HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 8, 201914505094 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/505,094 10/02/2014 Aman GARG P140152US HRMN/0107US 8688 98031 7590 11/08/2019 Artegis Law Group, LLP - Harman 7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104 Houston, TX 77095 EXAMINER MAUNG, THOMAS H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2656 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/08/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): algdocketing@artegislaw.com jmatthews@artegislaw.com kcruz@artegislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte AMAN GARG, DAVIDE DI CENSO, and RAGHAVENDRA CHIDRI ____________________ Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before J. JOHN LEE, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. LEE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Introduction Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1, 4, 6–9, 11, 13–16, 19, 20, and 26–34, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, and 21–25 have been cancelled. We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Harman International Industries. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The present invention relates generally to a media presentation system that physically actuates a media content presentation device towards a particular location. Spec. ¶¶ 1–2, Abstract. Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and recites: 1. A mount for a media content presentation device, the mount comprising: a base member; a support member coupled to the base member and adapted to physically couple to the media content presentation device; a first computing device disposed within the base member and configured to wirelessly receive location data and media content from a mobile device being carried by a user and output the media content to the media content presentation device using a different connection; and an actuating device that is communicatively coupled to the first computing device and operates to move the support member based on one or more locations of the user determined using the location data at one or more corresponding points in time. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable in view of Desenberg2 and McCarty.3 Final Act. 2–10. 2 Desenberg, US 2012/0027226 A1, published Feb. 2, 2012. 3 McCarty, US 2012/0121104 A1, published May 17, 2012. Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 3 Claims 4, 11, 26, 28, 30, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable in view of Desenberg, McCarty, and Carlsson.4 Id. at 10–14. Claims 8, 15, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable in view of Desenberg, McCarty, and Naka.5 Id. at 14–17. Claim 27 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable in view of Desenberg, McCarty, and Kechichian.6 Id. at 17–18. Claim 29 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable in view of Desenberg, McCarty, Kechichian, and Carlsson. Id. at 18–19. Claims 31 and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable in view of Desenberg, McCarty, and Lee.7 Id. at 19–21. ANALYSIS All of the Examiner’s rejections depend, at least in part, on Desenberg and McCarty. Final Act. 2–21. Appellant presents arguments relating to those references only and does not address the Examiner’s rejections separately. See Appeal Br. 10–14. Further, Appellant essentially argues all rejected claims together and does not address any claim separately. See id. As explained below, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. First, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Desenberg and McCarty teaches “wirelessly receiv[ing] location data and media content from a mobile device being carried by a user,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in independent claims 9 4 Carlsson, US 2015/0256954 A1, published Sept. 10, 2015. 5 Naka, US 2010/0053466 A1, published Mar. 4, 2010. 6 Kechichian, US 2014/0024317 A1, published Jan. 23, 2014. 7 Lee, US 2007/0266395 A1, published Nov. 15, 2007. Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 4 and 16. Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 3–6. Appellant argues that the combination “would result in a stationary device, not a mobile device that is carried by a user and transmits both location data and media content to a media presentation system.” Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5. Appellant further argues Desenberg does not teach that its “wearable transmitter wirelessly transmits media content.” Appeal Br. 12; see id. at 11; Reply Br. 4. We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Desenberg teaches “wirelessly receiv[ing] location data . . . from a mobile device being carried by a user.” Final Act. 3. To support that finding, the Examiner relies on Desenberg’s description of “a radio frequency transmitter 16c” that is “worn or otherwise attached to [a] person” and that transmits the person’s movement data to an audio speaker system. Desenberg ¶ 39. The Examiner further finds, and we agree, McCarty teaches “wirelessly receiv[ing] media content.” Final Act. 4. To support that finding, the Examiner relies on McCarty’s description of a home network system that wirelessly transmits an audio input device’s audio signal to output speakers. Id. citing (McCarty ¶¶ 5, 7); see McCarty ¶¶ 50, 106, Fig. 1. Appellant’s argument that the combination of Desenberg and McCarty “would result in a stationary device, not a mobile device” (Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5) relies on the premise that McCarty’s audio input devices (which transmit audio signals) are wired to McCarty’s transmitter and, as such, those components are “stationary and not intended to be mobile.” Appeal Br. 11–12 (emphasis omitted). However, contrary to Appellant’s argument, McCarty teaches “a mobile device.” As the Examiner finds (Ans. 24), McCarty describes that its audio input devices may be positioned at “portable locations” (McCarty ¶ 51; see id. ¶ 5), i.e., mobile locations. Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 5 Furthermore, as discussed above, McCarty discloses that the network through which its devices communicate may be “wireless.” McCarty ¶ 50. Appellant has not persuasively explained why McCarty’s portable audio input device fails to teach a mobile device. Because we agree with the Examiner that McCarty teaches a mobile device, Appellant’s argument that the combination would result in a stationary device is unpersuasive. Moreover, even if we agreed with Appellant that McCarty describes stationary components, that argument does not address the Examiner’s combination of Desenberg and McCarty. Combining Desenberg’s mobile device and McCarty’s wirelessly received media content does not require bodily incorporating McCarty’s alleged stationary components. See In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). Furthermore, Appellant has not provided persuasive argument or evidence that combining McCarty’s wireless media content transmission with Desenberg’s mobile device would transform Desenberg’s mobile device into a stationary device. As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Desenberg and McCarty teaches “wirelessly receiv[ing] location data and media content from a mobile device being carried by a user.” Similarly, Appellant’s argument that Desenberg does not teach wirelessly transmitting media content (Appeal Br. 12; see id. at 11; Reply Br. 4) does not address the Examiner’s reliance on McCarty to teach such a feature (Final Act. 4–5 (citing McCarty ¶¶ 5, 7; see id. ¶ 50, Fig. 1)). Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 6 Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Desenberg and McCarty teaches “wirelessly receiv[ing] location data and media content from a mobile device being carried by a user,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 9 and 16. Appellant also argues the Examiner improperly combined Desenberg and McCarty. Appeal Br. 13. Specifically, Appellant argues McCarty teaches away from “a first computing device configured to wirelessly receive media content from a mobile device being carried by a user” because McCarty’s “receiver components are capable of receiving audio signals only via a stationary IR transmitter.” Id. We are not persuaded. To teach away, a reference must “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant has not shown where McCarty criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages wireless transmission of media content from a mobile device to a speaker system. As such, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive for this reason alone. Furthermore, as discussed above, McCarty teaches that its audio input devices—which ultimately transmit media content wirelessly to McCarty’s speakers—may be mobile devices. McCarty ¶ 51. Thus, McCarty also does not teach away from wirelessly receiving media content from a mobile device because McCarty expressly describes an embodiment in which a mobile device transmits media content. For the reasons explained above, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and sustain the rejection of claims 1, 9, and 16 as obvious in view of Desenberg and McCarty. Appellant does not present separate arguments for dependent claims 6, 7, 13, 14, and 19, and, thus, we also sustain the rejection Appeal 2019-000691 Application 14/505,094 7 of those claims as obvious in view of Desenberg and McCarty. See Appeal Br. 10–15. Further, Appellant also does not present any other arguments with respect to claims 4, 8, 11, 15, 20, and 26–34. See Appeal Br. 10–15. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of these claims as well. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19 103 Desenberg, McCarty 1, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19 4, 11, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33 103 Desenberg, McCarty, Carlsson 4, 11, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33 8, 15, 20 103 Desenberg, McCarty, Naka 8, 15, 20 27 103 Desenberg, McCarty, Kechichian 27 29 103 Desenberg, McCarty, Kechichian, Carlsson 29 31, 34 103 Desenberg, McCarty, Lee 31, 34 Overall Outcome 1, 4, 6–9, 11, 13–16, 19, 20, 26–34 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation