina, as a result, of
negotiations for a first contract, the union accepted lower
wages for one classification of employees than they had
been receiving prior to the advent of the union. It appears
that the story was true, it is admitted by President Parker
and there is no rationale on which it is, objectionable. I take
it that the Union has abandoned this objection inasmuch
7 Respondent adduced evidence that the wage raises given during the 3 considered the evidence adduced as partial support of this position in view
months preceding the election were given pursuant to its normal course of of my rulings made at the hearing limiting the scope of the objection which I
business in giving merit raises, as its normal course had been affected by the would consider.
-various phases of the government 's wage and price campaign. I have not 8 West did not testify.
1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as in spelling out the objections in its brief, this one was
omitted. I recommend that the objection be overruled.
The next objection certified for hearing herein was stated
as follows "VI. Under the guise of a no-solicitation rule,
pro-union employees were prohibited from doing any on
premise solicitation. On the other hand, non-union
employees were allowed to roam the plant urging votes
against the Union."
The evidence adduced by the Union and argued by it in
its brief reveals that the thrust of this objection is alleged
disparate treatment between the prounion and the antiun-
ion employees with regard to their campaigning on
company time . There is no evidence that any employee was
at any time inhibited in campaigning for or against the
Union on his own time, either in or out of the plant. It is
equally obvious that both pro-and antiunion employees
used their working time to a considerable extent for
campaigning purposes. The real objection of the Union
obviously is that the union employees were inhibited in
doing so whereas the antiunion employees were not only
not inhibited but encouraged. In support of this position,
the Union adduced testimony by Emmanuel Marks that
while he was waiting outside the personnel manager's
office to see the personnel manager, Richard Mabe pushed
ahead of him and entered Lewis' office but failed to close
the door completely. Marks listened at the door and heard
Mabe report to Lewis what steps he was taking to influence
people against the Union and Lewis said "We need more
good people like you to go against the Union."9 Lewis'
statement to Mabe can hardly be construed to be anything
more than an expression of Lewis' satisfaction with Mabe's
antiunion attitude and activities and is not necessarily
supportive of the Union's position. However, other
evidence adduced by the Union is more to the point. The
record reveals that the chief union supporters, Shoemaker,
Maynard, Marks, Wayman Free and Jack Coltraine were
each inhibited in their movements during the union
campaign . Of course as I found above, with regard to
Shoemaker, the inhibition was total and final because he
was discharged. With regard to Wayman Free, his job was
assembling parts and supplies to be sent from the plant to
customers , dealers, or the other plant . His duties prior to
the union campaign had carried him all over the High
Point plant. Immediately after the preelection conference,
at which he appeared, he was told that he was having to do
too much running around in the plant. Thereafter, all parts
required by him were to be brought to him in his shipping
area except those parts that he could get from the main
stockroom where many of the larger parts he had to ship
were located.
Emmanuel Marks, prior to the union campaign, was free
to go anywhere within his department rather than merely
in the area in which he worked in order to obtain supplies
and equipment necessary to train employees in the
laminating work which was his specialty. However, after he
appeared at the preelection conference as a representative
of the Union, Marks was told by his foreman not to leave
his area for anything, if he needed anything to let the
foreman know and it would be brought to him. Jack
Coltraine worked as a painter. His main job was finishing
cabinets. Prior to the advent of the Union, he was allowed
to go around the plant to wood prefinish departments to
check on when cabinets would be completed and sent to
him. Sometimes he would take the shop truck and pick
them up and bring them to his paint shop. At times he
would go into another department where a paint shaker
was located to shake the paint which he was about to use.
After the advent of the Union, however, his supervisor,
Norman Stallings, told him that he had to stay in his work
area and all the things he needed would be brought to him
there. Stallings warned him that if he were caught out of
his area again he would be discharged. This took place
after Coltraine started wearing a PSA badge.
The Union contends that Tony Maynard was discrimi-
nated against in his job assignments because of his
activities on behalf of the Union. This contention was
specifically overruled by the Regional Director and will
not be considered herein. It does not appear that Maynard
had any freedom of movement prior to the campaign and
the changes in his job assignments during the campaign
made no change in this regard.
On the other hand, the Union adduced considerable
evidence to the effect that various members of the
antiunion committee freely wandered over the plant
talking against the Union with no apparent hindrance.
Most of those identified as members of the antiunion
committee, it appears, were inspectors whose work normal-
ly took them all over the plant. One, however, Mabe, was a
machinist and Respondent points out that on the second
occasion that his supervisor spoke to him about wandering
around the plant, the supervisor advised him that he would
receive a warning if he were caught doing so again.
Contrasted to the discharge meted out to Shoemaker and
the limitations placed upon the movements of Marks, Free
and Coltraine, the discipline scarcely seems to be even-
handed. Respondent charges that the Union was unable to
specifically pinpoint even one instance of company
knowledge and argued in advance of the hearing that by
the failure of the Union to name supervisors who did not
act to prevent antiunion organizing, Respondent was put
into an unsupportable position. This is of course a faulty
argument. Assuming that it has been proved and I believe
that it has, that the actions of the antiunion committee
were open and notorious, so much so that no supervisor
could fail to have been aware of it, Respondent needs only
to adduce evidence that supervisors did take action to stop
antiunion campaigning commensurate with that they took
to stop prounion campaigning. The problem of proof is not
difficult. The difficult problem, however , is in assessing the
relative activities which the supervisors could or should
have been called upon to stop . It is clear from the
testimony of witnesses presented by the Union that there
was a lot of antiunion campaigning going on during
working hours. It is equally clear from the testimony of the
witnesses presented by the Employer that there was a lot of
prounion campaigning going on. I believe that the Union
has met its burden by showing that each of the leading
prounion campaigners , with the possible exception of
8 Mabe was not called as a witness. Lewis gave an account of the
conversation which fairly well supported that of Marks.
HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF INC.
Maynard, was inhibited in his campaigning, while only one
of the antiunion campaigners appears even to have been
warned that he might be warned. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent enforced its no-solicitation rule disparately
and that by so doing , interfered with the election process. I
shall recommend that this objection be sustained.
I find above that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act by the discharge of Shoemaker and by that
discharge and by other conduct it violated Section 8(axl)
of the Act. Some of these activities took place during the
critical period and they do form part of the objections
which must be sustained. I recommend that the election
conducted at the High Point plant be set aside and a new
election be conducted.
V. THE OBJECTIONS-NEW BERN PLANT
The Union filed precisely the same objections at both
plants. In his consideration of the objections at the New
Bern plant the Regional Director ordered a hearing on the
same objections as at the High Point plant with the
exception of objection VII, "firing employees for support-
ing the union." The findings made above with regard to
sections 1(B) and 1(C), are the same with regard to both
plants. With regard to the increase of wages of certain
individuals, the Union produced no evidence of such
increases within I week of the election and I recommend
that this objection be overruled.
With regard to singling out employees supporting the
Union by calling over fellow employees and making
derogatory remarks, the only evidence adduced by the
Union is that an employee, Janice Jones, wore a PSA pin
at the plant. Her supervisor asked her what it was and she
said that "it is a PSA button." The supervisor said "What
does it mean? I didn't think that you would do me like
that." She answered, "Well it still doesn't tell what is in my
heart; what's on my mind." This conversation was
overheard by Tyrone Riggs who reported that Supervisor
Tommy Thompson asked what Janice had on. Janice
answered that it was a PSA badge. Thompson said "I
didn't know you was a PSA" and Janice answered "Well I
don't have to be a PSA just because I'm wearing a badge"
to which Thompson answered, "Well I didn't know you
could do that just like that."
I see nothing coercive or derogatory in any remark
quoted either by Riggs or Mrs. Jones, nor do I see any
unlawful interrogation in this exchange as suggested by the
Union's brief . I recommend that the objection be dis-
missed.
With regard to the alleged disparate enforcement of the
no-solicitation rule, the Union presented a wealth of
evidence that a group of women headed by a Mrs. Ipock
passed out leaflets at the gate on 3 nights immediately
before the election. They would leave the plant shortly
before the quitting time and these ladies as well as other
antiunion employees spent much time campaigning during
working hours within the plant. Furthermore, there is some
evidence that Mrs. Ipock, who is a leadwoman, was
10 This resulted from the fact that Mrs. Ipock was one of several
leadwomen working for a supervisor who had two different departments to
supervise and apparently left much of his supervisory function to Mrs.
(pock. There is no evidence that upper management knew of this
1051
effectively a supervisor although her job was not one that is
normally supervisory.10
There is no evidence of disparate treatment in the early
releasing of employees for handbilling purposes. There is
no evidence that anyone from the Union ever sought an
early release for this or any other purpose. Similarly, there
is no evidence that any employee was punished for similar
activity with the exception of testimony by employee
Turberville.
Turberville testified that during the course of the union
campaign he was warned on two occasions by Herbert
Caudle and once by Caudle's supervisor, Ronnie Shelton,
that thereafter he was transferred and warned some more.
He testified that he was told that if he kept talking union
business on company time he would be fired. All of the
warnings came either before or at the time he was
transferred from one job to another. The transfer, he
stated, took place in September or October or November,
at any rate , 3 weeks after the Union first started on the
gate.
The campaign started in October in New Bern so it
would appear that all of the warnings Turberville might
have gotten would have been before the first or second
week in November 1972. The immediate supervisor of
Turberville testified that about a week before Turberville
was transferred he had occasion to speak to him about
walking around the plant and talking to other employees.
He stated that he spoke to him only one time. His
supervisor, Shelton , said he never warned or spoke to
Turberville about talking or about campaigning on
company time. Turberville was not asked and did not
testify as to any of the occasions on which he was
"warned" and attributes the same language to all three
supervisors who allegedly warned him.
I conclude that the evidence of warnings to Turberville is
insufficient to demonstrate that Respondent made any real
attempt to enforce a no-solicitation rule at the New Bern
plant. There was plenty of evidence from witnesses called
by both the Employer and the Union that talk pro and con
the Union was widespread and constant in the plant during
the entire union campaign and I credit this . That one
employee was warned in October or early November when
the union campaign was first beginning does not adequate-
ly demonstrate in a unit of 450 persons such disparate
treatment that I would be warranted in setting the election
aside . Accordingly, I recommend that this objection too be
overruled.
Having recommended that all of the objections relating
to the New Bern plant be overruled, I recommend that the
Board issue its decision certifying the results of the election
on the tally of ballots heretofore issued.
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations
described in section I, above , have a close, intimate, and
arrangement . The evidence reveals that the foreman discharged two
employees at Mrs. Ipock's request, obviously without independent investi-
gation, and that Mrs. (pock had the authority to release employees early
and to move them from job to job without consultation.
1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
On the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At all times material herein Respondent has been
engaged in commerce as an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. At all times material herein the Union has been a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By discriminatorily discharging Michael Shoemaker
in the disparate enforcement of a no-solicitation rule and
because of his union activities, Respondent discriminated
in regard to the tenure of his employment in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the discharge of Shoemaker as set forth above, by
interrogating employees about the Union, by soliciting and
assisting employees in the revocation of their union cards,
by creating the impression of surveillance of union
activities and by threats of retaliation for employees' union
activity, Respondent interfered with, coerced and re-
strained employees in the exercise of their rights protected
in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that
Respondent has discriminatorily discharged Michael Shoe-
maker, I shall recommend that it offer him reinstatement
to his job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent job and make him whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of
money equal to that which he normally would have earned
from the date of his discharge to the date of a valid offer of
reinstatement less net earnings during such period to be
computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 280, and with interest as described in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceed-
ing, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the following recommended:
ORDER 11
Respondent , Hatteras Yachts, AMF Incorporated, High
Point, North Carolina, its officers, agents , successors and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees about their activities on
behalf of Peninsula Shipbuilders Association or any other
union, creating the impression of surveillance of employ-
ees' union activities , threatening to reduce benefits of
employees in relation for their union activities, and
soliciting or assisting in the revocation of their union cards.
(b) Discouraging membership and activities on behalf of
the above-named Union or any other labor organization
by discriminating in regard to the tenure of their employees
because of their union activities and in disparate enforce-
ment of a no-solicitation rule.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing and to engage in any other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer to Michael Shoemaker reinstatement to his
former job or, in the event that job is no longer available,
to a substantially equivalent job and make him whole in
the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(c) Post at its plant at High Point, North Carolina, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 11, after being duly signed by its representative,
shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
I I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give
HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF INC.
evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has
ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out
the Order of the Board and abide by the following:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing
To act together for collective-bargaming pur-
poses or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with or
restrains or coerces employees with respect to these
rights.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against our employees for
engaging in activities on behalf of the Union or on their
own behalf.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
about their or other employees' activities on behalf of
Peninsula Shipbuilders Association or any other union.
WE WILL not solicit our employees to cancel their
designations on behalf of the Union or assist them in
doing so.
WE WILL reinstate Michael Shoemaker to his old job
1053
or to one as good and make him whole for any pay he
lost as a result of our discriminatory discharge of him.
WE WILL NOT create in our employees the impression
that we have engaged in surveillance of their union
activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of
benefits unless they cease engaging in union activities.
Dated By
HATTERAS YACHTS, AMF
INCORPORATED
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
-This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1624
Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-2300.