Hartford Life Insurance Co.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 30, 2000

No. 75250941 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2000)

Paper No. 12
TEH
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Hartford Life Insurance Company
________
Serial No. 75/250,941
_______
John R. Garber of Cooper & Dunham LLP for Hartford Life Insurance
Company.
Sarah A. Otte, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 114 (K.
Margaret Le, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Hanak, Bottorff and Holtzman, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Holtzman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
An application has been filed by Hartford Life Insurance
Company to register the mark STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN for "life
insurance underwriting services.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has finally refused
registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act on the basis

1 Application Serial No. 75/250,941, filed March 3, 1997, alleging
dates of first use and first use in commerce on December 10, 1996. The
term VARIABLE LIFE has been disclaimed. In addition, applicant has
claimed ownership of Registration Nos. 1,682,219 and 2,081,676.
Ser No. 75/250,941
2
of the previously registered mark ARTISAN for "investment
advisory services, securities brokerage services and mutual fund
brokerage, distribution and investment services.2
Applicant has appealed. Briefs have been filed but an oral
hearing was not requested.
We affirm the refusal to register.
Here, as in any likelihood of confusion analysis, we look to
the factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973), giving particular attention
to the factors most relevant to the case at hand, including the
similarity of the marks, the strength of the marks and the
relatedness of the goods or services. See Federated Foods, Inc.
v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976);
and In re Azteca Restaurant Enterprises Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209
(TTAB 1999).
Turning first to the services, the Examining Attorney argues
that insurance and financial services are closely related, that
the services are in the same channels of trade and directed to
the same classes of purchasers. In support of her position, the
Examining Attorney has submitted copies of six third-party
registrations3 and excerpts from a number of articles from the

2 Registration No. 2,003,659; issued September 24, 1996.
3 One registration, initially included as a pending application, has
now issued into a registration.
Ser No. 75/250,941
3
NEXIS database which, according to the Examining Attorney, show
that life insurance underwriting services are offered by the same
companies that offer investment advisory services, and that in
fact it is becoming more common to find these services offered by
a single company.4 In addition, the Examining Attorney claims
that applicant's own specimens refer to life insurance as an
investment option.
Applicant, on the other hand, argues that the services are
"dissimilar" and "distinctly different." Applicant maintains
that it is not relevant that some registrations cover both
services because the owner of the cited registration "is not an
insurance company" and "is not licensed to offer insurance
services of any kind." Applicant states that, in fact, "it would
be a crime" for the registrant to offer the services provided by
applicant.
It is true that there are specific differences in the life
insurance underwriting services offered by applicant and the
investment services provided by registrant. However, the
question is not whether purchasers can differentiate the services

4 The Examining Attorney also made of record one application based upon
an intent to use the mark in commerce, two abandoned applications
(owned by the same entity), and one registration which does not contain
any reference to life insurance underwriting services. In addition, one
of the Nexis references is from a foreign publication. None of this
evidence has been considered by the Board.
Ser No. 75/250,941
4
themselves but rather whether purchasers are likely to confuse
the source of the services. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Industries
Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 13 USPQ2d 1618 (TTAB 1989). Thus, it
is not necessary that the services of the applicant and
registrant be similar or even competitive to support a finding of
likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient if the respective
services are related in some manner and/or that the conditions
surrounding their marketing are such that they would be
encountered by the same persons under circumstances that could,
because of the similarity of the marks used thereon, give rise to
the mistaken belief that they emanate from or are associated
with, the same source. See In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29
USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB 1993).
We find that applicant's and registrant's services are
related, both involving the sale of investment products and
services as part of an overall financial planning program. The
complementary and overlapping nature of these services is
confirmed by applicant’s own sales brochures, submitted as
specimens, which refer to the different investment options
available under the ARTISAN policy as follows:
...Artisan is the perfect complement to your current sales
activities....With Artisan, you can help prospective clients
combine life insurance with participation in the equity
markets. And you can approach your current clients with an
exciting new way to accomplish financial objectives.
Ser No. 75/250,941
5
Moreover, the third-party registrations submitted by the
Examining Attorney show that the same mark has been registered
for life insurance underwriting services and for one or more of
registrant's services. Although the third-party registrations
are not evidence of use of the marks in commerce, the
registrations have probative value to the extent that they
suggest that the respective services are of a type which may
emanate from the same source.5 See, e.g., In re Albert Trostel
& Sons Co., supra at 1785-1786; and In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co.,
6 USPQ2d 1467 (TTAB 1988). The Nexis articles, two examples of
which follow, show that insurance companies are expanding their
operations into the area of investment services, further
demonstrating that the life insurance underwriting services and
investment services would be perceived as originating with the
same companies.
Welcome to the brave new world of insurance finance. Its
players are the newest kids on the capital markets block:
about 20 reinsurers, insurance brokers, and, to a lesser
degree, primary insurers that all have launched new capital
markets groups to sell many of the products and services
offered by major investment banks.... 'The investment banks
need a vehicle through which they can engage in the business
of insurance, through which they can write insurance
policies....' Investment Dealers Digest (August 3, 1998).
As barriers between banks, investment banks and insurers
break down, banks see size as a key to winning that fight.
Lots of customers mean lots of chances to cross-sell

5 We note that none of these registrations involve house marks for
broad or diverse categories of goods.
Ser No. 75/250,941
6
insurance and investments to bank-account holders. St.
Louis Post-Dispatch (April 14, 1998).
Furthermore, although applicant’s specimens appear to
indicate that applicant’s services are sold through insurance
agents or brokers, there is no restriction in applicant’s
recitation (nor in registrant’s) so both applicant's and
registrant's services could be sold in same channels of trade to
the general public. Purchasers of these services may be careful
about how they invest their money and the investment services and
products, including a life insurance policy, that they select.
However, there is no evidence or even argument in this case that
the purchasers of investment products and services are
sophisticated or experienced in these matters, and indeed they
may not be.6 Moreover, even if purchasers were established to be
sophisticated with respect to the services, we would have no
basis upon which to conclude that such sophistication would
extend to the marks used in connection with them.
Applicant's claim that it would "be a crime" for registrant
to offer the services provided by applicant, even if true, does
not overcome the perception of the respective services as

6 The case of Amalgamated Bank v. Amalgamated Trust, 842 F.2d 1270, 6
USPQ2d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1988), relied on by the dissent, is
distinguishable. The Court's finding of no likelihood of confusion in
that case was based on the parties' evidence (a consent agreement) that
their respective banking customers would not be confused. We have no
such evidence, by agreement or otherwise, in the present case.
Ser No. 75/250,941
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originating with a common source. Purchasers would not
necessarily be aware of such limitations, or even if they were so
aware, there is no apparent similar prohibition against applicant
providing types of investment products and services other than
insurance. See In re United California Brokers, Inc., 222 USPQ
361 (TTAB 1984). Therefore, purchasers would still be likely to
assume that there is some relationship or connection between the
applicant and registrant if their services are offered under
similar marks.
Turning then to the marks, the Examining Attorney argues
that applicant has merely added a house mark STAG and highly
descriptive terms VARIABLE LIFE to registrant's mark. The
Examining Attorney points to applicant's use of the ARTISAN
portion of the mark in applicant's specimens to demonstrate that
applicant itself perceives that term as the most significant
feature of its mark and that is the image which would be
projected to the purchaser of applicant's services.
Applicant, on the other hand, submits that the term STAG is
the dominant portion of its mark. In support of this position
applicant claims that it is the owner of a "family" of thirteen
STAG formative marks for life insurance underwriting services,
including two registration for marks which contain the elements
Ser No. 75/250,941
8
STAG and VARIABLE LIFE.7 In addition, applicant maintains that
the Examining Attorney analyzed the marks as three component
parts instead of considering the marks in their entireties thus,
according to applicant, effectively ignoring the descriptive
wording in the mark in finding the marks to be similar.
In comparing the marks STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN and
ARTISAN in their entireties as we must, we find that the marks
are similar in appearance and meaning. As our primary reviewing
court has stated, there is nothing improper in "examining each
component of the mark" and giving appropriate weight to that
component in reaching a conclusion based on consideration of the
marks in their entireties. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,
222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1845 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Sweats
Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 4 USPQ2d
1793 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
One of the strongest impressions of applicant's mark is
conveyed by the term ARTISAN. That same word is registrant's
entire mark. We have no evidence of third-party use or
registration of the word ARTISAN in connection with similar

7 Applicant has identified those registrations as follows: STAG
VARIABLE LIFE; STAG VARIABLE LIFE LAST SURVIVOR; STAG VL LS; STAG
SIMPLE TERM; STAG SIMPLE TERM+; STAG FOUR; STAG FIVE; STAG LS THREE;
STAG SIX; STAG LS TWO; STAG THREE; STAG SERIES; and STAG TWO.
Ser No. 75/250,941
9
services, or any other evidence in the record to suggest that
ARTISAN is weak, or entitled to anything less than a broad scope
of protection. Thus, we find ARTISAN to be a unique expression
in the insurance and financial fields and thus more likely to
create confusion when used in both marks. See, e.g., Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23
USPQ2d 1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Further evidence of the significance of ARTISAN to applicant
and the overall meaning of applicant's mark is demonstrated by
the applicant's product brochure. Throughout this brochure,
applicant refers to its mark solely by the word ARTISAN. A few
examples of such usage are as follows (emphasis added):
Artisan adds a new dimension to life by offering greater
flexibility, at lower cost, than many other policies.
Once you establish your clients' need for life insurance,
you'll be able to tell an impressive and convincing story
about Artisan's powerful benefits...
It doesn't matter whether you're accustomed to handling
securities or insurance products, you can easily apply your
skills to the sale of Artisan. In fact, Artisan is the
perfect complement to your current sales activities.
This brochure appears to be distributed to or used by
applicant's own insurance agents. Nevertheless, it indicates the
importance of the ARTISAN portion of the mark at least to
applicant and to its agents who will ultimately be selling these
insurance products to the general public. It also suggests that
Ser No. 75/250,941
10
the single word ARTISAN may be used by applicant, and in turn by
applicant's agents in their dealings with consumers, as a
convenient shorthand way to distinguish this particular insurance
product from the products offered under applicant's many other
"STAG" marks.8
Given the uniqueness of ARTISAN in the identified fields,
the additional wording in applicant's mark is insufficient to
distinguish the marks. The term VARIABLE LIFE is admittedly
descriptive, if not generic, and therefore is less significant in
the mark's commercial impression. See In re National Data Corp.,
supra. Moreover, it is well-settled that the addition of a house
mark or other such matter to one of two otherwise similar marks
will not serve to avoid a likelihood of confusion particularly in
cases where, as here, the term shared by the two marks is unique
and arbitrary. See, e.g., In re Pierce Foods Corporation, 230
USPQ 307 (TTAB 1986); In re Dennison Manufacturing Company, 220
USPQ 1015 (TTAB 1983). Indeed, when used in connection with
related services as we have here, the differences in the marks

8 We recognize, as the dissent points out, that these brochures are not
distributed to the public. Nevertheless, it is not improper for us to
consider, in our likelihood of confusion analysis, the manner of use of
applicant's mark in these materials as evidence of, for example, the
meaning or commercial impression the mark projects. See, e.g.,
Specialty Brands v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 223
USPQ 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and In re Nationwide Industries, Inc. 6
USPQ2d 1882 (TTAB 1988). We must emphasize, however, that while we
have considered this evidence, our decision in this case is based on
the mark as it appears in the drawing.
Ser No. 75/250,941
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may be perceived as merely identifying another in the line of
services rather than a different source for the services.
Applicant's claim that STAG may be the name of an alleged
"family" of marks or even the subject of prior registrations is
of no persuasive effect in this case. First, applicant has not
established a family of STAG marks. The mere existence of a
number of registrations containing a particular term does not
automatically make it a "family."9 Even assuming the existence
of a family of STAG marks would not overcome the similarity
between the marks in this case because the "family" name would do
nothing to prevent consumers from mistakenly assuming that
registrant is somehow associated with applicant or that there is
at least some relationship between them.
Finally, to the extent that there is any doubt on the issue
of likelihood of confusion, it is settled that such doubt must be
resolved in favor of the prior registrant. In re Shell Oil Co.,
992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

9 In order to establish ownership of a family of marks, it must be
shown that the marks containing the family feature have been used and
promoted together in such a manner as to create public recognition and
that the family feature is distinctive, i.e., not descriptive, highly
suggestive, or commonly used in the trade. See Marion Laboratories
Inc. v. Biochemical/Diagnostics Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1215 (TTAB 1988).
Ser No. 75/250,941
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Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.
C. M. Bottorff
T. E. Holtzman
Administrative Trademark
Judges, Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board
Hanak, Administrative Trademark Judge, dissenting:
I am of the view that applicant’s mark STAG VARIABLE LIFE
ARTISAN and registrant’s mark ARTISAN are so totally dissimilar
in terms of visual appearance, pronunciation and connotation such
that their use on even identical services may not result in a
likelihood of confusion. See Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enterprises
Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991). To
state the obvious, applicant’s four word mark and registrant’s
one word mark are vastly different in terms of visual appearance
and pronunciation. The two marks are also vastly different in
terms of connotation. The first word of applicant’s mark is a
well known word which, as applied to either applicant’s services
or registrant’s services, is totally arbitrary. The word “stag”
is defined as meaning “a full-grown male deer.” Webster’s New
World Dictionary (2d ed. 1970). Thus, the presence of the
Ser No. 75/250,941
13
arbitrary word STAG, along with the descriptive wording VARIABLE
LIFE, causes applicant’s mark in its entirety to be distinctly
different from registrant’s mark ARTISAN in terms of connotation
or meaning.
Moreover, the Examining Attorney has never disputed the
contention of applicant Hartford Life Insurance Company that it
has for many years extensively used the representation of a stag
in connection with the sale of its various insurance products,
including specifically its life insurance products. This
extensive use of a representation of a stag serves as yet another
basis to enable consumers to differentiate between the marks STAG
VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN for life insurance underwriting services
and ARTISAN for investment advisory services and mutual fund
services.
In an effort to bridge the gap between the vast differences
in the two marks, the majority argues that in an internal
brochure, “applicant refers to its mark solely by the word
ARTISAN.” (Majority opinion page 9). The majority’s agrument is
deficient for two reasons. First, the brochure which the
majority refers to is not a sales brochure. Rather, this
brochure is directed solely to applicant’s own insurance agents
for their own internal use. Indeed, this brochure contains the
following disclaimer in bold, solid capital letters: FOR
PRODUCER INFORMATION ONLY. NOT FOR USE WITH THE PUBLIC.
Ser No. 75/250,941
14
Obviously, applicant’s own insurance agents know that they
are dealing with the Hartford Life Insurance Company. There is
simply no need for applicant in its own internal literature
directed solely to its own insurance agents to repeatedly refer
to applicant’s insurance products by their full names, such as
HARTFORD VARIABLE LIFE; HARTFORD WHOLE LIFE or STAG VARIABLE LIFE
ARTISAN. The repeated use in internal documents of the words
HARTFORD and STAG is utterly unnecessary. Moreover, even in this
internal brochure directed solely to its own agents, applicant on
numerous occasions refers to its insurance product by its full
name (STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN).
There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that when
applicant or its agents present STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN
insurance products to potential buyers of insurance, that they do
not use the full name STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN. Indeed, given
the plethora of different HARTFORD insurance products, it is
obvious that Hartford agents must distinguish between these
various insurance products and that they would do so by using the
full names of the various insurance products. Moveover, given
the substantial investment applicant has made over many years in
promoting its “stag” symbol, it is doubtful that Hartford agents
would drop the word STAG and, before the purchasing public, refer
to this insurance product as simply ARTISAN, as the majority
Ser No. 75/250,941
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speculates without any evidentiary support. (Majority opinion
page 10).
Second, our concern in this PTO proceeding is with the
“registrability of the mark as shown and described in the
application itself.” Smith v. Tobacco By-Products, 243 F.2d 188,
113 USPQ 339, 341 (CCPA 1957). See also 3 J. McCarthy, McCarthy
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition Section 20:15 at page 20-28
(4th ed. 2000). Even assuming for the pure sake of argument that
applicant uses ARTISAN per se for an insurance product and such
use occurs before the purchasing public, said use has no bearing
on applicant’s right to register STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN
unless such use shows bad faith, a contention never raised in
this proceeding.
As noted at the outset, I would find that the two marks are
so dissimilar that their use on even identical services may not
result in a likelihood of confusion. Of course, the services in
question are by no means identical. I believe that the vast
majority of consumers would distinguish between, on the one hand,
life insurance services and, on the other hand, investment
advisory services and mutual fund services.
More importantly, both types of services are purchased with
a great deal of care. There is no dispute that in applying for a
life insurance policy or seeking to invest in a mutual fund, the
potential buyer must read numerous papers explaining the
Ser No. 75/250,941
16
insurance policy or mutual fund; must sign various papers
indicating that they understand the nature of the insurance
product or mutual fund product; and, in the case of life
insurance products, they must, at a minimum, fill out a very
extensive health questionnaire and, in most cases, must take a
physical examination. Our primary reviewing Court has taken
judicial notice and held that when consumers select banking
services, they exercise a very high level of care such that “it
would be strange for customers of banks to be confused about whom
they were dealing with.” Amalgamated Bank v. Amalgamated Trust,
842 F.2d 1270, 6 USPQ2d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1988). I believe
that the same analysis applies with equal, if not greater force,
to insurance services, investment advisory services and mutual
fund services.
Moreover, in the process of dealing with the large amount of
paper work just described, it is my belief that consumers would
acquire a certain degree of sophistication. As our primary
reviewing Court has made clear, purchaser “sophistication is
important and often dispositive because sophisticated consumers
may be expected to exercise greater care.” Electronic Design &
Sales v. Electronic Data Systems, 954 F.2d 713, 21 USPQ2d 1388,
1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In short, given the vast dissimilarities in the two marks;
the fact that the two marks are used for distinctly different
Ser No. 75/250,941
17
services; and the fact that in purchasing such services,
consumers must read and sign numerous papers, there exists no
chance for a likelihood of confusion. It has been said that “the
purchasing public must be credited with at least a modicum of
intelligence.” Carnation Company v. California Growers, 97 F.2d
80, 37 USPQ 735, 736 (CCPA 1938).
It is my view that in finding that the public would be
likely to confuse a STAG VARIABLE LIFE ARTISAN life insurance
policy with an ARTISAN mutual fund, the majority has simply
failed to credit the public with a modicum of intelligence.
E. W. Hanak
Administrative Trademark
Judge, Trademark Trial