Hartsell Mills Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 12, 1939

18 N.L.R.B. 268 (N.L.R.B. 1939)

In the Matter of HARTSELL MILLS COMPANY and TEXTILE WORKERS'
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Cases Nos. C-943 and R-970.-Decided December 12, 1939
Upholstery and Drapery Fabrics Manufacturing Industry-Interference, Re-
straint, and Coercion : coercive statements made by the respondent 's supervisory
employees-Discrimination : charges of , sustained as to one employee ; not sus-
tained as to one employee-Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining: pro-
duction and maintenance employees excluding clerical and supervisory em-
ployees and watchmen-Representatives : proof of choice : membership cards ;
testimony of union official-Collective Bargaining : employer refused to recog-
nize the union as the representative of all employees in the appropriate unit,
although a majority of the employees had designated the union as their bar-
gaining representative ; employer refused to reduce such terms as might be
agreed upon to a signed , written contract ; employer refused to continue
bargaining negotiations unless the union should request the withdrawal of
certain charges which it had filed with the Regional Director ; employer ordered
to notify the union in writing that it is prepared to enter into bargaining
negotiations , upon request bargain collectively with the union , and to embody
understanding , if reached , in a signed , written contract ; order based on majority
at date of refusal to bargain-Reinstatement Ordered: discharged employee-
Back Pay: awarded-Complaint : dismissed as to one employee-Investigation
of Representatives : petition for, dismissed , in view of order to bargain.
Mr. Charles Y. Latimer, for the Board.
Drinker, Biddle & Reath , by Mr. Edwin A. Lucas, of Philadelphia,
Pa., for the respondent.
Mr. S. P. Brewer, of Charlotte, N. C., for the T. W. O. C.
Mr. Roscoe L. Barrow, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 1, 1937, Textile Workers' Organizing Committee,
herein called the T. W. O. C., duly filed charges alleging that Hartsell
Mills Company, Concord, North Carolina, herein called the respond-
ent, had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the
Act. On February 19, 1938, the T. W. O. C. duly filed charges alleg-
ing that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair
18 N. L. R. B., No. 43.
268
HART SELL MILLS C'0MPANTY 269
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5)
and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. Thereafter, the National
Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional
Director for the Fifth Region (Baltimore, Maryland), issued its
complaint, dated May 14, 1938, against the respondent, alleging that
the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1),
(3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. Copies of the
complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon
the respondent and the T. W. O. C.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged
in substance: (1) that the respondent on or about August 13, 1936,
discharged Lloyd S. Love because of his membership in and activities
in behalf of Local Union No. 2483, United Tapestry Workers
(A. F. L.),' and on or about April 5, 1938, discharged J. O. Scott 2
because of his membership in and activities in behalf of the T. W.
O. C., and has refused to employ them for the same reasons; (2)
that on or about December 4, 1937, and at all times thereafter the
respondent refused to bargain collectively with the T. W. O. C. as
the representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, although
the T. W. O. C. was the designated representative of a majority of
such employees; and (3) that by the above-mentioned acts, by-mak-
ing speeches at various times since July 1, 1936, which were hostile
to the membership of its employees in any labor organization, and
by other acts, the respondent has discouraged the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act.
On June 1, 1938, the respondent, by its attorney, entered a special
appearance for the purpose of moving to dismiss the complaint.
The respondent filed its answer on June 3, 1938. The complaint
having been orally amended during the course of the hearing, the
respondent at the same time orally amended its answer to meet the
matter added to the complaint. The respondent's answer, as amended
during the course of the hearing, denied that it had engaged in or was
engaging in the alleged unfair labor practices, and concluded with
1 The complaint originally alleged that Love was discharged because of his membership in
and activities in behalf of Local Union No. 1902, United Textile Workers of America
(A. F. L.). The evidence adduced at the hearing showed that Love was active in Local
Union No . 1902 during 1934, but that during 1935 , he secured a charter from the United
Tapestry Workers Union ( A. F. L.) and established Local Union No. 2483. It was while
he was a member of Local Union No. 2483 that he was discharged . At the close of the
hearing counsel for the Board moved to amend the complaint to conform to the proof. The
motion was allowed. This motion cured the defect in the complaint.
After Love's discharge Local Union No. 2483 became dormant , and when the T. W. 0. C.
began its organizational activity in 1937 many of the employees who had been members of
Local Union No. 2483 , including Love, joined the T. W. 0. C. The T. W. 0. C. filed the
charge in Love's behalf.
The complaint was amended during the course of the hearing by adding thereto an alle-
gation that J. 0. Scott was discriminatorily discharged. Counsel for the respondent waived
objections thereto.
270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a prayer to dismiss the complaint. The answer was accompanied
by a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respond=
ent is not engaged in interstate commerce, that the complaint contra-
venes the respondent's constitutional rights, and that the respondent
has not engaged in and is not engaging in the alleged unfair labor
practices.
On November 27, 1937, the T. W. O. C. filed with the Regional
Director a petition alleging that a question affecting commerce had
arisen concerning the representation of employees of the respondent,
and requesting an investigation and certification of representatives
pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the Act. On April 27, 1938, the Board,
acting pursuant to Section 9 (c).of the Act and Article III, Section
3, of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series
1, as amended,- ordered an investigation and authorized the Regional
Director to conduct it and to provide for an appropriate hearing upon
due notice, and acting pursuant to Article III, Section 10, of said
Rules and Regulations, further ordered on May 10, 1938, that, for
purposes of hearing, the cases be consolidated and that one record of
the hearing be made.
Pursuant to an amended notice duly served on the parties, a hear-
ing was held on July 21, 22, and 23, 1938, in Concord, North Carolina,
before Albert H. Lohm, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the
Board. The Board and the respondent were represented by counsel
and the T. W. O. C. was represented by one of its representatives.
Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded all
parties.
At the opening of the hearing, the respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint, and at the close of the Board's case, the respondent renewed
its motion. The Trial Examiner denied the motion on both occasions.
At the close of the hearing, the respondent again renewed its motion
to dismiss. The Trial Examiner withheld ruling on the motion. In
his Intermediate Report, issued thereafter, he denied the motion.
During the course of the hearing the Trial Examiner made several
rulings on motions and on objections to the admission of evidence.
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings and finds that
no prejudicial errors were committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed.
On September 19, 1938, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate
Report, copies of which were duly served on the parties, finding that
the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) and Section
2 (6) and (7) of the Act. He recommended that the respondent cease
and desist from its unfair labor practices; offer to Lloyd S. Love and
J. O. Scott immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions;
HARTSL'LL MILLS COMPANY 271
make whole Lloyd S. Love and J. O. Scott for any losses of pay sus-
tained by reason of their discriminatory discharges; upon request, bar-
gain collectively with the T. W. O. C.; post notices in its plant stating
that it will cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and will,
upon request, bargain with the T. W. O. C. with respect to conditions
of employment; and file with the Regional Director within 10 days
a report setting forth the manner and form of compliance therewith.
The respondent and the T. W. O. C. were notified by the Trial Ex-
aminer that they were entitled to request the privilege of filing briefs
with, or presenting oral argument before, the Board within 10 days of
the receipt of the Report.
The respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and to
other parts of the record on September 30, 1938, and a brief on No-
vember 14, 1938. On September 7, 1939, a hearing for the purpose of
oral argument was duly held before the Board in Washington, D. C.,
in which the respondent participated by counsel. The Board has re-
viewed the respondent's exceptions to the Intermediate Report and to
other parts of the record and, except in so far as they are consistent
with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds them to
be without merit.
On October 1, 1938, and on October 29, 1938, respectively, the re-
spondent filed motions to reopen the record and to receive further evi-
dence, alleging as grounds therefor: (1) that the signatures on two of
the T. W. O. C.'s membership cards, which were received in evidence
to establish the T. W. O. C.'s majority status, were forged; (2) that 12
or 15 members of the T. W. O. C. on September 24, 1938, served notice
on the T. W. O. C. of their intent to withdraw their memberships there-
in; and (3) that about 23 members of the T. W. O. C. on or about
October 20, 1938, resigned from the T. W. O. C. On October 21, 1938,
and on November 12, 1938, the Board denied the respective motions.
These motions are discussed further in the section below entitled "The
remedy."
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Hartsell Mills Company is a North Carolina corporation engaged in
the manufacture of upholstery and drapery fabrics at Concord, North
Carolina. Its capital structure consists of $125,000 common stock and
$200,000 preferred stock. Approximately 62 per cent of the common
stock and approximately 97 per cent of the preferred stock is owned by
Stead & Miller Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The principal
officers of Stead & Miller Company are also the principal officers of the
272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
respondent, and the respondent's board of directors is composed of
certain members of the board of directors of Stead & Miller Company.
The two firms operate as separate corporations.
The principal raw materials used in the respondent's operations are
yarn, rayon, salt, chemicals, dyestuffs, coal, and electricity. During
1937 the respondent purchased 501,547 pounds of yarn costing $191,-
310; 21,487 pounds of rayon costing $11,213; salt costing $1,936; chem-
icals costing $616; dyestuffs costing $16,428; coal costing $10,032; and
electricity costing $7,450. The respondent purchased these materials
delivered at Concord, North Carolina. However, approximately 31
per cent, by value, of them were shipped to Concord from points out-
side North Carolina.
All of the respondent's finished goods, excluding "seconds" and
remnants, are sold to Stead & Miller Company, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania. During 1937 the respondent sold 468,821 yards of cloth to
Stead & Miller Company, for which it received $473,543. During the
same period it sold 6,587 yards of cloth "seconds," grossing $3,293, to a
North Carolina concern and miscellaneous remnants, grossing $1,500,
most of which were shipped to firms outside North Carolina. The
goods sold to Stead & Miller Company, constituting approximately 99
per cent of the respondent's output, are sold f. o. b. Concord, North
Carolina. A contract hauler then transports the goods by automobile
truck from Concord, North Carolina, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania..
The respondent in its motion to dismiss and in its brief contends that
its business is intrastate, since most of its raw materials originate in
North Carolina, since such raw materials as are obtained from outside
North Carolina are purchased delivered at Concord, North Carolina,
and since its finished products are sold f. o. b. Concord, North Carolina.
This position is plainly foreclosed by the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Santa Cruz case.3 In that case the
Court said :
There is no question that petitioner was engaged in interstate
and foreign commerce. We have often decided that sales to pur-
chasers in another state are not withdrawn from federal control
because the goods are delivered f. o. b. at stated points within the
state of origin for transportation . . . A large part of the inter-
state commerce of the country is conducted upon that basis and
the arrangements that are made between seller and purchaser with
respect to the place of taking title to the commodity, or as to
payment of freight, where the actual movement is interstate, do
not affect either the power of Congress or the jurisdiction of the
agencies which Congress has established.4
3 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Company v . National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453.
4 Id., at page 463.
HARTSELL MILLS COMPANY 273
It is clear that about one-third of the respondent's raw materials and
substantially all of its finished products are transported in interstate
commerce. If industrial strife should cause a cessation of the respond-
ent's operations, the transportation in interstate commerce of these raw
materials and finished goods would be substantially interrupted. It is
plain that the respondent's operations bring it within the jurisdiction
of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers' Organizing Committee is a labor organization
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. It admits to
membership all production and maintenance employees of the re-
spondent, excluding clerical and supervisory employees and watchmen.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain collectively
The complaint alleges that on or about December 4, 1937, and at all
times thereafter, the respondent refused to bargain collectively with
the T. W. O. C., although a majority of the respondent's employees in
an appropriate unit had designated it as their bargaining agent. The
respondent's answer denies the allegations.
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges that all production and maintenance employ-
ees excluding clerical and supervisory employees and watchmen, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The respondent, in its answer, denies that such a 'unit is appropriate,
but except as to one employee, C. A. Honeycutt, it introduced no evi-
dence at the hearing to support its denial. The respondent contends
that C. A. Honeycutt is not a supervisory employee. After Honeycutt
has ascertained from H. H. Whittle, comanager of the respondent, the
types of cloth which are to be woven, he determines which weavers
are capable of doing the work and then tells the smash-hands and
leash-out men to place the warps in the looms of the weavers selected.
After the warps are in the looms, he inspects the looms to see that
the cloth is started correctly and inspects the cloth from time to time
as it is woven. There are approximately 75 employees in this depart-
ment. We find that Honeycutt's duties are supervisory in character.
We shall exclude him from the unit.
The T. W. O. C. excludes from its membership clerical and super-
visory employees and watchmen, and the exclusion of such employees
from an industrial unit is proper and common. We find that the pro-
duction and maintenance employees of the respondent, excluding cler-
274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ical and supervisory employees and watchmen, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining and that such
unit insures to employees of the respondent the full benefit of their
right to self-organization and collective bargaining and otherwise
effectuates the policies of the Act.
2. Representation by the T. W. 0. C. of a majority in the appropriate
unit
During the hearing the respondent produced its pay roll for the
period ending December 4, 1937. No earlier pay roll was requested
or produced. The pay roll lists the names of 217 employees. T. M.
Schramm, comanager of the respondent, testified that this number
was reduced by approximately 1 per cent each month up to May 14,
1938, when the complaint, issued. Seventeen of the employees are
plant officials, supervisory employees, clerical employees, and watch-
men, whom we have excluded from the unit. Thus there were 200
employees in the appropriate unit on December 4, 1937. The T. W.
0. C. introduced in evidence 137 membership cards. At the hearing,
the names on the membership cards were checked against the names
on the pay roll. It was found that 58 of the names on the cards
corresponded exactly with names on the pay roll. There were minor
discrepancies between 52 of the names as they appeared on the cards
and the pay roll. The discrepancies on 49 of the cards were cured
by the testimony of James Seahorn, an active member of the T. W.
0. C., who had witnessed the signing of 12 of the cards, and who
knew personally the 49 signatories who signed the cards about which
he testified. He .testified that the discrepancies are explained by
poor spelling and poor writing and that the names on the cards are
in each instance the names of persons whose names are on the Decem-
ber 4, 1937, pay roll.
The respondent contends that Seahorn was not qualified to authen-
ticate these cards. Under the circumstances, we see no merit in this
contention. In any event, the discrepancies referred to are for the
most part an initial for the given name on the one and the name
spelled out on the other, or a slight difference in the spelling of the
surnames. Discrepancies of this type are self-explanatory. The re-
spondent produced no specific evidence to discredit the cards. We
find that these 49 cards were signed by employees whose names
appear on the December 4, 1937, pay roll.
Three other cards which bore similar discrepancies were found by
the Trial Examiner to have been signed by persons whose names
appear on the December 4 pay roll. We have examined these 3 cards
and agree with the Trial Examiner's finding. The remaining 27
cards were not signed by employees whose names are on the December
HARTSELL MILLS COMPANY 275
4 pay roll. We find that 110 of the 200 employees in the appropriate
unit on December 4, 1937, were members of the T. W. O. C.
In view of the foregoing facts, we find that on December 4, 1937,
and thereafter,5 the T. W. O. C. was the duly designated representa-
tive of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, and pur-
suant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, was the exclusive representative of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing with the respondent in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment.
3. The refusal to bargain
In 1934 Local Union No. 1902, United Textile Workers of America
(A. F. L.), herein called Local Union No. 1902, was active in the
plant. It initiated a strike which was unsuccessful, and thereafter
its membership dropped. Lloyd S. Love, who was employed by the
respondent following the 1934 strike, succeeded in signing up other
members, but they, too, became inactive. 'A number of employees
having expressed a preference for a local union admitting to mem-
bership employees of the respondent only, in ,the fall of 1935 Love
obtained a charter for Local Union No. 2483, United Tapestry Work-
ers (A. F. L.), herein called Local No. 2483. This union restricted
its membership to employees of the respondent. Love was discharged
on September 14, 1936, and thereafter the union became dormant. In
1937 the T. W. O. C. initiated a membership drive. Most of those
who had belonged to Local Union No. 2483 became affiliated with the
T. W. 0. C.
In September 1937 S. P. Brewer, T. W. O. C. representative, noti-
fied the respondent that the T. W. O. C. had attained a majority sta-
tus in the plant and asked the respondent to meet with the T. W. O. C.
for the purposes of collective bargaining. Thereafter representatives
of the respondent and the T. W. O. C. met on October 14, 16, 23,
November 20, December 4, 1937, and January 19, 1938. The respond-
ent was represented in these negotiations by T. M. Schramm and
H. H. Whittle, comanagers of the respondent. The T. W. O. C.
was represented by Brewer and a shop committee.
The T. W. O. C. charges that the respondent refused to recognize
it as representative of all the employees in a unit composed of pro-
duction and maintenance employees and excluding clerical and super-
visory employees and watchmen, although a majority of the employ-
ees in such unit had designated it as their bargaining representative.
On October 14 the representatives of the T. W. O. C. and the respond-
5 The respondent 's motions alleging a subsequent loss of majority are discussed below in
the section entitled "The remedy."
276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ent met briefly and arranged to continue bargaining negotiations on
October 16. According to Brewer, during the October 16 meeting,
he stated that the T. W. O. C. had attained a majority status in the
plant; he asked Schramm whether,or not the respondent questioned
that; and Schramm answered that he did not question it, and that he
would accept Brewer's statement as being authentic. Schramm, on
the other hand, testified that he never conceded that the T. W. O. C.
had,a majority status; that he merely told Brewer that for the pur-
poses of the bargaining negotiations he would assume that Brewer
was telling the truth.
The T. W. O. C., at this meeting, tendered a proposed contract to
the respondent. The provisions of the contract were discussed for
about 3 hours. Arrangements were then made for a further meeting
on October 23.
At the meeting on October 23, Schramm took the position that the
respondent would recognize the T. W. O. C. as bargaining agent for
its own members and for no others. Schramm's testimony indicates
that this position was taken regardless of whether or not the T. W.
O. C. represented a majority of the employees.
Q. Did Mr. Brewer indicate any particular opposition to the
extent to which you were willing to recognize the T. W. O. C.... ?
A. Absolutely. . . . He said that if the T. W. O. C. represented
a majority of the employees, it would be necessary for them to
represent all of the employees.
Q. What was the position of yourself and Mr. Whittle all the
way through the conference in respect to any concession or any
agreement that they had a majority of your employees among
their members?
A. We felt that it was reasonable for the T. W. O. C. to
represent those employees who were members of their organi-
zation... .
Q. What about any other employees that were not members of
their organizations?
A. We didn't see where they should represent a man that didn't
belong to their outfit.
It does not appear whether or not this issue received discussion at the
other meetings, but it is clear that the respondent never receded from
its position. The Trial Examiner found that the respondent refused
to recognize the T. W. O. C. as representative of all the employees in
the unit.
It is clear that the respondent at the outset of the negotiations agreed
that it would not question the majority status of the T. W. O. C. for
the purposes of the collective bargaining negotiations. Having this
H-AnT'SPLL MILLS COMPANY 277
assurance, the T. W. O. C. did not attempt to prove its majority. Had
it been called upon to produce proof, in all probability it could have
done so, for all its membership cards were signed from April through
October 1937.8 We find that the respondent accepted the T. W. O. C.'s
statement that it had attained a majority status. When the re-
spondent later refused to recognize the T. W. O. C. as representative
of any employees except its own members, it did not request proof of
the T. W. O. C.'s majority status and did not question such majority
status. Rather, it was taking a position that as a matter of law a
union is not entitled to represent any employees in the unit who are
not its own members, although a majority of the employees have
designated the union as their representative.
Since the meetings of December 4, 1937, the date on which the
T. W. O. C.'s majority was established, and January 19, 1938, were
taken up with the issue of whether or not the T. W. O. C. would with-
draw its charge as a condition to further bargaining, the refusal to
recognize the T. W. O. C. as representative of all the employees in
the unit received little discussion. However, this position taken in
one of the series of conferences, and never retracted, persisted as the
position of the respondent on December 4, 1937, and thereafter.
We find that on and after December 4, 1937, as well as before that
date, the respondent refused to recognize the T. W. O. C. as the repre-
sentative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, although a
majority of such employees had designated the T. W. O. C. as their
bargaining representative and although the respondent did not ques-
tion that fact. In so doing, it failed to comply with the requirements
set out in Section 8 (5) and Section 9 (a) of the Act, which provide
that the employer shall bargain with the agency selected by a majority
of the employees, as exclusive representative of all the employees in
the unit.7
The T. W. O. C. further maintains that the respondent refused to
reduce such terms as should be agreed upon to a signed, written con-
tract. Brewer testified that Schramm took this position at the first
meeting and that he reiterated his position at all the meetings through
December 4.
Schramm testified that during the meeting on November 20, he told
Brewer that he would ask a lawyer whether or not the Act required the
employer to sign a contract with the employees. Around Thanks-
" While it would appear that the T. W. O. C.'s majority dates from the latter part of
October 1937, we have not found that it attained a majority status as of that date because
no pay roll earlier than the December 4, 1937, pay roll is available.
7
See Matter of Biles-Coleman Lumber Company and Puget Sound District Council of
Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 4 N. L. R . B. 679, order enforced in National Labor Relations
Board v. Bites-Coleman Lumber Company, 96 P. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 9) ; Matter of Burnside
Steel Foundry Company and Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of
North America, Lodge No. 1719, 7 N. L. R. B. 714.
278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
giving Day, 1937, he consulted counsel who advised him that the Act
did not require the respondent to sign a written agreement. Schramm
further testified that Brewer, at the meeting on November 20, insisted
on knowing whether the respondent would sign a contract at any time,
and that he told Brewer that he saw no need of discussing that ques-
tion until they had agreed upon terms. The respondent contends that
it has never refused to enter into a signed, written contract. At the
hearing, Schramm stated that he did not see the necessity of reducing
a labor contract to writing; that an oral agreement was sufficient.
The Trial Examiner, who observed the demeanor of the witnesses at
the hearing, found Schramm to be "a consistently evasive witness."
He found that from the outset the respondent took the position that
even if terms were agreed upon it would not enter into a written con-
tract. We find that the respondent refused, both before and after
December 4, 1937, to enter into a signed, written contract with the
T. W. O. C., regardless of the terms agreed upon. The record is
replete with evidence, and we find, that this refusal was a subject of
bitter discussion in all the meetings through December 4, and was a
factor in the final breakdown of negotiations.
In Matter o l Inland Steel Company," we held that under normal
circumstances, an essential element of collective bargaining in good
faith by an employer is a willingness to embody the results of negotia-
tions in a signed agreement. We pointed out in that case that Section
8 (5) of the Act requires the employer to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining in good faith, that the nature of this procedure
is determined in the light of the prevailing practice of collective bar-
gaining, and that the prevailing practice in collective bargaining is,
under normal circumstances, to embody understandings reached in
signed agreements.
In Globe Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board e the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said :
We believe there is a duty on both sides, though difficult of legal
enforcement, to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind,
and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement touching wages
and hours and conditions of labor, and if found to embody it in a
contract as specific as possible, which shall stand as a mutual
guaranty of conduct, and as a guide for the adjustment of
grievances.
The respondent's attitude, in refusing to recognize the T. W. 0. C.'s
status as an equal party in normal business relationships, does not
8 Matter of Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers ' Organizing Committee and Amal-
gamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of North America, Lodge Nos . 64, 1010,
and 1101, 9 N. L. R. B. 783.
9 103 F. (2d) 91 (1939).
H•ARTSELL MILLS COMPANY 279
lend itself to the dignified and stable collective bargaining process
contemplated by the Act as an aid to industrial peace.10 We find that
the respondent refused to reduce to a signed, written contract such
terms as should be agreed upon. Such refusal constitutes a violation
of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
The T. W. O. C. further contends that the respondent made with-
drawal of certain charges, alleging that Lloyd S. Love was discrimi-
natorily discharged by the respondent, a condition precedent to further
negotiations. Brewer testified that on October 23, 1937, and Novem-
ber 20,1937, Schramm insisted that the charges be withdrawn. Brewer
told Schramm on each occasion that it was not his purpose to discuss
the merits of Love's case. At the conference on December 4, 1937,
according to Brewer, the management strongly objected to discussing
the terms of the T. W. O. C.'s proposal unless the T. W. O. C. would
agree to withdraw its charges. He testified that Schramm, on January
19, 1938, again argued that the T. W. O. C. should withdraw its
charges before the parties should undertake to negotiate further on
the bargaining agreement, because the respondent would not be able
to come to terms until the Love controversy was resolved. Brewer
then told Schramm that if the respondent was refusing to negotiate
further, the meeting would adjourn. No further conference for the
purposes of collective bargaining was requested.
Schramm testified that on November 20, 1937, Brewer told him that
as soon as a contract was signed the charges relating to Love would
be dropped. Brewer denied making any such statement. This tes-
timony of Schramm's substantially corroborates Brewer's testimony
as to the respondent's position relative to the dropping of the charges.
Schramm admitted that on December 4, he told Brewer that the charge
would be conducive to a certain amount of ill feeling and lack of
cooperation in the negotiations and that it would serve the best in-
terests of all to dispose of the case as quickly as possible, but he
maintains that Brewer asked him if this was a condition precedent to
further bargaining and he said it was not.
On December 8, 1937, the Regional Director for the Fifth Region
wrote a letter to Schramm in which he stated, "Mr. Brewer informs.
me in his letter that you have made the withdrawal of this charge
[alleging discrimination in the discharge of Lloyd S. Love] a con-
dition of any further negotiations. If this is an accurate statement
of your attitude regarding this, you are of course in an untenable posi-
tion, which might lead to a charge of refusal to bargain." It is sig-
10 See Matter of St. Joseph Stockyards Company and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America , Local Union No. 159, 2 N. L. R. B. 39; Matter of
H. J. Heinz Company and Canning and Pickle Workers, Local No. 325, a ffi liated with Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America , American Federation of
Labor, 10 N. L . R. B. 963; Holston Manufacturing Company and American Federation of
Hosiery Wcrker., 13 N. L. R. B. 783.
283029-11-vol. 18-19
280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nificant that the respondent did not reply to this letter. The Trial
Examiner found that the respondent made withdrawal of the charge
a prerequisite to further bargaining. We agree with the Trial
Examiner's finding.
The Act establishes a duty on the part of an employer to bargain
with the representative of a majority of its employees concerning
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The Act does
not at the same time permit the employer to hedge about this duty by
imposing unreasonable conditions precedent to bargaining collectively.
A condition of the type here imposed, combining a restraint on the
right to bargain collectively with an inducement to the labor organiza-
tion to forego its redress for the employer's wrongful conduct in dis-
criminatorily discharging its employees, is particularly repugnant to
the spirit of the Act. We find that the imposition by the respondent
of the aforesaid condition precedent to bargaining collectively consti-
tutes a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of
the Act.
B. Interference, restraint, and coercion
J. 0. Scott, a former employee, testified that on April 16, 1937,
William S. Buff, a foreman, asked him how the T. W. 0. C. was
progressing in the weave shop. Buff admitted having made this
inquiry, and added that he asked "quite a few of them once in a
while" about their union affiliation. F. L. Stallings, an employee, tes-
tified that he asked Honeycutt, a supervisory employee, for a job as
smash-hand and that Honeycutt told him that if he were given the
job he would influence the employees with whom he worked to join
the T. W. 0. C. According to Stallings, Honeycutt advised him as
follows : "The best thing for you to do is to stay out of it. It never
will amount to anything. You can't expect the company to do any-
thing for you if you get into such a mess." Honeycutt took the stand
and did not deny having made this statement. James Seahorn, an
employee, testified that during June 1936 Honeycutt advised him that
his union activity was holding him down and that if he would quit
the union he could get more work. Honeycutt admitted that he told
Seahorn that if he would take up more time on his own job and let the
union alone, he would be better off ; and that the union was no good
for anyone.
We find that the respondent, by the above-described activities of its
supervisory employees, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act.
Another question is raised by the record which warrants a brief
discussion. Certain Social Security cards used by the respondent pro-
vided space for designating the employee's union affiliation. The
HART SELL NI'ILLS COMPANY 281
employees were not forced to supply this information. Schramm
testified that its Social Security card system was purchased upon the
advice of an accounting firm. He stated that it was not purchased
because the respondent desired to obtain information concerning the
union affiliation of its employees. While the union affiliation of its
employees is clearly not a proper concern of the respondent, and such
information should not be called for on its Social Security cards or
any other cards which the employees are required to fill out, we do
not feel that the respondent selected this card system with a view to
obtaining information concerning the union affiliation of its employees
or of applicants for employment. We do not find that the respondent
has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (1) of the Act.
C. The discharges
The complaint alleges that the respondent discharged Lloyd S.
Love and J. 0. Scott and refused to employ them because of their
membership in and activities in behalf of Local Union No. 2483 11
and the T. W. 0. C., respectively. The respondent's answer denies
the allegations.
Lloyd S. Love was first employed by the respondent as a loom fixer
in 1934. He was active in Local Union No. 1902 until it became dor-
mant. In 1935 Love obtained a charter for Local Union No. 2483.
Love was the moving spirit of Local Union No. 2483. About August
1, 1936, he became its president. He was discharged on September
14, 1936. After the discharge of Love, Local Union No. 2483 ceased
to function.
The respondent contends that Love was discharged because he dis-
paraged the management, spoiled some cloth, and disobeyed a company
rule.
The respondent's storekeeper and four employees testified that in
the spring of 1935, Love stated in the respondent's store that the re-
spondent's mill was going bankrupt, that it was going to sell out to
Cannon Mills, and that anyone desiring continuous employment had
better apply for work with Cannon Mills. Pharr, the superintendent
of the mill, testified that he called in Love, who admitted making some
such statement, explained to him the seriousness of such a statement
and suggested that he be more careful in the future. Pharr admitted
that Love "had some mistaken ground for this statement because of
the fact that Cannon Mills trucks were coming in and out of our plant
at the time delivering yarn." Love claims that his statement was,
"I wonder if the Cannon Mills Company is still the selling agent of
11 See footnote 1, supra.
282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hartsell ." He testified that he told those in the store that he was
going to Belmont to attend a union rally on Saturday and that on
the following Monday Pharr called him in and after questioning him
about the rally asked him about the alleged remarks cited above.
Pharr did not deny that he had questioned Love concerning the union
rally. We give credence to the respondent's several witnesses and
find that Love made statements substantially as attributed to him
above. Such a statement made a year and a half prior to Love's
discharge, however, does not appear to us to have been a potent factor
in the discharge. The evidence is open to interpretation that another
reason for calling Love to Pharr's office at that time was his attend-
ance at the union rally.
During July or August 1935 Love circulated in the plant a petition
indicating opposition to a proposed consolidation of two schools in
that district. The respondent claims that it has a rule against the
circulation in the plant of petitions, whatever their purpose may be.
Love testified that Buff, a foreman, gave him permission to circulate
the petition. Buff testified, and he told Pharr upon inquiry, that he
did not give Love permission to circulate the petition, but that Love
might have inferred from his statement that he did have permission
to circulate the petition. We find that Love obtained permission from
his foreman to circulate the petition.
During the summer of 1936 some defective cloth was produced.
Whittle and Honeycutt contended that the defect was caused by a
defective jack-head in the loom. As loom fixer,.it was Love's job to
keep the looms in good condition. Love testified that the defect was
caused by the use of an improper card. Failure to repair the loom
was not considered an offense justifying discharge, and no discipline
was meted out to Love. The respondent does not question Love's
general skill and efficiency, and this incident evidently played no part
in motivating the respondent to discharge him.
W. B. Kennedy, an oversee, testified that about December 25, 1935,
Love said to him, concerning the management, "Them damn wops ain't
got sense enough to run the mill." Kennedy testified that he was
"pretty sure" that he mentioned this to Honeycutt, an overseer. A. M.
Gaskey, clerk in a store operated by the respondent, testified that he
once heard Love say, "that Mr. Whittle didn't know anything about
mill work and he would be going back north again." Floyd Tucker,
an employee, testified that he heard Love say at one time that, "[the
employees] ought to go out to the office and get Mr. Whittle and run
him back to Philadelphia." James Hensley, a former employee, testi-
fied that he once heard Love say that "Hartsell Mills Company didn't
have any houses fit for niggers to live in." This testimony was given
LIARTSELL MILLS COMPANY 283
after Love had been placed on the stand, and he was not recalled to
deny it. Only one of the above statements is dated, and that occurred
eight and one-half months prior to Love's discharge. Hensley left the
respondent's employ February 11, 1936, so the statement which he
attributes to Love was made before that date, if at all. Except for
Kennedy's testimony, mentioned above, there is no evidence that these
statements came to the attention of the management so as to become a
factor in the discharge.
During July 1936 the respondent discharged the gatekeeper, one
Lisenby. Lisenby was a disabled man of 85 years of age. He was
clearly unable to perform his duties. Pharr testified that Love said
to the employees that the management had been "cold blooded" and
ruthless in their dealing with Lisenby. Pharr further testified that
the respondent had been very considerate of Lisenby, first seeing to it
that Lisenby would be able to live with his son, and then giving him a
month's notice before discharging him. According to Pharr, Love's
remarks about the discharge of Lisenby were the last of a series of
incidents which persuaded him that Love should be discharged. While
Love criticized the respondent for discharging Lisenby, as president of
Local Union No. 2483, it was natural that he should protest the dis-
placement of an old employee and union member. The evidence indi-
cates that the extent of Love's statement concerning the discharge was
that "Lisenby had worked for the mill for years and years, and after
he became so old that he was of no value to the mill, they discharged
him and threw him out."
We do not feel that the reasons advanced by the respondent for dis-
charging Love were, in fact, the true reasons for his discharge. The
statement concerning the financial condition of the respondent is too
remote in time. Love had permission to circulate the petition, and
in any event we see no reason why the circulation of a petition con-
cerning the consolidation of two schools, a year or more prior to Love's
dismissal, should have motivated the respondent to discharge Love.
Love's skill as a workman is unquestioned. The evidence does not
show that the statements made by Love, excepting the statements con-
cerning Lisenby, came to the attention of the company officials who
discharged him. On the other hand Love was the moving spirit of
Local Union No. 2483, and in discharging Love, shortly after he
became president, the respondent played a large part in the destruction
of Local Union No. 2483. We conclude that Love was discharged
because of his membership in and activities in behalf of Local Union
No. 2483.
We find that by the discharge of Lloyd S. Love the respondent has
discriminated in regard to his hire and tenure of employment, thereby
discouraging membership in a labor organization and interfering with,
284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Love has received almost continuous employment since his discharge.
At the time of the hearing , he was employed about 100 miles from his
home. This necessitates his living away from home most of the time,
and he desires to be reinstated in his former position . We shall order
the respondent to reinstate Love to his former position with back pay.
J. O. Scott was arrested for intoxication on the evening of April 2,
1938. He spent the night in jail, and was released the following morn-
ing upon payment of a fine. On April 5 his foreman, Buff, told him
that he was being laid off , but that he would in all probability be
recalled. A week later, Scott talked to Whittle , who told him that he
was discharged for intoxication . Scott had solicited memberships for
the T . W. O. C. in the plant, but he had not held an office in the
T. W. O. C. The respondent knew that Scott was a member of the
T. W. O. C. On September 16, 1937 , Buff questioned Scott about the
progress of the T. W. O. C., asking him to name some of the members.
Scott said that he was a member as were about 85 per cent of the
employees in the weave shop.
The respondent contends that it has a rule that any' employee who
becomes intoxicated on or off duty is subject to discharge , and that
Scott was discharged for violating this rule . It was established that
some employees have been laid off and some discharged for intoxi-
cation.
Five employees, all respondent 's witnesses , testified that they had
been intoxicated on one or more occasions . None of them had been dis-
charged therefor , although one had been laid off twice because of
intoxication . It is clear that the management had knowledge of a
number of these cases. Honeycutt testified that at one time Whittle
knew he was intoxicated and that Whittle warned him about it. Buff,
who had authority to hire and discharge , testified that he once knew of
a case of an employee getting drunk , but that he did not report it. It
appears that the respondent enforced its rule at times and did not at
others.
Buff admitted that shortly after W. L. Stogner, another employee,
was arrested for being intoxicated in January 1938, he asked Scott if
it were he and Stogner who had become intoxicated , and Scott answered
that it was Stogner and not he. The Trial Examiner found that this
episode established that the respondent was seeking a pretext to justify
its discharge of Scott. We are unable to agree with the Trial Exam-
iner's finding. Stogner was a member of the T. W. O. C . as was Scott.
Scott's union activity was not so prominent as to make it likely that the
respondent would single him out as one to be discharged to cripple the
T. W. O. C. There was no acute episode in Scott's relationship with
HART SELL MILLS COMPANY 285
the respondent immediately preceding his discharge, so far as union
activity is concerned. The charge that Scott was discriminatorily dis-
charged was not filed until the hearing was in progress. Although the
case is not free of doubt, we conclude from all the circumstances that
J. 0. Scott was discharged for reasons other than his union membership
or activity. We shall, therefore, dismiss the allegations of the complaint
as to him.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III A and B,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent
described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, we will order it to cease and desist therefrom and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act and to remove, in so far as possible, the effects of such practices.
We have found that the respondent refused to bargain collectively
with the T. W. 0. C. although a majority of the employees in the appro-
priate unit had designated the T. W. 0. C. as their agent for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining. As noted above, the respondent filed
motions to reopen the record and to receive further evidence on the
ground that the T. W. 0. C. has, since the unfair labor practices took
place, lost its majority status in the plant. The Board denied the
motions. The implication from the respondent's motions is that the
Board cannot order it to bargain with the T. W. 0. C. since the
T. W. 0. C. no longer represents a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit. While we have not ascertained whether this is, in
fact, the current situation in the plant, it is clear that the loss of a
majority status by the T. W. 0. C., after the refusal to bargain took
place, cannot affect the respondent's unfair labor practices engaged in
prior to such alleged loss of majority. In this regard we said in Matter
of Inland Steel Company: 12
The necessary delays incident to the adjudication of a dispute
have postponed the Board's order until a time considerably subse-
quent to the original wrongful refusal to bargain. The refusal to
bargain collectively disrupts the morale of the men, has a deterring
effect upon the organizational activity of the union and a discour-
" See footnote 8, supra.
286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
aging influence on members already gained which tends to induce
them to drop from the ranks. . . . If an order to bargain col-
lectively cannot be deemed an appropriate remedy for the refusal
to bargain collectively unless the S. W. O. C.'s majority is kept
intact until the Board can issue a decision, the plain policy and
intent of the Act will be defeated. The respondent would be per-
mitted further to evade the obligation of Section 8 (5) by profiting
from the discouraging effects of its already accomplished violation
of that very obligation. We cannot concede the validity of such a
doctrine of futility, and we hold that to effectuate the policies of
the Act, the respondent's refusal to bargain must be remedied by
an order to bargain, based on the majority obtaining on the date
of the refusal to bargain.
We apply the same principle here.
The further ground for the respondent's motions to reopen the record
and to receive further evidence is that the signatures on two of the
T. W. O. C.'s membership cards, which were received in evidence to
establish the T. W. O. C.'s majority status, were forged. Even if the
cards-referred to were forged, the T. W. O. C. had a majority status as
of date the refusal to bargain took place without counting these cards.
In the absence of any proof in the record or offered at the time of the
motions, we cannot assume that other cards similarly authenticated
were forged also.
Our Order will provide that the respondent, upon request, bargain
collectively with the T. W. O. C. as the exclusive representative of all
the employees in the appropriate unit, in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an
understanding is reached on such matters, to embody said understand-
ing in a signed, written contract.
We have found that the respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
in discharging Lloyd S. Love. We shall order the respondent to offer
reinstatement to Love and to make him whole for any loss of pay he
has suffered by reason of his discharge by payment to him of a sum
equal to the amount which he normally would have earned as wages
from the date of his discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement,
less his net earnings 13 during that period.
13 By "net earnings " is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room,
and board , incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent , which would not have been incurred but for the unlawful
refusal of his application for reinstatement and the consequent necessity of his seeking
employment elsewhere . See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union , Local 2590,
8 N. L. R. B. 440 . Monies received for work performed upon Federal , State, county,
municipal , or other work -relief projects are not considered as earnings , but, as provided
below in the Order, shall be deducted from the sum due the employee, and the amount
thereof shall be paid over to the appropriate fiscal agency of the Federal, State , county,
municipal , or other government or governments which supplied the funds for such work-
relief projects.
HARTSE'LL MILLS COMPANY
THE PETITION
287
We have determined the appropriate bargaining unit and have found
that a majority of the respondent's employees within that unit desig-
nated the T. W. O. C. as their representative for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining . Since our Order will provide that the respondent,
upon request , bargain collectively with the T. W. O. C. as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, we will dis-
miss the petition for investigation and certification of representatives.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Textile Workers' Organizing Committee is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. The production and maintenance employees of the respondent,
excluding clerical and supervisory employees and watchmen , constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. Textile Workers' Organizing Committee was on December 4, 1937,
and at all times since has been, the exclusive representative of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining , within
the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of Lloyd S. Love and thereby discouraging membership in
Textile Workers' Organizing Committee, the respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (3) of the Act.
5. By refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers'
Organizing Committee, as the exclusive representative of its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, the respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section
8 (5) of the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the
respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
8. The respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act by discharging J. O. Scott.
288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
respondent, Hartsell Mills Company, and its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers' Organizing
Committee or any other labor organization of its employees, by dis-
charging or refusing to reinstate any of its employees, or in any other
manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of their employment because of mem-
bership in or activity in connection with any such labor organization;
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers' Organ-
izing Committee as the exclusive representative of the respondent's
production and maintenance employees, excluding clerical and super-
visory employees and watchmen;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc-
ing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer Lloyd S. Love immediate and full reinstatement to his
former position without prejudice to his seniority and other rights
and privileges;
(b) Make whole Lloyd S. Love for any loss of pay he has suffered
by reason of his discharge by payment to him of a sum of money
equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages from the
date of his discharge to the date reinstatement is offered, less his net
earnings during such period ; deducting, however, from the amount
otherwise due to him, monies received during said period for work per-
formed upon Federal, State, county, municipal, or other work-relief
projects, and pay over the amount so deducted to the appropriate
fiscal agency of the Federal, State, county, municipal, or other gov-
ernment or governments which supply the funds for said work-relief
projects;
(c) Notify the Textile Workers' Organizing Committee in writing
that it is prepared to renew negotiations looking toward a collective
bargaining agreement and to embody such terms as may be finally
arrived at in a signed, written contract;
HA'RTSELL MILLS COMPANY 289
(d) Upon request bargain collectively with Textile Workers'
Organizing Committee , as the exclusive representative of its produc-
tion and maintenance employees , excluding clerical and supervisory
employees and watchmen , in respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of
employment , and other conditions of employment , and, if an under-
standing is reached on such matters, embody said understanding in a
signed, written contract;
(e) Immediately post notices to all its employees in conspicuous
places in and about its plant, and maintain said notices for a period
of at least sixty ( 60) consecutive days, stating that the respondent
will cease and desist in the manner set forth in paragraphs 1 (a),
(b), and ( c) of this Order, that the respondent 's employees are free
to become or remain members of Textile Workers' Organizing Com-
mittee, and that the respondent will take the affirmative action set
forth in paragraphs 2 (a), (b), (c ), and (d ) of this Order;
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region in writing
within ten ( 10) days from the date of this Order what steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in so far as it alleges that the respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 ( 3) of the Act
by discharging J. O. Scott.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for investigation and
certification of representatives filed by Textile Workers ' Organizing
Committee , be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MR. WILLIAM M. LEISERSON took no part in the consideration of the
above Decision and Order.